

立法會
Legislative Council

LC Paper No. CB(1)1726/01-02
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by the Administration)

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Legislative Council
Panel on Transport

Minutes of special meeting held on
Thursday, 17 January 2002, at 4:30 am
in the Chamber of the Legislative Council Building

Members present : Hon Miriam LAU Kin-ye, JP (Chairman)
Hon Abraham SHEK Lai-him, JP (Deputy Chairman)
Hon Albert HO Chun-yan
Ir Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai, JP
Hon CHAN Kwok-keung
Hon Andrew WONG Wang-fat, JP
Hon LAU Kong-wah
Hon Andrew CHENG Kar-foo
Hon TAM Yiu-chung, GBS, JP
Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, JP
Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip
Hon LEUNG Fu-wah, MH, JP
Hon LAU Ping-cheung

Non-Panel members : Hon Eric LI Ka-cheung, JP
attending Hon CHAN Yuen-han, JP
Hon CHAN Kam-lam
Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing, JP

Members absent : Dr Hon David CHU Yu-lin, JP
Hon Mrs Selina CHOW LIANG Shuk-ye, JP
Hon LAU Chin-shek, JP
Dr Hon TANG Siu-tong, JP
Hon WONG Sing-chi

**Public officers
attending**

: Transport Bureau

Mr Nicholas NG
Secretary for Transport

Mr Paul TANG
Deputy Secretary for Transport

Ms Shirley LAM
Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport

Highways Department

Mr Bob LLOYD
Project Manager/Major Works

Mr E J ROBLIN
Deputy Project Manager/Major Works (1)

Mr Adrian NG
Deputy Project Manager/Major Works (3)

Mr Norman MAK
Chief Engineer/Major Works

Transport Department

Mr George LAI
Deputy Commissioner for Transport
(Planning & Technical Services)

Mr Brian GROGAN
Assistant Commissioner for Transport (Planning)

Mr Tony SO
Chief Engineer/Strategic Roads

**Attendance by
Invitation**

: Islands District Council

Miss YUNG Wing-sheung
Member

Ha Tsuen Rural Committee

Mr TANG Chik-kit
Chairman

Mr TANG Kwan-shing
Vice Chairman

Tuen Mun Rural Committee

Mr CHOI Wah-tong
屯門鄉事委員會執行委員

Mr LI Ting-wah
屯門掃管笏村村代表

The Association of Consulting Engineers of Hong Kong

Mr K W KEE
Council Member

The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers

Ir Kenneth K S AU YEUNG
Executive Member

The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in Hong Kong

Mr K Y LEUNG
Council Member

Dr Timothy D HAU
Council Member

屯門掃管笏老青山村居民聯會

Mr LEUNG Kwok-kau
Secretary

Mr PANG Wing-ming
Member

Port and Maritime Board

Dr Sir Gordon WU, KCMG, FICE
Chairman

Ir Leo K K LEUNG
Assistant to Sir Gordon WU

Route 3 (CPS) Company Limited

Mr Gary K H LUK
General Manager

Mr Edwin HULL
Technical Director, Wilbur Smith Associates Limited

Action Group Against Siu Lam Works (Route 10)

Mr NG Kwai-wah
Representative

Ms Susanna CHAN
Representative

Hong Kong Logistics Association

Mr Anthony WONG
Vice Chairman

Mr Paul KAN
Ex-com Member

Individual

Mr Richard YU
Planning Consultant

Clerk in attendance : Mr Andy LAU
Chief Assistant Secretary (1)2

Staff in attendance : Ms Alice AU
Senior Assistant Secretary (1)5

- Action
- I Shenzhen Western Corridor, Deep Bay Link and Route 10**
(LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(01) - Further submission from Tuen Mun Rural Committee;
LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(02) - Further submission from 屯門掃管笏老青山村居民聯會;
LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(03) - Further submission from Sir Gordon WU, Chairman of Port and Maritime Board;
LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(04) - Further submission from Route 3 (CPS) Company Limited;
LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(05) - Summary of views on Shenzhen Western Corridor, Deep Bay Link and Route 10 prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat;
LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(06) - Information paper provided by the Administration; and
LC Paper No. CB(1)837/01-02(01) - Further submission from The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in Hong Kong)

