Specialist Advisor to the Subcommittee on West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD) Development for the study on The Financial Aspects of the WKCD Project for the Legislative Council Commission

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Presentation on 24 may 2008 by K C Wong, K W Chau, S K Wong, and P Yung of Versitech Limited

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1. a financial overview

	figures in NPV, 2008 prices, HK\$, millions	capital	operations	total	%
1	WKCDA management	(1,230)	(1,015)	(2,245)	9%
2	master planning	(34)	-	(34)	0.1%
3	M+	(4,749)	(5,917)	(10,666)	40%
4	exhibition centre	(535)	281	(254)	1%
5	mega performance venue	(2,706)	1,014	(1,692)	6%
6	great theater 1	(1,220)	(5)	(1,225)	5%
7	great theatre 2 and medium theatre 3	(986)	(318)	(1,304)	5%
8	medium theatre 4	(303)	(128)	(431)	2%
9	concert hall & chamber music hall	(1,421)	(307)	(1,728)	7%
10	xiqu centre	(1,174)	(213)	(1,387)	5%
11	medium theatre 1	(515)	(159)	(674)	3%
12	medium theatre 2 & black box theatre 1	(699)	(213)	(912)	3%
13	black box theatres 2 & 3	(320)	(140)	(460)	2%
14	black box theatre 4	(195)	(104)	(299)	1%
15	piazzas	(310)	-	(310)	1%
16	other arts and cultural facilities	(331)	-	(331)	1%
17	transport facilities	(1,049)	179	(870)	3%
18	communal facilities	(1,027)	(537)	(1,564)	6%
	sub-total	(18,804)	(7,582)	(26,386)	100%
19	RDE: retail, dinning & entertainment	(2,765)	8,448	5,683	21.5%
	total	(21,569)	866	VERS	SITECH LTD.
	to be met by land values	21,288		The Quineral	ty Technology Transfel Company

2. scenarios of private sector involvements

options:	1A	1B	2
M+ 's procurement & operation	Same for all 3 Scenarios: design competition, design & build Operate, Manage and Maintain by Not-for-Profit Organisation		
	design & build only	design & build	design & build
private sector's roles	do NOT finance,	finance & maintain	finance & maintain
on performing arts (PA) facilities	maintain, or operate	do NOT operate	own & operate packaged PA facilities*
level of private sector involvement	small	medium	large
total cost: capital & operating	\$29,950 Mn	5.8% more expensive than 1A	8.1% more expensive than 1A
finance cost	6.1% p.a.	12.5% p.a.	12.5% p.a.
risk premiums allowed	23%	29.5% (p 34)	20.8%
operating costs (over 50 years)	\$8,333 Mn	\$8,333 Mn same as 1A?	\$8,569 Mn almost the same as 1A?
efficiency gain due to larger private involvement	-	Not allo	wed for
WKCD Authority's costs Same for all 3 Scenarios : \$2,117 Mn			117 Mn

^{*} Package A: MPV + hotel 2,3 + RDE; B: MT1+ BBT2,3 + hotel 1 + RDE; C: residential, others A&C + transport, communal facilities



3. on "design and build"

design & build conventional: separating design & build

Full performance specification needed	tender after detailed design		
This specification is never exhaustive			
How to specify performance in terms of comfort, space, aesthetics, quality of architectural detailing?	Could be reviewed and adjusted after detailed design, and before tendering		
Without detailed design, BD contractor may cut costs to meet minimum performance only	With detailed design, there can be much more accurate costs estimates for both contracting parties:		
lacks an architect's independent view	has architect's independent view		
May save time before tendering, but could be problematic if competition is used to choose a design	Little longer time for detailing, but will pay off in terms of value for money		
May be more costly to rectify problems, such as contractual dispute that occurs at a later stage	Client knows exactly what it will get before committing resources		
Suitable for, civil engineering projects, building services or buildings with functional requirements only	More suitable for artistic and innovative complexes, like M+ and PA facilities		
Appointment of an operator before conceptual design is most essential in both cases			



