

立法會

調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日 開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜 專責委員會

第8次公開研訊的逐字紀錄本

日期： 1998年10月15日(星期四)
時間： 下午2時30分
地點： 立法會會議廳

出席委員

周梁淑怡議員(主席)
何鍾泰議員(副主席)
何承天議員
李永達議員
吳靄儀議員
馬逢國議員
張永森議員
陸恭蕙議員
陳鑑林議員
單仲偕議員
劉江華議員
劉慧卿議員
蔡素玉議員

證人

香港機場管理局項目工程總監
柯家威先生

陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士

香港機場管理局合約經理
潘嘉宏先生

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜
專責委員會
Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

主席：

多謝各位出席今天舉行的專責委員會第8次研訊。

在未正式開始研訊前，我想提醒各位委員，整個研訊過程必須有足夠的法定人數，即連主席在內共5名委員。

我想藉此機會再次提醒公眾人士及傳媒，若在研訊進行程序以外披露研訊上提供的證據，將不受《立法局(權力及特權)條例》所保障，因此傳媒應就他們的法律責任，徵詢法律意見。

在未傳召證人香港機場管理局項目工程總監柯家威先生之前，我想徵詢委員的意見，柯家威先生已通知專責委員會秘書，他將帶同以下人士出席研訊，他是香港機場管理局合約經理潘嘉宏先生。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許潘嘉宏先生在研訊進行期間陪同柯家威先生，但他不可以席上發言。

如委員對研訊程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊開始，並傳召證人香港機場管理局項目工程總監柯家威先生。

(柯家威先生進入會議廳，
並由潘嘉宏先生陪同)

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE, thank you for attending today's hearing. You are summonsed before the Select Committee today to give evidence and to produce papers, books, records and documents related to the Select Committee's scope of enquiry. First of all the Committee has decided that all witnesses must give evidence on oath. As Chairman of the Select Committee I will administer the oath. You may either take the oath with your hand on the bible or take an affirmation. Please follow the terms of the oath or affirmation put in front of you.

Mr Douglas Edwin OAKERVEE, Project Director of Airport Authority Hong Kong (Project Director, AA)

I swear, by almighty God, that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Chairman:

Thank you, Mr OAKERVEE. 專責委員會現在會處理1998年10月14日的傳票命令證人出示的文據、紀錄及文件。專責委員會知悉，證人已根據傳票，提供下列文件：

柯家威先生的證人陳述書。

Chairman:

Are you now formally producing to the Select Committee the document mentioned as witness statement of Mr Douglas Edwin OAKERVEE as evidence pursuant to the summons?

Project Director, AA:

I am, Chairman.

主席：

我現在宣布上述文件獲接納為向專責委員會出示的證據。除上述文件外，專責委員會知悉，機管局行政總監董誠亨博士曾於1998年8月、9月及10月向專責委員會提供多份文件。鑑於董誠亨博士現時仍在醫院接受治療，專責委員會同意將董誠亨博士出席研訊的日期順延，確實日期將於稍後決定。專責委員會亦知悉，機管局主席黃保欣先生於1998年9月24日到專責委員會席前作證後，向專責委員會提供了進一步的文件，包括他的證人陳述書。專責委員會決定暫時不會命令黃先生到委員會席前進一步作證。鑑於上述的情況發展，雖然董誠亨博士提供的文件及黃保欣先生提供的進一步文件仍未正式向專責委員會出示，但除黃保欣先生的證人陳述書外，該等文件均可於專責委員會研訊上被引述。機管局已確認對此項安排沒有異議。

Mr OAKERVEE, I now ask the first question. Would you please refer to Paper no. B39 for use at the hearing, Volume III. Paper no. B39 is the AA Board Paper no. 194/98 prepared for discussion on 14 July 1998, titled "Operational problems in the first week after airport opening." Mr OAKERVEE, would you please refer to the list of problems contained in the paper and tell this Committee which of these problems are within your direct line of responsibility?

