

# 立法會

## *Legislative Council*

LC Paper No. CB(1)2291/11-12

Ref. : CB1/PL/EDEV

### **Report of the Panel on Economic Development for submission to the Legislative Council**

#### **Purpose**

This report gives an account of the work of the Panel on Economic Development during the 2011-2012 Legislative Council ("LegCo") session. It will be tabled at the meeting of the Council on 11 July 2012 in accordance with Rule 77(14) of the Rules of Procedure.

#### **The Panel**

2. The Panel was formed by a resolution passed by the Council on 8 July 1998 and as amended on 20 December 2000, 9 October 2002, 11 July 2007 and 2 July 2008 for the purpose of monitoring and examining Government policies and issues of public concern relating to economic infrastructure and services, including air and sea transport facilities and services, postal and weather information services, energy supply and safety, consumer protection, competition policy and tourism. The terms of reference of the Panel are in **Appendix I**.

3. For the 2011-2012 session, the Panel comprised 23 members, with Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung and Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun elected as Chairman and Deputy Chairman respectively. The membership list of the Panel is in **Appendix II**.

#### **Major work**

Annual electricity tariff review

*Reduction of the rates of tariff increase*

4. In this session, the Panel continued to monitor closely the electricity tariff increases of the two power companies. At the Panel meeting on 13 December 2011, The Hongkong Electric Co., Ltd. ("HEC") and CLP Power Hong Kong Limited ("CLP") announced a tariff increase for 2012 of 6.3% and 9.2% respectively. Members expressed great discontent with the tariff increase which exceeded the inflation rate and requested both HEC and CLP to lower their increase. The majority of members considered that they were not given sufficient information to assess whether the tariff increase proposals were justified. Members questioned whether the Administration had properly played its "gatekeeper" role in vetting the rationale provided by the two power companies for their tariff increase proposals.

5. Following the Panel discussion, HEC announced on 16 December 2011 improvement to its progressive tariff structure and the reduction of rate of tariff increase to 4.97% or less for 90% of its domestic consumers. On 21 December 2011, the Council had an adjournment debate on the impact of electricity tariff increase on the general public and enterprises, as well as the Government's corresponding measures. On the same date, CLP revised downwards the tariff increase to 7.4%

6. In view of the public concern about the tariff increases, the Panel held a further meeting on 23 December 2011 to discuss with the Administration and the two power companies. The Panel passed a motion urging the two power companies to defer the tariff increase by two months. CLP was also urged to lower the tariff increase by reducing the operating costs, taking out the capital investment projects not agreed by the Administration and making use of the Tariff Stabilization Fund ("TSF"), and to lower the tariff immediately upon receipt of rent and rates refund.

7. CLP subsequently announced on 30 December 2011 a further reduction of the tariff increase from 7.4% to 4.9%. According to CLP, the reduction was achieved by reducing operating costs, taking out premature capital investment for increasing generation capacity, reducing the projected TSF balance and providing a one-off Rent and Rates Rebate.

*On-going monitoring work relating to the electricity market*

8. The Panel saw the need for the Administration to enhance the tariff mechanism for the benefit of the general public. It urged the Administration to spare no effort in performing its monitoring role in ensuring reasonable tariff adjustment. The Administration should achieve this by diligently ensuring that any necessary developments and service improvements of the power companies would proceed within the scope of their five-year development plans approved by the Government; vetting the two power companies' operating expenditure and

raising query about unreasonable items; using the two power companies' TSFs to mitigate pressure of tariff increase, and their Fuel Clause Accounts to tackle sharp fuel cost increase due to the expiry of existing fuel supply contracts or fluctuations in supply; and examining whether any special income of the two companies could be used to offset cost increase.

9. Some members expressed concern about the likely tariff increase in future due to escalating fuel prices and urged the Administration to begin the negotiation process of the 2013 tariff review early. In order to avoid controversies similar to those occurred in the 2012 tariff review, they urged the Administration and the two power companies to explore measures and practices in operations which could keep costs down. Other members considered the reserve margins of the generation capacity of the two power companies way too excessive, and opined that the Administration should more stringently vet the capital investments in generation capacity in the two companies' five-year development plans.