4. capital, on-costs, and operating costs

Capital costs	NPV 2008 \$ million	as % construction cost	Compared to Conventional/ Alternative
direct construction cost	11,012	100%	unit costs are comparable
professional fees	4 000	6% to 14.6%	6%
contract management	1,869	8% to 9%	conventionally included in the
WKCDA's costs years 1-8	1,230	11.2%	developer's normal profit: either the WACC(12.5% p.a.), or 10% profit on construction (H-11)
risk allowances	2,850	25.9%	10% to 15% contingencies
major repair and renovation	2,891	26.3%	Conventionally half-replaced
			Not allowed for after 50 years
museum development	1,717	15.6%	franchise fee \$156 million for international operator
Total capital cost	21,569	195.9%	Det EA near II 44 and WIVED 544
To be met by land value	21,288		Ref. FA page H-11 ; and WKCD-511 Annex 2, and 5(a)
Operating deficits			
CACF, transport, communal	6,567		
WKCDA's costs years 9-50	1,015		
Total operating deficit	7,582	•	VERSITECH LTD.
To be met by RDE rental	8,448		The britishing Technology Trackle Company

5. risk and sensitivity analysis: any contingency plan?

		Assumptions	Financial impacts in billion HK\$	As % of \$21.6 billion
Sensitivity Tests	ST2	Pessimistic Outcome in procurement and operations	- 5.7	-26%
	ST4	50% Real Decrease in Land Premium	-10.4	-48%
	ST9	3% Real Discount Rate (instead of 4%)	- 4.1	-19%
Tests still n	Construction costs escalation (over 6% p.a. over past 30 years, much higher than FA's assumption of 2%)		most Significant especially	to be
		Volatility in investment returns (no risk free investment tools at 6.1%)	first 5 years	assessed



6. management organisation

	WKCDA management costs years 1-8 development phase	WKCDA management costs years 9-50 operation phase
1 Directors Staff	90 (5 departments: chief executive, planning & development, property, finance, procurement. excluding consultants)	33 (5 departments: chief executive, area management, finance)
2 Duties	land assembly and property master planning and project development strategic and business planning cultural and arts policy liaison legal, procurement contracting and finance	estate management area marketing and programming strategic and business planning cultural policy liaison legal, contract management procurement and finance
3 Annual costs (HK\$)	189.4 million	60.3 million
4 In 2008 NPV	1.23 billion	1.015 billion
5 Other supports	out-source consultants	Operations of individual facilities budget separately

Relevant questions:

- 1. What are the detailed duties, ranks, salaries, for these 90 (or 33) staff? 5. Would their duties overlap with the out-source consultants?
- 2. Would it be more cost effective to out-source some of these duties?
- 3. What are the detailed breakdowns of \$189.4 and \$60.3 million?
- 4. Compared with CACF (details down to the smallest theatre are provided), is the information too coarse to justify the funding of \$2.245 billion?



7. financial sustainability

Under the current proposal of a 21.6 billion endowment fund

Capital costs:	met by land values
Operating cost:	met by RDE rental

After 50 years, there will be no funding provided for:

	Renovation/reconstruction of building
renovations of	structures & fabric:
FFE, M&E	assuming the buildings last only for 50 years

The additional seed fund needed for this purpose is \$3.38 billion * (i.e. 16% of the endowment, in PV terms,)

*3.378 billion = 20.639 billion x $(1/1.04)^50 + (1/1.04)^100 + ...$ 20.639 billion = 21.568 - 0.873 billion (for museum collection) - 0.056 (for land cost of off site storage) in 2008 NPV



8. the question of M+: is it like Pompidou?

