

立法會

調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日 開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜 專責委員會

第7次公開研訊的逐字紀錄本

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地點： 立法會會議廳

出席委員

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證人

民航處處長
施高理先生

陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士

民航處總策劃主任
李天柱先生

高級政府律師
區倩芬小姐

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜
專責委員會
Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

主席：

多謝各位出席今天舉行的專責委員會第7次公開研訊。

在未正式開始研訊前，我想提醒各位委員，整個研訊過程必須有足夠的法定人數，即連主席在內共有5名委員。

我想藉此機會再次提醒公眾人士及傳媒，若在研訊進行程序以外披露研訊上提供的證據，將不受《立法局(權力及特權)條例》所保障，因此傳媒應就他們的法律責任，徵詢法律意見。

在未傳召證人民航處處長施高理先生之前，我想徵詢委員的意見。施高理先生已通知專責委員會秘書，他將帶同以下人士出席研訊：他們就是民航處總策劃主任李天柱先生及高級政府律師區倩芬小姐。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許李先生和區小姐在研訊進行期間陪同施高理先生，但他們不可以在席上發言。

如委員對研訊程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊現在開始，並傳召證人民航處處長施高理先生。

(施高理先生進入會議廳，
並由李天柱先生及區倩芬小姐陪同)

主席：

施高理先生，多謝你出席今天的研訊。本專責委員會今天傳召你到本委員會席前，作證和出示與專責委員會研訊範圍有關的文據、簿冊、紀錄和文件。首先，本委員會決定所有證人均須宣誓作供，我將以專責委員會主席的身份負責為證人監督。

你可選擇以手按聖經以宗教式宣誓，或以非宗教式宣誓。請依照放在你面前的誓詞宣誓。

Mr Richard SIEGEL, Director of Civil Aviation (Director of Civil Aviation):

I swear, by Almighty, God that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

主席：

多謝你，施高理先生。

專責委員會現在會處理1998年9月19日的傳票命令證人出示的文據、紀錄及文件。

專責委員會知悉，證人已經根據傳票，提供下列文據、紀錄及文件：

- (1) 施高理先生向新機場調查委員會提供的證人陳述書；
- (2) 就立法會環境事務委員會對飛機噪音所提的問題，政府當局在1998年8月所作出的回應。

施高理先生，你現在是否根據1998年9月19日的傳票，正式向專責委員會出示上述所有文件作為證據？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, Madam Chairman.

主席：

我現在宣布上述所有文件獲接納為向專責委員會出示的證據。

我想提醒各位委員，所有向專責委員會提供的文件均須保密。不過，如果證人就披露其證據及／或文件作出任何申述，則視乎專責委員會在回應其申述時所作的決定，有關證據及／或文件在獲接納為向委員會出示的證據後，可於委員會的公開研訊上被引用。

Mr SIEGEL, it was recorded in the ADSCOM's notes of the special meeting held on 7 November 1997, in Paragraph 3 - this is Paper no. A25 in our files - under Paragraph 3 it is recorded, and I quote:

"DCA had no faith in the top management of AA. The project was driven by PD/AA [that is the Project Director of AA] who always tried to bulldoze his way through. CEO/AA was not in control and the organisation was not functioning as it should. He cited an example of the problems on the software side. Build 1.5 failed to arrive on 3 November as scheduled, and the AA management could not give him a date on which

it would arrive. DCA was worried about systems integration within FIDS and about its integration with other airport systems. There had to be definitive contingency measures in case of failure, but so far AA had only developed crude contingency plans. In his view, for the airport to operate the AODB system had also to be able to talk with AIDB."

And so on and so forth. Now, given that this was recorded in your first meeting, that was the first meeting that you attended as advisor to ADSCOM, what in fact gave you the material for you to formulate that judgment on the top level of management of the AA plus the fact that the system is in a lot of trouble?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Firstly I would point out that I am not an information technology expert. I am not a computer expert. I have never suggested that I am. My views on the time frames were based on my experience running Kai Tak, which I did for 10 years as General Manager, and my involvement in the procurement and installation of a number of systems at that airport, although I readily admit much less sophisticated.

This experience clearly demonstrated to me that a very significant time was needed for trials and testing. I was concerned with the status of the project in November and that this necessary period for testing and trials would not be available.

This position was further confirmed to me by my experience with our air traffic control system at CLK. This is a very sophisticated system and we had experienced software problems in early '96. These were addressed in a very robust manner by the department and the supplier and the programme was on track. However, at that time we had no illusions as to the difficulties of integration and software when dealing with these very sophisticated systems.

So, in the light of my experience with our air traffic system and in the light of my previous experience at Kai Tak I was very conservative in my approach towards systems management and the need to have adequate time for testing and trials, particularly where a large degree of integration was required, integration between the different components of the system. This serves to complicate the software and thus can influence delays. So, on that basis I had a very large discomfort level and that is what prompted that statement.

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL, yes, we realise of course from all the public statements that you made and also from the evidence that you gave to the Commission what your views are regarding the system, FIDS. But here my question really relates to your judgment of the management, the top management of AA. It is in fact quite a serious matter to in fact put to ADSCOM that, as a Board member of AA, you in fact had no faith in the top management of AA and that your view was that the PD was always trying to bulldoze his way through and the CEO was not in control.

Now, these are very, very serious views concerning the top management. Could you please elaborate to this Select Committee on why you came to this view? Obviously what you said about the system could normally be something that you would rely on the management of the organisation to resolve.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Those comments, of course, must be seen in the context of Para. 3, the whole of Paragraph 3, which was related to FIDS. I mean, it was not intended as a general statement, certainly not with regard to the integrity of the individuals referred to. It was said in the context of FIDS, and it was said in the context of FIDS because there had been slippage and I was concerned that the project programme was not under firm control at that time, and that is reflected in my comments. It was not intended as a general statement upon the entire management of the Airport Authority. It was intended in that context and that's what Para. 3 says.

Chairman:

But further, in Paragraph 5, you also made some statement concerning training:

"On training DCA said the programme was behind schedule. Details of the training programme had been worked out but were aborted by delays in the works progress."

That, of course, did not just relate to FIDS, right? It related to works

progress in general, did it not?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That was a comment on a separate issue, the training programme, which was behind schedule. It was a schedule which could presumably have been covered and which had been delayed due to delays in the works programme. That does not necessarily translate into the fact that there was no faith in the entire top management.

主席：

陳鑑林議員。

陳鑑林議員：

主席，施高理先生，你雖然不是"IT"的專家，但你對機場啟用前的準備工夫顯得非常審慎。你其實非常重視後備系統，故此在4月1日，他們提出打算在5月15日作好準備時，你要求將準備就緒的日子提前至5月1日。就此，你其後有否留意該項要求是否得到重視和落實？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, yes, my concerns regarding 15 May is, of course, quite correct. 15 May, the envelope between 15 May and the opening was quite short and I wanted to gain as much time as possible. Hence the proposal that, if it could be done, it should be brought back to 1 May. I believe that was taken on board by management and efforts were made.

陳鑑林議員：

施高理先生，你其後如何跟進此事？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, it wasn't so much follow-up to be done by me. That was the

responsibility of the management to take forward. As I say, I was not responsible for the project or driving the project. The progress of the stand-by system was progressed by management. And from 15 May on, of course, we are working on a 6 July opening. You have well less than 2 months and what they did was very well to put in place.

陳鑑林議員：

主席。施高理先生，我明白你並非直接負責這項工程，但你卻深知，所有系統及工程必須準備就緒，才會使你安心。正如剛才主席亦提及，你在事前非常重視所有工程項目的細節，甚至提出很多寶貴意見。我想了解，據你所知，整個“stand-by”系統曾否進行測試，而你認為你所收到的報告是否準確？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I received assurances. In fact the Board and others received assurances that the stand-by system was in place and operating and would be available, and I accepted those assurances.

陳鑑林議員：

施高理先生，在7月舉行的最後一次會議，即第186次會議席上，有人提及赤鱘角的系統與吉隆坡的系統相若，當時你深表懷疑。當時你是如何說的？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Do you have any reference, Madam Chairman?

陳鑑林議員：

文件第A46號。

主席：

文件第A46號。

陳鑑林議員：

機策會第186次會議。

Director of Civil Aviation:

I am grateful. And paragraph?

Chairman:

The first paragraph.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, I recall, yes, I understood the designer of CLK software had also designed the software for the new airport at Kuala Lumpur, and that I had been informed, yes. How true it was or the extent of its similarity I cannot comment.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，據我所知，施高理先生非常關注吉隆坡機場所出現的問題，當時CPM如何向你解釋兩個系統的不同之處，使你放心？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, it was a general statement which is reflected there in the minutes. It stated that the company had tried to modify the Kuala Lumpur system which was prepared by a local firm in Malaysia. The implication, I believe accurate, was that we were not necessarily talking about apples and apples. I don't know because I don't know the details of the Kuala Lumpur system, and I am not too sure as to how far CPM was aware of the details of the Kuala Lumpur system.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，施高理先生亦知道“stand-by”系統非常重要。我想了解，他在同一次會議中是否知道該系統需要30至45分鐘才能啟動？他認為是否可以接受？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, it wasn't for me to find it acceptable or otherwise, Madam Chairman. I understood that with the stand-by system there would need to be a time difference. 35, 30 minutes was mentioned. But if the data displays were frozen at that time and didn't go off the board, there would be a time lag required to actually change over from one to the other and that was the best that could be achieved. I would have preferred it, obviously, to be a hot stand-by so it was running in parallel. That was better than no stand-by, and we had a stand-by and we were told the stand-by worked and would be in place on 6 July.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，請問施高理先生在同一次會議中如何理解後備系統將會在甚麼情況下運作？當機策會主席告訴你們，原來後備系統不會在主系統有問題的情況下運作時，你認為有沒有問題？

Director of Civil Aviation:

My understanding was clear. We had a stand-by system. We were assured by management that the stand-by system was in place, had been tested and worked and would be available for 6 July. That was my understanding. I did not delve into further details of the mechanics and application. My objective had been to ensure that a stand-by system was available. That was in place, that was achieved.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，我想問施高理先生，據你所知，機策會主席在當天會議席上曾否告訴各位，如主系統損壞，後備系統將不會使用？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I don't recall that, Madam Chairman, to be honest. I don't recall that. I mean, my understanding by 30 June, what we are addressing here at Paper no. A46, was that there would be, there was a stand-by system. It was in place. It had been tested. It would work and was available. And that's where we stood.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，在這次會議中，施高理先生得悉他過去一直所爭取並認為需要提供的後備系統，最終雖然存在，但卻不能使用。我想再問施高理先生，你有否感到被騙或感到有問題？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

It was, I am sorry, Madam Chairman, if I appear repetitive here but we were looking for a stand-by system. We were told that there was a stand-by system. We were told that it was available. We were told it had been tested and we were told that it would be available and operational on 6 July if necessary. I accepted those assurances on that basis. It was not used on 6 July, I understand.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，不是在7月6日沒有使用後備系統，而是在7月4日那次會議席上，機策會主席被新機場工程統籌署署長所引導，向大家表示後備系統將不會在有問題的情況下使用。你是否知道這事？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I was aware there was a stand-by system. A stand-by system had been produced. I was not aware that it would not be used, no, otherwise why would it have been produced, Madam Chairman?

陳鑑林議員：

主席，由於施高理先生表示不知道不會使用後備系統，因此我稍後會再提問其他問題。在6月30日，施高理先生曾指出機場各項工程並非完全竣工。請問施高理先生，作為民航處處長，你當時有何看法？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Which projects, Madam Chairman, are you referring to? What is the reference there that I can use?

陳鑑林議員：

施高理先生曾提出很多問題，除“access control”方面有問題外，地面運輸、空調、保安及消防等方面的工程亦未完成。

Director of Civil Aviation:

What are the references for these, Madam Chairman?

陳鑑林議員：

同樣是文件第A46號。

Director of Civil Aviation:

Paper no. A46, thank you. Paragraph?

陳鑑林議員：

主席，施高理先生有出席該次會議。根據該份文件，工務局局長提出了很多問題，例如根據第8段，電話和傳真線路也未準備妥當。

Director of Civil Aviation:

Para. 8? Yes, that was attributable to the Secretary for Works who did

indeed mention that telephone and fax lines must be working. Yes, he did raise that.

陳鑑林議員：

第14段。第14段提及一些政府系統的問題。

Director of Civil Aviation:

Secretary for Works pointed out that the audio-visual conference facilities in the VIP suite were still awaiting connection. Yes, that is a matter for the record, yes.

陳鑑林議員：

第17、18段也有提及。

主席：

你再複述你的問題。

陳鑑林議員：

主席，在這次會議中，施高理先生從有關部門的報告得悉工程其實仍未完全完成。鑑於啟用日期即將來臨，時間如此緊迫，你是否感到安心還是認為有問題？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I had previously given concerns. Other members had concerns in their respective areas. Assurances were given that these shortcomings which had been mentioned would be resolved. But as I say, I didn't raise these points. In fairness, Madam Chairman, they should be addressed to the Secretary for Works who raised these concerns.

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL, perhaps if I may follow up on a previous question regarding the use of the stand-by system on the 6th as discussed in a meeting of the 4th. In Paragraph 5, Paper no. A46, in Paragraph 5 the last sentence there:

"HIT/ AA said there would be workarounds when a function of a system went down, and the workarounds had been tested and found to work well."

Concerning these "workarounds", are they the equivalent to the stand-by system or not?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It wasn't specific, Madam Chairman, in Para. 5. I think it went further than the stand-by system. My understanding of the stand-by system is that it was providing support for the basic flight information displays. There were other workarounds for communications, for example, between the AA and the control tower where it had been agreed before opening that faxes and other means would be used to pass data. So, he may well have been speaking on a broader basis when he spoke of workarounds. That is a contingency which is not unreasonable. But what he was specifically referring to, I am not sure. I think it went beyond the stand-by.

Chairman:

Well, given your very serious concerns about the unreliability of the FIDS system, given that you have in fact pushed both personally and collectively as the Government team on the AA Board for the stand-by system, probably the key remedy should the main system go wrong on the opening day, and given that you were also supplied the NAPCO paper which was the Update on New Airport Project as at 30 June '98, which is Paper no. A53. A53, if you could turn to that. Page 2 of Paper no.A53.

Director of Civil Aviation:

This only goes up to Paper no. A51. Give me a new file, I'm afraid. Mine only goes to Paper no. A51.

Chairman:

OK.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, I have it.

Chairman:

Paper no. A53, Page 2, about penultimate paragraph, last line:

"The Airport Management Division is not giving priority to the stand-by FIDS at this moment."

You do have that paper? I mean, you did have that paper for that meeting, didn't you? That was in fact supplied to ADSCOM, a NAPCO paper? Given all these, wouldn't you say that it was rather curious that you should have such high confidence level that the whole thing would work out two days before airport opening?

Director of Civil Aviation:

This is not a question of my confidence level, Madam Chairman. This is a question of a very professional management who had been involved with this project for a number of years, who were driving that project and who gave repeated assurances that the various components would be in place and operational. I was informed and others were informed that the stand-by system, as I have said several times, was in place, working and would be available. The third bullet on (a), on Page 2, which I think is what we are referring to:

"The stand-by system is reported as being ready but the change-over time is estimated to be 45 minutes. This is very optimistic and only possible with a large amount of staff resources to effect the switch-over."

