

條例草案審議委員會
《2000年土地註冊(修訂)條例草案》
議員於2001年3月6日第三次會議
所要求提供的資料

(1) 告知土地登記冊「等待註冊的契約」一欄所載的契約資料

土地登記冊「等待註冊的契約」一欄所載的契約資料包括：註冊摘要編號、文件日期、送交日期、文件性質、受益人和成交價錢。夾附的「電腦土地登記冊簡介」小冊子載有土地登記冊樣本，以供參考。

(2) 解釋為何毋須就送交註冊在物業上的文件通知業主的現行做法

I. 由於沒有需要、沒有理據、並不符合土地註冊處客戶的利益，所以毋須就送交註冊在物業上的文件通知業主。

(i) 沒有需要

(a) 《土地註冊條例》(第128章)及其附屬法例就土地登記冊的設立及運作訂定條文。土地註冊處備存土地記錄的公眾登記冊。凡會影響土地的文書均可送交註冊，而土地記錄會公開給公眾查閱。

(b) 根據《土地註冊條例》，凡影響土地的文書均可註冊。無論業主是否知道或同意，該類文書仍可註冊。因此，並沒有需要在收到註冊文件時通知業主。

(ii) 不合理據

(a) 土地註冊處的客戶並非單單只有業主，還包括所有使用公眾土地登記冊的人士。使用土地登記冊的人士或許是準買家、租戶、承按人和其他擬辦理文件註冊及查冊的人士。倘若土地註冊處需在收到一份文書的註冊申請時向業主發出通知，則會帶來大量的行政工作。二零零零年共有 685,775 份契約送交註冊。因此，當局或需調高註冊費以收回處理上述工作的成本。

(b) 為發出註冊通知給業主而向土地註冊處所有客戶徵收較高的註冊費用並不合理。

(iii) 並不符合客戶的利益

如土地註冊處需向業主發出通知，這個新加的步驟或會延遲註冊過程，亦不符合土地註冊處客戶的利益。

II. 業主只需繳付 15 元低廉的費用進行查冊，便可確定是否有任何文書註冊在其物業上。如業主身在海外，可藉郵遞方式申請進行土地查冊或指示代理人進行查冊。

(3) 土地註冊處應考慮將暫止註冊契約分類，以便更快捷刪除一些不合理的暫止註冊契約以免影響將來的交易，而不應要求業主向法庭申請

在重新考慮有關事宜後，當局同意縮短刪除暫止註冊契約的時間。當局會

提出委員會審議階段修訂建議，把 12 個月的時間縮短至 6 個月，並授權土地註冊處處長在合適的情況下延長時間。在這項新建議下，當局不會建議進一步把暫止註冊契約分類。

(4) 提出法律意見以解釋為何《個人資料（私隱）條例》第 58(1)(d)條適用於虧欠漁農自然護理署的貸款

當局已徵詢律政司的法律意見。根據他們的意見—

向虧欠漁農自然護理署管理的貸款基金貸款的人士採取法律行動屬民事過失的糾正，並符合《個人資料（私隱）條例》第 58(1)(d)條中可獲豁免的「不合法或嚴重不當的行為的糾正」的描述。根據高等法院在 Lily Tse Lai Yin & others v The Incorporated Owners of Albert House & others [1999] 1 HKC 386 的判決，第 58(1)(d)條中「不合法或嚴重不當的行為」一詞包括民事過失。

TSE LAI YIN LILY & ORS v INCORPORATED OWNERS OF ALBERT HOUSE & ORS

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
PERSONAL INJURIES NO 828 OF 1997
SUFFIAD J
10 DECEMBER 1998

Civil Procedure – Discovery against non parties – Accident involving death and injuries – Police obtained statements from witnesses – Whether discovery of statements to plaintiffs of civil claims should be ordered – Whether contravened Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance – Whether Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance inconsistent with s 42 of High Court Ordinance – High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) s 42 – Rules of the High Court (Cap 4) O 24 r 7A – Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486) s 58(1), (2), Sch 1 Principle 3

Tort – Personal injuries action – Discovery against non-parties – Accident involving death and injuries – Police obtained statements from witnesses – Whether discovery of statements to plaintiffs of civil claims should be ordered – Whether contravened Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance – Whether Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance inconsistent with s 42 of High Court Ordinance – High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) s 42 – Rules of the High Court (Cap 4) O 24 r 7A – Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486) s 58(1), (2), Sch 1 Principle 3