The Chairman recapitulated the recent discussions of the Panel on the three projects. Since October 2001, the Panel had held five meetings to discuss the projects. It had received 22 submissions from deputations/individuals and met with 19 of them. There were 13 deputations/individuals attending this meeting. Five of them had submitted further submissions to the Panel for members' information. She also drew members' attention to the written submission put forward by the Hong Kong Highway Association Limited (which was tabled at the meeting and subsequently circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(1)851/01-02(02)). The Administration had also provided further information on the Route 10 project subsequent to the meeting on 11 January 2002 vide LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(06). It had also prepared a written response to the further submissions put forward by the deputations and the Administration's reply was tabled at the meeting and subsequently circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(1)851/01-02(01).

Views presented by the deputations

*Port and Maritime Board, Sir Gordon WU
[LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(03)]*

2. The Chairman of the Port and Maritime Board, Sir Gordon WU said that subsequent to the meeting on 11 January 2002, he had provided further information to the Panel expressing his objection to the proposed implementation of Route 10. He

Action

highlighted the salient points as contained in his written submission circulated vide LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(03):

- (a) It was inappropriate to quote the high demand scenario in the Third Comprehensive Transport Study (CTS-3) to justify the fast-track programme for Route 10. Indeed, traffic forecasts provided by the Administration differed greatly from the actual situation. In accordance with CTS-3, the traffic projection of Route 3 in 2001 was around 80 000 vehicles but the actual traffic in 2000 was only around 44 000 vehicles. The vehicle/capacity (v/c) ratio of 0.8 for Route 3 quoted by the Administration was not the annual average figure. Route 3 indeed had substantial spare capacity.
- (b) The forecasted daily cross-boundary traffic was on the high side, taking into account the historical trend.
- (c) The level of toll was a vital consideration to the success or failure of any tolled road in term of economics and its ability to achieve traffic diversion.

3 Regarding the engineering concerns raised by the Administration on the proposed Tuen Mun East Bypass and Tuen Mun Tunnel linking Chek Lap Kok (the Tuen Mun Tunnel), Sir Gordon WU gave the following views:

- (a) The trestle bridge portion of the proposed Tuen Mun Tunnel was entirely out of the navigation channel, and hence, there was no risk to ship impact.
- (b) There was no reason for the Administration to adopt a tighter standard for his proposal. In accordance with the Transport Planning Design Manual, the longitudinal gradient for road tunnel approach could be maintained at 4% to 8%. However, the Administration had chosen to adopt a tighter standard of 3% for the proposed Tuen Mun Tunnel.
- (c) In accordance with the estimates cited in the Government's "Key Transport Statistics, April 2001", the estimated cost of the 8.8 km submerged tunnel was \$16.3 billion. However, the Administration's recent estimates of the Tuen Mun Tunnel was revised to \$20.6 billion.

Route 3 (CPS) Company Limited
[LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(04)]

4. Mr Gary LUK of Route 3 (CPS) Company Limited stated that the Company strongly opposed to the proposed fast-track programme for the implementation of Route 10. It would cause irreparable damage to the Company and would not be in the interest of Hong Kong as well. Whilst supporting the Shenzhen Western Corridor

Action

(SWC), the Company considered that an additional link, the Western Highway linking SWC to Route 3 via Yuen Long Highway, should be provided with a view to maximizing the use of existing road resources. It would help relieve traffic movement during the time gap between the completion of the Deep Bay Link (DBL) and Route 10. In view of the uncertainties in the economic conditions, the location of the future container port, the effect of the West Rail on traffic flow and the feasibility of the alternative infrastructure proposals put forward by Sir Gordon WU, the company was of the view that the Administration should conduct a comprehensive review of the Route 10 project including its need, timing and alignment. The speaking note of Mr LUK was circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(1) 821/01-02(04).

Tuen Mun Rural Committee

[LC Paper No. CB(1)821/01-02(01)]

5. Mr LI Ting-wah, representative of 屯門掃管笏村 was seriously concerned about the passing of the proposed So Kwun Wat Link Road of the Route 10 Southern Section through So Kwun Wat Tsuen because of the serious livelihood problems, fung-shui implications and environmental impact arising out of the project. As such, he suggested that the concerned viaduct section be replaced by a tunnel.