10. The Administration undertook to listen to the views of members and the public in formulating the five-year development plan and tariff adjustments, to ensure that the electricity supply in Hong Kong can achieve the policy objective of striking a balance amongst reliability, safety, environmental protection and affordability.

11. In the course of the Panel's deliberations on tariff review, members repeatedly requested the Administration and the two power companies to provide the detailed financial information relating to the capital investment of the two power companies in the next five years as well as their operating expenditures with a view to ascertaining whether the rates of tariff increase for 2012 were justified.

12. The two power companies insisted that the requested information be provided to the Panel on a confidential basis. They considered that some of the requested information, if not kept confidential, might be detrimental to the interests of the public. The reason was that the disclosure of information related to projections of future business (e.g. capital expenditure and electricity sales) would enable the suppliers to easily assess the budgets estimate of certain projects, or know in advance the two power companies' demand for services, and increase their bargaining power. This might cause an increase in capital expenditure or costs of the two power companies, affecting future tariff increases, and jeopardizing the interests of the public. According to the two power companies, revealing information about contract requirement and price forecast would significantly weaken bargaining position of the two power companies in prices and quantities negotiations, resulting in higher costs to be borne by the public. The two power companies further argued that if the

information was not kept confidential, there might be a violation of the Hong Kong Listing Rules requirements and detriment to the interests of small shareholders, or a breach of the Securities and Futures Ordinance.

13. Consequently, at the meeting of Panel on 7 February 2012, members discussed, with closed-door and relevant confidentiality arrangements in place, the supplementary information on the five-year development plan and 2012 tariff review submitted by the two power companies in the form of confidential documents. The two power companies provided explanation to questions raised by members. Some members remained of the view that holding discussions in camera was not conducive to their understanding of the information provided and prevented members from explaining to the public the reasons behind their positions in respect of the tariff review.

14. Considering that the information provided by the Administration and the two power companies was vastly inadequate for their deliberations, some members made use of other forums in the hope to gain access to the more in-depth information they required. The House Committee passed a motion on 6 January 2012 seeking the Council's authorization to empower the Panel to exercise the powers under the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance to order the production of information in connection with the tariff increases by the two power companies. On 8 February 2012 the Council deliberated the motion moved by the House Committee Chairman to that effect, but the motion was negated.

15. In the light of members' strong views, the two power companies subsequently made public those parts of the aforesaid documents not involving confidential information.

#### Service suspension of the Ngong Ping 360 ropeway

16. The service of the Ngong Ping 360 ropeway was suspended on 8, 18 and 22 December 2011 due to various mechanical faults. During the service suspension on 25 January 2012 (a Chinese New Year holiday), some 800 passengers were stranded in cabins for up to two hours under low temperature. Stranded passengers criticized Ngong Ping 360 Limited ("NP360") for failing to explain the reason for the suspension in the announcement made to cabins and to provide communication facility in cable cars to allow contact with station staff. In response to the spate of incidents, the ropeway was closed to facilitate replacement of all bearings on all bullwheels in the system and advancement of annual servicing inspection and examination. The ropeway reopened on 5 April 2012 following the completion of all engineering works undertaken and a full testing of the system.

17. On 27 February and 23 April 2012, the Panel received briefings by the Administration and NP360 on the handling of the incidents, findings of the investigation into the causes of the ropeway incidents as well as an update on the ropeway's resumption of service. NP360 had identified and implemented a series of enhancement and follow-up actions following the investigation of the 25 January 2012 incident conducted by NP360 and the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department. The investigation found that the spalling of the bullwheel bearing was caused by ineffective lubrication, arising from high water content in the grease leading to degraded lubricating effectiveness. In view of this finding, NP360 had enhanced the storage of the grease and enhanced monitoring of its water content. In addition to the use of a more water-resistant grease, it had also adopted other improvement measures and suggestions.

