

For discussion  
on 7 February 2002

**Legislative Council Panel on Security**

**PRISON DEVELOPMENT PLAN**

**PURPOSE**

At the Panel's meetings on 7 December 2000 and 7 June 2001, Members were consulted on a proposed prison development plan revolving round the concept of co-location of penal facilities. This paper presents the Administration's response to the issues raised by Members at the last meeting and propose a revised approach for Members' views. Members are also invited to comment on the two site options identified.

**ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO MEMBERS' CONCERNS**

2. Some Members have raised the idea of "partial co-locations". In the Panel paper for the last meeting on 7 June 2001 (LC Paper No. CB(2)1689/00-01(04)) (paragraphs 7-9), we detailed our reservations about a partial co-location approach on grounds of the operational problems, the undermining of economy of scale, and higher capital and recurrent costs that would result.

3. Notably some Members believed that "partial co-locations" at a few sites would entail a lower security risk when compared with full co-location at one site. We have revisited the security aspects critically and concluded that, on the contrary, partial co-locations are most undesirable in terms of the attendant risks in handling multiple incidents in diverse locations involving sizable numbers of inmates.

4. From the professional point of view of the Correctional Services Department (CSD), the major considerations in assessing the risks involved include the speed and size of the first tactical response, the command and co-ordination of the emergency deployment, effective communications, sufficiency of reinforcement and the huge logistical support that would be required. While

CSD is confident that it is capable, with the assistance of the other emergency services including the Police and Fire Services, to handle any major disturbances occurring in one fully co-located penal area even in a worst case scenario, the same cannot be said if these were to take place in a number of diverse locations with major concentrations of rioting inmates. In the latter case, the likely significant loss of life and damage to property before order could be restored would be unacceptable.

5. The Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong has provided a submission on partial co-locations with specific proposals on clustering and sites, and we have been asked to respond. Members have also requested information on economy of scale, penal population statistics, projected shortfall in penal places and experience of other places in co-location of penal facilities. Our detailed response is set out in Annex A.

## **REVISED APPROACH**

6. We remain of the view that full co-location would provide the best prospect for pursuing a prison development plan to meet Hong Kong's long-term penal needs, by addressing the current overcrowding problem, meeting the forecast penal growth until 2024 and providing the necessary facilities for the safe custody and effective rehabilitation of offenders. Nevertheless, we appreciate that some Members are opposed to the idea on grounds of the possible security risks of housing 15,000 inmates at one site, albeit in separate secure institutions. To take the matter forward, we propose a revised plan as follows.

7. Instead of committing ourselves to full co-location at one go, we may adopt a progressive approach and proceed with a mid-sized co-location project as a first step. Specifically, we propose a penal development which would, when built and commissioned in about 2013, provide 7,220 places at a chosen site to –

- re-provision all existing remand facilities and the penal institutions on Hong Kong Island and in urban Kowloon;
- provide 2,600 additional penal places over the re-provisioning requirement; and

- reprovision/provide support facilities for the institutions and the correctional services in general.

Details of the proposed development are provided in Annex B. Following repovisioning of the urban institutions as stated above, the remaining penal institutions (in the New Territories and Islands) will be maintained for continued operation.

8. To take forward the proposed development, a site of 76 hectares (with potential for expansion to 120 hectares) is required. Capital investment is estimated to be about \$16 billion. Planning, design and construction would take about 11-12 years.

9. This scaled-down approach would not allow us to reap the full benefits of total co-location, but would still achieve the following –

- After the commissioning of the new facilities, the total penal capacity under CSD will reach 13,860. Not only will the current overcrowding problem, which will persist until that time, be solved, but the forecast growth of the penal population until 2015 will be met.
- Adequate penal facilities with improved management will be provided to 7,220 inmates at the co-located prison area to ensure safe custody and effective rehabilitation.
- A critical mass of penal facilities will be co-located to achieve a significant degree of economy of scale.
- The revamped penal setting can result in long-term recurrent saving in operation and manpower costs. For example, only 700 additional staff would be required to cover the net increase of 2,600 penal places, instead of 1,100 which would otherwise be required under the traditional institution-by-institution approach (representing an annual saving of \$125m).
- The practical experience of managing a major co-located prison

area (particularly in the security aspect) can provide useful reference for the future.