Action Group Against Siu Lam Works (Route 10)

6. Mr NG Kwai-wah, representative of the Action Group Against Siu Lam Works (Route 10) queried the need and alignment for Route 10. Given the uncertainty as to the future locations of additional port facilities, the Administration should carry out a comprehensive review of the implementation programme for DBL and Route 10 to avoid wastage of public monies.

7. Ms Susanna CHAN, representative of the Action Group Against Siu Lam Works (Route 10) also queried the justifications for the proposed implementation of Route 10. She remarked that over the past one year, there were drastic changes to the overall planning of Route 10. The Hong Kong Lantau Link was dropped from the original blueprint. The alignments of various link roads had been altered. An additional access road to the east from SWC/DBL was now proposed. Due to these changes, the whole concept of Route 10 had already deviated from its original planning intent. She also regretted that the Administration had chosen to ignore the proposals put forward by Sir Gordon WU and Prof Richard WONG. Without ascertaining the future development of port facilities in Hong Kong, the need for Route 10 had yet to be established.

Ha Tsuen Rural Committee

8. Mr TANG Chit-kit, Chairman of Ha Tsuen Rural Committee and Member of Yuen Long District Council said that a direct road link from Ngau Hom Shek to Route 3 via Tin Shui Wai should be provided to meet the additional traffic generated from

Action

SWC. He called on the Administration to take into account local views in pursuing the detailed design for the projects.

Tuen Mun Rural Committee

9. Mr CHOI Wah-tong of Tuen Mun Rural Committee opined that the Administration should review the implementation programme for Route 10, taking into account the latest traffic forecasts, the strategic development in the territory and the need to ensure proper use of public funds. He however supported the early implementation of SWC. Given that a quota system was in place, there was no reason to believe that cross-boundary traffic would increase at a tremendously fast pace.

Meeting with deputations

10. Ir Dr Raymond HO sought the deputations' views on whether the Tuen Mun Tunnel as proposed by Sir Gordon WU could help relieve traffic congestion at Tuen Mun Road and the rest of the North West New Territories, and whether motorists would make use of the tunnel to gain access to the urban areas.

11. Mr K W LEE, Council Member of the Association of Consulting Engineers of Hong Kong, said that Tuen Mun Road section between Tuen Mun Town Centre and Sham Tseng was heavily congested. Route 10 would help relieve the congestion at Tuen Mun Road by offering a quicker and much safer alternative route. The proposed Tuen Mun Tunnel however could not perform such a function. Likewise, the proposed Tuen Mun East Bypass could not help relieve congestion at Tuen Mun Road and its surrounding feeder roads. The Association considered that Route 10 should proceed as soon as practicable in order to reduce the time gap between the completion of SWC/DBL and Route 10. It would be irresponsible for Government to make a start on Route 10 only when Route 3 was saturated.

12. Sir Gordon WU said that as part and parcel of his proposal, the Administration should purchase road capacity from Route 3 to achieve traffic diversion and relieve congestion at Tuen Mun Road. The construction of bypass was widely accepted as a means to relieve congestion. The proposed Tuen Mun East Bypass was a cost-effective option.

13. Miss YUNG Wing-sheung, Member of the Islands District Council, said that an alternative external road link for Lantau and the airport was of paramount importance. To ensure proper use of public funds, she shared the view of Sir Gordon WU that a comprehensive review should be conducted, taking into account the latest traffic forecasts and future planning of port-related facilities.

Need and timing for Route 10

14. Mr Albert HO remarked that in order to cater for the demand generated by

Action

DBL, he considered that there was a need to proceed with the proposed implementation of Route 10. Whilst supporting the initiative to identify measures to promote the utilization of Route 3, it did not obviate the need for Route 10.

15. Mr Eric LI however remarked that given the \$22 billion construction cost and in view of the budget deficit, the cost-effectiveness of the Route 10 project should be carefully considered. In this connection, the projected vehicle composition and utilization must be ascertained, taking into account the opening of the West Rail which might have a bearing on the economic benefits brought forward by the Route 10 project.

Admin

16. The Secretary for Transport (S for T) replied that SWC and Route 10 could be expected to bring about substantial economic benefits to Hong Kong. The net benefit of SWC and Route 10 would be \$175 billion and \$120 billion over a 20 year planning horizon from 2000 to 2020 respectively. At present, the majority of the vehicular traffic using the existing three boundary crossings was goods vehicles. He agreed to provide further information on the vehicle composition on Route 10, Route 3 and Tuen Mun Road.