Words and Phrases – ‘Unlawful or seriously improper conduct’ – ‘Remedying’ – Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486) s 58(1)(d)

民事訴訟程序 – 針對非訴訟方的文件透露要求 – 意外涉及死亡及損傷 – 警方從證人中錄取陳述書 – 應否作出透露陳述書予民事訴訟案中的原告人的命令 – 是否違反《個人資料(私隱)條例》 – 《個人資料(私隱)條例》是否與《高等法院條例》第42條互相抵觸 – 《高等法院條例》(第4章)第42條 – 《高等法院規則》(第4章)第24令第7A條 – 《個人資料(私隱)條例》(第486章)第58(1), (2)條, 附表1第3原則

侵權 – 人身傷害訴訟 – 針對非訴訟方的文件透露要求 – 意外涉及死亡及損傷 – 警方從證人中錄取陳述書 – 應否作出透露陳述書予民事訴訟案中的原告人的命令 – 是否違反《個人資料(私隱)條例》 – 《個人資料(私隱)條例》是否與《高等法院條例》第42條互相抵觸 – 《高等法院條例》(第4章)第42條 – 《高等法院規則》(第4章)第24令第7A條 – 《個人資料(私隱)條例》(第486章)第58(1), (2)條, 附表1第3原則

詞彙 – 「不合法或嚴重不當的行為」 – 「糾正」 – 《個人資料(私隱)條例》(第486章)第58(1)(d)條

The plaintiffs commenced action against the defendants for damages for personal injuries or under Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap 22) in respect of an accident on 1 August 1994 when a canopy collapsed on the pavement causing injuries and deaths to the passers-by. One of the allegations by the plaintiffs was that a fish tank installed at one end of the canopy caused or contributed to the collapse of the canopy. At the pre-trial review, the third defendant was given leave to amend his defence to include, inter alia, reliance upon approval for the fish tank allegedly given by the Urban Services Department in consultation with the Buildings Department. The amendment resulted in the plaintiffs seeking an order for discovery to inspect files of these two departments particularly in relation to the installation of the fish tank. The plaintiffs also sought discovery from the police for the statements taken by them from a number of witnesses after the accident. There was opposition in particular from the police and the Buildings Department for the disclosure of the unedited witness statements on the ground that it was in contravention of the provisions of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486) (the Ordinance). There was no dispute that the contents of the witness statements would contain personal data within the meaning of the Ordinance. The issue was whether the use of the data in a civil action claiming for damages resulting from the collapse of the canopy fell within the ambit of s 58(1)(d), the application of which would invoke s 58(2) to exempt the data from being subject to data protection principle 3, which prohibited the use of the data other than for the purpose for which the data were to be used at the time of the collection, or any other purpose directly related to that purpose.

Held, allowing the application:

(1) In personal injuries or fatal accident cases, the High Court had jurisdiction under s 42 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) to order the disclosure by a non-party to the proceedings, documents in his possession, custody or power which were relevant to any issue arising out of that claim. Such power was not fettered except as provided by the relevant provisions of statute and the rules, and was to be exercised so as to further the proper administration of justice. *Wong Siu Hing & Anor (Administratrixes of the Estate of Yu Loi Lung, deceased) v Lo Che Keung & Anor* [1991] 1 HKC 412 applied; *Chan Tam Sze & Ors v Hip Hing Construction Co Ltd & Ors* [1990] 1 HKLR 473 considered (at 391D-F/G).

(2) In s 58(1)(d) of the Ordinance, the use of the words ‘unlawful or seriously improper conduct’ extended beyond criminal conduct to include civil wrongs. The use of the word ‘remedying’ in the same subsection was suggestive of the same meaning. Since tort was a civil wrong, the bringing of a civil claim for damages in tort amounted to the remedying of unlawful or seriously improper conduct. As such, s 58(1)(d) was sufficiently wide to cover claim for damages in a personal injuries and/or fatal accident case. The use of such data in respect of such a civil claim was therefore exempted from the provisions of the data protection principle 3 by s 58(2). *R v R* [1991] 4 All ER 481 considered (at 393D-G/H).