Project Director, AA:

Madam Chairman, perhaps I should commence the answer by saying that as from mid-June, as the Project Director at the Airport, I handed the entire facility over to the Airport Management Division and the Maintenance Division. As for the installation of all the equipment I was responsible for the design and its installation, but once it became operational I no longer directly looked after it. So, although I am aware of all these problems and have been involved in the Task Force that the Chief Secretary set up immediately after the opening of the airport, my actual responsibility is a secondary responsibility from opening date onwards, and hence my knowledge in some case is direct and in others is hearsay.

Chairman:

Could you perhaps direct Members to those for which you have direct knowledge?

Project Director, AA:

The ramp handling in Item 4, I certainly have no direct knowledge of. The baggage handling, I have some knowledge of but again I was not involved in the management of the operation on Day One. The Flight Information Display System, again I am aware of some of the works that have been done on it since, but as of the trials held on 14 June we had a stable system which we handed over. The telephones, I do have direct knowledge of. The public address system, I have some knowledge of. Airbridges, I am aware of the problems there. Building Services, the failures, I have knowledge of. Access control under "Security", I have some knowledge of. Cleanliness and waste management, I am not involved with. Signage, I am aware of. Catering outlets, I have no knowledge of. Air cargo handling, I have no knowledge of, other than for construction. Overcrowding in the PTB, I know the consequences of it in certain areas but wasn't involved with it. Public relations handling, I have no involvement.

Chairman:

So, just now when you ran down the list and gave us the idea of which of the items you have direct knowledge of, and some of the ones you in fact mentioned, you mentioned that in fact you seem to have direct involvement on the construction side, the physical side, could you in fact let us know which are

the ones that you would consider you have actually handed over and therefore is in somebody else's hands, and which are the ones which in fact have not been completely handed over?

Project Director, AA:

Madam Chairman, all systems, as I said earlier, were handed over on 14 June or thereabouts to the AMD as they are solely in charge of the operation of the airport. On all the contracts that exist, due to the fact that there is a defects liability period on all contracts and outstanding works under the contract, I still play a role and so do my staff in managing those contracts. But on day-to-day operation they are handled through the Airport Management Division.

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

主席，首先我想問柯家威先生，雖然他對大型工程很有經驗，但對於大型電腦，柯家威先生過往有否接觸此類工程，有否相關的經驗？

Project Director, AA:

Madam Chairman, no, I am not a specialist in computers or IT. I have no qualifications in that field.

劉江華議員：

若根據你工作的進程，據你所知，一個這麼大型的電腦系統，"FIDS"，要用多少時間進行測試，才可達到可靠及可使用的階段？

Project Director, AA:

There is a programme set out initially between the contractor and the Authority and it formed part of his contract. That programme was changed from time to time during the course of the contract due to the change in scope of his contract and also problems that he found himself that caused him to change his programme. The testing period was over a period of about 9 months in all in the different components, and took 2 parts. One was the Factory Acceptance Tests. The next was the Site Acceptance Tests and the Regression Tests that went on,

and there are still tests continuing today because it was part of the contract that was agreed that the whole of the FIDS system would not be complete by opening.

劉江華議員：

主席，我想柯家威先生提供一個準確的日期。剛才他說電腦系統須測試9個月，現在仍在測試中。但我想問的是，若要達到可靠及可使用的階段，需要用多少時間進行測試？而實際上機場管理局用了多少時間進行測試？

Project Director, AA:

Obviously, Madam Chairman, I have not got a programme in front of me so the timing is going to be somewhat approximate. But testing started on various components of the system in 1997. The priority tests were carried out on those modules which interface with the baggage handling system and the common user terminal system, which is the system that connects to the airline zone software system.