- Existing penal sites on the Hong Kong Island and in urban Kowloon can be released for alternative development.

10. In the longer term, further prison development will be considered in the light of the operational experience of the co-located prison development being run in parallel with the remaining penal institutions. Regard will be had to the prevailing circumstances, including the then actual and forecast penal growth and the conditions of the remaining archaic institutions. Adoption of the revised approach will allow us to keep our options open on the final scale and size of the co-located prison development. As needs be and without precluding other possibilities, we may in future consider expanding the new prison development in an incremental manner, if expansion was then considered desirable and appropriate.

11. In order to keep our options open, an expansion factor will be built into the infrastructure (viz. water supply, drainage and sewage systems) of the co-located prison development to support further penal (or other possible) development in the vicinity. The support facilities (e.g. kitchen, laundry workshop and hospital) will also be designed and built in such a way as to enable appropriate conversion and expansion for best interface with additional institutions in future. The cost of allowing for this expansion potential has been included in the estimated capital investment of \$16 billion, and accounts for about 2.5% of the capital investment. Unless we rule out the possibility now of any expansion of the development for prison or other use in future altogether, this approach is reasonable and necessary. To do otherwise would not only increase the capital cost<sup>1</sup> and the manning requirement<sup>2</sup> of any future expansion, but also require substantial in situ construction works which would create unacceptable security risks and operational difficulties to the prison development already up and running.

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<sup>1</sup> An addition of about \$90 million for Kong Nga Po or about \$160 million for Hei Ling Chau on top of the 2.5% (or \$400 million) referred to in para 11.

<sup>2</sup> It is estimated that about 100 more staff (amounting to an annual recurrent cost of \$30 million) would be required to man the common facilities if they were separately built in the different phases.

**ADVICE SOUGHT**

12. Members are invited to give their views on the revised approach as set out above and the possible site options (i.e. Kong Nga Po in the North District and Hei Ling Chau in the Islands District) as detailed in the previous Panel paper (LC Paper No. CB(2)1689/00-01(04)).

Security Bureau  
January 2002

**Administration's Response to the Issues raised by  
the Panel on Security at its Meeting held on 7 June 2001**

**Issue 1: Areas where a large prison complex could benefit from economy  
of scale**

*The Administration was requested to provide a full list of areas where a large prison complex could benefit from economy of scale.*

We anticipate that economy of scale, and hence capital and recurrent savings in equipment, manpower and operating costs, can be achieved in the following areas under the full co-location approach -

**(a) Reduction in operating costs for escort services**

Escort of prisoners to and from different places outside prison and between institutions is an onerous part in the daily penal operations for purposes such as court attendance, medical consultations in specialist clinics and public hospitals, security and prison management, etc. At present, with the 24 institutions scattered all over the territory, the sharing of escort services and facilities is minimal. Transfers between institutions also take time. If all penal institutions are co-located in one place, we can maximise the sharing of the escort provision and minimise the escort implications of internal transfer of prisoners.

**(b) Saving in manpower for standby duties**

At present, each institution has to arrange its own standby arrangements to cover contingencies and emergency situations. Co-locating all institutions at one site would not only allow the pooling of the maximum number of staff for standby duties but also achieve the greatest flexibility and the shortest response time in staff mobilisation during emergency. The aggregate number of standby staff can be greatly reduced.

(c) **Sharing of common support facilities**

With full co-location of all institutions, support facilities such as hospital, kitchen, laundry, visitor reception facilities, supplies store, dog kennel etc would be combined and centralised. The larger the scale of such facilities, the higher the savings.

**Issue 2: Submission from the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong on the Prison Development Plan**

*The Administration was requested to provide a response to the submission from the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) on the Prison Development Plan.*

**Rehabilitation concerns**

We strongly believe that no problem of labelling/branding effect should arise merely because of co-location of penal institutions for reasons we have given in Annex B to the Panel paper for the meeting of 7 June 2001 (which is now reproduced at **Appendix A**). Furthermore, the institutions will be individually and properly named to reflect their different penal functions. At present, Sha Tsui Detention Centre (STDC, a male young offender institution of minimum security grading) is located just next to Shek Pik Prison (a maximum security male adult prison). The physical proximity has in no way compromised the different rehabilitation programmes run for the two respective groups of inmates. Nor is there any adverse psychological effect created on the young offenders detained in STDC.