So, the system was there in place and available, but because of the progress, and I take you back to the first bullet, during 312 hours of continuous tests it was down for nine percent. This translates to two hours, and the assurances that management gave that the system would be in place, the main system would be operational on 6 July, then the stand-by system, it would seem, was given an appropriate priority. It was not for me to say what priority it should be given. That was a matter for the AA management. They were prioritising and driving this. I wasn't.

主席：

最後一個問題。陳鑑林議員。

陳鑑林議員：

文件第 A46 號第 7 段載述，“HIT/AA explained that during the workarounds, the system would be in the permanent FIDS environment. AA would try to reboot the system. Meanwhile, whiteboards and extra hands will be available to help with directing the passengers in the problem area”。施高理先生，在當時的情況下，你是否知道這段文字意味“stand-by”系統能不能使用，或者為何使用“whiteboards and extra hands”來解決問題？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, I was not told the stand-by system would not be used. I understood it would be available on 6 July. I expected it to be available on 6 July and that was why the arrangements were put in place for its provision. There would be little point in going to the trouble since February of installing a stand-by system if you then didn't use it, or it wasn't available.

Chairman:

I think Mr CHAN'S question is : If they were talking about the stand-by system why would then the white boards and the extra hands be necessary?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I suggest you address that question to the Airport Authority management, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

I think he is asking for your answer because you were at the meeting.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, they didn't say at the meeting and it was not evident in the meeting. I mean, at what level do you use whiteboards? I mean, you may have used them in offices. You may have used them to help direct passengers in a particular problem area. It was not evident that white boards were the saviour of the system. My understanding the saviour of the system would be the stand-by facility which had been put in place and we were told was working.

Chairman:

Well, clearly, according to the record this is said in the context of a crash or a breakdown in the FIDS system, because he says that he explained that during the workarounds, "during the workarounds whiteboards and extra hands", so I don't think anybody would be under any illusion that this is being used in another context. Mr SIEGEL?

Director of Civil Aviation:

In fact, whiteboards were used on the 6th in offices and in particular key areas, for example down by the people-mover and so on. They were used by the ramp handlers. My understanding was clear, and I must emphasise this and say it once again. My position is quite clear. I looked for a stand-by because I was concerned. A stand-by was produced. In the time available it is evident from these documents that it had limitations, but I was told and assurances were given that the FIDS would be used and that the stand-by system was available and had been tested. I was told that. I understood that and that was the basis on which the airport opening was going forward.

主席 :

“I have four names here”。有四位議員正等待提問，他們是陸恭蕙議員、李永達議員、副主席及吳靄儀議員。我們現在所討論的是後備系統，即“stand-by system”。請問這幾位同事是否想就這方面提問？或許我們首先集中討論這方面的問題。吳靄儀議員，你想……

吳靄儀議員 :

我想跟進陳鑑林議員所提問的問題。

主席：

鑑於其他同事正在等候，我容許你提出一條問題。

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr SIEGEL, it may be that in law you are entitled to rely on the reassurance of the Airport Authority, but what this Select Committee wants to test is the attitude of the Government during the run-up to the opening date, whether the Government officials had done all they could.

Now, we would like you to explain why there seems to be a very dramatic difference between your own attitude, the position that you took prior to the 2 January 1998 and afterwards, and also the difference between your attitude as expressed in the ADSCOM meeting and your attitude today. Your attitude seems to be, and I hope I have got you wrong, that provided someone, the Airport Authority, comes up with an assurance that there is a stand-by system, then you don't want to know what is in the stand-by system. You don't want to be personally satisfied that it would work, provided the Airport Authority gives you that assurance. I hope I have got it wrong. Can you explain what you had done to personally satisfy yourself that the system suggested would work and was going to work?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, I am happy to assure Ms NG that she has got it wrong. My attitude is consistent. It has always been consistent and will always be consistent.

As I have said I am not an IT expert. I do not understand the full details and implications of this system. Today I do not understand the full details and implications of this system. My concern was on time frames. It is not a question of myself as DCA abrogating responsibility and leaving it to the AA. Myself and other Government officers were very responsible in voicing our concerns and pushing management and pointing out to management the problems as we saw them.

The responsibility for implementation is with the management. That has always been the case. It is not up to me to decide the form that the stand-by should take or how it should be implemented. I was concerned about time frames. My objective was to ensure that the stand-by was in fact available. And that is what I did. My attitude is entirely consistent. To this day I am not aware of the finer details of that system. Or indeed, I am not aware of the finer details of what actually went wrong on 6 July. And as DCA that is not unreasonable, I believe. I was just one member of the Board. My concerns were on time frames from my personal experience. I flagged up those concerns consistently and I took the matter forward. I was told that a stand-by system would be in place. I pushed for that system and it was available. I was told it had been tested. I was told that it worked. Now, the precise application within a flight information system, which I am told is probably the most sophisticated in the world, it is not for me to understand the finer points of that system, Madam Chairman.

主席：

陸恭蕙議員。

Hon Christine LOH:

Thank you, Chairman. Would it be right to say, therefore, that just prior to airport opening on the 6th, you were comfortable that at airport opening on the 6th that the system would work whether it was the FIDS system or the stand-by system?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, given the statements from Management regarding the tests on the main system, the tests on the main system, given that we had achieved the objective of getting a stand-by system produced and in place, I was much more comfortable.

Hon Christine LOH:

I would just like to re-ask this question but I would like to be absolutely clear that you yourself was comfortable just prior to airport opening that the system somehow would work?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I was comfortable that we had done all we could in the circumstances, yes, and given the assurances from the CEO that it had been tested and was working 98 percent of the time, and that was the main system, and given the fact that we had the stand-by system and given the fact that we had been assured by management that that system would work for an April opening and it was now a July opening, and we were almost therefore three months on, that gave me added comfort. Yes.

Hon Christine LOH:

Thank you.

Chairman:

Yes?

Hon Christine LOH:

Can I just have a "yes" answer, Sir, to my question, not "given, given, given", but "yes, you were comfortable"?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Perhaps, Madam Chairman, could you repeat the question?

Hon Christine LOH:

Yes, that you were comfortable just prior to airport opening that the system would work? That we would not have problems, serious problems?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Serious problems? Yes.

Hon Christine LOH:

The fact that the so-called stand-by system was not used, when did you realise that the stand-by system was not used?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, it was some time after opening because on opening I was very busy with many other more urgent matters. I wasn't involved in analysis of what had occurred, and it was some time afterwards.

Hon Christine LOH:

On the same day?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, it wasn't the same day.

Hon Christine LOH:

Approximately?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I can't say, Madam Chairman, please. I can't say exactly, the exact time and when it was. I became aware at some time after opening that it hadn't been used.

Hon Christine LOH:

When did you become aware of the whiteboard system that was used?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

In the Airport Authority offices on that day, they were using the whiteboard. But the whiteboard that they were using in the Airport Authority

offices, I saw it was being used for collating the information from the control tower and dissemination of information to the ramp handlers.

Hon Christine LOH:

So, when did you realise that the whiteboard system was in fact the stand-by system on the day?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I didn't believe it then that the whiteboard system was the stand-by system on the day and I must say, Madam Chairman, I am not sure to what extent the white board system was used throughout the building because I didn't go throughout the building and look. These are questions which, Madam Chairman, should be addressed to the Airport Authority management, with respect. I was also not ...

Chairman:

Well, Mr SIEGEL, I think that Members are asking for your views. You were very much involved as a Board member of AA, also as an adviser to ADSCOM and also as a member of the task force who was actually asked to come in and help to somehow resolve the problems that arose as a result of the disaster on the 6 July.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Absolutely.

Chairman:

So, I think that it is perfectly fine for Members to pose the questions that they are posing now to you, Mr SIEGEL. I mean, you only need to tell Members as far as you can see, as far as you know, as far your view is concerned. We are not asking you to answer on behalf of other individuals.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, I am grateful for that assurance, Madam Chairman.

Hon Christine LOH:

Yes, please answer the question.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Could you ask it again, please, Ms LOH?

Hon Christine LOH:

At what point did you realise that the whiteboard system that was used throughout the airport was in fact the stand-by system?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I didn't really appreciate it at that time, Ms LOH, no, I didn't, Madam Chairman. I didn't appreciate it. My focus on the 6th as part of that task force was very narrow. It was particularly working with the ramp handlers to get the aeroplanes in the right place and get the aeroplanes moving, because once the aeroplanes were moving and the turn-arounds were being affected, then the rest would follow on, and that was my focus. I was, it was not evident to me that the white boards were in fact the stand-by system, no.

Hon Christine LOH:

Would it be possible to therefore say, as somebody who was intimately related to this, the airport opening at least, that no one perhaps knew exactly what was happening where?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I wouldn't say that, Madam Chairman, no.

Hon Christine LOH:

Then there were other people who should know? Is that what you were saying? That you didn't know but other people must know the extent of the problem on the day?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Correct.

Chairman:

Do you know now why they did not use the stand-by system?

Director of Civil Aviation:

As you can imagine, Madam Chairman, I have asked. Yes.

Chairman:

What was the answer? We are very interested to know? What is your understanding of why the stand-by system has not been used and do you accept that explanation, Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

The explanation that I was given when I asked was that the FIDS, the main FIDS went down and they tried to re-establish the main FIDS. This is what I have been told. And then to try and start the stand-by was in their judgment, could have destabilised the main FIDS even more. Now, that was a judgment which they made. That's what I have been told. Whether, how valid it is, with respect, I think that is not for me to say, Madam Chairman. I can't say that because I am not that close to it.

Chairman:

I think that is an answer, right.

Hon Christine LOH:

But just one final question. I get the feeling that the witness is surprised with that answer?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Disappointed, Madam Chairman.

Hon Christine LOH:

Thank you.

Chairman:

Let's say you certainly did not expect that answer?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, I didn't.

主席：

李永達議員。

李永達議員：

施高理先生可否看一看文件B29，即機場管理局的會議紀要。施高理先生，你有否出席這次會議？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, Madam Chairman.

李永達議員：

施高理先生，你可否看一看文件第1.5段。這段最後三行指出“Mr OAKERVEE”，即項目工程總監說：“since more than 90% of the construction works had been completed, henceforth, the risk of failing to meet the April 1998 opening date diminished day after day”。當時你是否聽過這段說話？

Director of Civil Aviation:

It is a matter for the record, Madam Chairman.

李永達議員：

在這份會議紀要的另一段，即第1.18段，亦記錄了項目工程總監柯家威先生的說話：“Mr OAKERVEE said that he had gone through the works programme and had been inspecting the site on a daily basis. He felt that the contractors and subcontractors had the initiative to finish works in time for April 1998 opening”。你在該次會議席上亦聽到這保證，是不是？

主席：

是不是1.9段？

李永達議員：

1.18段。

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, Madam Chairman, I did, yes.

李永達議員：

在1.19段的中段記錄了機場管理局行政總監董誠亨先生的說話：“The Chief Executive Officer said that the Management was highly confident in achieving the targeted April 1998 opening date. It was fully aware that possible problems might arise and was prepared to expeditiously resolve them along the way. He concluded that the staff members and business partners were all dedicated to meet this target”。施高理先生曾否在會議中聽過這段說話？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I was there and heard the words. They are a matter for the record, of the record, yes.

李永達議員：

我想問施高理先生的第一個問題是，在這次會議中，負責工程的柯家威先生和機場管理局行政總監董誠亨先生均給予施高理先生十足的保證，表示機場可以在4月啟用，為何這保證仍不能令你放心？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, indeed those assurances were given. They were very strong assurances given by management that the airport would be ready for an April opening. Most of these comments related to physical works, particularly the comments by Mr OAKERVEE. My concern was on the FIDS system itself. And I continued to have doubts on that time frame for April for the FIDS system.

李永達議員：

主席，施高理先生可否說明他有否在會議中對“FIDS”系統提出疑問？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I can't recall if it was mentioned. I mentioned training in Paragraph 1.12. I also mentioned training again in Paragraph 1.13. FIDS was a concern, a constant concern, if it wasn't mentioned specifically then, because December had been mentioned as a date, I recall, for completion of a software build. There had been slippage. We were then, I think, working on 15 January, as another target date for a milestone for FIDS. And then it was going to be 15 February. So, we were in a process of progression towards completion of the FIDS, but the focus of that particular meeting was on the physical works as has been stated and I mentioned training. That was my focus at that particular meeting. In fact, Madam Chairman, I think it is probably the only meeting I didn't mention FIDS!

李永達議員：

施高理先生，即使機場管理局的行政或管理層已作出保證，你也不一定會接受，對嗎？你是否認為即使有關方面作出保證，你也不會無條件地接受這保證？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I was not in a position not to accept assurances in respect of the physical works because I had no involvement with the physical works programme and I am not a civil engineer. So, I accepted the assurances as did others, I am sure, on the state of progress of the civil works.

李永達議員：

主席，施高理先生說，除了我剛才所提及的會議外，他每一次開會也會提到關於“FIDS”的問題。我想請施高理先生看一看文件第B28-9。

主席：

甚麼文件？

李永達議員：

文件B28-9。

主席：

文件B28-9。

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have it.

李永達議員：

你看一看第3.12段。這一段的中段提到“the Director of Civil Aviation on systems and related training would be held tomorrow afternoon”。施高理先生，這一段是說些甚麼的？

Director of Civil Aviation:

This was a meeting which I chaired, Madam Chairman, at the CAD headquarters and related to systems in general and their status, the interface between CAD systems and the AA, air traffic systems and the AA, and the training related to those. That meeting took place and was held, and out of that came recommendations and a position from myself and the Department that contingencies of some form were needed to be in place because there were concerns on time frames.

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, can I have the reference again, please?

Chairman:

It is Paper no. B28-9.

李永達議員：

B28-9，對不起。

Hon Margaret NG:

Paragraph?

Chairman:

Paragraph 3.1.2., Ms NG.

吳靄儀議員：

3.1.2，thank you madam。

李永達議員：

主席，施高理先生是否同意，他並沒有在這次會議中提到關於“FIDS”的問題？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I did mention FIDS.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

You did mention?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Is this November? Yes, this was a Friday. I think it was a Friday afternoon. Yes, FIDS were mentioned at the meeting.

李永達議員：

在文件中的哪部分提及？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Sorry, Madam Chairman, this is a reference, these are the minutes of the meeting of the Authority Board which referred to the meeting. The meeting was not an Authority meeting. It was a CAD meeting which I chaired in CAD headquarters.

李永達議員：

主席，我想問的問題是，施高理先生在另一個委員會的研訊中提及你自己的經驗，當時你多次重申你並不是資訊科技專家，很多對系統方面的認識也是憑經驗累積得來。你提及你對處理民航處系統很有信心，因為這系統有6個月的測試過程。你曾否說過這些話？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I did indeed, Sir, yes, Madam Chairman.

李永達議員：

即是說，憑你個人的經驗和你對民航處系統的瞭解，進行為期6個

月的測試會令你有更大的信心和比較舒服，“comfortable”一點的，是不是？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes. Madam Chairman, perhaps if I could illustrate this with the time frames for our air traffic system. We started the integration of the various systems. They were installed and we started the integration of them in January '97, I believe. That work continued through the Spring and Summer of '97 and the system was commissioned in October '97. That was after a period of acceptance, trials and evaluation, and between October '97 and April '98, which was of course the original opening date for our programme, we had a period of operational evaluation and working-up and training. So, that was the time frame that we had and we stuck to. And Madam Chairman, we needed it.