*Concerns on the ropeway design*

18. Members questioned whether the design and manufacture of the Ngong Ping ropeway were up to standard, and whether similar bi-cable systems overseas were equally incident-plagued. The Administration advised that there were about 30 bi-cable systems in the world, mainly located in Europe with a few in Japan and Korea. The bi-cable systems in Europe, Japan and Korea operated in a relatively drier climate. The design of the Ngong Ping ropeway was unique in that a 5.7 km long ropeway was provided with two intermediate angle stations, which required more bullwheels in comparison with other ropeway systems. Coupled with its unique operating environment, including its long span across the Tung Chung Bay, proximity to the seashore and humid environment, it was difficult to make direct comparison with the other bi-cable systems in the world.

19. The Administration emphasized that the Ngong Ping ropeway was designed according to international standards and due regard had been given to the weather conditions in Hong Kong. The system was comprehensively tested and approved to be fit for safe operations. This notwithstanding, it was a normal practice for the cable car operator to suitably review and introduce enhancement measures to improve the quality of its repair and maintenance system after it had accumulated actual experience from operating the system in the prevailing external environment.

*Remedial and follow-up measures*

20. To cater for the local humid environment, NP360 had already used a water-resistant grease as recommended by the manufacturer to lubricate the bullwheel bearings since the commencement of operation. In the light of the experience of the 25 January 2012 incident where higher than normal water content was found in the grease in the bearings, NP360 had implemented further improvement measures to enhance the usage, storage and monitoring of the grease having regard to the unique operating environment in Hong Kong.

21. Some members enquired whether damages could be claimed from the manufacturer of the ropeway for the incidents. The Administration advised that the manufacturer's maintenance manual and guidelines only provided general basic information on maintenance. The operator should adjust these guidelines in the light of the actual operating condition and experience gained. Besides, the investigation result had not found any sub-standard materials in the bearings provided by the manufacturer or supplier. NP360 had sought legal advice on the grounds for seeking claims from the manufacturer. The conclusion was that there was no legal basis for bringing a claim against the manufacturer. Hence, NP360 considered that claiming the manufacturer for the indemnity of the 25 January 2012 incident was not appropriate.

22. The Panel urged NP360 to learn from the breakdown incidents and carry out the improvement measures identified in respect of the maintenance regime of the ropeway, the emergency response mechanism, communication with customers as well as the cable car service notification.

Hong Kong International Airport Master Plan 2030

23. During this session, the Panel continued to monitor Hong Kong International Airport ("HKIA") Master Plan 2030. In March 2012, the Chief Executive in Council approved in principle the recommendation of Airport Authority Hong Kong ("AAHK") to adopt the option of expanding into a three-runway system as the future development option for the HKIA for planning purposes. AAHK could proceed with the next stage of planning related to the development of the three-runway system, which included in particular the statutory environmental impact assessment ("EIA"), the associated design details and the financial arrangements. It was estimated that the whole EIA process would take about two years. Upon completion of the aforesaid work and a report by AAHK, the Government would assess in detail all relevant considerations before making the final decision on whether the option of expanding into a three-runway system should be adopted.

24. The Panel received briefing by the Administration and AAHK on the

outcome of the consultation conducted earlier on HKIA Master Plan 2030 and the way forward. The Panel had all along noted the views of the public that while there was an impending need for expanding HKIA with a third runway to maintain Hong Kong's competitiveness as an aviation hub in the region, there were various concerns on the three-runway option, including the Pearl River Delta airspace issue, capital investment, funding arrangement, environmental impact such as the preservation of marine life and noise nuisance to residential communities in Tung Chung, Tuen Mun and Ma Wan. The Panel supported the three-runway option but urged that the Administration and AAHK should continue to conduct the relevant public consultation and engagement exercise better to involve all stakeholders. Better still, local and international experts should be engaged in the consultation process.

#### *Financing for the third runway*

25. In response to members' queries about the current cost estimate of third runway, the Administration advised that it was the best that could be made based on information available in the meantime. The Administration would, however, closely monitor the impacts of the relevant EIA outcomes and associated design details on the construction cost. When these details became available in end 2014, a more accurate estimate of the construction cost would be worked out.