劉江華議員：

主席，他仍然未能回答我的問題。我當然知道當中涉及很多的聯繫，但你既是主要的負責人，你應知道要多少時間測試，實際上機管局又用了多少時間測試，你只要告訴我兩個數字就可以。

Project Director, AA:

The tests have not been completed yet because the system is not complete. I don't expect the system to be completed until March next year.

Chairman:

Perhaps we can put the question another way. We always relate all these questions to AOR, Airport Operational Readiness, which means that it is ready for opening at least, OK, even if it is not 100 percent. I suppose it is a concept that you would accept, would it not?

Project Director, AA:

Indeed.

Chairman:

Yes, so let's talk about AOR. AOR, in order to get the system ready for AOR, how much time is actually required for tests and trials, and how much time did you have actually for tests and trials for FIDS?

Project Director, AA:

The tests and trials, as I said earlier, Madam Chairman, started on various components in the course of 1997 and they followed a scheduled programme. The basic tests and Site Acceptance Tests were finished by 14 June.

Chairman:

Surely, surely there has been a time gap planned for training and getting the people who are going to man the system ready for its operation. There must be a time there allowed so, say AOR, whether it is April or whether it is 6 July, that is the date of AOR. When should you have had it ready? How long that period should have been for tests and trials and how long did you have, in fact, for tests and trials?

Project Director, AA:

I have been reminded now, Madam Chairman, that the Pre-Site Acceptance Tests for the final group of integrated tests started on 18 February '98 and they finished on 16 April '98 and regression tests continued through February right to June. The training, as the best of my memory serves me, started in March and those that were using the systems were part of the exercise and involved with the actual Site Acceptance Tests. So, there was training and testing going on together.

We also had our systems, an establishment called Interface House which is where we had all systems in, best described as, a simulator and it was the requirement of each contractor to install both his hardware and his software in that facility first and undertake tests before he was allowed to put it actually in the permanent facilities in the terminal or anywhere else on the airport. This included all systems within the airport. And testing went on there, the Pre-Site Acceptance Test and some training started there as early as the beginning of

1998.

劉江華議員：

主席，我想再問柯家威先生，當"EDS"，即"FIDS"的承造公司投標時，你有否參與批核該投標？

Project Director, AA:

I was involved in the senior capacity and took the recommendations of the tender team, of both the Project Committee and the main Board for approval.

劉江華議員：

在你的證人供詞中曾提述，該承造商在3月時辭退了一個很主要的工作人員，你事後知否該人為何被辭退？

Project Director, AA:

No, Madam Chairman. In my witness statement there is the letter that I sent to the Managing Director of EDS expressing both mine and the Authority's annoyance that this had been done and a response was made but it is not a satisfactory response to the reason why he was dismissed. One suspects that it is because he wasn't able to get the financial returns out of the contract that his superiors had anticipated, because they, EDS have, I believe, lost quite a bit of money on this contract. But that's pure supposition on my part. I have no evidence of that. But I have no satisfactory answer from them, and in my opinion to sack the Managing Director who had taken a very keen interest in the job from the end of '96 and been the prime mover of it had adverse effects on the Authority.

劉江華議員：

根據你個人的判斷，你認為該人被辭退是否對整個工程造成影響？

Project Director, AA:

It would be difficult to answer that other than to hypothesize, but I certainly do not believe it did any good.

劉江華議員：

主席，既然柯家威先生提到那封信，我希望就該信即文件第B71-7段提問。該信是你寫給承造商的，信內提及被辭退的人，但我最關注的是最後一段，其內容是："Finally, you should be aware that as a result of prolonged uncertainty of both Government and the Authority in your ability to deliver a reliable FIDS, substantial contingency plans have been instituted to enable the airport to operate in the event your system fails and/or has to be abandoned. I am sure that the latter would be totally unacceptable to us both...."。我想問的是，一直以來，不論是機策會或機管局，都很強調機場啟用當日必須有一個後備系統"Stand-by FIDS"，但你這段說話，是否暗示無須用"Stand-by FIDS"呢？

Project Director, AA:

No, I am not. I don't think I am hinting, Madam Chairman. What I was saying here was we had great difficulty in the first part of this year because a lot of the tests that they did and the trials in the first 2 trials failed. There were also other problems between the airlines CUTE system and FIDS, and at this time there was a bit of uncertainty where the responsibility lies between CUTE and FIDS. It appeared to be CUTE in the end. But really what I was saying, the fact that ADSCOM and the Board had been discussing a stand-by system was nothing to do with this contractor because the stand-by system was being considered outside the contract and we were considering who we would have to do it, and we certainly didn't want EDS to provide the stand-by system.