Most importantly, rehabilitation of offenders requires not only a properly-run correctional programme but also a caring community that accepts the return of rehabilitated offenders. CSD will continue to launch territory-wide publicity campaigns with a view to fostering greater community support for rehabilitated offenders. This will help alleviate any possible branding effect due to the proposed prison development.

## **Security concerns**

We are confident that the measures proposed in Annex A to the paper discussed at the Panel meeting of 7 June 2001 (which is now reproduced at **Appendix B**) can ensure adequate security control in the proposed prison development. In addition, a Graded Response System is already in place for CSD to mobilise resources and manpower to deal with emergencies of different degrees, involving the Police and Fire Services as the circumstances may warrant. This will be enhanced by the establishment of an 'Emergency Service Unit' similar to that servicing the Rikers Island in the USA to deal with major disturbances or riots.

Specifically, the chances of any mass indiscipline in any one institution being spread to other institutions can be kept to the minimum. Take the incident at the Hei Ling Chau Drug Addiction Treatment Centre (HLTC) on Hei Ling Chau in June 2000 as an example. There are two other correctional institutions in the vicinity, namely, the Lai Sun Correctional Institution and the Hei Ling Chau Correctional Institution. Given their independent management and activation of contingency plans, they were unaffected by the mass indiscipline at HLTC throughout the incident.

Drawing an analogy between the proposed prison development and the Vietnamese Migrants (VMs) detention centre in respect of concentration of inmates and hence the security risk is not entirely appropriate. VM detention centres were run on a totally different philosophy from that of a penal institution, as VMs are not offenders. For instance, VMs were basically free to move within the camps at will and were not locked up at night. The manning ratio in VMs detention centres (e.g. 773 staff against 23,000 inmates in Whitehead Detention Centre in 1991) was far lower than that in prisons (6,400 staff against 12,000 inmates in 2001). VMs were not required to work. Idling and boredom had led to unrest. VMs detention centres were but make-shift structures and were prone to vandalism. Inmates in the proposed prison development would be subject to physical security, penal staff manning ratio and institutional routine and programmes which are applicable to offenders.

## **Partial co-locations and homogenous clustering of facilities**

Our security objections to partial co-locations are set out in paragraphs 3-4 of

the Panel paper. We also have serious reservations in the specific suggestions of homogenous clustering of institutions in a partial co-location arrangement, i.e. site 1 for all maximum security institutions (male); site 2 for all female institutions; site 3 for all medium security institutions (male) and site 4 for all minimum security institutions (male), for the following reasons –

- (a) Tension in a maximum security institution is always higher than that in penal institutions of lower security grading, given its design, security installations, rigorous regime and demanding discipline and orderliness. Pooling together the maximum security institutions would not be conducive to the relief of tension which is an important element in maintaining staff morale and stability of penal environment for safe custody of inmates.
- (b) Such homogenous clustering at separate locations could not achieve savings in resources required for transfer of prisoners. For good security and penal management, prisoners are commonly subject to transfer from one institution to another in the course of their incarceration. For example, prisoners sentenced to long-term imprisonment are normally transferred from a maximum security institution to a medium/minimum security institution after completion of a major part of the sentence. Problematic prisoners at medium/minimum security institutions may have to be transferred to maximum security institutions for management purposes. Heterogeneous clustering of penal institutions of different security grading is a basic concept in co-location from the viewpoint of minimising resources for transfer of prisoners.
- (c) Homogenous clustering of institutions imposes restrictions on the work arrangements for prisoners and reduces the extent of building support facilities for shared use. Under the full co-location proposal, there will be centralised facilities, e.g. kitchen and laundry, to serve the various institutions. As most prisoners detained in maximum and medium security institutions cannot leave the institutions for outside work, the common facilities will be manned by prisoners mainly from the minimum security institutions. However, such work arrangements would not be possible in a cluster making up of maximum security institutions only. The support facilities therefore can only be kept inside the respective institutions with no centralisation possible.