26. Some members expressed concern about the financing arrangements and the likely increase in cost due to inflation. In response, the Administration advised that the financing arrangements could only be worked out after completion of the EIA process. The outcomes of EIA could shed light on the mitigation measures and environmental costs required. The associated design details, which would be prepared in parallel with the EIA process, could then be refined. When the final design and the changes necessary to mitigate any environmental impact so identified were worked out, the actual construction costs required would be finalized to enable AAHK to formulate the financing arrangements for developing the three-runway system.

27. Regarding the options for financing arrangements, the Panel noted that these could include direct injection of funds by the Government, delayed dividend payment by AAHK to the Government and issue of bonds by AAHK. The Government would consider all the above options with an open mind and would not pre-empt the adoption of any of them. The Administration agreed with some members' views that care should be exercised in applying the "user pays" principle in this case, lest HKIA's competitiveness would be affected.

#### *Public consultation*

28. The Panel considered it imperative that the Administration and AAHK

should conduct a thorough public consultation exercise and keep up contact with all sectors in the society during the EIA process. The Administration assured members that the public engagement exercise of the three-runway option would be conducted properly.

#### The new cruise terminal at Kai Tak

29. The Administration announced on 8 March 2012 that the tenancy for operating and managing the new cruise terminal at Kai Tak had been awarded to Worldwide Cruise Terminals Consortium ("WCT"), which was a joint venture of three companies, namely Worldwide Flight Services, Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd and Neo Crown Ltd. WCT was required to pay to the Government a fixed rent and a variable rent. The fixed rent for the 10-year operation was approximately \$13 million. The Government would receive a percentage of the gross receipts of the operator as the variable rent, and the percentage of the gross receipts to be shared with the Government would increase as the gross receipts went up.

30. In April 2012, the Administration briefed the Panel on the latest progress of the new cruise terminal project at Kai Tak and the promotional initiatives to enhance cruise tourism in Hong Kong. The Panel noted that construction works of the new cruise terminal were progressing smoothly. The terminal building and the first berth were expected to be commissioned in mid-2013.

31. Members noted that there would be a cluster of tourism facilities next to the new cruise terminal, which would include hotels, commercial premises, entertainment facilities and food and beverage outlets. The cluster of facilities was a development planned in the context of the Kai Tak Development project and would be completed at a later stage. Members urged the Administration to expedite planning of the above cluster of tourism facilities to achieve synergy between the cluster and the new cruise terminal, and to minimize any inconvenience or nuisances caused by the construction works concerned to cruise passengers and cruise terminal visitors, in order to avoid giving the cruise passengers a bad first impression of Hong Kong.

#### Operation and regulatory framework of the tourism sector

32. In the light of incidents involving unscrupulous practices of the tourism trade relating to Mainland tour groups in 2010, the Chief Executive stated in his 2010-2011 Policy Address that the Government would review the operation and regulatory framework of the entire tourism sector, including the role, powers, responsibilities and operation of Travel Industry Council of Hong Kong ("TIC"), as well as its working relationship with Travel Agent Registry ("TAR"). In



April 2011, the Government consulted the public on the options for reforming the present regulatory framework set in its consultation paper "Review of the Operation and Regulatory Framework of the Tourism Sector in Hong Kong". At the meeting on 27 February 2012, the Panel received briefing by the Administration on the findings of the public consultation and the Administration's proposed way forward.

*Proposal to establish the Travel Industry Authority*

33. According to the Administration's proposal, an independent statutory body, tentatively named the Travel Industry Authority ("TIA"), would be established as the overall regulatory body of the tourism sector. The functions of the TIA would include licensing of travel agents, tourist guides and tour escorts; drawing up codes of conduct, guidelines, and directives to govern the work of travel agents, tourist guides and tour escorts, and regular monitoring of their work; handling complaints against travel agents, tourist guides and tour escorts; investigating suspected breaches of the provisions of the relevant legislation, codes of conduct, guidelines and directives by travel agents, tourist guides or tour escorts and taking disciplinary action where appropriate; and advising the Government on matters relating to the regulation of the tourism sector.

