Corporate Governance in Hong Kong

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Characteristics of Asian Equity Markets

- Single majority shareholder
- Family control
- Lack of institutional investors
- CEO and chairman are not separated
- Underdeveloped corporate control market

Corporate Governance

• A Successful Market Depends On:

'Right' Regulatory Framework

- Quality Listed Companies
- Quality Intermediaries


Corporate Governance: 'Right' Regulatory Framework

- Small Shareholders
 - Look for short-term capital gain
 - Ignore issues of corporate governance
 - Do not pay attention to shareholder's right
 - Inadequate shareholder protection

Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies I

- IPO's Performance
 - □ Sample period: January 1986 December 1996
 - 404 IPOs
 - Regulatory change in 1994
 - Requirements on size, pre-listing earning, operating history, etc...
 - Findings:
 - Tougher requirements improve IPO's long-term performance
 - STILL IPO's long-term performance is BAD (similar to other overseas markets)


Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies II



IPO's Long-Term Performance

Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies III

IPO's Long-Term Performance (Buy & Hold Return)



Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies IV

- A successful market does not depend on:
 - Number of listed companies
 - Market capitalization
- Depends on:
 - Number of good listed companies
 - Liquidity
 - Ability to attract funds

Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies V

- Relation between director's pay and company's performance
 - Sample period: 1991-1995
 10% director's pay > company's earnings
 No relation

Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies VI

Corporate governance

Independence of the Board

Problem

- Connected parties transactions
- Information disclosure


Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies VII

- Connected parties transactions
 - **Sample period: 1998-2000**
 - All transactions (328)
 - 11 categories including sell stake to parent, sell assets to parent, acquire assets from parent, strategies (JV) deals, etc...

Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies VIII

- Connected parties transactions
 - Results:
 - CLEAR evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders
 - Degree of expropriation is positively related to the percentage of ownership by the main shareholder
 - Information disclosure about connected transaction appears significant
 - The likelihood of incomplete disclosure is positively related to ownership by the main shareholder

Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies IX



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Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies X

- Enhance independence of the Board
 - Recruitment details of independent non-executive directors
 - Greater transparency
 - Financial
 - Non-Financial

Performance evaluation

Corporate Governance: Quality Listed Companies XI

Suggestions

Licensing for directors

Director's education

Scorecard for corporate governance

Investors

Peer Pressure

Corporate Governance: Quality Intermediaries

- Intermediaries
 - Accountants
 - Auditors
 - Lawyers
 - Financial Analysts

Conclusion

- Market creditability
- Investor confidence
- Ability for further funding
- Ability to attract quality companies

~ The End ~

Thank you