

Legislative Council Panel on Transport
Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways

Overhead Line Incident on MTR Kwun Tong Line
on 10 April 2017

A fault occurred on the overhead line of the MTR Kwun Tong Line (“KTL”) on 10 April 2017, resulting in train service suspension between Kowloon Tong and Kwun Tong stations for around 2 hours and 20 minutes. Service was maintained on other sections of KTL but at reduced frequencies. This paper briefs the Subcommittee on the sequence of events, contingency arrangement, preliminary investigation findings and follow up actions regarding the incident.

Sequence of events

2. At around 6:02 p.m. on 10 April 2017, the overhead line between Kwun Tong and Kowloon Tong stations on KTL (Whampoa-bound) tripped, affecting power supply to that section. The protection system was automatically triggered¹. As a result, train service between Kowloon Tong and Kwun Tong stations on KTL was immediately suspended. When recovering an incident, it has to be carried out in a safe and orderly manner, with safety of passengers and maintenance staff coming first. According to established procedures, the MTR Operations Control Centre (OCC) immediately carried out inspection and recovery with three major steps –

- (1) firstly, OCC communicated with train captains of the seven trains which were stalled between Kowloon Tong and Kwun Tong stations to establish whether the tripping was caused by fault of any individual train. The preliminary assessment was that the tripping was not caused by a train fault;

¹ When an irregularity is detected in the railway system, the protection system will automatically stop the train service, which can only be re-activated after conducting inspection and repair by maintenance staff. The purpose is to avoid the occurrence of more serious incidents and ensure passenger safety, but service disruption or suspension is inevitable in the circumstances. In terms of the power supply system, the protection system will cut off the power supply when it is in unstable condition, such as circuit overload or short circuit. Accordingly, train service will be suspended.

- (2) there are three power supply zones along the section between Kowloon Tong and Kwun Tong stations (see Annex 1). OCC attempted to re-energise the overhead line power supply for the three zones one by one and was successful in re-energising two of them, namely the zone between Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong stations and the zone between Diamond Hill and Kowloon Tong stations. Power supply for the remaining zone (between Kowloon Bay and Diamond Hill stations) could not be resumed. Therefore, OCC narrowed down the cause of the incident to the overhead line of that particular section; and
- (3) maintenance staff was arranged to enter the track between Kowloon Bay and Diamond Hill stations for inspection.

3. In parallel, OCC deployed trains to maintain service at sections where power supply was not affected. During the incident, train service between Kowloon Tong and Whampoa stations was maintained at 10-minute intervals, while service between Tiu Keng Leng and Kwun Tong stations was maintained at 12-minute intervals.

4. After resuming the power supply of two zones, namely between Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong stations and between Diamond Hill and Kowloon Tong stations, OCC arranged 4 of the 7 trains which were stalled in the affected area to proceed to platforms at Lok Fu, Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong stations for passengers to detrain at platforms. Passengers on another train boarded and alighted normally again at Kowloon Tong Station after resumption of power supply at the station. At one juncture, OCC succeeded to temporarily resume power supply at a short section near the platform at Kowloon Bay Station after multiple attempts, so that one train could enter the platform for detrainment. However, this process took a relatively longer period of time, delaying the subsequent inspection to be carried out by maintenance staff on track. This led to longer handling time.

5. Since the power supply for the zone between Diamond Hill and Kowloon Bay stations has yet to be resumed, a train (hereinafter referred to “Train A”) was stalled with two cars into the tunnel and the remaining 6 cars in the platform area of the Choi Hung Station, while the following train (hereinafter referred to “Train B”) was stalled at a location around 30 meters from the Choi Hung Station platform. OCC made a number of attempts to resume power supply for the two trains to proceed to the platform for detrainment, but to no avail. During the process, backup power supply for on-train equipment, including emergency lighting and

ventilation systems, was operational². In around 40 minutes after the incident occurred (i.e. at around 6:42 p.m.), since the power supply for the zone between Diamond Hill and Kowloon Bay stations could not be resumed, OCC decided to detrain the passengers of the two trains in accordance with the safety procedures³ to avoid further delaying the ensuing emergency handling work. MTRCL staff manually opened the platform screen doors at Choi Hung Station and train doors of Train A that were stalled in the platform to detrain passengers. Meanwhile, after confirming as quickly as possible that the overhead line of this section was isolated and no train was on track to ensure track access safety, OCC instructed the captain of Train B to arrange passengers to evacuate onto the track and walk to the platform of Choi Hung Station with the assistance of MTRCL staff. All passengers reached the platform at around 7:30 p.m.. Ambulance had already arrived at Choi Hung Station at the time to convey passengers feeling unwell to the hospital.