34. Members enquired about the relevant funding arrangements for the TIA, and stressed the need to avoid substantially increasing the operating costs of the trade upon the establishment of the TIA, and causing an unreasonable burden to the travelling public. The Administration proposed that the TIA should operate on a self-financing basis in the long run, and its sources of funding would include the licence fees from travel agents, levy on outbound tours, and registration fees for Mainland inbound tours. With a view to achieving self-financing in the long run, the TIA would inevitably have to adjust its fees by adopting an incremental approach. To reduce the impact on the industry, particularly having regard to the affordability of small and medium sized travel agents, the Administration did not propose any increase to the existing licensing fees and levy immediately upon the establishment of the TIA.

*Consultation with the trade*

35. Members urged the Administration to ensure that the functions of the future TIA would not duplicate with those of TIC. The Administration agreed with the views of Panel members that the TIC is familiar with the operation of the trade and had accumulated years of regulatory experience. Through the years, it had been playing an important role in regulating and developing the tourism sector. With a view to tapping the TIC's expertise and strength, the Government would enter into discussions with the TIC to explore its

involvement in the future regulatory regime, and to examine the possibilities of entrusting to it certain non-regulatory public functions, e.g. coordinating the trade in dealing with emergency incidents involving inbound or outbound tours.

36. The Panel in general supported the proposed way forward, and urged the Administration to expedite discussion with the trade on the way forward and the establishment of TIA. The Panel noted that the administration would proceed with drafting a new legislation to replace the current Travel Agents Ordinance (Cap. 218). It was expected that the draft new legislation could be introduced into the Legislative Council in about two and a half years. The Panel called on the Administration to continue to listen to the views of the public and the trade in ironing out the detailed arrangements under the new regulatory regime, and explore with the TIC on its future public functions. The Panel noted that there would be a transition period of at least three years, from now to the enactment of the new legislation. During the transition period, the Administration would continue to adopt the current two-tier regulatory regime, the TAR under the Tourism Commission would step up its surveillance work. The Administration would also engage the TIC and encourage it to continue with its current regulatory efforts.

### Mega Events Fund

37. The Financial Secretary, in his 2009-10 Budget, earmarked \$100 million to assist local non-profit-making bodies to host more attractive arts, cultural and sports events in Hong Kong. The Administration obtained the funding approval from the Finance Committee ("FC") of the Legislative Council in May 2009 to establish the Mega Events Fund ("MEF") for a period of three years.

38. The three-year funding approval for the MEF would expire on 31 March 2012. The Administration stated its commitment to attracting more internationally-acclaimed mega events to Hong Kong to reinforce our image as the Events Capital of Asia. In his 2012-13 Budget, the Financial Secretary proposed to allocate \$150 million to the MEF and extend its operation for five years. The MEF Assessment Committee ("AC") was also invited to study ways of giving the MEF more flexibility to facilitate its effective operation.

### *Proposed two-tier system*

39. At its meeting on 26 March 2012, the Panel received briefing on the Administration's proposal to allocate \$150 million to extend the MEF for five years up to March 2017 and to modify the current MEF scheme into a two-tier system to enhance flexibility and facilitate its effective operation. Tier 1 would be a new mechanism to attract internationally-acclaimed mega events to Hong

Kong, whilst Tier 2 would essentially be an enhanced version of the current scheme which provide funding support to local non-profit-making organizations to host events which had potential to become mega events in Hong Kong, especially those activities which could showcase traditional Chinese culture and local heritage.

40. The Panel supported the funding proposal to extend the operation of MEF under a modified scheme for five years up to March 2017. The Panel, however, also saw a need for MEF AC to focus resources on supporting events which were truly mega; attract more overseas visitors to come to Hong Kong specifically for the events; and strike a balance to ensure public money would be used in a prudent manner despite the proposal to introduce Tier 1 of the MEF scheme to attract to Hong Kong internationally-acclaimed mega events which might be owned/operated by private event management companies.