- (d) Institutions of different security grading have different manning ratios with maximum security institutions having the highest. In a homogeneous setting, staff will be concentrated in a particular cluster. Such imbalance of manpower may lead to difficulties in staff deployment, especially in case of emergency.

### **Feasibility of redeveloping existing prison facilities**

For the two correctional institutions in Chi Ma Wan, Chi Ma Wan Correctional Institution was converted from a sanatorium (built in 1955) in 1994 and Chi Ma Wan Addiction Treatment Centre was converted from a VMs detention centre in 1996. As for the institutions on Hei Ling Chau, Hei Ling Chau Addiction Treatment Centre was converted from a leprosarium (built in 1952) in 1975 and Hei Ling Chau Correctional Institution was converted from a VMs detention centre in 1993. As all the facilities were non-purpose-built but converted from aged buildings/structures, the standard and quality of facilities in these institutions can hardly meet present day standards. It is indeed one of the very objectives of the co-location proposal to replace such archaic facilities. DAB's proposal for building on the existing facilities on Chi Ma Wan and Hei Ling Chau would not be feasible for long term penal development which would, on the contrary, require the complete demolition of existing facilities and extensive site formation works.

### **Cost-effectiveness**

Last but not least, partial co-locations in general would greatly reduce the extent of the sharing of common facilities and infrastructure. Additional capital works would be required. Operational efficiency and effectiveness achieved through economy of scale would also be undermined considerably. If we were to provide 15,000 penal places by building on DAB's specific suggestion, the capital costs would be roughly \$30.4 billion (excluding cost for temporary reprovisioning during the transition) and 615 additional CSD officers (amounting to an annual recurrent cost of \$0.19 billion) would be required to man the four clusters. Full co-location would require less capital investment (about \$28b) and no additional staff for manning.

### **Issue 3: Statistics on existing penal Institutions**

*The Administration was requested to provide information on the existing number of penal places, the existing penal population and their distribution among different categories of inmates.*

Please refer to **Appendix C**.

### **Issue 4: Projected shortfall in penal places**

*The Administration was requested to provide information on the proportion of Mainland inmates among the projected shortfall of 3,800 penal places by the year 2024, and the projected decrease in the number of Mainland inmates when an agreement on the transfer of sentenced persons was reached with the Mainland.*

Of the total penal population of 15,000 projected to 2024, some 3,500 (or 23%) will be Mainland Chinese. This estimation has taken into account, among other things, the projected number of arrests/prosecutions of illegal immigrants from the Mainland provided by the Police Force and the Immigration Department and a drop of such arrests in recent years. We do not have a breakdown of Mainland Chinese in the projected shortfall of 3800 penal places.

As regards transfer of sentenced persons (TSP), because of the time normally taken to process applications, under the current TSP agreements we signed with other jurisdictions, prisoners with less than one year's remaining sentence are normally not eligible for consideration for transfer. Without prejudice to the on-going discussion, it is unlikely that the future TSP arrangement between Hong Kong and the Mainland will adopt a different approach.

Of the 3,000 Mainlanders currently serving sentence in Hong Kong (as at January 2002), some 2,700 have a remaining length of sentence of less than one year and would be unlikely to be able to benefit from a TSP scheme. On the other hand, it is understood that some 500 Hong Kong residents are being incarcerated on the Mainland but further details are not available. In overall terms, we envisage that the long-term effect of the two-way transfer of sentenced persons between Hong Kong and the Mainland on our total penal

population would be insignificant.

### **Issue 5: Experience of other places**

*The Administration was requested to provide information on the experience of other places in large prison complexes and the sizes of prison complexes in these places.*

In July 2001 a delegation of the Hong Kong CSD paid a study visit to the Rikers Island prison complex in New York City, USA and exchanged views with the City's Department of Correction (NYCDOC) on the management and operation of a large prison complex.

### **General features**

Located on the Rikers Island, the Complex occupies a total area of 166 hectares of land and is home to 12 penal institutions and a maximum number of 17,000 prisoners. These institutions are physically separated from one another and operate independently. Support facilities such as hospital, bakery, laundry, tailor workshop, print shop, maintenance and transportation divisions are, on the other hand, basically centralised and shared among all institutions. An aerial photo showing the layout of the Complex is at **Appendix D**. A brief description of individual institutions is at **Appendix E**.