劉江華議員：

柯家威先生剛才解釋"contingency plans ... has to be abandoned"，你的意思是甚麼？為何此東西……

Project Director, AA:

Sorry, what I mean is the system. I mean at that point in time the system was not performing on trials. It had gone through these factory tests in most areas but not in all areas at that stage, but we were having difficulties with it in the trials and it crashed twice. And I think one must bear in mind, Madam Chairman, that this is a letter between the Authority as an employer and one of its contractors and the style of writing is somewhat different to what we would

discuss internally ourselves.

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE, perhaps you can enlighten the Committee. This event, this fact that the Managing Director of EDS left at a very critical stage of your installation of the system and so on, testing and so on, did it actually impact on the date on which the system would actually be ready for AOR?

Project Director, AA:

No, it didn't as far as I am aware, Madam Chairman. What it did have obviously (a) I found out as it suggested in this letter, that he had been dismissed and I was told some days after he had been dismissed which I found quite annoying. The second thing is it obviously had an effect on the morale of the EDS staff on site.

Chairman:

So, in other words you actually think that to have the system ready, which was 14 June you mentioned earlier on, which was perhaps, how many days, twenty days before the airport was scheduled to open, was in fact a perfectly reasonable state of things to have, for you to in fact hand over a system which you regard as reliable as far as AOR is concerned, is perfectly acceptable?

Project Director, AA:

The system was also running on 2 May at the previous trial. It was also operating on the one preceding that, although there were some deficiencies. There were 5 trials in all and the first 2 were the ones that it crashed absolutely.

Chairman:

Was it not true that even when you were resolving problems as you went along new problems cropped up?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, that is so, and of course although I am not an IT expert as I said earlier,

as each new segment of software is introduced there is likely to be other problem reports coming up there that have got to be resolved. It is a reiterative process, really.

Chairman:

So, it was very evident that in fact the system was highly unstable?

Project Director, AA:

No, by 14 June we believe we had a stable system but the information that was being provided to the FIDS system was the information that was passing through Kai Tak. And we used the Kai Tak information on our own system because obviously we had no live material to put in it and that was the nearest thing that could be used. So, we used that information and it was going properly.

The area of concern that we had really on 14 June was the reliability of some of the hardware. We had more monitors gone down than we had expected and we also had some of the liquid display, crystal liquid display boards gone down. That was not an EDS function. That was a GEC problem, which was the main contractor here, and they found that there was a piece of software within the liquid crystal display boards which was playing up and they made modifications to that. In the case of the monitors that are in the big banks of eight, it has been found subsequently that the problem there that we had was that GEC and EDS had stored them in a manner where some of the contacts had got oxidised inside the monitors through poor storage.

Chairman:

So, would you say that was your responsibility or the responsibility of the operational side?

Project Director, AA:

The fact that was the fault, that came directly under me. As a consequence it is mine, yes.