(Post-meeting note: The information was circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(1)890/01-02(03).)

17. Whilst supporting the construction of SWC and DBL, Mr Abraham SHEK Lai-him queried the proposed fast-track programme for the implementation of Route 10. He opined that the Administration should conduct a comprehensive review, taking into account the latest economic conditions, land development and traffic forecasts. Noting that the total capacity of Route 3 and Tuen Mun Road was 250 000 vehicles vis-à-vis the daily flow of about 140 000 vehicles, there was no urgent need to proceed with the Route 10 project. The proposed fast-track programme not only affected the Route 3 Company but also the credibility of Government to attract and retain investment.

18. S for T replied that the Administration had not done anything to violate the spirit of contract. Indeed, the Administration had been identifying measures to assist the Route 3 Company. In planning transport infrastructure, the Administration needed to take into account the peak hour traffic flow on individual roads rather than focusing on the total daily capacity of roads. It was a fallacy to assume that because Route 3 had presently spare capacity, it did not need to plan for Route 10. With the rapid development of cross-boundary traffic, the need for this link was becoming more pressing. It could help provide a convenient alternative access for Lantau and the airport, meet forecast traffic demand generated by cross-boundary activities and provide a more direct and convenient route for vehicles leaving DBL to the container ports in Kwai Chung and the urban areas.

19. Mr SHEK was not convinced of the Administration's reply. In light of budget deficit and noting that there were only about 28 000 vehicles leaving SWC in

Action

2006, he considered it not cost-effective to spend a huge sum of money at this stage where traffic could be diverted to make use of Route 3, which had substantial spare capacity.

20. S for T remarked that the estimated average daily two-way traffic demand for SWC in 2006, 2011 and 2016 were 28 400, 46 100 and 80 000 vehicles. With more infrastructure provided, the Administration would be in a better position to meet the suppressed demand in terms of cross-boundary traffic.

Access road to the east from SWC/DBL

21. In view of the time gap between the completion of SWC and Route 10, and the possible slippage of the completion of Route 10 due to unforeseen circumstances, Mr LAU Kong-wah opined that the timely completion of an additional link between DBL and the existing road network, including Route 3, to the east was of paramount importance. He enquired about the planning and implementation timetable for the proposed access road to the east from SWC/DBL as set out in the Administration's paper.

22. S for T advised that there had been suggestions for an additional more direct link between DBL and the existing road network, including Route 3, to the east. In order to facilitate motorists heading east after landing at Ngau Hom Shek, the Administration would include in the scope of detailed design an additional access road which connected SWC/DBL to existing road system in the east. The Administration had initially considered three proposals from various parties on the possible alignment of this access road:

- (a) Tin Shui Wai North;
- (b) Tin Shui Wai West; and
- (c) Hung Shui Kiu.

23. In this regard, the Project Manager/Major Works of the Highways Department advised that the route via Tin Shui Wai North might affect the Deep Bay coast and there might be environmental concerns owing to the proximity of the route to wetlands at Tin Shui Wai, Mai Po and Kam Tin. Regarding the route via Tin Shui Wai West, this alignment might affect the Deep Bay coast. It also required the widening of existing roads and interchange which might have adverse effect on local road network, land and environment. As for the route via Hung Shui Kiu, it would adversely affect the "green town" concept of the proposed Hung Shui Kiu New Development Area. The Administration would further examine the alignment options in the detailed design of SWC/DBL with a view to identifying a feasible alignment.

24. Noting the Administration's reply that the northern section of Route 10 would not be required before 2010/11, Mr LAU Kong-wah enquired whether the

Action

Administration would review the timing for the implementation of the northern section of Route 10 and synchronize the implementation programme for the proposed access road to the east from SWC/DBL with that of SWC/DBL.

25. S for T replied that the proposed easterly link road would be examined in the context of the DBL project and its completion time would be synchronized with that of DBL. Notwithstanding the above, he reiterated the need for Route 10. Given that Route 10 was a strategic highway and performed a wide range of functions, the Administration was of the view that it should proceed with the detailed design of the project at this stage. Upon completion of the detailed design, the Administration would review the implementation programme for the project, taking into account the latest traffic forecasts and economic conditions before seeking funding approval of the Legislative Council for the actual construction works.