6. Meanwhile, maintenance staff confirmed that it would be necessary to conduct detailed inspection of the overhead line along the section between Diamond Hill and Kowloon Bay stations. After ensuring that safety protection measures were in place, four teams of engineering staff comprising three dedicated teams of overhead line maintenance staff and a team of Rapid Respond Unit members with a total of 10 persons were deployed to the track for inspection of the overhead line. Around 30 minutes after entering the track, the maintenance personnel found that two support components on overhead line at the tunnel of a reception track towards Kowloon Bay Depot were loosened, resulting in a slight displacement of a Current Return Wire which caused the tripping.

7. Maintenance staff immediately isolated the faulty overhead line and carried out inspection of the section where train service was suspended in accordance with safety procedures. After confirming that all passengers and other personnel were cleared from the track according to safety check procedures, power supply was resumed for mainline operation and test-run of trains on that section was arranged. Service was resumed upon confirmation of safe and smooth operation. Train service on KTL gradually resumed to normal starting from 8:23 p.m..

² The lighting and ventilation systems of Train B were shut down for 3 minutes because the train captain inadvertently pressed the wrong button.

³ MTRCL arranges detrainment at stations as far as practicable because they are more spacious and more staff members are present to assist passengers. Therefore, MTRCL made every endeavor to resume the power supply for trains to approach the stations. Backup power supply was in place to support emergency lighting and ventilation on trains to operate for at least an hour.

8. The faulty components were immediately replaced by maintenance personnel after close of traffic on that day. Detailed checking was also carried out on the overhead line and track at the concerned section, as well as the pantographs of trains that passed the concerned sections, to ensure safety.

Contingency arrangement during the incident

9. MTRCL has established contingency plans for various kinds of incidents for execution by the staff in different divisions and stations when incident occurs. The contingency arrangement in the event of railway service disruptions is at Annex 2. On 10 April, MTRCL took the following actions according to this plan to minimise the impact on passengers –

(a) Notification and information dissemination

10. At 6:05 p.m. on 10 April (i.e. within 3 minutes after the incident took place), MTRCL notified the Transport Department (“TD”) once the incident was expected to last for 8 minutes or more. MTRCL also notified passenger of the service disruption on KTL via the MTR Mobile App “Traffic News” at 6:10 p.m.. Once MTRCL ascertained that the railway section could not be re-energised within a short period of time and that train service would be disrupted for 20 minutes or more, a “Red Alert” message on major service disruptions was issued at 6:23 p.m. to inform TD and the media of the incident, so that TD could coordinate other public transport operators to strengthen their services. MTRCL also notified passengers of the service disruption and provide information on alternate public transport services as well as free MTR shuttle bus services via broadcasting in stations and on trains; signage inside stations and on the roads, as well as the Service Information Panel near station entry gates.

11. MTRCL further updated the public on the latest train service information via “Traffic News” and the media. MTRCL also made announcement via these channels when the KTL service started to gradually resume at 8:23 p.m..

(b) Manpower deployment

12. During the incident, MTRCL deployed around 300 staff members (including operating and station staff, members of the Customer Service Support Unit and Customer Service Rapid Respond Unit) to assist passengers at various affected stations and major interchange stations of KTL, such as Prince Edward and Mong Kok stations. They assisted in the detrainment of passengers along tracks to reach the platform, summoning ambulances to convey passengers who felt unwell to the hospital, crowd management, guiding passengers to take shuttle buses, etc.

13. During the incident, MTRCL also mobilised some 40 maintenance staff to carry out inspection and urgent recovery work on site.

(c) Free shuttle bus service

14. MTRCL arranged a total of 125 free shuttle buses during the incident, providing service along the section where railway service was suspended (i.e. between Kwun Tong and Kowloon Tong). Around 150 bus trips were operated, carrying more than 8 000 passengers affected by the incident. Details of the free shuttle bus arrangement are at Annex 3. Large panels providing information on shuttle bus service were displayed at affected stations to guide passengers to use the free shuttle bus service.