### **Rehabilitation of offenders**

A variety of rehabilitation programmes to cater for the needs of different categories of inmates is run in the respective institutions in the Complex. The layout design of the Complex ensures that inmates in one institution are properly separated from and not in sight of those of other institutions. Each individual rehabilitation programme can therefore retain its own integrity. For example, one institution in the Complex effectively runs a discipline-oriented programme for young offenders (like the CSD's Detention Centre programme), separate and distinct from adult penal programmes operating in other institutions. Also, the experience of the NYCDOC is that sustained, effective public relations efforts have neutralised any possible negative branding effect on the inmates and helped the Complex gain acceptance from both its neighbours

and the public at large.

### **Security management and emergency response**

The Complex ensures adequate security measures through the provision of physical infrastructure (e.g. the central punitive segregation unit<sup>1</sup>), modern physical security system, security information management system and well organised emergency response system. Notably the Complex is covered by an Emergency Services Unit (ESU), which is reportedly the elite, tactical team of the NYCDOC. Its 114 full-time staff are on call 24 hours a day and seven days a week. They receive highly specialised training and are well equipped to provide emergency responses as swiftly as possible at very short notices. There is also an ESU Security Intelligence Office responsible for surveillance and monitoring. The Complex is seen fully capable of containing and controlling major disturbances or riots.

In terms of daily penal discipline, incidents of inmate violence were reportedly relatively frequent before 1995. The situation has greatly improved following determined measures targeted at the prison management of the Complex, such as introduction of the Total Efficiency Accountability Management System. For example, the number of inmate on inmate violence (stabbing and slashing) has dropped substantially from 1093 in 1995 to 70 in year 2000 (see chart in **Appendix F**). This clearly demonstrates that penal discipline is very much a management issue: co-location in itself should not be a cause for concern.

### **Conclusion**

The Rikers Island prison complex in New York City is a real-life example demonstrating the feasibility of the concept of co-location of penal institutions. Given careful planning and layout design, provision of necessary security measures and technologies, and sophisticated penal management, it is possible to run a prison development of a similar scale in a way conducive to safe custody and effective rehabilitation of offenders as well as efficient use of resources.

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<sup>1</sup> The **central punitive segregation unit** is for the custody of troublesome inmates, ring leaders of major incidents, inmates requiring independent custody, etc from any institutions in the Rikers Island prison complex. This feature obviates the need for separate segregation units in individual institutions and may be considered for our proposed co-located prison area.

**Effective rehabilitation programmes for different types of offenders**

Under the local law and the relevant international conventions, different categories of inmates (e.g. males, females, convicted prisoners, remands, adults, and youths) are separated from each other. Inmates that are subject to different rehabilitation programmes (such as the Detention Centres and Training Centres programmes for young offenders, the Drug Addiction Treatment Centres programme for drug addicts, or different programmes according to the security risks of prisoners) are also separated accordingly. The current independent and separate operation of different institutions would continue in the proposed prison complex.

2. To avoid possible adverse psychological impact on young offenders and those convicted of minor crimes, the following measures may be put in place -

- (a) The overall environment in the proposed prison complex can be improved by means of soft landscaping and warmer architectural design.
- (b) Each institution will be physically separated from one another with adequate buffer area.
- (c) The layout and design of each institution will be dedicated to the specific nature and function of the rehabilitation programmes operated in the institution. For example, in the minimum security institutions such as Training Centres and Detention Centres for young offenders and Drug Addiction Treatment Centres for drug addicts, a more open environment can be provided to facilitate inmates' recreational, gardening and green-house farming activities.

3. Most importantly, the proposed prison complex will see provision of adequate and modern facilities for education and vocational training, family visits, parent-inmates activities and programmes run by non-government organizations, in order to meet the rehabilitation needs of different types of inmates.