26. Mr Albert CHAN noted that the Administration would seek additional funds for the design and site investigations for an easterly link road from DBL but had not provided any substantive information on this road link including its feasibility, alignment and standard. He considered that this had departed from the standing practice of seeking funding approval for the detailed design of a road project after its feasibility and preliminary alignment had been established. Should the Administration consider that there was a case to amend the proposed scope of the projects, it should conduct an overall review, taking into account the need to re-examine the landing point of SWC and the associated supporting infrastructure as well as the development need of the logistics industry.

27. S for T clarified that the provision of an easterly link road from DBL to Yuen Long Highway was made in response to the requests of some Members and deputations. It could help provide a more direct link to divert vehicles leaving SWC to the eastern part of the New Territories. He stressed that the need for Route 10 was beyond doubt. The Administration was not proposing an access road to the east from SWC/DBL as an alternative to the proposed construction of DBL and Route 10.

Policy on the construction and operation of tunnels

28. Mr CHENG Kar-foo opined that in order to achieve traffic diversion, the Administration should review its policy on the construction and operation of tunnels. Given that the proposal to use public funds to "subsidize" certain users of Route 3 as suggested by Prof Richard WONG could bring about substantial social and economic benefits, the Administration should not treat this as a kind of subsidy. He called on the Administration to review the related policy. In this regard, the Democratic Party had suggested that the Administration should consider setting up a Tunnels and Bridges Authority to take over the ownership of all privately-owned bridges and tunnels, and formulate a preferred tolling strategy for all competing tolled facilities towards better balancing of demand and capacity among tolled and un-tolled roads/tunnels/bridges.

Action

29. S for T replied that the proposal was being examined by the Administration in detail.

30. In response to queries raised by Sir Gordon WU and Mr Albert HO, S for T clarified that Route 10 would be a tolled road. Access to Lantau via the North Lantau Highway would be tolled at one level, whether access was through Tsing Lung Bridge or the Lantau Link.

Traffic forecast

31. Mr Edwin HULL, Technical Director, Wilbur Smith Associates Limited (WSA) queried the use of a capacity of 1 800 passenger car units (pcus) per lane per hour as a basis for determining the v/c ratios in the Government's analysis. In its analysis, WSA had adopted a value for capacity of 2 300 pcus per lane per hour. This was widely accepted as the typical saturation flow for a highway lane and was consistent with peak hour traffic volume in many cities throughout the world. In view that the 2001 forecasts made in 1997 were unrealistically high and that the forecast input assumptions for the 2011 forecasts appeared somewhat optimistic, it would appear prudent to delay investment decisions until there was a clear indication that population and economic growth would recover vigorously from the current prolonged downturn.

32. Referring to the two different sets of traffic forecasts presented by the Administration and the Route 3 Company, Mr LAU Ping-cheung remarked that it would be difficult for members to judge which set of traffic forecasts was reliable. On the other hand, he also cast doubt on whether Ting Kau Bridge would have sufficient capacity to cater for the anticipated growth in traffic demand, bearing in mind the additional traffic generated by Route 10.

33. The Deputy Commissioner for Transport (Planning & Technical Services) (DC for T) explained that Ting Kau Bridge was a dual three-lane highway with hard shoulders on both sides. Arrangements could be made to convert the hard shoulders into additional traffic lanes. As a result, the capacity on each side would be increased by 1 800 pcus per hour. With this improvement, the forecasted v/c ratio in 2011 with Route 10 was 0.93 during morning peak period. S for T added that WSA was the consultant who undertook the CTS-3 for Government. According to the recommendations of WSA in the CTS-3 consultancy, the Administration had instituted a Strategic Project Highway Review mechanism. Hence, the more recent forecasts prepared by the Administration were based on the most up-to-date realistic planning parameters which had already taken into account the existing and anticipated effects of the changes which had occurred over the last few years.