Museums	M+	Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum (New York)	San Francisco Museum of Modern Art	Museum of Modern Art, New York	Metro- politan museum of Art, New York	Art Institute of Chicago	Tate Modern London	Centre Pompidou Paris
Exhibit area sq. m	26,000	4,600	4,647	11,612	78,366	19,600	7,827	22,000
GFA sq. m	61,950	n.a.	20,911	73,420	200,000	64,400	43,000	103,305
Exhibits	Design, popular culture, moving image, visual art	Modern art	Modern art	Modern & con- temporary art	One of world's largest & finest art museum	Art museum and school	Modern art	Modern art & contemporary creation, including design & architecture
collection/ history/ franchise fee	Cost \$1,717 million to be collected in 4 years & developed	Franchise fee \$156million in the 1990s for Bilbao	Since 1935; now over 22,000 objects	Founded in 1929; now 150,000 pieces ^[7]	Opened in 1872; now over 2 million works	Founded in 1879; now over 25,000 pieces	Collection began in 1847; Tate Gallery founded in 1897; now 65,000 pcs	Previously National Museum of Modern Art opened in 1947; now 53,000 pcs *
Full time staff	336	95 F/T	232 approx	590 F/T 20 P/T	1,783 F/T 744 P/T	725 F/T 46 P/T	1,157 FTE	918 F/T 63 Ct
Yearly acquisition	\$20 million	\$16 million	\$11 million	\$395 million	\$774 million	\$125 million	\$264 million	\$70 million
Adult fee	\$27.5 - \$30	\$137	\$98	\$156	\$156	\$94	various	\$103
Visitors per year	1.2 – 2 million	0.9 million	0.8 million	2.7 million	Over 4.0 million	1.4 million	4.0 million	5.5 million
cost recovery	18 - 22%	66%	59%	57%	55%	50%	54%	27%

^{*} Long collection history achieved "through the generosity of artists such as Picasso, Braque, Matisse, Chagall and Brancusi, which had hitherto been passed over by other institutions."



8. the question of M+ (cont'd): the Guggenheim model

The FA's conclusions on the Guggenheim model:

Question:

Guggenheim is not interested	Did Guggenheim joint venture with Pompidou and HK's Dynamic Star in 2005 for WKCD (IFP)? There was an open statement*
looking for "an open purse from the government"	Is this a serious claim, which should be supported by evidence and assessed financial figures?
	Should this be welcomed? The FA also pinpointed that "The only direct local experience of large-scale museum operation lies with LCSD's operation of public museums."
want design, operational, curatorial control	Yet the largest local art museum that could provide local experts with suitable experience, namely the Hong Kong Museum of Art, is only 16% of the proposed size of M+.
	Is this the best way for knowledge transfer? After all M+ is a \$10.7 billion investment.
a pricey model	Inconsistent with FA's data: this model could save up to \$4.8 billion, according to FA's data provided so far. This is financially so significant that it should have been studied and compared very seriously than the way it is treated now.



^{*} Statement still available on the web: http://www.guggenheim.org/press_releases/release_140.html

9. on RDE: retail, dining and entertainment

119,000 sq.m gfa:(2012 construction)	a considerable size: bigger than Elements, potentially a rival if not planned very differently		
Valued at monthly rental of \$30 psf:	Comparables are large malls: not scattered		
scattered shops: how to ensure sufficient pedestrian flow in order to sustain \$30 psf?	full integration of cultural venues and shops: a lengthy evolution process. London Theatre Land has more than 200 years history		
Physical plan unknown: complements or	RDE: CACF ratio = 2:5		
conflict to arts facilities	A rather large ratio to be planned into CACF		
not all developers are successful in RDE/malls. most successful ones own substantial shares of their malls	successful malls/RDE depends on: expertise in planning, design, tenant mix, tenants' relative locations, pedestrian flow, leasing, theme, promotion, management		
Experience shows that public owners are likely to be less successful:	the level of private participation in WKCD's RDE should be carefully considered		
the current proposal might have implied 100% WKCDA ownership?			
(otherwise, there is insufficient RDE rental to cover operating loss)			
Comparing to operating details of CACF, those for RDE are clearly insufficient			
Needs a good business plan for this life line			



10. Key parameters to be monitored

The publication of these information are essential:

The early appointment of operators	A time line for inviting proposals from and appointment of operators
Investment return	Investment portfolio and performance
Design quality	Rules of design competition (open or by invitation) IPF for professional services, design brief, selection criteria Winning designs
Quality specifications	Specifications for quality of materials and workmanship
	Unit construction costs (CFA and GFA)
	Professional fees
Information on expenditures	Project and contract management costs
	Status of contingencies and risk allowances
	Major repair and renovation costs
Management organisation	Staff numbers, respective ranks, performance pledged and achieved
Utilization rates	Number and types of visitors
Cost effectiveness	Cost recovery rates for individual facilities



11. funding priorities

Cost item		Factors to consider		
		Uncertainty	Improvement Potential	Financial Significance
1	WKCDA Management	Medium Role & responsibility not clear	Medium in efficiency	Medium
2a	M+ (capital cost)	High Cost, quality & outcome highly uncertain with Design and Build	High in procurement (Except for costs of design competition and consultant fees)	High
2b	M+ (operating cost)	High Limited options available	High in operation mode	High Major cost centre
3	Exhibition centre	Medium* * Low if procured traditionally	Low	Low
4	Mega performance venue	Medium*	Low	Medium
5	Great theater 1	Medium*	Low	Medium
6	Great theatre 2 and medium theatre 3	Medium*	Medium # # late in program	Medium
7	Medium theatre 4	Medium*	Medium #	Low
8	Concert hall & chamber music hall	Medium* * Low if procured traditionally	Low	Medium

11. funding priorities (cont'd)

Cost item		Factors to consider		
		Uncertainty	Improvement Potential	Financial Significance
9	Xiqu centre	Medium*	Low	Medium
10	Medium theatre 1	Medium*	Low	Low
11	Medium theatre 2 & black box theatre 1	Medium*	Low	Low
12	Black box theatres 2 & 3	Medium*	Low	Low
13	Black box theatre 4	Medium*	Low	Low
14	Piazzas	Medium*	Low	Low
15	Other arts and cultural facilities	Medium*	Low	Low
16	transport facilities	Low	Low	Low
17	communal facilities	Low	Medium	Medium
18	Retail, dinning & entertainment	High Limited study on demand, business concepts, and their integration with other facilities	High Can consider other modes of operation such as private sector participation	High Life line for financial sustainability



12. executive summary

- 1. This report assumes the principle that the WKCD should be financially self sufficient and financially sustainable within the 40 hectares of land.
- 2. The Method of comparing Scenarios of private sector involvement is questionable. Scenarios 1B and 2 are not sufficiently realistic to allow meaningful comparisons. Despite greater private sector participation in, no additional efficiency gain has been allowed for.
- 3. "Design and Build" is not a suitable procurement method for M+ and possibly not the best option for other core arts and cultural facilities as well.
- 4. Unit construction costs are within a reasonable range. On-costs are, however, higher than conventional.
- 5. The Financial Advisor's (FA) sensitivity analyses have not covered the financial implications of risks in investment returns and in construction cost escalation. There are also no contingency plans for the worse cases scenario.



12. executive summary (cont'd)

- 6. There is no fund set aside for major renovations or re-constructions after 50 years, beyond which the WKCD may not be financially sustainable. An extra saving of \$3.38 billion on capital and operating costs, equivalent to 16% of the \$21.6 billion seed fund, is needed.
- 7. Under the FA's operating assumptions, M+ would cost \$10.7 billion to construct and operate for 50 years. By 2059, M+ would account for 89% of the WKCD's yearly deficit. M+ might become a long term financial burden of the WKCD.
- 8. According to the information provided by the FA so far, should M+ be run by an international operator, the potential saving of \$4.8 billion, in very crude terms, could be as high as 22% of the \$21.6 billion seed fund.
- 9. RDE is the life line of the WKCD. Yet compared to the financial and operating details for Core Arts and Cultural Facilities (CACF), those information provided for RDE are clearly insufficient.
- 10. To build up the financial strength of the WKCD, one has to cut spending and earn more. it's worthwhile to consider options for (a) reduction of on-costs; (b) a more efficient operation mode of M+; and (c) an effective business plan for RDE facilities, are essential.