**Security management in the proposed prison complex**

To ensure adequate security management and control in the proposed prison complex, the following measures may be put in place in the physical design and penal management –

- (a) The penal institutions in the proposed prison complex will be divided into several clusters. Each cluster will have its own boundary wall and contain a penal population of about 3,000, which is similar to the size of the current penal population in the Stanley prison area (2,894 penal places). Moreover, each individual institution within a cluster will have its own perimeter walls or fences and hold a manageable size of prisoners, say from 400 to 800. Within each institution, the unit management concept would be applied, such that each unit, with say 25-30 prisoners, would be separated from the others in work, accommodation and recreation.
- (b) In the event of an emergency, the situation would be confined to a small number of prisoners within an institution. The physical separation of the institutions or clusters and established contingency measures would further and effectively prevent the spread of mass behaviour and unrest to other institutions or clusters in the prison complex.
- (c) Inmates in one institution are not within sight of those in other institutions. Possible spreading of noises generated by inmates in mass behaviour could be prevented through careful and tailored design to reduce or even eliminate sound transmission. Other measures to prevent spread of mass behaviour include proper location of exercise and accommodation areas, installation of windows of special size and angle, application of the ventilation system and tactical use of the public address system.

- (d) Adequate number of observation towers, equipped with electronic optical devices may be built at strategic locations in the prison complex, notably at the boundary walls, to ensure close surveillance of prisoner movement, including possible escapes and unrest.
- (e) We will make the best use of advanced technology in the installation of electric security lock systems, intrusion detection systems, etc in the new penal institutions to provide useful means for swift separation of different inmate groups especially during mass indiscipline of inmates or other emergency situations.
- (f) By co-locating all penal institutions at a single site, the maximum number of CSD staff will be pooled together for standby duties and can be deployed to deal with emergency situations in the most flexible manner within the shortest possible time.

**Occupancy Rate of Penal Institutions as at 11.01.2002****By Sex**

<b><u>Sex</u></b>	<b><u>Population</u></b>	<b><u>Certified Accommodation</u></b>	<b><u>Occupancy Rate(%)</u></b>
Male	10,226	9,869	103.6
Female	1 800	1,033	174.2
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>12,026</b>	<b>10,902</b>	<b>110.3</b>

**By Age**

<b><u>Type of Offenders</u></b>	<b><u>Population</u></b>	<b><u>Certified Accommodation</u></b>	<b><u>Occupancy Rate(%)</u></b>
Adult Offenders (21 and above)	10,676	9,318	114.6
Young Offenders (14 and above but below 21)	1,350	1,584	85.2
	<b>12,026</b>		

**By Type of Detention**

<b><u>Type of Offenders</u></b>	<b><u>Population</u></b>
Sentenced	10,670
Remanded	1,185
Detainees pending repatriation	171
	<b>12,026</b>

**By Nationality**

<b><u>Type of Offenders</u></b>	<b><u>Population</u></b>		
	<b><u>Sentenced</u></b>	<b><u>Remanded</u></b>	<b><u>Total</u></b>
Local Chinese	6,767	779	7,546
Mainland Chinese	3,015	297	3,312
Other Nationals	888	109	997
Detainees pending repatriation	-	-	171
	<b>10,670</b>	<b>1,185</b>	<b>12,026</b>

Rikers Island, New York, USA



**Brief description of institutions on Rikers Island**


<b>Institution</b>	<b>Capacity</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Categorization</b>
1. North Infirmary Command (NIC)	500	Male	For Detainees: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● requiring infirmary care and extreme protective custody</li> <li>● with AIDS and AIDS-related cases</li> </ul>
2. James A. Thomas Centre (JATC)	1200	Male	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● For Adult Detainees</li> <li>● Maximum security with single-cell</li> </ul>
3. George Motchan Detention Centre (GMTC)	2500	Male	For Adult Detainees
4. Anna M. Kross Centre (AMKC)	2400	Male	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● For Adult Detainees</li> <li>● With a Methadone Detoxification Centre and a Mental Health Centre</li> </ul>
5. Otis Bantum Correctional Centre (OBCC)	2000	Male	For Adult Detainees
6. Harold A. Wildstein (Annex to OBCC)	162	Male	For Adult Detainees
7. Walter B. Keane (Annex to OBCC)	162	Male	For Adult Detainees
8. George R. Vierno Centre (GRVC)	1350	Male	For Adult Detainees
9. West Facility (WF)	800	Male & Female	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Mainly for Male Adult Detainees</li> <li>● With a Communicable Disease Unit in which 140 specially air-controlled units are reserved for male and female inmates with contagious diseases such as tuberculosis</li> </ul>
10. Eric M. Taylor Centre (EMTC)	2250	Male	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Adolescent (Ages 16-18) &amp; Adult Sentenced Inmates with 1 yr. or less imprisonment</li> <li>● Able-bodied inmates are required to work</li> </ul>
11. Adolescent Reception & Detention Centre (ARDC)	2500	Male	For Adolescent (Ages 16-18) Detainees
12. Ross M. Singer Centre (RMSC)	1700	Female	For all Detainees & Sentenced Inmates