李永達議員：

施高理先生，“FIDS”系統令你感到擔心，是否由於沒有足夠時間進行測試，所以不能令你放心？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Correct.

李永達議員：

施高理先生，你可否再看一看文件B33第2.2.6段。這次會議在2月26日舉行，施高理先生你也有出席。第2.2.6段最後4行是這樣記錄的：“The Director of Civil Aviation pointed out that the experience of Kai Tak showed that to run in a stand-alone systems required some three or four months. He reiterated that a decision should be made to proceed with the fall-back plan”。這段話你說得很清楚。

Director of Civil Aviation:

Right.

李永達議員：

施高理先生，你是一個很謹慎的人，所以即使是一個後備系統，你也覺得應該有3至4個月時間完成這個系統並進行測試，是不是？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, yes, indeed, that's the idea and that's what at that time we hoped we might have. You must remember that this was February '98 and the airport opening date was then July. Perhaps, this is a very important meeting, Madam Chairman, perhaps if I could take you back to what prompted this position and my comments at Paragraph 2.2.5?

There was a presentation on the flight information display and this is referred to at Paragraph 2.2.3, and it was evident that the FIDS was not progressing at that time as well as it should have done. I was concerned at that, and at the reference at Paragraph 2.2.5, which stated that: I asked management if he could guarantee that the systems would be operational on 6 July if the stand-by option was pursued. Considering the doubts on the matter, that was the doubts of management, it would be strongly advisable to give the go-ahead signal for the fall-back plan at this meeting, that was the February meeting, rather than wait until 19 March, which was the next Board meeting. I didn't want to waste any more time. He emphasised that it was necessary for management to ensure members [assure members, that should be] that the basic function of the system would be operational on airport opening.

This was and always has been my primary objective, to ensure there was a basic operational system on airport opening. The Board then gave approval for the management to plan the stand-by system and to come back to the Board on 19 March with the details, so no time was lost, and that action was taken. As I said in Paragraph 2.2.6:

"DCA pointed out the functions of the back-up system should be as basic

as possible."

And that was taken forward at that meeting. It was an important meeting.

李永達議員：

主席，我想進一步跟進問題。施高理先生，你是否記得這後備系統的測試在何時進行？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I believe the first components were in late May, I believe, so if I recall. That was their target at the time, for late May, end of May.

Chairman:

Mr LEE is asking you for the actual time, not the target.

李永達議員：

主席，這點並不重要，施高理先生亦清楚記得一部分測試是在5月底進行，而正式的全面測試則在6月中進行，是不是？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes correct.

李永達議員：

你在這會議中說希望有3至4個月時間測試，而你直至在6月6日與“ADSCOM”開會時才知道全面測試要到6月中才可進行，這是否與你的期望相差很遠？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, the progress had been made. The system which had been demonstrated was relatively simple, and I was told that it was working. And if it was working and working satisfactorily I greeted that news very happily. I was very pleased that it was working. I was told that it was working.

Chairman:

When were you told that it was working?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I can't recall the exact date, Madam Chairman. It was during June. I must admit I don't have total recall of all these dates and times.

李永達議員：

主席，可否進一步跟進這問題？在6月6日機策會的會議中，你經常對另一個委員會說，你是一個會出示紅旗的系統，“you flag”，即是一遇到問題你便會“flag”。

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

李永達議員：

那你在6月6日曾否出示紅旗？換句話說，你在2、3月的機場管理局會議中說希望有3、4個月時間測試後備系統，但直至6月初你才知道這系統會在6月中才開始測試，當時你有沒有出示紅旗？

Director of Civil Aviation:

3 to 4 months is desirable in a perfect world. It can be done in a shorter time. I was told that it had been achieved in a shorter time and I was somewhat relieved at that news. As you said earlier, I am extremely conservative.

李永達議員：

主席。我覺得施高理先生是一個很謹慎的人，在2月時你覺得需要3至4個月時間來測試後備系統你才會“舒服”，但為何突然到6月初，當你知道只剩下3個星期進行測試時，你仍覺得“舒服”？是甚麼令你轉變態度？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

In March, when the Board, when it went forward after months of planning, April, May, June, July, that's only three or four months anyway, and I knew that in February. So, my statement in February it would take three or four months was a "nice to have" and was desirable. I mean, I would have liked to have had more. I would have liked to have more time for everything. It was, three or four months was never a given. It was never set in concrete. Three or four months was desirable and when I was informed that it had been achieved in early June, or June, I was relieved and pleased.

李永達議員：

主席，我想問的問題是，施高理先生何時才知道中央人民政府的代表會出席新機場的開幕典禮？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

When I read it in the newspaper, Madam Chairman.

李永達議員：

主席，你可否要求施高理先生看一看文件A35？

Chairman:

Paper no. A35。

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have it.

李永達議員：

施高理先生，你有否出席這次會議？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I attended, yes, I was, bottom line, I was there and I was in attendance.

李永達議員：

你是否在這次會議結束後才離席，而不是中途離開？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Perhaps if I could explain all these meetings ...

李永達議員：

主席，我不想問其他問題，我只想問這問題。你是否出席整個會議，並沒有中途離席，亦沒有早退？

Director of Civil Aviation:

The format of these meetings, Madam Chairman, perhaps if I could explain it as follows. You are generally called in, if you are in attendance for a specific agenda item, for that specific item. I was shown as "in attendance" there. I do not recall whether I was there for the full meeting or whether I was called in for a specific agenda item. I simply do not recall to be honest with you, but please ask the question, of course.

李永達議員：

施高理先生，根據這些文件的慣例，如果你有出席會議，但又中途離席，這些文件一定會註明這點的，你是否同意？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

李永達議員：

你可否看文件最後那段，即第47段。

主席：

47段。

李永達議員：

“Airport Opening Ceremony”。在這段的第3行，“she asked whether”，“she”即是“Mrs Anson CHAN”，“she asked whether it was possible for the leaders from the Central People's Government to depart from Chak Lap Kok. DCA said that technically it was not a problem”。我想問施高理先生，你並不是從報章得知有中央人民政府的代表到來，而是從會議中得知這消息，對嗎？

Director of Civil Aviation:

There was speculation in the media, Madam Chairman, regarding who was going to open the airport from an early time. When that was asked on a technical basis, whether they could depart from Chek Lap Kok, technically it was not a problem because technically it was not a problem.

李永達議員：

施高理先生，所以你不是從報章得知中央人民政府的代表會到來，而是在會議中已經知道的了，是不是這意思？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I probably read it in the press before that time, Madam Chairman.

李永達議員：

主席，我想多問一個問題。施高理先生，你在會議末段提出這個問題後，根據你個人的見解，當時的情況是否已顯示更改機場啟用日期已經是一個完全不能考慮的選擇？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Ah, I see the point. In March, that is a hypothetical question, Madam Chairman. I think it was possible to change the opening date in March, yes, I do. And I would like to make a point here because I see the questioning. The decision for the 6 July date in all the meetings that I attended was driven by the practical considerations of opening the airport, specifically the railway. At no time at any meeting I was present was there a statement that the opening of the airport should be influenced by the presence of individuals. The date of the 6th was driven by the railway and other practical considerations, and I will be happy to outline those for the benefit of Members of this Committee.

李永達議員：

主席，我想進一步提問。我很同意剛才吳靄儀議員所提出的問題。我看畢文件後，發覺當決定機場應該在4月至7月之間啟用時，施高理先生的態度是非常率直的，並多次出示“紅旗”，所以每次會議也有很多“紅旗”。但當我再查看機策會或機場管理局的文件時，發現你減低了出示“紅旗”的速度和次數。所以我想問一個問題，其實在3月21日的會議中，機策會主席陳方安生女士問了這問題後，你個人是否認為根本無法更改7月6日的機場啟用日期，所以你只能夠盡量做到最好，盡量要求進行更多測試？你一直要求用6個月時間測試系統，而在3月時你亦提出需要3個月時間，但最後測試時間只有3個星期，較你原本要求的時間縮短了很多，於是你覺得無可奈何，覺得已經沒有選擇了，是不是這樣？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Absolutely untrue. Absolutely untrue. Madam Chairman, I will make the point. The objective of opening that airport was that it would work and it would be a world-class airport for Hong Kong. The delay from April to July was driven by the railway and other factors. If, I believe that if it had been considered by Government that it was necessary to further delay that airport to avoid the events that we are now going through, including this Select Committee and the events of the 6 July, I believe it would have been delayed.

李永達議員：

主席，我沒有進一步的問題了。

Chairman:

Could I just ask about the meeting for further clarification. Paper no. B33, that is the February meeting of AA that Mr LEE was quoting. It is Paper no. B33. We were looking at the paragraphs concerning the decision to go ahead with the stand-by system. Paragraph 2.2.15 on Page 7.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have it. The paragraph again, Madam Chairman?

Chairman:

Paragraph 2.2.15, which is on Page 7.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, I have it.

Chairman:

Can you please clarify for Members the last 4 lines:

"The Secretary for the Treasury pointed out that the additional system to be set up was for stand-by and not fall-back situations. The Director of Civil Aviation endorsed this comment and urged that the matter be addressed at this meeting."

Now, we know the consequences of the last part of your statement. It was addressed and the Board approved the go-ahead, but what about that point, "the additional system to be set up was for stand-by and not fall-back situations." What does that mean?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That it was not a longer term back-up facility, stand-by facility. It was a stand-by which would be available for 6 July. I think that was the context in which that comment was said, although it isn't stated there. The additional system to be set up was for a stand-by for 6 July, because we were talking about opening here and that was how I interpreted it and that's why I endorsed it.

Chairman:

Can you confirm that even in the ADSCOM meeting on 6 June, the testing of the stand-by system has not been completed and in fact the tests didn't take place until 20 June. Through your evidence to the Commission, it was mentioned that in fact the test was eventually done between 18 and 20 June?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, if that's the record then, yes, that's what happened.

Chairman:

So, it means that there were only 2 weeks between that and the airport opening. Now, I don't seem to find it anywhere in our records, but is there any record that that test has been satisfactorily concluded on 20 June? Were you satisfied that the stand-by system was satisfactorily concluded, given that you were so concerned about the stand-by system?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I was indeed relieved when we were told that it was satisfactorily

concluded and that the stand-by system worked.

Chairman:

Can you perhaps supply us with the paper that in fact proves that? Maybe not now. You can supply it after the meeting.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I will endeavour to ascertain whether that is in writing and who has that but it is most likely to be an Authority source. It is certainly not a Civil Aviation Department source. So, I think that document should be obtained from the Airport Authority, Madam Chairman.

主席：

劉江華議員是否想問有關“stand-by”的問題？

劉江華議員：

是。

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

主席，剛才施高理先生不斷重複兩個觀點。第一，他不是專家；第二，後備系統等某些問題是機管局的責任。施高理先生，其實你還擔當其他兩個角色的，第一個角色是機場管理局董事，你是否承認這點？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, indeed, Madam Chairman.

劉江華議員：

機場管理局董事的職責是否包括確保機場管理局所監察的範圍能有效地運作？你的角色需否承擔這責任？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, as a member of the Board we have a collective responsibility to further the objectives of the Authority and to ensure they are achieved, yes.

劉江華議員：

主席，我不是想問他這是否集體的責任，那當然是一個集體，但我想問你個人是否有責任監察機場能否順利運作？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Sorry, perhaps that was a slip, Madam Chairman. Both collectively and individually we have a responsibility to further the interests of the Authority.

劉江華議員：

除了參閱機場管理局管理層的報告外，其實“NAPCO”新機場工程統籌署每周也會向你提交報告，是嗎？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Not weekly reports to DCA, no.

劉江華議員：

主席，我想問他有沒有看過“NAPCO”這些資料，即每周報告？是在文件A80之前，對不起，是文件C80之前的資料。

主席：

你是否指機策會的報告？

劉江華議員：

不錯，是機策會的報告。

Chairman:

The NAPCO SIT-REP to ADSCOM, as an adviser of ADSCOM you would receive them, wouldn't you?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I did not get, I did not get them, no I did not get the NAPCO SIT-REP to ADSCOM, no. Separately, no, I did not. Sorry, the only NAPCO documents I received was the multi-progress report which is an ACP document, isn't it, Sir?

劉江華議員：

主席，可否讓他看“NAPCO”6月27日、6月20日的報告，即C79和C80號文件？我想問他曾否看過這些報告。

主席：

Paper no. C79, C80. Volumn II.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have Paper no. C79.

Chairman:

Have you seen these reports?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I don't recall seeing this report in this form. No, I don't.

劉江華議員：

若你沒有看過，那麼你有沒有看過文件C12的每月報告？6月份的

報告？這是每月的報告，你有沒有看過文件C12這一份報告？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Paper no. C12 is not in my file, Madam Chairman. The flag is, but the ...

劉江華議員：

C12。

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have it on another file, Madam Chairman, yes.

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

施高理先生，你曾經看過這份每月報告，是嗎？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

This is the one signed by Mr Tudor WALTERS?

劉江華議員：

是，你曾經看過這份報告？

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, I haven't.

劉江華議員：

你說你有看每月的報告？你看的是甚麼報告？

Director of Civil Aviation:

The monthly reports I was referring to, Madam Chairman, are the monthly ACP progress reports, not the monthly reports to ADSCOM. This document signed by Mr Tudor WALTERS I have not seen before.

劉江華議員：

施高理先生，你說你每月也有看“monthly ACP report”，這不就是“monthly ACP report”嗎？你曾經看過這些報告，是不是？你收到這些報告，那你為甚麼沒有看過？

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, that is not correct, Sir. I have not received these reports. This is not the report I am referring to in the monthly ACP report, which is an entirely different format and deals with the ACP programme in general. This seems to be a specific and is, I don't recall seeing this one. No, this is signed by Tudor WALTERS dated 24 October? No, I have not seen this before, Sir. I have not. It is not a question of me receiving papers and not reading them. I have not received this before for the record, Madam Chairman.

劉江華議員：

我感到有些莫名奇妙，我剛才引述的文件全部顯示“FIDS”和後備系統也出現了問題，直至6月底也有問題出現……

主席：

施高理先生剛才說，他沒有收到你所說的兩份文件。

劉江華議員：

我知道。

主席：

你最好看一看他收到的是哪一份文件。

劉江華議員：

我問的問題是，那些是政府的報告，他作為政府人員，他可以說沒有看過或者不知情……

主席：

他說沒有收過。

劉江華議員：

我明白。“NAPCO”的人員有沒有直接對你說“FIDS”並不妥當，後備系統也不妥當？直至6月底，政府的內部人員有沒有對你說過這一點？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

So, then we are perfectly clear here, Madam Chairman, we are not labouring under any confusion. I have in my hand here a document which reads, it is headed "Formal Government Responsibilities relating to the CLK Opening" signed by Mr Tudor WALTERS dated the 24 October 1997. This one, is the one which, this is what we are referring to, is it?

Chairman:

Which flag number?

Director of Civil Aviation:

This was the one I didn't have in my file, which was I think Paper no. C12.

Chairman:

Paper no. C12, yes.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Now, if that is the document we are referring to I have not seen it before.

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, my Paper no. C12 is quite a different document.

Chairman:

This is the one, C12.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Oh, that is different. This is the monthly progress report. As you can see, Madam Chairman, it is headed "Airport Core Programme". Yes, I do get this document.

Chairman:

OK.