(3) The bringing of the civil action for damages in relation to the collapse of the canopy was a purpose directly related to the initial purpose for which the witness statements were originally taken by the police, namely the police investigation into the collapse of the canopy. Therefore, para (b) of data protection principle 3 in Sch 1 of the Ordinance created a further exemption. There was no

need to obtain the consent of the data subject before such data could be used in the ensuing civil action (at 393G/H-I). A

(4) On the true construction of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, there was no inconsistency between the Ordinance with s 42 of the High Court Ordinance. It was never the intention of the legislature that the Ordinance would impede the administration of justice by restricting or eliminating the power of the High Court to order discovery under s 42 of the High Court Ordinance (at 393I-394A). B

(5) The material sought by the plaintiffs in this application were highly relevant to the issues in the action. What evidence was or was not relevant to the issues in a personal injuries action was to be determined by the court and not by the data user. That was the purpose for the enactment of s 42 of the High Court Ordinance (at 394B-C). C

Per curiam

Perhaps these Government departments would like to consider redrafting the standard forms of witness statements to be taken in future so as to include in those standard forms words which had the effect of making known to the witnesses that such statements, once given and signed by them, might be used in ensuing civil actions or in matters directly related to the purpose for which such statements were initially taken (at 394D/E-F). D

Cases referred to

Chan Tam Sze & Ors v Hip Hing Construction Co Ltd & Ors [1990] 1 HKLR 473 E
R v R [1992] 1 AC 599, [1991] 4 All ER 481, [1991] 3 WLR 767
Wong Siu Hing & Anor (Administratrixes of the Estate of Yu Loi Lung, deceased) v Lo Che Keung & Anor [1991] 1 HKC 412

Legislation referred to

Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance (Cap 59) s 5, repealed by s 48 F
of Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance (No 39 of 1997)
Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap 22)
High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) s 42
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486) ss 2(1), 4, 58(1), (2), Sch 1
Principle 3 G
Rules of the High Court (Cap 4) O 24 r 7A
Data Protection Act 1984 [Eng] s 34(5)

[*Editorial note:* as to discovery against non-parties in personal injuries and death actions generally see *Halsbury's Laws of Hong Kong* Vol 5, Civil Procedure [90.0493].] H

Summons

This was a hearing of three summonses taken out by the plaintiffs applying for discovery of documents from the Director of Buildings, the Director of Urban Services and the Commissioner of Police, who were all non-parties to the action for damages for personal injuries or under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap 22). The facts appear sufficiently in the following judgment. I

Corinne Remedios (Wilkinson & Grist) for the plaintiffs.
Herbert Li (Law Officer (Civil Law)) for the Director of Urban Services,
Director of Buildings and Commissioner of Police.

Vivien Lee (Gallant YT Ho & Co) for the second defendant.
Joseph Lai (J Chan Yip So & Partners) for the third defendant.
The first, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants absent.

Suffiad J: The plaintiffs took out three summonses, all under O 24 r 7A of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4) for non-party discovery against the Director of Buildings, the Director of the Urban Services Department and the Commissioner of Police respectively, dated 1st, 2nd and 8th December 1998. After hearing the parties, I gave the orders sought by the plaintiffs in respect of all three summonses. I now give my reasons for the orders.

Background

This is a claim by seven plaintiffs for damages, either for personal injuries or under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap 22) in respect of a tragic accident which took place on 1 August 1994 when the canopy on the first floor of Albert House in Aberdeen collapsed, falling onto the pavement below and causing either the injuries or the death to the passers-by who were on that pavement at that time. The trial in respect of liability is scheduled for May 1999.

There are six defendants altogether being sued. One of the issues in the case is the allegation by the plaintiffs that a fish tank installed at one end of this canopy caused or contributed to the collapse of the canopy either because of its weight, or due to the fact that at the time of the accident, this fish tank was being dismantled. This fish tank was being used at the time of the accident by the fourth defendant, the New Best Restaurant Ltd, the licensee of which is the third defendant, Ho Wing Hang. At the pre-trial review of this action on 30 November 1998, the third defendant was given leave to amend his defence to include, inter alia, reliance upon advice given by alleged professionals and/or contractors in so far as the installation of the fish tank was concerned, and also reliance upon approval for the fish tank allegedly given by the Urban Services Department in consultation with the Buildings Department. This amendment has obviously opened up new avenues and therefore the necessity to follow this up with the Urban Services Department and the Buildings Department. It is for this reason that the plaintiff now wish to inspect the files of these two departments particularly in relation to the installation of the fish tank.