### Hong Kong Disneyland

41. Hong Kong Disneyland ("HKD") is a long-term investment of Hong Kong in tourism infrastructure in which the Government holds 52% of the shares. The Panel has all along closely monitored the performance of HKD and received annual progress reports on the performance of HKD. In 2010-2011, HKD's attendance reached 5.9 million, a 13% rise over the previous year, with the guest mix of 31% local, 45% Mainland and 24% international. According to the Administration, HKD's total revenue in 2010-2011 was \$3,630 million, 20% higher than the previous year. The earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization were \$506 million, a substantial improvement from \$221 million in the previous year. The additional spending of all HKD visitors in Hong Kong had also increased to \$10.9 billion, as compared to \$9.6 billion in the previous year. The Panel noted that following the FC's approval in July 2009 of the HKD expansion project, the expansion works had proceeded as planned and the first new themed area, Toy Story Land, was opened in November 2011. Grizzly Gulch would be opened in 2012 and Mystic Point in 2013 respectively.

### *Corporate social responsibility and cost control*

42. Panel members called upon HKD to keep up the good efforts to break even and then generate profits, and to strive to achieve the projected attendance while taking care to strike a balance in guest mix. They also called upon HKD to make better efforts to fulfil its social responsibility by employing more persons with disabilities, sponsoring more free visits to the park by children from low-income families, and providing greater fare concessions to the elderly.

43. In response to Panel members' concern about the increase in HKD's

operating cost as well as the time it would take for the investment in HKD to break even, the Administration said that the Tourism Commission would continue to work closely with the Hong Kong Disneyland Management Limited to keep up HKD's good attendance and financial performance. HKD pointed out that a major reason for cost increase was the inevitable increase in staff costs which was directly related to the increase in attendance. This notwithstanding, HKD had been examining various cost control measures in the areas of personnel management, energy management, and procurement and outsourcing.

### Hong Kong Tourism Board Work Plan

44. The Panel received annual briefings from Hong Kong Tourism Board ("HKTB") on its work plan as well as an overview of Hong Kong's tourism industry in the current year and the coming year. The Panel noted that visitor arrivals hit a new record of 41.92 million in 2011, representing an annual growth of 16.4% when compared to 2010. Panel members also noted that HKTB's total proposed marketing budget for 2012-2013 was \$349.8 million, which was \$2 million less than the revised marketing budget for 2011-2012.

45. The total marketing budget for source markets would be \$182.5 million, an increase of 1% over the revised amount for 2011-2012. In respect of market investment, HKTB would focus investment in 20 key markets worldwide, increase investment in non-Southern China regions, strengthen promotional effort in short-haul markets, maintain investment in the long-haul markets and accelerate the development of emerging markets. On measures to address the latest market trends and demands, HKTB would reinforce Hong Kong's brand image through the "Hong Kong. Asia's World City" platform, strengthen digital marketing effort and create impactful TV coverage on Hong Kong through collaboration with major international TV stations. To tap new business opportunities, HKTB planned to promote Hong Kong as the hub for multi-destination travel in the region, boost MICE (meetings, incentives, conventions and exhibitions) arrivals and build cruise demand.

### *Visitor portfolio*

46. Panel members showed appreciation for the many efforts made by HKTB during 2011 to promote Hong Kong, resulting in a significant growth in visitor arrivals. Some Panel members considered the increase in visitor arrivals from the long-haul markets in 2011 by 1.7% too small as compared to that from Mainland China at 23.9%. They noted that due to the poor economy in the United States and Europe visitor arrivals from these long-haul markets had been forecast to drop by 1.9% in 2012. Members expressed concern that Hong Kong might become a Mainland city for Mainland visitors rather than a world-class tourist destination for tourists from all over the world. They

considered it imperative that HKTB should strive to achieve a balanced visitor portfolio. HKTB assured members that it was fully aware of the need to ensure increase in visitor arrivals from the long-haul markets achieve a balanced visitor portfolio, and resources for the purpose would not be reduced.