劉江華議員：

說得很清楚，你的確是看過這份文件。文件第C12號第1.1的第2段清楚指出，這航班資料顯示系統有很多失敗之處。你看過這報告，而你過往亦很清楚瞭解到不能盡信機場管理局的話。為何你在6月時對他們充滿信心，只要他們認為沒有問題，你便接受呢？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Thank you. I had this paragraph. Yes, I do see that. "A number of FIDS systems operational and display problems continue to be noted." Yes, well, that would not indicate that on 6 July we are going to have a complete crash. And also we had the back-up, the stand-by system which I had been told was, had been working and was satisfactory. We also had the assurances of the management that the FIDS was 98 percent satisfactory. With a system of this sophistication one would expect problems. I would have been extremely surprised if any system worked a hundred percent continually before

opening, particularly of this sophistication. But that statement in the second paragraph, or third paragraph, does not indicate that it is going to totally fail on 6 July.

劉江華議員：

從這些紀錄，你覺得是否已有跡象顯示機場啟用當日不會很順利？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, no. There are problems. You have teething problems, but there is nothing from this statement, in this report to indicate that there would be a failure of the magnitude which was experienced on 6 July.

劉江華議員：

我想問施高理先生，當後備系統進行測試時，民航處有沒有職員在場監察測試？這不一定是你本人，但你有沒有委派職員到場監察？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, firstly it would have been wrong for CAD to participate in the testing of an AA system of this nature. We have our own responsibilities. Our electronics engineers were also totally committed to bringing on line one of the most sophisticated air traffic control systems in the world at that time, and doing it very successfully. So, firstly it was not our role. The AA had a very experienced team and the support of their suppliers and sub-contractors to ensure that this system was operational viable. And they told us, me personally, the Board and ADSCOM, that this objective had been achieved.

劉江華議員：

主席，我的問題不是這樣，但我稍後會跟進你提供的答覆。我的問題是，當他們進行測試時，你有沒有委派職員監察他們的測試？你可以回答說沒有。

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, and it was correct that I did not do so.

劉江華議員：

請問施高理先生，機場客運大樓的各項運作或航班資料顯示系統是否與貴處負責的航空交通系統全無關連，或完全不受影響？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, in essence yes. Our air traffic control's computers and systems are entirely separate from the AA's computers. The only interface that we have is in terms of the information technology where we feed data to them for estimated times of arrival for aircraft and they feed to us the parking positions of the aircraft. But in terms of the safety of air traffic control, the radar computers for controlling aircraft, that is totally separate.

劉江華議員：

主席，施高理先生亦同意，如"FIDS"或“stand-by”系統發生問題，也會對該處負責的工作造成影響。

Director of Civil Aviation:

As I said we have an interface with the AA with regard to the IT and information aspects.

劉江華議員：

因此，對於你剛才指稱這方面是機管局的責任，我們是不會理會的。作為民航處處長，你應否採取這樣的態度？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, Madam Chairman, that is an entirely proper attitude. It is not my

responsibility to involve my staff in AA systems which are the responsibility of the Airport Authority, particularly to divert, to dilute our very tight resources when they are involved in bringing on-line and making operational our ATC systems.

The interface between the AA and the Civil Aviation Department are minor and relate purely to the provision of estimated times of arrival on our part, and on their part provision of aircraft parking positions. Those are the limits of our IT and computer interfaces. That does not justify the dilution of my electronic engineers' resources to participate in their activities. They have their suppliers. They have their sub-contractors. They have their own IT departments, and it is clearly and plainly their responsibility, and thus it should remain.

劉江華議員：

主席，我要跟進的是，就該處所負責的系統而言，若施高理先生你確定所有後備系統均須在5月1日準備就緒，但該等系統在4月30日仍在設計階段，你可否接受這種情況？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, when the stand-by system was first tabled and, well, when it was first discussed in February and then I believe in March, I said, and the date of 15 May was mentioned, I suggested that we should if possible bring it back two weeks as an objective. That was at the design stage, purely in the interests of saving time.

Chairman:

I think, Mr SIEGEL, that was not the question. Mr LAU, could you please repeat your question?

劉江華議員：

就你的工作範圍而言，按照原定計劃，某個系統(包括後備系統)必須在5月1日準備就緒，但在4月30日，該系統仍在設計階段，你可否

接受這種情況？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, 1 May was not the target, Madam Chairman. It was 15 May. And therefore it is a hypothetical question. If you ask me, I would like to bring it forward and I would like to expedite it as any project manager would.

劉江華議員：

這並不是一個假設，情況確實如此。5月1日這個日期是施高理先生你在機策會會議席上提出的，當時與會各人均表示同意，機策會主席亦贊成。但後來，機管局所提交的文件顯示設計階段延至4月30日才結束。為何施高理先生你仍能接受這種情況？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, I raised 1 May because it was two weeks before 15 May, which was their target date. They said 15 May. I said "if you could do it, bring it forward two weeks, if it can be done." That was an objective. That was agreed by ADSCOM. Now, so 1 May was not given, was not a date. It was an aspiration, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL, I think Mr LAU'S point is that it was an objective which was not met and that, instead of completing the task, not only part of the task but in fact finished, the design. So, he is asking you what your attitude is towards this delay?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It was not, I suggested bringing it forward by two weeks. It was not a target which was set in concrete. It was an idea. If it wasn't possible due to practical considerations, then it wasn't practical. I raised it at a meeting. I had no knowledge of how practical that extra two weeks, bringing it forward two weeks would be. It was an objective which I proposed. 15 May was the date that management proposed in practical terms, and if that wasn't achieved then what would I have done? I would have looked to improve on that date as far as I could have done, and I'm sure that's what they did, Sir.

劉江華議員：

正如你所說，你是為了爭取較多時間才提出5月1日這日期，但這肯定是機策會各委員所同意的日期。你仍未回答我的問題，即你為何接受4月30日為設計階段的最後日期？你為何不提出此點？

主席：

他已回答你的問題。他答稱，他希望於5月1日完成，但若未能完成，亦別無他法，唯有繼續盡力工作。至於你能否接受這個答覆，則是另一回事。

劉江華議員：

主席，在同一次機策會會議席上，陳方安生女士請施高理先生……

主席：

哪一次會議？

劉江華議員：

4月1日。根據文件第A37號第23段，陳方安生女士請施高理先生與董誠亨先生合作“看看”這個系統。

主席：

哪一段？

劉江華議員：

文件第A37號第23段。該段指明陳太支持你的觀點，認為系統應在5月1日準備就緒，她並請董誠亨先生與你一同“看看”這件事。你如何理解這句說話？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

That's my point, Madam Chairman. CS asked, I raised the possibility of bringing it forward by two weeks because it was an aspiration, it was a desirable thing to do, and CS said "yes, go and look into that with CEO". But it was evident that the amount of work involved that this aspiration wasn't feasible.

劉江華議員：

我想問的是，你如何理解“請你們一同看看後備系統在5月1日準備就緒這件事”？所謂“看看”是甚麼意思？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Very clearly, Madam Chairman, she agreed that it was desirable to bring it forward two weeks if it could be done and she asked me to take that forward with the CEO to establish whether it could be done. And subsequently, because of the amount of work involved it was found it couldn't be done.

劉江華議員：

根據你的理解，你後來有否與董誠亨先生不斷“看看”後備系統？根據這次機策會會議，這是你的責任。

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, I followed it up with their HIT staff. I mentioned it to them and they came back to me very clearly and said that, with the amount of work involved, it couldn't be brought forward those extra two weeks. And I accepted that because they were the professionals who were producing the stand-by system. And it is evident from the length that they were right. They couldn't do it by the 1st.

劉江華議員：

主席，施高理先生表示曾主持一次民航處內部會議，討論系統互相協調的問題。我最後想請施高理先生提交有關文件，特別是後期擬備的文件，供各委員參考。

Director of Civil Aviation:

There was one discussion. There was one meeting which was a coordination meeting at the end of November, which I chaired, on the question of systems generally with the AA and the CAD involvement with those systems, as I said, passing the ETA's, passing the bay numbers. There was only that one meeting and it was a general discussion on those issues. It did not focus on specifics but there are notes, yes.

主席：

現在我們休息十分鐘，於11時回來繼續研訊。請各委員到會議室C。

[研訊於上午11時10分繼續]

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

主席，我想簡短地跟進兩個問題。第一個問題是，剛才施高理先生曾提及在進行後備系統測試時，民航處並無派員監察測試的過程，這一點令我感到奇怪。我想再請問施高理先生，當他們就後備系統進行測試時，民航處是否完全沒有參與其事？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

We were not involved with testing the stand-by system. Our involvement with the Airport Authority IT systems were limited to the exchanges I mentioned earlier.

Chairman:

Does not the stand-by system involve certain interfacing with CAD?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. It did not. It didn't. No.

劉江華議員：

主席，另一個問題是關於施高理先生的態度。剛才亦有議員提過，施高理先生在態度上有一定的轉變，這是事實。當初你不相信機管局的一些建議，到後期卻完全相信機管局的一些看法；從當初你說一定要有後備系統，到後期連沒有這個後備系統亦不知道，甚或不理會。對於這兩種態度的轉變，你有否感到不可思議？對我來說，我有這種感覺。

主席：

對不起，你的意思是否指沒有使用後備系統？

劉江華議員：

是的。

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, there is no change of attitude. My position is consistent. The proposals that I put forward were because of my concerns with time frames. The concerns were addressed. As I have said, it is not a role of the Civil Aviation Department to involve themselves in the AA systems of this nature, particularly when we were committed to installing probably one of the most sophisticated air traffic control systems in the world, which we succeeded in doing, and has worked from the Day One without a single problem. I would add that's probably the first time in the world that's ever been achieved either. Many other countries have tried and failed, and I think due credit should go to the staff who have been involved in that exercise and endeavour for what they have achieved. I was not aware that the stand-by would not be used on 6 July. I believed it would be used, as I have said earlier.

主席：

張永森議員。

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Mr SIEGEL, you have a number of capacities in your role in this particular new Airport exercise. Apart from being a Member of the AA Board, an Advisor to ADSCOM and a Member of the Transition Working Committee, you are also the Head of the CAD. What is your role as the Head of the CAD in terms of this particular regulatory capacity? Are you also responsible for issuing licences for the new Airport?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, I am grateful for the question. It's helpful that these positions be aired. Thank you. As you are aware, Madam Chairman, CAD were completely responsible for the management and operation of Kai Tak. However, the Airport Authority have a responsibility for the management of the new Airport. CAD maintains its role in respect of air traffic control, which I have mentioned previously, which has been running smoothly since opening, and, during my tenure as Director and shortly before, CAD has evolved more into a regulatory body responsible for overseeing airport operations in terms of safety and security, and I would emphasise these two roles. In order to perform this regulatory role, a new Division, the Airport's Standards Division was established in August '95, which has been working with the AA as they progressed towards the new airport, towards the opening of the airport, and towards a recommendation to DCA to issue an airport licence. An airport licence is assessed primarily, as I have said, on security and safety. The airport is safe for use by aircraft, having regard in particular to the physical characteristics of the airport - runways, taxi-ways, obstacle environment, ground markings, lighting systems, provision of rescue and fire fighting services and facilities, power supplies, operating procedures, emergency rescue plans, security measures, and so on. The licence does not relate to flight information

display systems, toilets, telephones, and so on. It is on that basis that the licence was issued for security and specifically safety. So, we are, as you say, Sir, we have evolved more into a regulatory organisation. Yes, that is true.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Is it right to say that, prior to the commissioning of the new Airport, the CAD is responsible for and including the airport management? That includes passengers, as well as cargo?

Director of Civil Aviation:

At Kai Tak, Sir, yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

At Kai Tak.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

So, the flight information system is therefore under CAD's operation control?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That is true.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Do you have a team of information technology expert assisting you to actually make sure the FIDS system at the Kai Tak Airport is operational and efficient?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. It was a relatively simple system which was well within the capabilities of our electronics engineers and our contractors, our maintenance contractors.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Would you classify them as, at least, professionals in the information and technology aspect?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Their disciplines are more focused on radars and air traffic technology, rather than IT. We do have a small IT group, yes, but it is very small, and at Kai Tak, as I say, the technology for the flight information system was very much, and I would emphasise very much lower than that at the new airport, and that was handled by these engineers and by a maintenance contractor. The system also was quite old, because obviously we were depreciating it up to airport closing.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Do this small IT group give you any backup in terms of assessment of the FIDS system in the new airport?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, they were not involved. I must come back to this point, Madam Chairman. We were fully stretched with the air traffic control system. It is an extremely sophisticated and large system, and our electronics engineers were fully stretched with their specific CAD air traffics safety responsibilities. I did not involve them in the FIDS. It was not their role. That was a role and responsibility of the AA, and they had very specific safety responsibilities, and I would suggest that, if there had been any problems with the air traffic system, these sort of queries which I could have received from Members, if they had been off helping the AA on a flight information display.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Can you elaborate a little bit, Mr SIEGEL, - previously you mentioned

about the interfacing with AA on information technology being relating to flight information, estimating time of arrival and departure, and the parking position of the aircraft, and all this interfacing - is it part of air traffic control safety and security? I mean, how do they relate to each other?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It comes under Air Traffic Control, because Air Traffic Control generate the data, and there is a link between our Air Traffic Control and the Airport Authority, as I say, which passes estimated times of arrival to the Authority, and, in return, gets the parking positions of aircraft, so that these can be passed to the pilots, so they can park on the right location.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

So, in other words, you agree that the FIDS system is directly linked to Air Traffic Control, in order to make sure that you are happy with the situation?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It is linked to Air Traffic Control for the provision of a specific information. It is not an air, it is not linked to the control of aircraft. It hasn't, the FIDS system has no bearing on the control of aircraft.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Has it any bearing on your issuing of your licences?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

To make sure that the FIDS system or the stand-by system is efficient and operational?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, Madam Chairman, it does not.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Why is not?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Because it's not safety related, Madam Chairman.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

I don't understand that, Madam Chairman. Can Mr SIEGEL explain to me if indeed the flight information system is not working, and indeed, on the date, 6 July, it is not operational. Don't you think that it's going to affect the safety/security of the whole airport?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It causes.....

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Operation?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, it causes, it causes disruption, and we had in place alternative means, contingencies, for the provision and receipt of the data that we needed. The aircraft landed perfectly safely. They taxied to a holding point, and they waited there. That was not unsafe. The aircraft were delayed going onto a parking bay. That was not unsafe. The baggage was late. That was not unsafe. Safety was not prejudiced from an air traffic viewpoint, 'no'.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Can I put it directly to you, Mr SIEGEL, would you issue an aerodrome licence with no confidence on the flight display system?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I explained the parameters for the issue of a licence, which I'll happily give to Members, and that is the physical characteristics of an airport.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

You have it on the Statement actually.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have it on the Statement. Fine, yes, of course. Thank you for reminding me, Sir. I refer Members to that. A flight information display system, a baggage sortation system, toilets, telephones, these are not safety related for the issuance of a licence under the terms of the Air Navigation Order, which I also believe is referred to in the Statement.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

And that is the reason why you issue the aerodrome licence on 29 June, despite the fact that you have repeated concerns on the testing on the stand-by and stand-by system and on the standalone system of the FIDS system?