After the accident, the police took statements from a number of witnesses for the purpose of investigation into this accident and no doubt to see whether any person should be prosecuted as a result of this accident.

At the hearing of these summonses, I was informed by Ms Remedios that the Buildings Department and the Urban Services Department have

already supplied to the plaintiffs some documents but not all the documents in the relevant files have been disclosed, in particular, those relating to the canopy, including the application by the third and fourth defendants for approval of the fish tank and any material bearing upon the accident. Ongoing attempts to obtain such material first from the Buildings Department and subsequently from the police met eventually with opposition, particularly in relation to unedited witness statements taken by both the police and the Buildings Department after the accident.

Stance taken by the Department of Justice

Mr Li appears on behalf of the Department of Justice, who in turn represents the Director of Buildings, the Director of Urban Services Department and the Commissioner of Police. I was informed by Mr Li that whilst the Director of Buildings does not oppose the disclosure of unedited statements of witnesses because consent from those witnesses have already been obtained, however, the main opposition comes from the Commissioner of Police on the grounds that indiscriminate disclosure of the personal data of data subjects as contained in the witness statements taken by the police will contravene the provisions of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486) (the Ordinance).

Reliance is placed on Principle 3 set out in Sch 1 of the Ordinance which principle relates to the use of personal data, and that s 4 of the Ordinance provides that a data user shall not do an act or engage in a practice that contravenes a data protection principle unless it is required and permitted under the Ordinance. There is no dispute that, for the purpose of the Ordinance, the Hong Kong Police Force is the data user and the witnesses who gave those statements are the data subjects. It can also be safely presumed that the contents of those witness statements would contain personal data of the relevant data subjects.

It was submitted by Mr Li that Principle 3 requires that the personal data of a data subject shall not, without the written consent of the data subject, be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which the data were to be used at the time of the collection of the data, or any other purpose directly related to that purpose. In the present case, Mr Li submits that the sole purpose for the taking of those witness statements which contain the personal data of the data subjects, was for police investigations into the accident with a view to possibly prosecuting any person who may be found criminally responsible for the accident, and did not include the disclosure of such data to the plaintiffs in the civil action herein. Mr Li further highlights in his argument the fact that there is no specific provision under the Ordinance whereby compliance with a court order may be exempted from Principle 3, unlike s 34(5) of the Data Protection Act 1984 in the United Kingdom whereby personal data are exempted from the non-disclosure provisions in the Act in any case in which the disclosure is

required by the order of a court made in the course of legal proceedings.

A further point relied on by Mr Li is that he seeks to rely on common law principles that where a subsequent statute is inconsistent with any earlier statute and the conflicts cannot be reconciled, the legislature is taken to intend that the subsequent statute should prevail over the earlier statute. Whilst acknowledging that s 42 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) gives the court power to order non-party discovery, he argues that the Ordinance is subsequent in time to the High Court Ordinance, therefore any inconsistency between the Ordinance and s 42 of the High Court Ordinance, where the conflict cannot be reconciled, the provisions of the Ordinance should prevail.

For these reasons, Mr Li submits that the plaintiff's summonses for unedited statements should be dismissed.

Law and practice in respect of non-party discovery

In personal injuries or fatal accident cases, there is a long standing jurisdiction of the High Court to order the disclosure by a non-party to the proceedings, documents in his possession, custody or power which are relevant to any issue arising out of that claim. This jurisdiction of the High Court is derived from s 42 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) with rules enacted under O 24 r 7A to carry into practice what is provided for in s 42 of the High Court Ordinance. In the case of *Wong Siu Hing & Anor (Administratrixes of the Estate of Yu Loi Lung, deceased) v Lo Che Keung & Anor* [1991] 1 HKC 412, it was held by Kaplan J that the power of the court to order a non-party to produce relevant documents was not fettered except as provided by the relevant provisions of statute and the rules, and was to be exercised so as to further the proper administration of justice.