15. Free shuttle bus service is a supplementary measure to bring passengers to the nearest MTR station outside the affected section of a railway line to continue with their journeys, with a view to relieving passengers' inconvenience. The carrying capacity of shuttle buses is limited and is not for replacing normal railway service. In this regard, during the incident, there were quite a large number of passengers waiting at the free shuttle bus stops and it took time to relieve the queue.

(d) Other public transport services

16. Upon receiving the notification of this incident from MTRCL, in view of the seriousness of the incident, the Emergency Transport Coordination Centre ("ETCC") of TD escalated its operation to Tier 2

mode⁴ and deployed more staff to work in the Centre, to better coordinate other public transport services and formulate traffic and transport contingency plans. According to TD, under the coordination, 30 franchised bus routes strengthened their services during the incident to assist in serving the affected passengers. Details are at [Annex 4](#). At the same time, TD deployed personnel to major affected MTR stations, including Kwun Tong, Kowloon Bay and Kowloon Tong stations, to observe the situation on site and the deployment of shuttle bus service by MTRCL during the incident.

17. Besides, ETCC also made announcement at the Eastern Harbour Crossing and Tseung Kwan O Tunnel to provide drivers with information on road traffic as soon as possible.

Preliminary investigation findings and follow-up actions

18. MTRCL received a letter from the Secretary for Transport and Housing on 11 April 2017 (i.e. the next day after the incident), asking the Corporation to look thoroughly into the root cause of the incident, both to avoid recurrence and to establish if there are any systemic issues of concerns, and to submit investigation reports to the Government. MTRCL is conducting a detailed investigation at the moment. Preliminary findings reveal that the overhead line fault of this incident was triggered because two support components on overhead line at the tunnel of a reception track (near Choi Hung Station) towards Kowloon Bay Depot were loosened, causing a slight displacement of a Current Return Wire. The displaced wire then came into contact with the live part of the overhead line, causing short-circuiting and tripping, hence triggering the protection system to cut off the power supply at the zone between Diamond Hill and Kowloon Bay stations (i.e. zone 2 as shown in [Annex 1](#)). The power supply to the two zones adjoining zone 2, i.e. between Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong stations (zone 1) and between Kowloon Tong and Diamond Hill stations (zone 3), was originally normal. Nevertheless, when short circuiting and tripping occurred in zone 2, there were trains passing through zone 1 and zone 2, as well as zone 2 and zone 3, bridging zones 1 and 3 to zone 2 and causing short-circuiting at these two zones. The protection system thus cut off the power supply for these two zones at the same time to ensure safety.

⁴ Under normal circumstances, ETCC operates round the clock under Tier 1 mode in handling daily minor traffic accidents. If there are small-scale and planned activities, serious road and tunnel accidents or serious or widespread public transport service disruptions, ETCC will escalate its operation to Tier 2 mode and deploy more staff to work in the Centre.

19. MTRCL has put in place stringent systems and procedures for regular inspection, maintenance and replacement of railway facilities, including overhead lines. Regular inspections with equipment of the overhead lines are conducted every one to three months. Close-up inspections and regular maintenance are carried out annually by maintenance staff using elevated platforms. According to MTRCL's records, maintenance staff using elevated platform completed inspection of the overhead line equipment at the concerned section in January this year (i.e. three months ago) and no irregularity was spotted then.

20. The asset life of the concerned overhead-line support component normally lasts for several decades, but the actual duration may be affected by different factors (such as the location of installation, operating environment, etc). The concerned component was installed in the period from 1995 to 1996 and has yet to enter its aging cycle in normal circumstances. The faulty component has been sent to an independent expert for laboratory examination covering various aspects, including the materials, installation and operating environment of the component, in order to establish the cause of the damage. This would take around two months. Meanwhile, there are some 800 similar overhead-line support components installed in similar operating environment in the railway network. The MTRCL maintenance personnel has completed inspection of all these components and confirmed that they are in good conditions.

21. MTRCL is also reviewing the handling of overhead line-related incidents to explore if there is room for improvement in the fault-finding method and procedures so as to expedite the process and to reduce the duration of service disruption in future.

22. Upon completion of the investigation, MTRCL will submit a report to the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department ("EMSD"), providing an account of the cause of the incident and subsequent follow-up actions. EMSD will review MTRCL's report and request MTRCL to take improvement actions accordingly to prevent recurrence of similar incidents. EMSD has also separately engaged an independent expert to advise on the incident investigation. MTRCL will also submit a report to TD on the incident's impact on railway service and the effectiveness of the contingency measures taken. TD will review the report and examine together with MTRCL the service arrangement during the incident, with a view to improving the arrangements (including internal communication and information dissemination) in handling similar incidents in future.