- (a) The above facilities (1) – (9) are mainly for the custody of male adult (aged over 18) detainees. Detainees constitute about two-thirds of the total inmate population of the New York City Department of Correction (DOC). They are persons who – after arraignment on criminal charges – have been unable to post bail or were remanded without bail, pending adjudication of their criminal charges. In HKSAR, the Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre (LCKRC) of CSD serves similar purpose as these facilities. We classified LCKRC as a maximum security institution since remands have a higher tendency of escape or committing suicide.
- (b) Among the remaining one-third of inmate population of the DOC, about half is the City-sentenced inmates and half is the State-sentenced inmates (based on year 2000's statistical data of DOC). City-sentenced inmates, sentenced with 1 year or less, will be incarcerated by DOC at the above facility (10) which will be further described below. State-sentenced inmates, sentenced with more than a year, will be held by DOC at the above facilities for Detainees pending transfer to the State Department of Correctional Services.
- (c) The above facility (10) houses separately adolescent (aged 16 – 18) and adult inmates sentenced to terms of 1 year or less. Able-bodied inmates are required to work. They constitute Rikers Island's grounds crews, facility maintenance and industrial labor force. In HKSAR, the Tai Lam Correctional Institution (TLCI), Tung Tau Correctional Institution (TTCI) and Pik Uk Prison (PUP) have similar function as this facility. We classified TLCI, TTCI and PUP as minimum security institutions. Inmates of these institutions may be assigned to work outside the centre and they have lessor tendency of escape.
- (d) The above facility (11) houses adolescent detainee. In HKSAR, the Pik Uk Correctional Institution (PUCI) serves similar purpose as this facility. The PUCI is classified as maximum security institution.
- (e) The above facility (12) houses all female detainees and sentenced inmates. In HKSAR, we have Tai Lam Centre for Women (TLCW) which is both for the custody of adult female inmates and remands. In addition, we have the Tai Tam Gap Correctional Institution (TGCI) which is for the custody of young female inmates and remand.



### INMATE ON INMATE VIOLENCE

Fiscal Years '95, '96, '97, '98, '99, '00  
(Stabbing and Slashing)



Department of Correction  
City of New York

**Proposed co-location of 7,220 penal places**

<b><u>Clustering</u></b>	<b><u>No. of Penal Places</u></b>
<b><u>Reception Complex</u></b>	
Reception Centre (Adult Male)	1,360
Reception Centre (Adult Female)	220
Reception Centre (Young Male)	300
Reception Centre (Young Female)	120
<i>Sub-total =</i>	<b>2,000</b>
<b><u>Cluster I</u></b>	
Maximum Security Prison (Adult Male)	875
Medium Security Prison (Adult Male)	400
Medium Security Prison (Adult Male)	400
Minimum Security Prison (Adult Male)	600
Rehabilitation Centre/Training Centre (Young Male)	320
<i>Sub-total =</i>	<b>2,595</b>
<b><u>Cluster II</u></b>	
Maximum Security Prison (Adult Male)	875
Medium Security Prison (Adult Male)	400
Minimum Security Prison (Adult Male)	600
Minimum Security Prison (Adult Male)	600
Rehabilitation Centre/Training Centre/Prison (Young Female)	150
<i>Sub-total =</i>	<b>2,625</b>
<i>Total =</i>	<b>7,220</b>
<b><u>Support Facilities</u></b>	
Kitchen	
Visitor Registration Centre	
Dog Unit	
Hospital	
Domestic Laundry Workshop	
Escort and Support Group	
Transport Pool	
Staff Training Insitute	
Central Supplies Store	
Staff Recreation Facilities	