In the case of *Chan Tam Sze & Ors v Hip Hing Construction Co Ltd & Ors* [1990] 1 HKLR 473, it was ordered against the Commissioner of Labour a non-party to that action, the discovery of files relating to construction sites at which the plaintiffs had been injured at work despite the objection by the Commissioner of Labour that such an order for discovery against him may contravene s 5 of the Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance (Cap 59) by disclosing either the name or identity of a complainant under that Ordinance, or by disclosing any manufacturing or commercial secret or working process. It was further held by Bokhary J (as he then was) that such order for discovery would be accompanied by an order made on the undertaking of the solicitors for the plaintiffs not to disclose the name or identity of a complainant, or any secret process contained in the discovered material other than to the plaintiff, his counsel, secretarial and clerical staff and experts.

These two cases underline not only the importance of the power given to the court under s 42 of the High Court Ordinance for ordering disclosure by non-parties, but also the extent to which that power relates.

Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance

Generally speaking, this Ordinance came into effect on 20 December 1996, although Pt II of that Ordinance dealing with administration came into effect on 1 August 1996. As stated in the Ordinance, this is an Ordinance to protect the privacy of individuals in relation to personal data and to provide for matters incidental thereto, or connected therewith. 'Personal data' is defined in s 2(1) of the Ordinance to mean any data —

- (a) relating directly or indirectly to a living individual;
- (b) from which it is practicable for the identity of the individual to be directly or indirectly ascertained; and
- (c) in a form in which access to or processing of the data is practicable.

'Data user' is also defined in s 2(1) of the Ordinance as

in relation to personal data, means a person who, either alone or jointly or in common with other persons, controls the collection, holding, processing or use of the data.

'Use' is defined in s 2(1) of the Ordinance in this way:

in relation to personal data, includes disclose or transfer the data.

Section 4 of the Ordinance provides that

A data user shall not do an act, or engage in a practice, that contravenes a data protection principle unless the act or practice, as the case may be, is required or permitted under this Ordinance.

Schedule 1 of the Ordinance contains data protection principles and Principle 3 thereof, in relation to use of personal data, provides that:—

Personal data shall not, without the prescribed consent of the data subject, be used for any purpose other than —

- (a) the purpose for which the data were to be used at the time of the collection of the data; or
- (b) a purpose directly related to the purpose referred to in paragraph (a).

Part VIII of the Ordinance deals with exemption and s 58 provides as follows:

(1) Personal data held for the purposes of —

- ...
- (d) the prevention, preclusion or remedying (including punishment) of unlawful or seriously improper conduct, or dishonesty or malpractice, by persons;
- ...

are exempt from the provisions of data protection principle 6 and section 18(1)(b) where the application of those provisions to the data would be likely to

- A (i) prejudice any of the matters referred to in that subsection; or
- (ii) directly or indirectly identify the person who is the source of the data.
- (2) Personal data are exempted from the provisions of data protection principle 3 in any case in which —

- B (a) the use of the data is for any of the purposes referred to in subsection (1) (and whether or not the data are held for any of those purposes); and
- (b) the application of those provisions in relation to such use would be likely to prejudice any of the matters referred to in that subsection ...

It is clear from s 58(2) that personal data are exempted from the provisions of data protection principle 3 where the use of the data is for any of the purposes referred to in s 58(1), and whether or not the data are held for any of those purposes. What I have to decide, therefore, is whether the use of such data in a civil action claiming for damages resulting from the collapse of this canopy falls within the ambit of s 58(1)(d) of the Ordinance which provides for, inter alia, the remedying of unlawful conduct.

Firstly, I note that in s 58(1), the use of the word 'crime' in para (a)⁽¹⁾ and the word 'offender' in para (b)⁽²⁾. This to my mind suggest, therefore, that the use of the words 'unlawful or seriously improper conduct' in para (d) extend beyond criminal conduct to include civil wrongs. Secondly, the use of the word 'remedying' in para (d) is again suggestive of the same thing. The most natural meaning that can be given to the word 'unlawful' is that it normally describes something which is contrary to some law or enactment or is done without lawful justification or excuse. (See *R v R* [1991] 4 All ER 481 per Lord Keith of Kinkel at 488d.)

Since tort is a civil wrong, the bringing of a civil claim for damages in tort amounts to the remedying of unlawful or seriously improper conduct. For these reasons, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the words contained in s 58(1)(d) of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance is sufficiently wide to cover claim for damages in a personal injuries and/or fatal accident case. That being the case, the use of such data in respect of such a civil claim is therefore exempted from the provisions of data protection principle 3 by s 58(2) of the Ordinance.