23. MTRCL will set aside \$3 million for this approximately 2-hour-20-minute service suspension under the Service Performance Arrangement (“SPA”). The proceeds will be used for fare concessions in 2018 in accordance with the SPA.

24. MTRCL has put in place a maintenance regime internationally recognised as being high standard. Its asset management system (including regular maintenance of trains, signalling system, power supply system and track) has been accredited with the ISO55001 certification. This standard is internationally recognised as one of the most stringent standards. Independent expert audit is conducted for the asset management system at least once every year, with repair and maintenance work covered. The latest audit was completed in November 2016, confirming that the overall performance of MTRCL’s asset management system satisfies international standards.

25. MTRCL has been providing safe and reliable railway service which is internationally recognised, with the Passengers Journey On-time maintained at 99.9%. In 2016, the number of service disruption incidents of 8 minutes or above due to factors within MTRCL’s control (including equipment failure and human factor) is 117, which is the lowest since the rail merger in 2007. Nonetheless, MTRCL will continue to use its best endeavours to improve service quality. MTRCL apologises to the passengers who have been affected by this major service disruption. As mentioned above, MTRCL will conduct an in-depth investigation into the incident in order to prevent recurrence of incident of a similar nature.

MTR Corporation Limited
April 2017

Power supply zones between Kowloon Tong and Kwun Tong stations



MTRCL's contingency plans for railway service disruptions

Purpose

The MTRCL has drawn up contingency plans for various service disruption situations specific to the needs of individual stations. They are made available to the staff assigned to contingency duties. For information that is of use to passengers, it is made available to them in stations and in the Internet. This note gives an account of the MTRCL's contingency plans for railway service disruptions.

Handling of railway service disruptions

2. When a serious incident happens and is expected to lead to a prolonged suspension of railway services for 20 minutes or more, the MTRCL will issue a "Red Alert" message to inform Government departments including the TD, other public transport operators and media organisations of the incident. Upon notification by the MTRCL, other public transport operators will provide appropriate supportive services as best as they can under the co-ordination of the TD. On its part, the MTRCL will suitably adjust its railway service to minimise impact and arrange free MTR shuttle buses to carry passengers from the affected stations to convenient locations, such as the nearest MTR station with railway service still in operation.

Alert System

3. "Red Alert" is defined as a signal which denotes that serious railway service disruption will continue or is expected to continue for 20 minutes or more, and emergency transport support services from other public transport operators are required. Upon being alerted, public transport operators will urgently mobilise their resources to provide appropriate supporting services as quickly as possible.

4. Prior to the issuance of a Red Alert message, the MTRCL may issue an "Amber Alert" message. "Amber Alert" is defined as an early warning in respect of an incident which may lead to a serious disruption

of service. After receiving this Alert, other public transport operators will alert their emergency unit, get prepared for possible emergency actions which may be demanded for at short notice and keep close contact with the MTRCL.

5. The MTRCL is also required to notify TD within 8 minutes on any service disruption incident which has lasted for 8 minutes or is expected to last for 8 minutes or more. Train service disruption incidents refer to those incidents that lead to a suspension or delay of service at a railway station or a Light Rail stop, or on a section of a railway line.

6. Besides, according to the Mass Transit Railway Regulations (Cap. 556A), the MTRCL shall report to the EMSD any incident that occurs at any part of the entire railway premises and which has a direct bearing on the safe operation of the railway.

Dissemination of information during incident

7. Regarding dissemination of information to passengers, the MTRCL has formulated measures to ensure effective communication with passengers during service disruption, with a view to assisting them to make appropriate alternative travel arrangements. These measures include:

- (a) broadcasting details of the service situation at stations and in trains;
- (b) providing information of alternative public transport service such as franchised bus routes, bus stop locations and free MTR shuttle bus boarding/alighting points on large information displays installed at stations;
- (c) displaying signs from concourse ceilings and at street level to mark routes to free MTR shuttle bus boarding/alighting points when free shuttle bus service is ready;
- (d) during service disruption, using LCD screens installed at visible locations near station entry gates of to provide train service information and other important notices;

- (e) posting railway service disruption message and information on free MTR shuttle bus services on the MTR website and MTR Mobile App “Traffic News”;
- (f) displaying alternative public transport information on maps in the concourse of affected stations; and
- (g) distributing “Rail Service Suspension – Passenger Guide” to passengers.