Director of Civil Aviation:

As I have said to you, Sir, FIDS is not a consideration in the issue of a licence for the operation of an airport. It does not affect the safety of landing of aeroplanes. That is a matter for our Air Traffic Control and their systems and our staff. That these were done absolutely safely. There was no risk to aircraft safety on the 6th, or subsequently. The airport has operated safely. FIDS was not a factor in the issue of a licence, any more than the baggage system, the toilets, the concession airs, the duty-free shop, or anything else. It causes disruption and delay. It doesn't mean it is unsafe.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Is there any particular reason why the licence is held back until 29 June before you issue the aerodrome licence?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes. It wasn't held back, Madam Chairman. There was no date. I didn't have a date when I said I would issue a licence. That was clearly so, there was no date about the 29th, the 28th, or the 15th or whatever.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Why do you pick 29 June then?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Because there were measures, particularly in the security area, which I believed could be improved upon, and they were improved upon, and, subsequent to that improvement, I issued a licence.

Chairman:

But it's a licence that has to be issued before 6 July though?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It has to issue before the airport opening, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

That's right.

Director of Civil Aviation:

That's right. Before airport opening.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

One last question, Madam Chairman. Is there any, any reason why that particular licence issue on the same day as the Passenger Terminal Building being issue? Is there any relationship between Occupation Permit, in terms of the attachment too, you did mention that the physical facilities of the buildings are going to be part and parcel of your consideration?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes. Physical consideration, physical facilities, and as they relate to security; not the Occupation Permit. I do not issue airport licences because of Occupation Permits.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

So, it's a co-incidence?

Director of Civil Aviation:

There was no relationship whatsoever. In fact, I didn't even know that the Occupation Permit was issued on 29 June.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

No further questions.

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL, if you would go to Paper no. B36, which is the Airport Authority's minutes of meeting, and under 'Progress on the Works Programme', which is Paragraph 5.1.

Director of Civil Aviation:

B36, yes.

Chairman:

This is the 28 May meeting of the AA. A number of issues were raised under that 'Progress', under that paragraph. Ground lighting being one?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Chairman:

Access control. In Paragraph 5.1.3, middle of the paragraph, "The Director of Civil Aviation noted that there were other areas which had yet to be tested or improved, and some of them would impact on the Aerodrome Licence". In

other words, by 28 May, you were not fully satisfied that all the things that had to be done by the AA had been complied with and, of course, one paragraph earlier, "The Secretary for Economic Services noted that the airfield ground lighting was critical to obtaining the Aerodrome Licence". So, in other words, there were quite a number of things which the AA had to do to satisfy you before a licence would be issued. Is that not right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, I'm glad you mentioned that, because that focuses on the previous question. That is quite correct, and, of course, as you will see, they are all safety and security related - access control systems, security related; docking system, that's for the aircraft; fire hydrant; crash alarm; lighting, all safety and security issues. Nothing to do with the FIDS, nothing to do with the baggage system. These, progress was being made on these, and that's why it was issued on 29 June, when these shortcomings were, in fact, rectified.

Chairman:

Is it not true, that, in fact, after looking further into these problem areas with management, some of these works had to be taken on board by yourselves, and not the AA? For example, the crash alarm, that you had to find another contractor to do it, instead of relying on the AA. If you had been so confident with the management of the AA, why had you not left it alone for the AA to resolve that problem for you?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, we are speaking about something rather different here, with respect. The crash alarm was a system which ran from the CAD control tower to the various fire stations and fire boat stations. This is what we called an 'entrusted work'. We had asked the AA to do this work on our behalf. We were, believed, that we would like to have this system under our control, so we went forward with our contractor to take that work forward, which is what we did, and it was completed within about 10/14 days, and it was working.

Chairman:

Yes, nevertheless, in the May meeting, the situation was still that the AA was supposed to undertake that, together with the airfield lighting, and then, by

June, it was evident that you, the CAD, had to actually attend to this by finding another contractor?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. With the airfield lighting that was not so. With the airfield lighting, there was modifications to the airfield lighting. We did not take the airfield lighting over. No. The crash alarm was, the simplest way forward was to run what we call a hard-wire, which is a telephone line, to all intents and purposes, from the Control Tower to the fire stations and the fire boat stations, and that was agreed with the AA as the simplest and fastest way of doing it. It wasn't a question of us taking it over because we believed the AA couldn't do it. We sat down with the AA and said, "What's the quickest way of getting this fire alarm installed and working?", and we said, "Why not do it through our contractor and hard-wire it, because it's an entrustment work to the AA anyway?", and they said, "Yes". So, we did it. It was pure expediency.

Chairman:

What about the access control system? In fact, you raised, you flagged up that particular system, and you, in the Board meeting of the 25th - which was the one following - you, in fact, flagged up the access control system, which had not been resolved, and you were concerned that it would become a matter of public concern. That was also one of AA's responsibilities which was not satisfactorily resolved.

Director of Civil Aviation:

But that was an AA responsibility. That was not a CAD works that we'd got the AA to do. That was not an entrustment, as the crash alarm.

Chairman:

No. I wasn't talking about.

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. I was just making the demarcation clear.

Chairman:

No. The crash alarm was the entrusted work, but the access system, you were quite concerned about, because it was a security problem. Wasn't it?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Could you draw that to my, which?

Chairman:

It's in the 25 June meeting.

Director of Civil Aviation:

The reference is?

Chairman:

Which was Paper no. B37.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Paper no. B37.

Chairman:

Paragraph 4.1.3.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Ah, yes, I have it. Yes. And your question, Madam Chairman? I'm sorry? Oh, the ACS, the ACS, the access control system, yes. The access control system was, is indeed a security system in that it controls many of the doors, and there were problems with access through the doors, and this system working correctly. So, we looked with the AA at our Airport Standards Unit, our Airport Standards Division, who have a responsibility for security, as part of the regulatory oversight. They looked at the number of doors, and looked at those which could perhaps be, have to be manned and others which could be permanently locked, others on which they could put a fire alarm, and so on, and until this work was achieved, and the security and integrity of the building was

achieved, that was an airport licensing issue, and, in fact, it did become a public comment, as you may recall.

Chairman:

Yes.

Director of Civil Aviation:

In the media at the time.

Chairman:

Yes. Wouldn't you say that that was part of the reasons why, because of non-performance on the part of the AA that the licensing had to, in fact, be delayed to accommodate?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It wasn't delayed. The licence was issued, when the Airport was ready. If this had been 1 April or the 1 May, then it would have been signed then. There was no date, no given, no date, no target. I made that very clear as DCA to Government. There was no date. I said I would issue the licence, when the airport was ready.

Chairman:

When was that made? When was that made clear to Government, and how was it made clear?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Oh, on a number of occasions. It was understood. There was no target date. I have never had a target date for the issue of the licence. There was never a date given that I would issue a licence on a day. It would be issued when the airport was ready. These items were raised at the Board and discussed. They were addressed and resolved. So, the licence was issued.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Was there no time at which you were concerned about the staffing and the

training of the AA staff?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, there were comments made, and these were referred to earlier this morning on the staff, the training programme, but it wasn't, if I recall, specifically for AA staff. It was for some of their business partners, and some of their franchisees.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

But you do realise that there were problems on the staffing and the training in terms of the time permitted and in terms of subsequent commissioning of the new airport?

Director of Civil Aviation:

They were having problems with the training programme as it interfaced with the availability of some of the structural works. If a facility isn't built, it's difficult to train staff on it.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

And that is part of the parameter under attachment 2 of the Aerodrome Licence that you will be looking for at this particular parameter?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Training, training.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

For the purpose of the Aerodrome Licence?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, indeed, training was a consideration.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

So, is it right to say that you issued the licence at the time when you had concern on the staff training of the AA staff?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

So, you were satisfied at that time?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Because I raised these concerns, as it was correct that I should do so, much earlier, and these were addressed by the airport management. I asked my staff to look at their response, and they reported to me their response was adequate and appropriate.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Can you supply the information, if it is in writing, from your staff, that you did ask your staff and your staff did supply the confirmation to you? Are those in any of those of your minutes of meetings?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I don't, I don't know, Sir. I would look, but I can't, I can't give you that assurance. I can't. I will look.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Can you at least look to see if there is anything there?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I will look. I will look. I will look.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Thank you.

Chairman:

Deputy Chairman?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr SIEGEL, you were appointed to serve on the ADSCOM as Advisor at the end of last year, and, in fact, you attended the first meeting on 7 November last year. What's the terms of reference of your position in ADSCOM as Advisor, Mr SIEGEL?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, I have not received written terms of reference. I was summoned to appear at ADSCOM and advise on those items, presumably as a result of my appropriate experience and background.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

What sort of advice that you think the Chief Secretary or the Chairman of the ADSCOM was looking to you for?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Advice appropriate to my experience as 10 years as General Manager of Kai Tak, and 25 years in the Department, and airport management and CAD.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Would that mean that not only just safety aspects alone and nothing else that she would be seeking your advice on?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, yes, and it is a matter for the record, my contribution and the comments that I gave.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

In fact, right from the start, when you began to serve the ADSCOM as Advisor, you made a lot of comments. In fact, just now, you said earlier on that it was only, maybe at just one or two meetings, that you did not mention the aspect of FIDS, apart from anything else, although you said that you were not an expert on IT, but, right from the start of the duty as Advisor in ADSCOM, you began to raise a lot of concerns. You flagged up a number of times your concerns about the FIDS operation or the performance. Why is that?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Correct. Why? For the reasons I indicated earlier, because of my concerns on time-frames, which I mentioned before the break, from the experience that I had had at Kai Tak and my experience with our own air traffic system.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

So, you mean that not only safety alone, you were also concerned about other things in respect of the operation of the new airport as a whole? Right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, that is correct.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And you were raising a lot of concerns, earlier on, but, later on, you accepted recommendations from the AA management? Just now you were telling us this, a short while ago.

Director of Civil Aviation:

This is a theme which Members seem to be returning to. Perhaps I should make this point very clear. There was constant slippage in the programme for FIDS through summer '97 and towards the end of the year. I constantly flagged up my concern on this, this slippage. Management gave constant assurances that this slippage, the programme could be maintained and would be met by the contractors. That position continued until after Christmas, when management assured that, in fact, they had been correct and that the FIDS

would be operationally viable on 6 July. So, at that point, it could be said that my continual efforts in this regard had the effect of, to some small degree, to some degree, ensuring that the programme was achieved, and I took comfort that, in fact, the management had been able to achieve what they had been saying they would be able to achieve. There was no change, no, no radical change of opinion or change of attitude. The management kept saying they could do it, and then, after Christmas, they said they had done it, and I was relieved and grateful to hear it, but, in the meantime, I had kept on about the stand-by, in case there was a problem on 6 July.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Let's come back to the Aerodrome Licence, for the moment. You were saying that there was no date for it to be issued. If it was, if everything was ready for the operation of the airport, you would be prepared to issue the licence before 29 June this year. Is that correct, Mr SIEGEL?

Director of Civil Aviation:

If the Airport had, in my opinion as DCA, been safe and secure, I would have issued it earlier.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Are you saying that, although AA constantly said the airport was ready in April, you were not issuing the licence until two months' later, Do you agree that the Airport was actually not ready in April?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I had severe doubts, certainly from a systems point of view, whether the airport could have opened successfully in April, but that was not the issue, because that decision to delay was driven by the Railway.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

What judgement were you based on, when you said just now that the system was not ready. What system were you referring to?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I was talking particularly about FIDS, because most of their, by January, by February, we were going for the stand-by, and to have opened it in April would only have given us, well, from the March meeting, just a few days.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Can I.....

Director of Civil Aviation:

But that was not an issue. The issue for the deferment was the Railway. The physical works at the airport were completed, so management said.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Was it because it was a decision at ADSCOM that, because of the public concern about the synchronisation of the opening of the Airport Railway and the airport itself, then it had to be after 21 June when the Airport Railway started to operate, then you just follow that decision?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, that was the major factor. If you look at the notes of the meeting in November, when I was asked by CS to give a frank view, I said that I believed that the Airport should not open without the Railway. I believed it then, and I believed it, I believe it now. I believe that was the correct decision now.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Then, afterwards, Mr SIEGEL, you just, you know, became completely comfortable, accepting the recommendations from the AA management, and then you were relieved of the concerns that you had on FIDS?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, I was more relieved because we had almost another three months which they could use to work on the FIDS.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Can I refer you to document, Paper no. A42, Mr SIEGEL? These are the notes of the 184th Meeting on 6 June this year.

Director of Civil Aviation:

A42?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Yes. Of ADSCOM. Have you got that Mr SIEGEL?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I, just, just, almost there. I have it, Sir, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Paragraph 13, please.

Director of Civil Aviation:

13.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Page 7.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

"On the Aerodrome Licence, DCA reported that the terms of the licence had been drawn up and the format decided. The licence will probably be issued by 25/26 June, as he wanted to be reassured that everything was in place, and with proven reliability". How come the terms of the licence and the format were just decided at that time and not before? Anything new to be added to that?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, no. With respect, Madam Chairman, I think, Sir, you are reading too much into the words. I was simply reporting. As you said, "The DCA reported that the terms had been drawn up and the format decided". I didn't want CS to think that here we were approaching opening, and I hadn't got the format decided and the terms drawn up. It is a document, but the format and terms had been in place for some time. We knew the form it would take.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

They were not newly drawn up forms?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, no.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

I see. Thank you. And, now you've been receiving the AOR's status reports, Mr SIEGEL? Airport Operation Readiness?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Which ones specifically? There's been a number of them, Sir.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Just say, the one dated 30 June 1998.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Do you have a reference there, Sir?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Paper no.36/98, ADSCOM paper.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Do you have a reference there at all?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Yes. We will find it for you, Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Thank you.

Chairman:

Paper no. A47.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Paper no. A47, Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Paper no. A47. I have it. Yes. Paragraph?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

In here, Paragraph 8. It says the Board has endorsed management's recommendation that at airport opening, etc. concerning the permanent FIDS, and other items.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I'm sorry, A47?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Paragraph 8.

Director of Civil Aviation:

8.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Page 3.

Director of Civil Aviation:

That, my copy reads, "Management is confident the key master and dates necessary to achieve an April 1 '98 Opening are achievable". This is ADSCOM paper 36/97?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

'98.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Ah, but that's.....

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Paper no. A47.

Chairman:

A47.

Director of Civil Aviation:

A47?

Chairman:

A47.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have A47, and that is, I have, this was a ADSCOM paper 36/97, dated 13 October '97 on my..... Yes. I have it, Sir.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Yes. Paragraph 8. Have you got that, Mr SIEGEL?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, I do.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Page 3.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, it says here in connection with FIDS, "the Board has endorsed Management's recommendation that at airport opening, the permanent FIDS system be used for the primary flight display systems in the PTB....."

Director of Civil Aviation:

Passengers Terminal Building.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

".....the recent trial and reliability tests have confirmed that the system can be used, and is sufficiently stable, and that, when some displace or functions fail, available workarounds can be depended upon." I will not read the rest. Now, are you saying that you would accept what's reported here? That, at the end of June, a few days before the actual opening of the airport, the Board already endorsed the management's recommendation. You accepted all these recommendations?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Although, earlier on, you agree that some reference quoted here by some Members, you did not quite agree with the AA management's details and, you

even said that the PD, the Project Director, actually bulldozed the issues, but you accepted all these?

Director of Civil Aviation:

This is a late paper. It's dated 4 July '98. My comments regarding the individuals, I believe, were dated November last year.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

OK. Last question is, Mr SIEGEL, now, if.