If I should be wrong on the above, I further hold that para (b) of data protection principle 3 in Sch 1 of the Ordinance creates a further exemption in that the bringing of this civil action for damages in relation to the collapse of the canopy is a purpose directly related to the initial purpose for which the witness statements were originally taken by the police, namely, the police investigation into the collapse of this canopy, and, therefore, there is no need to obtain the consent of the data subject before such data can be used in the ensuing civil action. The nexus of that relationship is the collapse of the canopy.

In the way that I have construed the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, there is therefore no inconsistency between it and s 42 of the High Court

(1) 'the prevention or detection of crime;', s 58(1)(a).

(2) 'the apprehension, prosecution or detention of offenders;', s 58(1)(b).

Ordinance. It should also be noted that it was never the intention of the legislature that the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance would impede the administration of justice by restricting or eliminating the power of the High Court to order discovery under s 42 of the High Court Ordinance and it would be a very sad day for the administration of justice in Hong Kong if that consequence came about, whether intended or not.

Moreover, I have not the slightest hesitation to hold that the material sought by the plaintiffs in this application are highly relevant to the issues in this case. I should just add here that what evidence is or is not relevant to the issues in a personal injuries action is to be determined by the court and not by the data user as seems to have been suggested by Mr Li in his submission. That no doubt is the *raison d'être* for s 42 of the High Court Ordinance.

Hopefully with this ruling, those involved in the administration of Government departments will no longer have to live with the shadow previously cast over them by the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance when being requested for witness statement by parties involved in personal injuries litigation arising out of the same accident, in respect of which those witness statements were taken initially. Secondly, perhaps these Government departments would like to consider redrafting the standard forms of witness statements to be taken in future so as to include in those standard forms words which have the effect of making known to the witnesses that such statements, once given and signed by them may be used in ensuing civil actions or in matters directly related to the purpose for which such statements were initially taken.

Reported by James Ding

A HKSAR v KONG YUNG & ANOR

COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 389 OF 1998
POWER VP AND LEONG JA
18 DECEMBER 1998

B Criminal Law and Procedure – Sentencing – Illegal entrants – Robbery involving invasion of private premises at night with use of violence – Whether appropriate for sentences on robbery to run consecutively to sentences on illegal entry – Whether sentences manifestly excessive

C 刑法與刑事訴訟程序 – 判刑 – 非法入境者 – 涉及夜間闖入私人處所並使用暴力的搶劫 – 搶劫的刑期與非法入境的刑期分期執行是否適當 – 刑期是否明顯地過重

D The applicants were illegal entrants. They each pleaded guilty to one charge of burglary and one charge of robbery. The prosecution case was that in one night, the applicant burgled into certain domestic premises and ransacked one of the rooms. On the following night, they broke into another domestic premises and alerted the householders in the course. They used a fruit knife to menace the householders, tied them up, cut the telephone lines and proceeded to ransack the premises. By the time of sentencing, the applicants had already served seven months of imprisonment out of a 15 months' term imposed on them by a magistrate for their illegal entry. The trial judge took a starting point of eight to nine years on the robbery charge and reduced it to five years taking into account the plea. For the burglary charge, he took a starting point of three years and reduced it to one of two years. Considering the totality principle, he ordered that one year of the sentences for burglary was to run concurrently with the sentences for robbery, thus making a total of six years' imprisonment. He further ordered that the sentences were to be consecutive to the sentences that they had been serving for illegal entry. The applicants sought leave to appeal against sentence.

G Held, dismissing the application:

(1) It was a proper order that the sentences for the present offences were to be consecutive to the earlier sentences imposed for the illegal entry. It was the kind of order that was made in all such cases (at 397B).

(2) While the starting point taken for the robbery charge was at the top of the range, the eventual figure of five years arrived at by the judge was an entirely proper sentence after plea for a charge of robbery of such seriousness. The final sentence imposed was neither manifestly excessive nor severe. *R v Mo Kwong Sang* [1981] HKLR 610 and *A-G v Chan Fat Keung* [1988] HKC 461 considered (at 397G-H, 398B).

I Obiter

Illegal entrants were continually entering Hong Kong and preying upon residents, particularly those who resided in border areas. It was the duty of the courts to pass sentences that would bring home to the offenders that the conduct was viewed with the utmost seriousness and would be met with severe punishment (at 396I).