Chairman:

Lau Kong-wah

劉江華議員：

主席，我仍然想問剛才的問題，因為他未能提供答案。這是很重要的，因為他剛才說，當日寫這封信時，數個管理部門都認為需要有一個後備系統"Standby-FIDS"，但柯家威先生則表示與"EDS"沒有關係。這是當然的，但整個FIDS系統的完整性，對後備系統一定有影響。柯家威先生是否同意由於"FIDS"系統一再延遲，至差不多6月底，令後備系統從來未經過測試，最後在當日亦沒有使用？你是否同意你們的工程進展緩慢，令後備系統直至最後還不能使用？

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

The stand-by system was a system that was undertaken by the Authority's IT Division rather than the Project Division, and we kept them quite separate. They started work in the first quarter of 1998 and had a contract with GEC again for some of the hardware, but not EDS. EDS was not involved in this. Hong Kong Telephone Company was involved in the stand-by system. And they had that system tested before we opened the airport. That was tested again in late June. From memory, something like 30 of the airlines were involved in that test and it functioned, as I understand it, properly. But we kept it quite separate from the engineers that were involved in the main system with EDS.

Chairman:

And it didn't come under you either?

Project Director, AA:

No.

劉江華議員：

主席，我想問他是否完全不需合作？即使此事指明是IT部門或

AMD部門負責，但你們兩個部門是否不需要合作呢？

Project Director, AA:

You do need the cooperation and there was cooperation. There was cooperation with the Project Division, IT and AMD, but the actual design of the system was left with IT and they installed it with the assistance of AMD, the Airport Management Division. I personally helped in getting the contract sorted out with GEC and getting the costs of the system back within the budget.

劉江華議員：

主席，最後一個問題，亦是關於該信的。在該信的第3段，他提到把"FIDS"系統的可靠性或進展直接向政務司司長匯報，我想問是否有這樣的一個機制？

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I reported to the Chief Secretary at this time, roughly every 2 weeks, through the ADSCOM process. Obviously I wasn't going to explain to a contractor the niceties of the arrangements we had with our principal shareholder.

主席：

李永達議員。

李永達議員：

主席，我想先請柯家威先生看看文件第4冊，C93。若他手頭沒有，或許我們給他看看。該文件是"Airport Core Programme Monthly Progress Report July 1998 (as at 1 July 1998)"。柯家威先生，你有否看過該文件？

Project Director, AA:

I have read it some time ago. I haven't read it in connection with this enquiry because it wasn't part of the package that I received last night, but if I am allowed to read whatever you want me to, I will do my best to ...

Chairman:

Yes, you will be given time.

李永達議員：

我會給他時間和逐點發問。請柯家威先生參看文件第1-1頁，"Summary"，應翻3頁便可看到，"Page 1-1"。

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I have got that page.

李永達議員：

在文件第3段這樣寫著，"The New Airport encountered significant operational teething problem in the first few days of service, resulting in an unacceptable standard of services. Primary causes of the problems appeared to be the partial failure and instability of the Flight Information Display System (FIDS), inadequate communications; lack of required resources, poor training and procedural integration; and lack of coordination between the AA and the Business Partners."。該文件應是新機場工程統籌署"NAPCO"所寫，你對我剛才所讀的結論是否同意？對於當中提到機場剛啟用首數天出現的問題是基於此等原因，你是否同意？

Project Director, AA:

I certainly agree with the first sentence. As to the cause I think some of the statements there may not be entirely correct, but I think that would be better answered by either the Chief Executive Officer or the AMD Director rather than myself.

李永達議員：

我想問這段所寫"The primary causes of the problems appeared to be the partial failure and instability of the Flight Information Display System."，這點你是否同意？

Project Director, AA:

I believe it was one of the constituent reasons for failure. Whether it is the

primary cause I wouldn't like to say. I am not too certain that it is myself. I think what most people realise, and please understand that I have, I mean, very sorry for those who were inconvenienced by the concerns that were caused at the airport so I have no intention of trying to treat this flippantly or underestimate the gravity of the situation so I am answering it in that context, but the new airport when it opened, all the trials that we conducted, although they were planned trials with specific programmes attached to them, were in a contrived environment and I know many of you here were at some of those trials. They were not the same as when we opened the airport on the first day under stress, and it was a stress level that was far greater than we had anticipated. That wouldn't affect the FIDS. The problem with the FIDS, I think, was there were problems with the actual input that was being made into the FIDS by some of the staff, plus some of the hardware failing. But I don't think the actual FIDS system itself was entirely to blame. Had it been so, and the software had been faulty, we would have never been able to get it up working in a few days.