#### *Protection for visitors*

47. Panel members called for more efforts to combat the malpractice by some Chinese medicinal herbs and dried seafood shops of displaying misleading price indications, which according to the Consumer Council ("CC") had proliferated recently. Both enforcement and publicity efforts should be geared up to halt the trend before Hong Kong's reputation was tarnished to the detriment of visitor growth.

48. The Administration responded that it had all along adopted a two-pronged approach, namely, enforcement and publicity, to combat the above malpractice. Where resources permitted, the Administration would gear up patrols as far as possible and take enforcement actions immediately as necessary. As to publicity, the website of CC as well as the publicity leaflets of TIC and the Tourism Commission all contained details on consumer rights and relevant enquiry and complaint hotlines, and the leaflets would be disseminated at tourist spots as well as border control points to enable visitors to know their rights. Establishments which passed stringent annual assessments showing that they met high standards of product and service quality would also be given Quality Tourism Services ("QTS")-accredited status under HKTB's QTS Scheme. The number of QTS-accredited shops had already exceeded 7 000 covering a large variety. With all these efforts, visitors would have more choices of shops and restaurants that they could trust and a greater understanding of the protection available to them when they shopped in Hong Kong.

#### *Hotel supply*

49. Some members were concerned that the number of overnight visitors had far exceeded that of the increase in hotel rooms in recent years and considered that there was a strong need to ensure sufficient hotel supply to meet the increasing demand. Otherwise promotional efforts to encourage visitors to stay in Hong Kong overnight would become futile. Greater coordination among various Government departments in providing land for hotel development was therefore crucial in providing support for the tourism industry.

#### Panel meetings

50. From October 2011 to end June 2012, the Panel held a total of 13 meetings, including two meetings held jointly with the Panel on Commerce and

Industry regarding the proposal to set up the new Commerce and Industries Bureau under the proposed re-organization of the Government Secretariat, and issues relating to the hotel accommodation arrangements for the Chief Executive's duty visits outside Hong Kong.

Council Business Division 1  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
5 July 2012

**Legislative Council**

**Panel on Economic Development**

**Terms of Reference**

1. To monitor and examine Government policies and issues of public concern relating to economic infrastructure and services, including air and sea transport facilities and services, postal and weather information services, energy supply and safety, consumer protection, competition policy and tourism.
2. To provide a forum for the exchange and dissemination of views on the above policy matters.
3. To receive briefings and to formulate views on any major legislative or financial proposals in respect of the above policy areas prior to their formal introduction to the Council or Finance Committee.
4. To monitor and examine, to the extent it considers necessary, the above policy matters referred to it by a member of the Panel or by the House Committee.
5. To make reports to the Council or to the House Committee as required by the Rules of Procedure.

**Legislative Council  
Panel on Economic Development**

**Membership list for 2011 - 2012 session**

<b>Chairman</b>	Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP
<b>Deputy Chairman</b>	Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun, JP
<b>Members</b>	Ir Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai, SBS, S.B.St.J., JP Dr Hon David LI Kwok-po, GBM, GBS, JP Hon Fred LI Wah-ming, SBS, JP Hon CHAN Kam-lam, SBS, JP Dr Hon Philip WONG Yu-hong, GBS Hon Miriam LAU Kin-yee, GBS, JP Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing, JP Hon Andrew CHENG Kar-foo Hon Vincent FANG Kang, SBS, JP Hon Andrew LEUNG Kwan-yuen, GBS, JP Hon WONG Ting-kwong, SBS, JP Hon Ronny TONG Ka-wah, SC Hon CHIM Pui-chung Hon Starry LEE Wai-king, JP Hon Paul CHAN Mo-po, MH, JP Dr Hon LEUNG Ka-lau Hon IP Wai-ming, MH Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee, GBS, JP Dr Hon Samson TAM Wai-ho, JP Hon Tanya CHAN Hon Albert CHAN Wai-yip

(Total: 23 members)

**Clerk** Mr Derek LO

**Legal Adviser** Mr Timothy TSO