Director of Civil Aviation:

That was, that was some nine months before.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

If, in the last minute, after issue of the Aerodrome Licence, and you were Advisor to the ADSCOM, you notice or realise that the Chairman of the ADSCOM was looking for any sign of seriousness, or any sign of warning that she might consider delaying the opening of the airport, were you aware of this?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Whether she was looking for?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Any sign of warning that the airport might not be able to start operating in a smooth, efficient and safe style?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, the information, from my understanding, put before ADSCOM was that it would be able to operate and be safe. I knew it would be safe, but that it would be able to operate efficiently.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

So, the last one is, as Advisor to ADSCOM, you would not put your mind to actually looking very quickly under microscope any aspect of the whole operation, which, when the airport started to operate, would cause any concern and would cause you to start trekking up again to tell the Chairman of the ADSCOM?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I would. I mean, this comes back to a question of integrity, Sir. I must make it quite clear that, if I had personal concerns of whatever nature, I would have said them, as I have consistently said for the last two years, and these are now a matter of the record.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

What I mean is, at that time, because you accepted the recommendations from the AA management, you felt relieved already. May be you were concentrating on the actual operation or your parts - you know, the aircraft or the air traffic control, etc., but the concerns that you raised earlier on in the previous months, about FIDS, etc., all of a sudden you felt quite relieved to just leave it to the AA management?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have never said that these time-frames, that the AA management wouldn't be able to do it. There is no, not a word in any of these papers, where I am quoted as saying that. All I have been saying is I have been concerned at the time frames that they had to achieve these objectives. Now, they assured the Board and ADSCOM that they had achieved these time frames and that the systems would be in place. The CEO said it personally to ADSCOM, and that perhaps Members will care to look for that reference, where he said it was 98 per cent.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

98.7%. You accept that?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I accepted it at its face value. If the Chief Executive officer of the Airport Authority makes a statement that it was 98.7%, then I accept what he says. Why should I do otherwise?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Madam Chairman, can I just ask just one more question? Paper no. A46, the meeting of ADSCOM dated 4 July '98, Paper no. A46. Have you got it?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, yes, I have, Sir.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Paragraph 5 on Page 3, please. Sorry, Paragraph 6.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have it, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

It says here, "The switch-over from permanent FIDS to the stand-by had also been tested on Thursday last with assistance of 35 airlines. Within 30 minutes, most of this phase were switched on". Do you think that this kind of switch-over exercise is adequate from your experience?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, I haven't had experience of a system of this complexity, as I have said several times, but, given the time frame for producing the stand-by, and that that was what was achieved and it was considered operational from then, it was acceptable from an operational point of view, and that was both from the Head of Information Technology of the AA and, presumably, the thirty-five airlines who participated in that trial, then that was good enough.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

That's your opinion?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, it wasn't my opinion. It was the opinion of the Head of the Information Technology of the AA and the thirty-five airlines who were going to use it. They found it operationally acceptable. I mean, everybody, I am sure, would have preferred something a little, would have preferred less time, or had been smoother, but that was the time that was achieved - 35 minutes, and the AA's Head of Information Technology and the 35 airlines, who were going to use it, found it operationally acceptable. It was not for me to argue against that. What should I have done? Said, "No, no, go away and make it five minutes, or two minutes"?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL, can I return to a point that you have made earlier concerning the decision to postpone the opening date of the airport. You put it to the Select Committee that it was driven, that decision was driven by the non-availability of the Airport Railway in April. That was the reason, but, if you look at the key meeting, which took place on 2 January, and the paper no. is A28, A28. There you have made the point quite forcefully to ADSCOM that the system, particularly FIDS, of course, was not ready.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I'm sorry, Madam Chairman, I don't have Paper no. A28. A28 is a letter?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Paper no. A29.

Chairman:

A? Sorry?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Paper no. A29. 2 January?

Chairman:

Paper no. A29. Sorry. I do apologise.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have it.

Chairman:

A29, Paragraph 7, you, in fact, analysed the situation regarding FIDS, and the software, and so on, and so forth. In fact, I do recall that somewhere, in some minutes, you did make it a point about the Airport Railway, but that was not the point that you emphasised in this key meeting on 2 January, but I would like you to turn to Paragraph 22 of the same meeting, and it says, “Summing up, the Chairman said whether the new airport would be ready in April remained a question mark. If opened in April, the new airport would certainly not be a world-class airport given the various makeshift arrangements, say, on the systems front. Added to that, the transport arrangements” and so on and so forth. So, in fact, it is fair to say that, when the decision was taken, it was taken on the grounds that the systems were not ready, first. Secondly, it is not supported by the Airport Railway. Now, if you turn to Paragraph 26, “DCA commented that, given the strong sentiments of individual AA Board Members toward the issue, it would be best to take the decision out of the AA Board and put the onus on the MTR and the non-availability of the AR”. So, in fact, the reason that I refer to those paragraphs was to put the question to you, because you said just now, “Oh, it was the AR. It was the AR”, but in the meeting, with the crucial meeting where the postponement was decided on, it wasn't the AR which was the first and foremost concern of the ADSCOM. It was, in fact, what you put to them about the unreliability of the system. Was it not, Mr SIEGEL?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. It wasn't, Madam Chairman. Let me, let me take you back to what I said originally in the November 1997 meeting, where I said that I believed then - I believe now - that the airport should not have opened without the Airport Railway. The Airport Railway was the, was the driving factor in deferring the decision to open the airport. I also said earlier that there were other factors. The other factors are those referred to at Paragraph 22, because of FIDS and particularly, as CS said, on the systems front, and the objective was that Hong Kong should open an airport which was of a world class standard. That was what was driving. So, it was the Airport Railway; the alternative ground transportation arrangements were not considered to be to a world-class standard we needed, it would give additional time for FIDS, which was a concern, and the Railway would be available on the third week of June. That was what was driving the system. Now, to take you to para - driving the decision, I'm sorry. Taking you to Paragraph 26, there was a very strong view within management that the airport was ready in April. This was driven particularly by the completion date of the Airport Terminal Building itself, the physical works, and management and the Board felt very strongly on these points that the Airport physically was constructed and ready. So therefore I said that it would be helpful to take the decision away from the construction of the physical building and to put the focus on the Airport Railway, and that was absolutely true.

Chairman:

Yes, perhaps you can tell the.....

Director of Civil Aviation:

I think, with all due respect, there is a gloss going on this, which isn't there.

Chairman:

No, no, no. I think what you need to answer the Select Committee is whether at that point, on 2 January, you were actually satisfied that, apart from the Railway, the FIDS was actually ready for an April Opening. Was it ready? At that point, there was not even a standby system. Was it, was it ready, given the delays and the lack of faith in the AA management at that point?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, from the statements which had been made earlier by management, it was ready. I was concerned that, in fact, there were doubts over the availability of the systems, and, giving another three months, would give them a chance to bring these to fruition.

Chairman:

Well, exactly.

Director of Civil Aviation:

That was a personal view.

Chairman:

Yes. My next question is: given the state that the system was in, and you were clearly dissatisfied, because it was actually on record you were not happy with the state of FIDS at that point in time, and you pressed very hard for the stand-by system and all that, why did you think that two months would actually give you the comfort for the system to be ready, given that the system was at the state it was, you know, at that point in time you were not at all happy. How did you come to the conclusion that a June opening date was an acceptable date as far as the systems were concerned?

Director of Civil Aviation:

If management had given you assurances that the airport is available for opening in April, and you have doubts on one specific aspect, and then you delay that date by almost three months, the next surely gives you added comfort?

Chairman:

Well, it would give you added comfort, but why, why three months? Why not four months? Why not two months? I mean, surely management did not come up with the June date. You, in ADSCOM, when I say you, I mean ADSCOM came up with the June date. Why did you think, given your reservation about the system, why did you think that June was good enough? You didn't even have the stand-by system at that point. Why did you feel that end of June was enough for you to rectify everything that exists in the system?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Because management said April was a good date, and management said they were ready in April. So, if they were ready in April, then presumably, accepting their assurance, on any date after April, they would also be ready.

Chairman:

Are you just saying it's guesswork?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. I'm not saying it's guesswork.

Chairman:

Well, I mean, what did you base it on then?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It was based - on 6 June? On 6 July?

Chairman:

No. At the postponement of the date from April to the end of June?

Director of Civil Aviation:

The postponement, the postponement was driven by the availability of the Railway, which was 21 June.

Chairman:

Yes. We heard that, but I.....

Director of Civil Aviation:

If management said that the airport was ready in April, then surely it will be ready at any date thereafter, certainly after 21 June.

Chairman:

No, but, Mr SIEGEL, I ask you a specific question. You were dissatisfied with FIDS. You were dissatisfied with the systems. It was very clear, and a decision was made on the basis of your representation, as well as the consideration of the Airport Railway. So, on what did you base your acceptance of an end of June opening date, as far as the systems were concerned?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It was, it was not based on a decision made, on advice given by myself. It was, the date of 6 July was driven by the Railway and the fact that the management said they were ready in April. If they were ready in April, then, accepting that, they should therefore be ready at a date thereafter. I saw April to the end of June as giving them three months to put in place additional contingency measures to support the FIDS. For opening day, 6 July was chosen because it was after 21 June and there were various practical operational considerations.

Chairman:

Now, what were these contingency measures, as you understood them at that point in time, Mr SIEGEL? Are you actually questioning the record in Paragraph 22 of that meeting, when, from what I read to you, the Chairman actually summed up, "If opened in April, the new airport would certainly not be a world-class airport given the various makeshift arrangements, say, on the systems front"?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Correct.

Chairman:

So, so, you agree with that?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Chairman:

You agreed with that, and yet, when she decided on an April, end of April date, you were happy that?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. 6 July.

Chairman:

No. It was end of June. Sorry, end of June. I beg your pardon. Not 6 July, because that date was not determined until.....

Director of Civil Aviation:

That came after.

Chairman:

But end of June, when she put end of June to ADSCOM because of these various reasons, your main concern was FIDS?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Chairman:

And, at that point, how did you come to the conclusion that end of June was enough? What information did you have to judge that end of June was enough for the improvement on FIDS, that it would be reliable, that it would be dependable, and so on and so forth?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Because, Madam Chairman, the Chief Executive Officer said to ADSCOM that it was running at 98.7%, Sir, was it? 98.7 per cent effective.

Chairman:

98 point - may I point out to you, Mr SIEGEL, 98.7 per cent is 4 July. It

came in the meeting on 4 July.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Chairman:

We're talking about 2 January in 1998, when the decision of end of June was made by ADSCOM.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Chairman:

At that point, the system was extremely unreliable. As you put it yourself, it continued to be unreliable. It crashed a few times during trial, and so on and so forth, even after 2 January. So, we are not talking about a system which has proved 98.7 per cent reliable.

Director of Civil Aviation:

So?

Chairman:

So, my question is why did you say at that point, why did you accept that end of June would be enough?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I'm sorry, Madam Chairman, this is becoming somewhat repetitive, and we can go around here. Management with the support of the Board, the majority of the Board, stated that that Airport could open in April. ADSCOM had concerns, specifically, the Railway, and, as is evident from Paragraph 22, because of the concerns with the systems. The delay 'til 6 July, or the end of June.....

Chairman:

End of June.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Because 6 July, which came slightly after, not only gave us the availability of the Railway, but also gave us another three months for the systems. Now, if management were prepared to open that airport in April with the system, stated that it was, and I gained considerable comfort that it would be better three months later. Now, if you ask me why should I know, be aware that three months is adequate, I don't, because, as I have said to you, I am not an IT expert. The management were asked whether they would be operational in July, and they said 'yes'. They had three more months to work on the system.

Chairman:

Ah, but wouldn't you agree, Mr SIEGEL, that, in that meeting, ADSCOM and in particular the Chairman was relying on your advice on FIDS to judge whether the systems in.....

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, no, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

According to AA, the systems would actually be ready by April?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, as I have said several times this morning, there is a limit to my knowledge and involvement in this integration and flight information display system. There is a very large team within the AA, an information technology team, there is a whole management within the AA, there is their suppliers and their sub-contractors. I am a single voice and I am Advisor to ADSCOM and I give a view.

Chairman:

A view that was.

Director of Civil Aviation:

There is, there is little, I have one view.

Chairman:

A view that was taken in preference to the AA management's view? Is it not?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. It says here, "And would not be given the various makeshift arrangements on the systems front". It was not seen in isolation. I would not wish to put myself up in, as the sole Advisor and arbiter on the flight information system at CLK, because that would be wrong, and it's not true.

Chairman:

Miss Christine LOH? You wanted to follow up?

Hon Christine LOH:

I do. Mr SIEGEL is a person of great experience in this business, and so I do believe that Mr SIEGEL has more understanding of the system than he is trying to make us believe. I'd just like to go back to the point that Mr LEE Wing-tat asked some time ago. Knowing what he knew and knowing what the Government knew at the time, Mr SIEGEL told us that there was no reason to delay the airport opening. I'd like him to confirm that statement again.

Director of Civil Aviation:

We are talking about 6 July now, Madam Chairman?

Hon Christine LOH:

6 July. Knowing what you knew and knowing what the Government knew, you were all comfortable with the opening on 6 July?

Director of Civil Aviation:

And what we had been assured and told, Madam Chairman, and I would like to take the point. I am very grateful to Ms LOH for her compliments, but I think it is overstated. My knowledge here is on time frames and project

management, not an intimate knowledge of the system itself.

Hon Christine LOH:

I wonder whether the Committee is getting the feeling that you are 'passing the buck'?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No.

Hon Christine LOH:

To management?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam Chairman, I never 'pass the buck'.

Hon Christine LOH:

OK. I'd like to refer to Paper no. A37, Paragraph 27. Chairman, I would just like to say I personally regard this as a crucial paragraph, and let me just go straight to the penultimate sentence, "If these systems could not function in their tip-top form, they should at least work as best as could be secured in the circumstances". This is something that the Chairman of ADSCOM said. The previous sentence talks about having a checklist of the systems available, making sure that there was some integration and making sure that somehow the airport could open on that day. So, what I'm really saying is, is this a very carefully worded sentence that the Government would write for the record, "That, no matter what happened, even if the system could not function well on that day, that the airport should open".?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Ah, Madam Chairman, correct me if I'm wrong. What you are saying is that there was a view that it should be open at all costs. Is that what you are saying? Is that what you are implying?

Hon Christine LOH:

Have we crossed, have we crossed?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Because I must, I must say, Madam Chairman, that this system has great complexity. It has integration - please let me say it, because this is important and it does have a bearing - it has great complexity and has integration with many other systems. You will always have problems with integration and software. What was being said here that we should have a functional, basic functional system on Day One, which would provide the minimum needs within the Passenger Terminal, and that's what I've been saying for two years. So, really this is just simply reiterating what I've been saying. There is no carefully crafted words here, believe me.

Hon Christine LOH:

What I'm saying is, even if it was not functioning, the airport has to open. That seems to be what it's saying?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. That is not what it says. What it is saying is that it should have the minimum necessary in order that the airport should open and function satisfactorily, and that is always, that is always true of any system that you open - that you have a minimum functioning capability.

Hon Christine LOH:

OK.

Director of Civil Aviation:

We, we have it within our air traffic systems.

Hon Christine LOH:

Right.

Director of Civil Aviation:

So, that is basically what is said here. There is an incredible amount of sophistication and integration with this system. What that was simply stating was that it should be the minimum necessary to make the airport work on opening.