Operation of train and free MTR shuttle bus during serious railway service disruptions

8. In the event of serious service disruption, the MTRCL will endeavour to minimise the area being affected and provide train service to the farthest extent by:

- (a) reversing trains at designated track sections to maintain train service in unaffected sections;
- (b) diverting trains through supplementary track sections to bypass the affected section;
- (c) diverting trains across lines through designated track sections to reduce the impact of service disruption; and
- (d) diverting trains through spare track sections to reduce the impact of service disruption (for example, when the cross-harbour section of Tseung Kwan O Line is suspended, depending on which section is affected, cross-harbour train service can be maintained via the Service Connection Tunnel of Kwun Tong Line to provide linkage between Lam Tin Station and Quarry Bay Station).

9. The MTRCL has formulated free shuttle bus deployment plans for railway incidents and agreements have been entered into with bus operators for the provision of such services during railway incidents to take affected passengers to the nearest MTR station still under normal operation to continue their journeys.

Operation of free MTR shuttle buses

10. Free MTR shuttle bus service is a supplementary measure to assist passengers to travel to convenient locations. Given the limited carrying capacity of shuttle buses, it is not intended to be a substitute for normal train service. It brings passengers to the nearest station outside the affected section of a railway line where service is disrupted, to enable them to continue with their journeys. Shuttle buses would also stop at stations in the affected section to provide services to passengers.

Activation of free MTR shuttle bus services

11. The number of free MTR shuttle buses and the level of shuttle bus service to be deployed during a railway incident will depend on which section of the railway line is involved and the seriousness of the situation. Generally speaking, according to the agreement between the MTRCL and the Public Omnibus Operators Association (POOA)¹, when free MTR shuttle bus service is needed, the POOA will arrange about 7 buses to provide service within 30 to 45 minutes after receiving the MTRCL's notification; an additional 40 buses, if required, will be deployed within 1 to 1.5 hour; and about 100 buses in total after 2 to 2.5 hours. The actual number of buses to be deployed will depend on the extent of impact to train service and road traffic condition. Depending on the actual situation, the MTRCL may operate additional shuttle buses or modify the operating details of shuttle bus services to suit the need of the affected passengers.

12. Information on the estimated arrival time, locations of and routes to boarding and alighting points of free MTR shuttle buses is included in MTRCL's "Rail Service Suspension – Passenger Guide" which is tailor-made for each station for distribution in the station. The Guide is also uploaded to MTRCL's website (http://www.mtr.com.hk/en/customer/services/needs_index.html).

13. Since the carrying capacity of shuttle buses is far below that of the railway, they can only serve as a support service to assist affected passengers to continue with their journeys. It is not possible for shuttle buses to serve as replacement for the entire railway service. Therefore, lines queuing for such bus service are expected and most passengers may

¹ POOA is the confederation of non-franchised public bus operators in Hong Kong. At present, more than 200 non-franchised operators are members of the POOA, and together having a fleet of about 4 000 buses which accounts for about 60% of the total non-franchised buses operating in Hong Kong.

have to change to other unaffected MTR lines or take alternative public transport services to travel to their destinations.

Manpower Deployment

14. In response to a service disruption incident, the MTRCL staff would be on duty at each MTR station to carry out crowd management duties, make public announcements, issue station notices and help passengers on fare matters according to the established procedures in times of incidents. The number of station staff will be increased as needed.

15. The MTRCL has also established a dedicated Customer Service Rapid Response Unit (“CSRRU”) with around 90 members to provide additional support focusing on customer service on top of the manpower stationed at individual stations. The MTRCL will from time to time review the number of team members of the CSRRU as necessary.

16. Upon calling out the free MTR shuttle bus services during serious service disruption, the Operations Control Centre (“OCC”) of the MTRCL will mobilise team members of CSRRU to affected stations to provide extra support on:

- setting up facilities for the implementation of free MTR shuttle bus services;
- maintaining order at affected stations and free MTR shuttle bus boarding/alighting points;
- making timely reports to the OCC during incidents to facilitate more effective co-ordination with relevant Government departments such as the Police for better crowd management;
- handling enquiries and advising passengers on alternative routes and transport choices; and
- providing guidance and assistance to passengers.