34. Mr LUK of the Route 3 Company said that the Company had repeatedly requested the Administration to provide the relevant planning parameters for verification but was in vain. Mr LUK also cast doubt on the effectiveness of the proposed conversion of the hard shoulders at Ting Kau Bridge into traffic lanes to increase its capacity as temporary lane closure would be required to facilitate

Action

maintenance works. Apart from Ting Kau Bridge, he was also concerned that traffic congestion would occur at the North West Tsing Yi Interchange.

35. The Chief Engineer/Strategic Roads of the Transport Department replied that the Southern Section of Route 10 with Sham Tseung Tunnel would not only deliver traffic to Ting Kau Bridge but also Tsing Lung Bridge and Tuen Mun Road. Between now and 2016, a series of improvement works would be carried out such as the proposed construction of Route 9 and the opening of the West Rail. As such, the forecasted v/c ratios of Ting Kau Bridge would be in the region of 1.0 up to 2016. Regarding the traffic situation at the North West Tsing Yi Interchange, necessary improvement measures would be implemented in the context of the Route 9 project.

36. Mr HULL of WSA said that the CTS-3 model was not a project specific model and was therefore not appropriate for application in this project. WSA had recently analyzed future traffic demand in the Northwest New Territories based on a specific model designed for the purpose. This analysis indicated that Route 3 (CPS) would not approach its practical capacity until the middle of the next decade. The opening of the West Rail would help relieve the growth in traffic demand. Due to restrictions on the cross-boundary control points, the peak hour traffic would also grow less quickly than the total daily traffic.

37. DC for T advised that the Administration had indeed employed consultants to carry out a Traffic Impact Assessment for Route 10 Northern Section to assess the traffic impacts of the project. The transport model developed by the consultants was a project specific model. Moreover, the model was validated against the actual traffic conditions with very good validation results.

38. Members asked for scenario tests showing the impact on Tuen Mun Road of a higher toll on Route 10 than Route 3 and a high growth in traffic flow. S for T undertook to provide further information after the meeting. The Administration would also provide further information on the technical questions raised by WSA.

Admin

(Post-meeting note: The information was circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(1)890/01-02(03).)

Funding request

39. Given that there was no immediate need to proceed with the northern section of Route 10 and in view of the diverging views of the general public over the proposed implementation of Route 10, Miss Emily LAU remarked that the Administration should consider deferring the funding request for Route 10 and examining further the views expressed by various deputations before a decision was made on the way forward.

40. S for T replied that the main thrust of the debate was on the timing for Route 10 Northern Section. The Administration planned to seek funding approval from the

Action

Public Works Subcommittee for the detailed design for Route 10 Northern Section on 30 January 2002, together with the deferred item for the detailed design for SWC/DBL. In order to have the flexibility of completing the Route 10 Northern Section between 2007/08 and 2010/11, the Administration proposed to start the detailed design of the Northern Section of Route 10. The study would take about 18 to 24 months to complete. It would put forward a definitive construction programme when the Administration sought funds for construction. On tolling, the forecasts presented to the Panel were based on a Route 10 toll level equal to that charged at Route 3. From the forecast, the congestion on Tuen Mun Road would still be manageable at a v/c ratio of 1.01 in am peak of 2011. If the Administration charged a lower toll, the situation on Tuen Mun Road would naturally be improved.

41. Miss LAU remained not convinced of the Administration's reply. She said that the estimated cost of the detailed design for Route 10 Northern Section together with SWC and DBL was in the region of \$286 million. Should there be any changes to the future land use planning, the monies so spent would be wasted.

42. S for T replied that the three existing vehicular boundary crossings were nearly saturated. There was an urgent need to remove these potential bottle-necks to trade and traffic. Further delay would not be in the interest of Hong Kong. Regarding the implementation of Route 10 Northern Section, it was only a matter of timing and priority. As such, the monies spent on the detailed design for Route 10 would not be wasted. As regards Sir Gordon WU's proposal of linking up Tuen Mun and Chek Lap Kok, the Administration indeed had a similar long-term plan for a direct link from Tuen Mun to Chek Lap Kok. Planning for this link would take into account further development of the logistics industry in Lantau, a possible fifth land crossing to the western shore of the Pearl River Delta and the future location of the new container port. However, it did not obviate the need for Route 10 which served different functions.

43. In view of time constraint, members decided to convene another meeting at 8:00 am on 23 January 2002 to continue discussion with the Administration/deputations on the projects.

II Any other business

44. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 6:40 pm.