Hon Christine LOH:

Right.

Director of Civil Aviation:

And that was an objective which any systems designer should have, and that had been my objective for the last two years.

Hon Christine LOH:

Right. OK. That was on 1 April, Chairman. On 18 April, if we go to Paper no. A40, Paragraph 37.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Madam, 37, isn't it?

Hon Christine LOH:

Paragraph 37.

Director of Civil Aviation:

37. I have it, yes.

Hon Christine LOH:

Yes. The last sentence again says, "The Chairman noted that, and asked AA and relevant Government departments to ensure that Hong Kong would be able to deliver airport opening on 6 July". So, some time after I guess, the announcement of 6 July January, we passed the 'point of no return', did we not, that the airport had to open?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Nobody, Madam Chairman, spoke to me of a 'point of no return', and I would - no, nobody has spoken to me of a 'point of no return'.

Hon Christine LOH:

If nobody has spoken to you, is that something that was generally understood. It would be unacceptable that the airport date had to be pushed back again?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. Not for me, Madam Chairman, 'no', as the Director of Civil Aviation.

Hon Christine LOH:

OK. If we can go to the evidence which you gave on 8 September to Justice Woo Commission of Inquiry. So, this is on 8 September, Pages 18 and 19.

Director of Civil Aviation:

You have a reference. Madam Chairman?

Hon Christine LOH:

Day Two, Day Two, this is Day Two.

Director of Civil Aviation:

We haven't raised the transcript. I haven't got that transcript.

Hon Christine LOH:

If we can give you a copy of the transcript.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Thank you very much. Day?

Hon Christine LOH:

Day Two, Pages 18 and 19.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Pages 18 and 19?

Hon Christine LOH:

And 19.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, I have it.

Hon Christine LOH:

Yes, thank you. It's the last question on Page 18. It talks about Dr TOWNSEND reporting that all systems were undergoing reliability testing and integration right up to the airport opening. You confirmed that that was the case. The question, I continue, is obviously what you would expect to happen, would you not? You would not expect them to simply wrap it up and put it in mothballs. Then you said, "We had no choice, because the airport was opening, but the fact that integration testing was carrying on right up to the airport opening, when the original intention was that it would be completed six months before", etc., etc.

Director of Civil Aviation:

But that, but.....

Hon Christine LOH:

It seems to me that documentation shows, Chairman, that it wasn't possible to even suggest that the airport could not be open on the 6th. Is that correct?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, Madam Chairman, I am sorry. The fact that they were still carrying out testing and integration does not mean necessarily that the Airport couldn't

have opened. You must remember that we had, as far as I was concerned and aware, we had the stand-by system. We had an assurance that the system was operating to its basic functionality, and we had an assurance that it was operating over 98 per cent reliable.

Hon Christine LOH:

My last question, Chairman, wasn't it just all wishful thinking?

Director of Civil Aviation:

What was wishful thinking, Madam Chairman?

Hon Christine LOH:

That it would work on the day, despite all your concerns. The stand-by system, in fact, wasn't even used on the day in retrospect. Just to be, just to rely on the fact that AA management assured you. I mean, isn't it all wishful thinking?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No.

Hon Christine LOH:

In retrospect at least?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. I don't think you can say it was wishful thinking. I don't believe it was wishful thinking. I mean, wishful thinking means that you are going forward into something which you have absolutely no faith of. We have spent, and all of us spending a lot of effort into this Select Committee. There's Justice WOO and his team, the discredit that it brought Hong Kong, the sadness it has given so many people in Hong Kong, including my goodself. Why should you proceed on wishful thinking, when you are faced with that? No.

Chairman:

Ms Margaret NG?

Hon Margaret NG:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. To begin with, may I just follow up on the November '97 meeting. That is Paper no. A27. Madam Chairman, Mr SIEGEL, this is where Mr SIEGEL gave a very frank view, frank advice to ADSCOM. I think he very correctly pointed out, in Paragraph 2 he said that the airport should only be opened when it is ready with the AR, but you know that it was ready.

Chairman:

I'm sorry. Sorry, just a minute.

Hon Margaret NG:

This is Paper no. A25. That's the meeting on 7 November 1997. Now, Paragraph 2 says DCA - I believe Mr SIEGEL that's you - believe that the airport should only be open when it was ready and with the AR. So, there are two things: Paragraph 2 talks about the AR, but I ask you, Mr SIEGEL, to look at Paragraph 3, when you then go into the system, the FIDS, and there it is in that context you said you have no faith in the top management of AA. My colleagues asked you many times why you thought that June was a reliable date, and you said that because the top management of AA assured you that it would be open, it would be ready for opening in April, and, so, if it is ready for April, it would be ready for June. You said that many times, isn't it, Mr SIEGEL?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It seems I did, Madam Chairman, 'yes'.

Hon Margaret NG:

Now, Mr SIEGEL, it's quite apparent to the Select Committee - and please correct us - at no time was AA's assurance that April was a reliable opening day, accepted by ADSCOM in your presence?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, there were concerns, as is evident from the record.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, Mr SIEGEL, it was more than just concerns. The AA's assurance was not accepted as Paragraph 3 shows that you yourself did not accept the assurance of the top management of AA?

Director of Civil Aviation:

At that time, as is indicated at para 3.

Hon Margaret NG:

You did not.

Director of Civil Aviation:

That was the case due to slippage in the software bills.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Now, looking at that paragraph, now you refer to FIDS, and then you said you were worried about systems integration, and you said there had to be definitive contingency measure in case of failure, but, so far, AA had only developed crude contingency plans. So, would you agree, Mr SIEGEL, it is not just a matter of the top management of AA telling you that there were plans, contingency plans for stand-by system, but you also evaluated them to the best of your ability?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, Madam Chairman, those words were chosen because, at the time, they were talking about a thing called 'standalone', and, whilst they constantly spoke of it, I never saw any evidence of it.

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, is it right that, by using the words "only developed crude contingency plans", it seems to show that the AA did have contingency

plans which were put before Mr SIEGEL and others, but that Mr SIEGEL considers them crude?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. I think Madam Chairman, you are reading too much into the minutes, and I think, with respect, that seems to be a problem generally. The contingency plans every time - every time is perhaps unfair - on occasions when I flagged up concerns regarding FIDS, I was told that the system had what they called a 'standalone' capability, where individual elements of the system could operate in isolation without the need for integration with each other, which is a major threat.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr SIEGEL, my point is very.....

Director of Civil Aviation:

So, that is what they said was 'standalone'. I never saw any contingency plans. I did not see them. They simply referred to them.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr SIEGEL, you're not saying that these minutes are not reliable, are you?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, no.

Hon Margaret NG:

Because we do spend a lot of time reading them, and, if they are not reliable, please tell us at once.

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, Madam Chairman, I am not saying that these minutes are not reliable. I'm just saying that it's perhaps, the interpretation which perhaps are the specific

words sometimes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Now, just to make that sure. Mr SIEGEL, you do not say that these minutes are inaccurate, do you?. Because it's important. We do spend a lot of time reading them.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I am not, Madam Chairman, I am not saying these minutes are inaccurate, 'no'.

Hon Margaret NG:

Are you saying that these minutes are inadequate, that they don't, that there is something wrong with the English that they can't be given their plain meaning?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, but, when you say 'crude contingency plans', I am saying the reality of what those words conveyed was that, in fact, they were speaking of a standalone system, of which I was not given any evidence that is what I am saying.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

And it is what those words mean, Madam Chairman.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Would you agree that 'crude contingency', 'only developed crude contingency plans' means contingency plans were developed, but these contingency plans were crude. That's the standard of my English, Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, but.....

Hon Margaret NG:

Thank you.

Director of Civil Aviation:

As, as.....

Hon Margaret NG:

So, isn't it right.....?

Director of Civil Aviation:

But I was not aware of them.

Hon Margaret NG:

Isn't it right, Mr SIEGEL, that you didn't take things at their face value. When people prop a contingency plan before you, you evaluate it. You have a view about them?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, Madam Chairman, as I have said, I did not evaluate it, because it was not put in front of me.

Hon Margaret NG:

Now, Mr SIEGEL, in the next sentence you said, in your view for the airport to operate the AODB - I believe that's Airport Operation Data.....?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Database.

Hon Margaret NG:

Airport Operation Database system. Is that right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

Had also to be able to talk with AIDB?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

Disconcertingly, A, I understand, means aero something or other, aeronautical?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Perhaps I can help, Madam Chairman, Aeronautical Information Database.

Hon Margaret NG:

Information Database. Right, you say that for the airport to operate, the AODB system had also to be able to talk with AIDB. Is that right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Now, is it also right that, up to now, AODB is not able to talk to AIDB?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That is absolutely correct, and the reason, and it couldn't. There were problems being experienced at that time in November, and, as a result, contingency plans were put in place between my Department and the AA, so that this information was passed by an alternative means.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right.

Director of Civil Aviation:

That alternative means is perfectly satisfactory. It was tested and in place before opening. It worked on the opening, and it is still working.

Hon Margaret NG:

That's a fax system. Is that right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Now, that's exactly what I'm trying to understand from you. Mr SIEGEL, there was quite a lot of confusion on the airport opening day, because we are told people did not know many of the operators, the business partners there, didn't know where the aeroplanes were parked, didn't know when they arrived, whether they have arrived, and so on. Is that right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That was a major issue.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Now, Mr SIEGEL, I understand that you, being responsible for air traffic control, is the person who has all that sort of data. Is that correct?

Director of Civil Aviation:

What sort of data, Madam Chairman?

Hon Margaret NG:

Whether the aeroplane has arrived, where they are parked?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No.

Hon Margaret NG:

No? You didn't?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No.

Hon Margaret NG:

Who had the.....?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Perhaps I can explain for the benefit of Members?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, please. Now, since you're going to explain, and I hope that you will give us a fairly full explanation, because that will help us understand what happened on that day. Now, obviously, it is important for this sort of information to be fed into the system, so that they are available to everybody, including people who are handling air cargo. Isn't it? And I understand that people handling air cargoes depend on the system called FDDS, Flight Data - what is it?

Chairman:

Distribution?

Hon Margaret NG:

Flight Data Distribution System?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Display system.

Hon Margaret NG:

Flight Data Display system, or, yes. Right, OK. Now, please tell me who feeds the information about the arrival time of the aircraft and where they are parked? Who feeds that into the system? Who provides the information?

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. There are two routes of information. There is the information that comes, as I have said several times this morning, the information that comes from AA, which is what they call the stand number, the parking position for the aircraft. The Airport Authority identify the stand number, and they inform Air Traffic Control, so that the Air Traffic Control can inform the crew of the aeroplane, so they can go to the right place to park the aeroplane. The Air Traffic Control advise the Airport Authority the estimated time of arrival of the aeroplane, and that comes from the AIDB to the AODB. The FDDS is separate. That is a system which comes off the AODB, and is, in fact, provided by a sub-contractor to the main FIDS system, and that provides parking positions and data, a whole range of data, not just air traffic data, to the ground handlers specifically. Not just to HACTL, but to the ground handlers. HACTL's requirements in this area are quite small. They just simply know; they don't even need to know actually where the aeroplane is going, because that is a function for the ramp handlers.

Hon Margaret NG:

That's the system which didn't work - right? - because that involved the AIDB. That's not the system which worked on AOD?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It did not, it did not work on, on.....

Hon Margaret NG:

Right.

Director of Civil Aviation:

On that day.

Hon Margaret NG:

Airport opening day.

Director of Civil Aviation:

On airport opening day.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, what is the system which you eventually agreed with, agreed to?

Director of Civil Aviation:

There were the two, which as I've said, from the AODB to AIDB, to Air Traffic is fax, and that was arranged and agreed.

Hon Margaret NG:

Sorry, can you say that again?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Fax.

Hon Margaret NG:

From AODB?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, let's say, from the Airport Authority to ATC, that was a fax machine, fax message, and then from the Air Traffic Control to the Apron Tower, who allocate the parking positions and to the AA, the ETA's. That was passed by a data link.

Hon Margaret NG:

What is an ETA?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Estimated time of arrival.

Hon Margaret NG:

Ah, right, OK. Please, carry on.

Director of Civil Aviation:

And that, that was passed by a data link, a simple data link. After 6 July, it was direct lines and telephones.

Hon Margaret NG:

On 6 July, what was the data link?

Director of Civil Aviation:

The data link was put in subsequently, wasn't it, or was it?

Hon Margaret NG:

Did you not know, Mr SIEGEL?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes. I was involved, but I'm trying to get the time frames right for you.

Hon Margaret NG:

Please.

Director of Civil Aviation:

But, on 6 July, we used telephones and direct lines.

Hon Margaret NG:

Sorry, you, meaning the.....?

Director of Civil Aviation:

The CAD.

Hon Margaret NG:

The CAD.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Not me personally. Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

The CAD had the information?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, yes, because we, we get the ETA's from our radars.

Hon Margaret NG:

That's right. You got yours?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, you are the first to have the information?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Air Traffic.

Hon Margaret NG:

You then used telephone lines, and.

Director of Civil Aviation:

We had, on 6 July, 'yes', telephones, because the link failed on 6 July.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. What was the link supposed to be?

Director of Civil Aviation:

The link was a very sophisticated link.

Hon Margaret NG:

What was it called? Does it have a name, like so many other people?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. I don't think it had a name. It was a very sophisticated link, which took raw data off our radars, and generated an estimated time of arrival and displayed it for the AA. This was an AA system.

Hon Margaret NG:

I don't think that's right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It's called a radar tracker.

Hon Margaret NG:

I understand, but, as you explained, and I'm trying to understand from your evidence in the Commission of Inquiry, that was the original idea?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

This was this very sophisticated system?

Director of Civil Aviation:

And it didn't work.

Hon Margaret NG:

And you knew that it wasn't going to work?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

You agreed beforehand that you were not going to use that because it was too difficult.

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, no.

Hon Margaret NG:

Isn't that right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. Let's forget about the system from AA to Air Traffic. Let's look at the system from Air Traffic.

Hon Margaret NG:

Air traffic being your business?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes. CAD.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right.

Director of Civil Aviation:

From Air Traffic to the AA. The AA, as part of their FIDS, looked and used data taken from our radars, pretty raw data, basic radar data. We told them this was ambitious, it was inaccurate and unreliable.

Hon Margaret NG:

All that. So, in the end, they abandoned that system for AOD?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. They, I believe they persisted in that system.

Hon Margaret NG:

No. I don't think so. Madam Chairman, I don't want to be unfair, and this is a very complicated issue. Perhaps I can refer Mr SIEGEL to his explanation before the Commission of Inquiry, and that was on 7 September, You would find upper right-hand corner of the page says 123.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I'm sorry. Could you give me that reference again?

Chairman:

7 September.

Hon Margaret NG:

7 September and on the right-hand corner, upper corner, you see '123'.
Your explanation actually began on Page 121.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I'm sorry, I.....

Hon Margaret NG:

Do you get the paper, Mr SIEGEL?

Chairman:

It's Day One.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes. OK. All these references always seem to be at the back, Madam
Chairman.

Hon Margaret NG:

It doesn't matter. Take your time.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Day?

Hon Margaret NG:

You have page, 7 September? Pages 121-123. Do you have that?

Director of Civil Aviation:

7 September I have. Page?

Hon Margaret NG:

Pages 121-123, at the top. Do you see 121, Mr SIEGEL?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I'm just getting there.