17. Upon notification of deployment, CSRRU team members will proceed to the affected stations by the best available means of transport, including taxi. The first team would likely arrive within 20 minutes in most cases according to past experience. CSRRU team members are easily identifiable in their pink vests.

Regular review and updating

18. The MTRCL will continue to regularly review and update its contingency plans for railway service disruption in consultation with relevant Government departments, in the light of operational experience gained.

Annex 3

**Provision of free shuttle bus service during the overhead line incident
on MTR Kwun Tong Line on 10 April 2017**

Shuttle Bus Service	Free shuttle bus service during the incident		
	Operation details	Start of service	End of service
Route K2 – Plying between Kwun Tong and Kowloon Tong Service hours: from 6:45 p.m. to 9:34 p.m.	Frequency: 1-7 minutes Number of departures from Kwun Tong: 62 Number of departures from Kowloon Tong: 88 Number of passengers carried from Kwun Tong: 2 521 Number of passengers carried from Kowloon Tong: 5 531 Number of buses deployed: 125	First Departure from Kwun Tong: 7:00 p.m. First Departure from Kowloon Tong: 7:04 p.m. Last Departure from Kwun Tong: 9:00 p.m. Last Departure from Kowloon Tong: 9:00 p.m.	Last Departure arriving Kwun Tong: 9:34 p.m. Last Departure arriving Kowloon Tong: 9:33 p.m.

Franchised bus routes with strengthened services during the overhead line incident on MTR Kwun Tong Line on 10 April 2017

Route Number		Origin	Destination	Number of vehicles allocated	Number of additional vehicles allocated
1	1	Chuk Yuen Estate	Star Ferry Pier	18	2
2	1A	Sau Mau Ping (Central)	Star Ferry Pier	28	3
3	3D	Tsz Wan Shan (Central)	Kwun Tong (Yue Man Square)	15	2
4	11	Diamond Hill Station	Kowloon Station	13	1
5	11C	Sau Mau Ping (Upper)	Chuk Yuen Estate	9	2
6	11D	Lok Fu	Kwun Tong Ferry Pier	5	2
7	14	Lei Yue Mun Estate Public Transport Interchange	China Ferry Terminal	14	1
8	14B	Lam Tin (Kwong Tin Estate)	Ngau Tau Kok	5	1
9	15	Ping Tin	Hung hom Ferry Pier Concourse	14	2
10	16	Lam Tin (Kwong Tin Estate)	Mong Kok (Park Avenue)	22	1
11	17	Oi Man	Kwun Tong (Yue Man Square)	15	2

Route Number		Origin	Destination	Number of vehicles allocated	Number of additional vehicles allocated
12	28	Lok Wah	Tsim Sha Tsui East (Mody Road)	14	1
13	38	Ping Tin	Kwai Shing (East)	26	1
14	40	Laguna City	Tsuen Wan (Hoi On Road)	10	3
15	42C	Lam Tin Station	Cheung Hang	31	3
16	74X	Kwun Tong Ferry Pier	Tai Po Centre	42	4
17	89D	Lam Tin Station	Wu Kai Sha Station	27	2
18	98A	Hang Hau (North)	Ngau Tau Kok Station (Circular)	15	4
19	215X	Lam Tin (Kwong Tin Estate)	Kowloon Station	24	1
20	258D	Lam Tin Station	Po Tin	17	2
21	277E	Lam Tin Station	Sheung Shui (Tin Ping)	39	1
22	277X		Luen Wo Hui		3
23	296A	Sheung Tak	Ngau Tau Kok Station (Circular)	8	6
24	290	Choi Ming Public Transport Interchange	Tsuen Wan West Station Public Transport Interchange	11	2

Route Number		Origin	Destination	Number of vehicles allocated	Number of additional vehicles allocated
25	290A	Choi Ming Public Transport Interchange	Tsuen Wan West Station Public Transport Interchange	11	1
26	796C	So Uk	Oscar By The Sea	10	4
27	796X	Tsim Sha Tsui East	LOHAS Park Station Public Transport Interchange	16	1
28	601	Po Tat	Admiralty Station (East)	20	2
29	619	Central (HK-Macau Ferry Terminal)	Shun Lee	23	3
		Shun Lee	Central (HK-Macau Ferry Terminal)		4
30	671	Diamond Hill Station	Ap Lei Chau (Lee Lok Street)	11	1
		Ap Lei Chau (Lee Lok Street)	Diamond Hill Station		1
Total				513	69