Chairman:

Bracketed Page 33, I think that's bracketed.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Page 121? Yes, I have.

Chairman:

Yes. You have it.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Page 121. Somewhere in the middle of the page, you find (a) and you said you are not an IT person, and so on?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

And there, you started to explain how your Department.....

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Puts a data into the system, and how the information is then used. Can you perhaps, you would like to read that quietly to yourself - the next couple of pages? Oh, sorry, to be fair, you should actually start the page before, on Page 120, at the bottom of the page. When you were referring to the AODB?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Then you start to explain. Could you tell me when you've finished reading?

Director of Civil Aviation:

I will. I, I have it.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes? Thank you, Mr SIEGEL. Now, you realise that somewhere between Pages 121 and 122, you said that this complicated system involving the AIDB, that is the raw radar?

Director of Civil Aviation:

The radar tracking.

Hon Margaret NG:

Track, tracking, and so on, you knew that it was too complicated, too sophisticated to work, and, before then, you recognised that it didn't work, and you agree on Day One you would use a fax?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, no, I'm sorry. We are confusing again. We used a fax from the AA to CAD. There is a two-way street of information. The information which the AA provided to CAD, the parking positions of the aeroplanes, that was provided by fax.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Yes?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Now, on this we are now addressing the information the other way, from the Air Traffic Control to the AA, which is the estimated time of arrival.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, estimated time of arrival is provided by you?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

And how do you pass it to the AA on AOD?

Director of Civil Aviation:

On airport operating day? We used, as it says there at Page 123 top. Perhaps we could take it, take, go through it? Recognising the ambitious nature, we with the AA, provided additional means of backup monitors, which were available in the Airport Control Centre and the Airport Operations Control Centre, which provided the same information from a different ATC source.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. "How did you provide it?" is my question.

Director of Civil Aviation:

It was, it was from a different radar source, but it was through dumb terminals, wasn't it?

Hon Margaret NG:

I know, but you have that, you received that, CAD received that information.

Director of Civil Aviation:

We input it actually, Madam.

Hon Margaret NG:

How do you pass that to the Airport Authority?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It was taken directly off the radar, and fed to the AA, and displayed on a monitor, as it said there. The original scheme was that it would go directly into the AODB, would feed directly into their system with no vetting, with no interface, with no screening of the data, and we consider that shouldn't be.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. So, what was the system you have changed to? I still don't understand.

Director of Civil Aviation:

That is where they take the feed, the information off another radar source, and it is projected on, displayed on a terminal in their facility. It is not automatically fed into the AODB system.

Hon Margaret NG:

I see. So, in other words, the original idea was that you would provide the information?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. We still provide the information. We still provide the information.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes?

Director of Civil Aviation:

But instead of the information coming off this piece of equipment and going straight into their system without any interface whatsoever, we provided with the AA terminals, so it was displayed in their facility. It wasn't fed directly into the FIDS.

Hon Margaret NG:

All right. Now, OK, what facility is theirs?

Director of Civil Aviation:

That's the AOCC, the Airport Operations Control Centre.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right.

Director of Civil Aviation:

There was an intervention, it's probably the best way of putting it. A screening. It was put up on a display in front of them, rather than the data automatically being fed into their AODB, database.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. And you said that, in the event, in fact, that didn't work either, and you had to use telephone lines. Is that right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Eventually, yes, we used, we used telephones, yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Now, did you consider beforehand that that would have been a very important part of the airport's operation. That something like this should work, that the AOCC should work, otherwise it would cause confusion to other people?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Well, of course, I am aware that the AOCC should work and that the AA were aware of it as well.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Now, what steps did you take to ensure that this was going to work, that information from you?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Because we put in this, as I said, at items 14, 15 and 16 on Page 123 on 7 September in my evidence to Justice WOO.

Hon Margaret NG:

You put in what? Sorry?

Director of Civil Aviation:

As I said, at para, at lines 13, 14, 15 and 16 and 17, 18, 19 and 20, that is what we put in, as I said to Justice WOO.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. So, in order to make sure that this part would work, that's what you did. You put in extra backup. Is that right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, we did.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, you didn't take for granted that because the AA assured you that it was going to work, it would work?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, but.....

Hon Margaret NG:

You took the step to provide the backup. Didn't you?

Director of Civil Aviation:

We took the steps, because they were taking data off our radars, and we knew that taking data off our radars in this way - as I have said there, in my evidence to Justice WOO - would be unreliable and inaccurate. We knew that. We told them that in writing, because it was our system that they were taking the data from. There's no read-across to fit here, Madam Chairman.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, what you're saying is that the entire system, on that day, does not depend on FIDS? Is that right?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. I'm not saying that. No. I'm saying that the feed of information, in this case, came from our system, and we knew the limitation of that system, and we informed the AA.

Hon Margaret NG:

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

I think we are sort of running out of time.

劉江華議員：

主席，我想緊跟這問題。

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Now, Mr SIEGEL, you are aware that, following the airport opening date, there was a report on the way the airport operated in the first week, in the AA Board meeting, and one of the causes for the confusion was delay in importing information, and one of it is estimated arrival time, estimated time of arrival. Can you explain to us how that happened? Did it come from you, or did it come from somebody else?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No. The delay was, eventually, we had a target time of thirty minutes. We achieved that time of thirty minutes. We believe that the delay was not because we didn't provide the ETA's, because we know when the aeroplane's arriving, because we are Air Traffic Control. The delays were because of a breakdown in the AA's communication system, they just couldn't assimilate the data.

Hon Margaret NG:

You gave them the data. They couldn't assimilate it. Is that what.....?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes. However, however we generated it, and however we got it to them. At one stage, I had staff running down to the Airport Control Tower, to the Apron Control Tower, to give them the information, because all their telephones were jammed. We couldn't get through. So.

Hon Margaret NG:

Thank you.

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

7月6日當天的第一班航機，原定是否應由羅馬來港？根據原定的編排，該班機由何處來港？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I think there were several aircrafts scheduled at the same time, Sir, Madam Chairman.

劉江華議員：

是哪幾班？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I think Rome. I mean, I haven't got this information with me, Madam Chairman, but I'll give you the best I can. There was Rome, which I believe was a 747. There was several aircraft scheduled to arrive at the same time, and let me explain why this is to Members. When aircraft are scheduled, they are scheduled in time windows. So, you will have, you will find that there are about three or four aircraft scheduled at the same time, which helps the marketing, but, in fact, they go within two or three minutes within a time window. It is purely a practicality point of view. So, there was several aircraft scheduled at the same time, Madam Chairman, 'yes'.

劉江華議員：

我想知道，首班機原是由羅馬來港的，但後來定了由倫敦來港的班機為首班機，當局在何時作出這個決定？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I don't recall the time when the decision was made. I don't see?

主席：

劉江華議員，你可否解釋這個問題與我們是次公開研訊的關係。

劉江華議員：

他剛才解釋謂，現時若有班機來港，他會將資料送往“AA”。如有任何改變，他是否可以立即通知“AA”？在當天來說，這是很關鍵的，所以我想知道他有否將次序重新調配，令機場管理局也不知道有此調動？而令到“FIDS”系統的資料出現錯誤。

Director of Civil Aviation:

Perhaps I can answer that? The aircraft were not rescheduled as suggested. Aircraft operate off-schedule all the time. Revisions to estimated times of arrival are a daily fact of life in the operation of any airport, and this information is processed by Air Traffic in the normal routine way, and it had no impact. Where I think, what he is referring to, is references to disruption caused by delays, and I think this was caused by aircraft not being able to get to a parking position; not due to delays in the air, but due to delays on the ground. We were holding aircraft on taxiways for some considerable time. I think this is where the delays came in.

劉江華議員：

我的問題主要是，當第一班航機到港，你有否很準確地將資料由控制塔輸送往“AA”？特別是要輸入“FIDS”系統，你是否可以準確傳送給他們？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

劉江華議員：

透過何種途徑？

Director of Civil Aviation:

Through the channels which were being used at the time, which I have just been discussing with Ms NG.

劉江華議員：

是否用電話？“Fax”？

Director of Civil Aviation:

I don't know, at that stage, whether it was telephones, because I don't know if the system, I don't think the system had failed on the first aeroplane. It failed later in the morning, and I'm not sure exactly what time. It was passed in the normal way. I don't know what time the system failed that morning. So, I don't think the first aircraft is relevant, with all respect, Madam Chairman.

劉江華議員：

甚麼是正常系統？你仍未回答是透過何種途徑輸送給“AA”。

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL, do you know the answer to his question? Through which channel, I think he asked the question, but do you know? If you don't know, just tell him you don't know.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I, I can't say at this stage.

劉江華議員：

主席，我覺得很奇怪，他作為民航處處長，竟然不知道第一班航機的資料怎樣輸送到“AA”。

主席：

我想這個問題由你自行作結論。你提出的只是意見。

Director of Civil Aviation:

It is not the conclusion that the Director of Civil Aviation does not know. The conclusion is that the precise route of that particular aeroplane of the several hundred that day, I cannot say. I can only suggest that it was passed in the normal procedure which was pertaining at the time, which was from Air Traffic Control down to the Airport Authority, Airport Operations Control Centre.

Chairman:

Thank you. Mr SIEGEL, for one last question, could you please turn to Paper no. A25? The record of ADSCOM's meeting dated 7 November, that was the first meeting that you attended, the first ADSCOM meeting you attended.

Director of Civil Aviation:

I have it.

Chairman:

You kept trying to assure Members earlier that whatever was said in Paragraph 3 was actually said in the context of FIDS, and so on and so forth, and that it was not, by any means, an indication of your general opinion of the AA management. Can I direct you to Paragraph 14? Last 2 lines, "DCA pointed out that there were staff in AA who had worked in Kai Tak. The unfortunate thing was that these staff had no clout to ensure that things that should be done were in place". Paragraph 15, last sentence, "DCA felt that time was extremely tight for recruitment of staff", and Paragraph 17, last line, "SES" - Secretary for Economic Services - "and DCA, both found it necessary to strengthen the AA management". Would you not agree, Mr SIEGEL, that these different lines and paragraphs prove the point that you had no faith in the management of AA generally, not just pertaining to the FIDS system?

Director of Civil Aviation:

No, I would not. Let us take them in, one after the other. Paragraph 14, the staff, in fact, were not at Director level. They were at - General Manager level was the most senior- Manager level. They were not influencing

policy. That was the unfortunate thing. Members may recall my appearances before this Chamber, when on the terms and conditions of moving, getting the staff from CAD to the AA, and I think also I'd like to make the point that these staff were instrumental in, like, recovering the situation after 6 July, and deserve a thanks and great credit, which unfortunately they deserve. Moving onto Paragraph 15, "Thought it was extremely tight for the recruitment of staff". Yes, it was extremely tight, but it didn't mean that it wouldn't be achieved, and, in fact, it was achieved. In fact, it was achieved very well, and again great credit should go to Sidney CHAU and ADSCOM, for what he's done in the last year, and he hasn't had a great deal of credit either. Strength in the AA management? Yes, I think there's a general view that - there was a view then - that the management should be, should have been reviewed. That was a view at the time. I have no specific views on it, but that doesn't mean that I would consent to personalising these comments, no.

Chairman:

Paragraph 22 of the same meeting, line 4, "DCA doubted AA's ability to open the airport in April 1998. The TOP date for the PTB had slipped, there was not enough time for proper training and trials". It was your recommendation to ADSCOM the first time you attended that meeting at ADSCOM. Was it not?

Director of Civil Aviation:

Yes, but, as I say, I think, during the course of this morning, and it's been very nice of you to give me the credit that you have, my influence, but one should not overstate that. I was of the view that they shouldn't open in April. I was of the view then, and I'm of the view now that I'm glad they didn't. When I talk about the Occupation Permit for the Terminal Building, of course, this was affecting training, because, if the Occupation Permit hadn't been issued, then the staff couldn't go and train on the facilities.

Chairman:

So, this was one of the key considerations. Not so much, not so much, perhaps partly because of the Airport Railway, but certainly uppermost in your mind, as a Board member of AA, is AA's ability to open the airport in April?

Director of Civil Aviation:

It was one of the factors. I referred to earlier, in addition to the Railway, yes.

Chairman:

Last question?

李永達議員：

對不起，我看到一些資料，想請施高理先生確定。因發牌時涉及保安問題，我想問 Mr SIEGEL，你曾否聽過機場管理局有一個“aviation security strategy”？

Director of Civil Aviation:

There is an airport security programme which they are required to comply with, so, presumably, that's the strategy, yes.

李永達議員：

我不知道施高理先生是否有這份文件？文件 C31，機場……“NAPCO”的文件。

主席：

剛才的文件 C80，他說沒有。

李永達議員：

若你沒有這文件，我讀一段給你聽，在 NAPCO，97年6月20日有一段關於“aviation security strategy”的話，“AA has reported that this issue is the most time critical item to AOR. To mitigate the adverse impact of the delay, AA has prepared a compressed programme of procuring their aviation security service to meet the target contract date of end November.”我想問這個“aviation security strategy”是否可以在你發出牌照前已完全做妥？

Director of Civil Aviation:

This was a strategy towards the, the provision of services, Madam Chairman. The needs of the airport aviation security programme, in order to secure the new airport, was complied with, and that's why the licence was issued on 29 June.

李永達議員：

施高理先生回答的意思是，在發出牌照前，這些已經全部做妥。

Director of Civil Aviation:

That they complied with? The strategy that I refer to there is for the provision of services, how they were going to obtain the services, I believe. I haven't seen the document. The, the airport security programme, which is the document they're required to meet as part of my regulatory requirements, was met.

李永達議員：

施高理先生是否可以簡單地說，它怎樣才能滿足到你的要求，即在甚麼情況下才符合保安上的要求？

Director of Civil Aviation:

There is a large document on this, which has been called the airport security programme, which, in essence, Madam Chairman, is that they must have in place a secure perimeter, a secure interface between the restricted areas and the public areas, that they must have adequately trained staff, that they must have in place the necessary screening measures for hold-store baggage, and passengers and hand baggage and various other requirements subject to the configuration of the building, and they comply with these. Otherwise, I wouldn't have issued the licence.

李永達議員：

我問最後一個問題。施高理先生是否記得在6月時，你仍然很擔心機場的保安問題，包括有太多出入口，而他們沒有足夠人手看守這些出入口，令許多沒有證件，即“permit”的人很容易便可進入機場。你是否擔心這點？

Chairman:

Mr SIEGEL.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Date again, Madam Chairman?

Chairman:

This was June 1998.

Director of Civil Aviation:

Not, in June 1998, because, during June, remedial measures were taken by the AA and their security contractor to resolve these problems.

李永達議員：

我沒有其他問題。

Chairman:

So, if Members have no further questions, today's hearing will end here, but, Mr SIEGEL, the Select Committee notes that you will proceed on retirement next week. So, on behalf of the Select Committee, we wish you a 'Happy Retirement'. However.....

Director of Civil Aviation:

However!

Chairman:

Please note that, if the Committee considers it necessary to order you to give further evidence, you must attend further hearings.

Director of Civil Aviation:

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜
專責委員會

Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. I've spent many times in this Chamber over the years, and it's nice to leave with those kind words. I'm grateful. Thank you.

Chairman:

You may now withdraw. Thank you. Members please go to Conference Room C.

(The hearing ended at 1 pm)