李永達議員：

柯家威先生，你可否把文件翻後3頁，即"Page 1-1"之後的第3頁，此處有一個表寫著"Executive Summary Programme (ESP): Milestones and Key Dates"。你找到這頁嗎？

Chairman:

Do you have it?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

李永達議員：

你看看該表第30行，"FIDS software ready for Airport operations"，這裏寫著："UBIP-96 Programme"，日期應該是1998年3月31日，"Current Forecast"是1998年7月6日，即表示延遲了14個星期。你是否同意該分析？

Project Director, AA:

The reason I am delaying, I am just trying to see what the dots on that mean behind that statement.

Chairman:

Do you agree?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, it was 14 weeks late. Yes, I do agree.

李永達議員：

14個星期大約是3個多月，你認為整個航班顯示系統軟件的預備情況較你最初預計的時間延遲了3個月，是不是一個很滿意或被接受的情況？

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

The FIDS software I don't believe was necessarily 3 months late. What it says is "for airport operation" and it is basically the integration of that software. What we agreed to open the airport on was that various modules had to be complete and integrated, and other parts of the equipment were not available for use. As I said earlier some in fact doesn't get completed until March next year. What this rather coarse milestone date refers to, backed to the up-dated base implementation programme in 1996, is everything collectively. So, yes, it is 14 weeks because it wasn't all integrated on 6 July. I mean, one could even make an argument that it won't be complete until next March.

李永達議員：

柯家威先生，你是否同意該14個星期的延誤，其後果是訓練和測試的時間大大縮短，甚至有些測試不能透徹地進行，你是否同意這說法？

Project Director, AA:

The training programmes were compressed but, as I said earlier, to offset

that rather than having training staff in the actual finished facilities in the airport, we mitigated the situation by commencing the training in Interface House where we had the simulation equipment. And that was not originally foreseen when these programmes were drafted. That was something that we decided to do subsequent to awarding the systems contract.

We still retain that facility and it will be retained as long as that building is able to stay on that site as a simulation centre so that any changes in the software, or upgrades to software, that are required in the future will be done there and also further training or initial training will be done in that facility. So, the whole concept of training in Interface House is not recognised by this programme. So, you are right, the training was compressed but the other facility was available.

The impact of that compression and the readiness of staff, I am not qualified to answer. Only the Director of AMD could answer that as to the readiness of his own staff. But the facilities were made there and we endeavoured to mitigate the situation by providing Interface House. So, I am afraid, Madam Chairman, with the best will in the world, due to my involvement I could only give a partial answer to that question.

Chairman:

Could you comment here on a view which was actually put to ADSCOM in November? In their meeting on 7 November, which is Paper no. A25, this particular issue was in fact discussed and it says here:

"Details of the training programme had been worked out, but were aborted by delays in the works progress. The training programme was not given a realistic timetable....However the detailed training programme had not been effectively implemented as the promised systems facilities and manuals were not available on time. AMD had to re-do the programme again and again.....AA's training programme was squeezed to fit in with the delays in works progress and thus became unrealistic."

This is in ADSCOM's Paper, which is Paper No. A25, Paragraph 5. Do you agree with that?

Project Director, AA:

Sorry, Madam Chairman, if I could read it. I've just been given it. Sorry,

I haven't been able to locate it. Which ...?

Chairman:

Paragraph 5 of the notes.

Project Director, AA:

I couldn't agree with the whole of it, no, Madam Chairman. I note for a start that nobody from the Airport Authority was in attendance at this meeting.

Chairman:

I am just asking whether this information given to ADSCOM is factually correct, that in fact "training programmes that had been worked out were aborted by delays in the works progress and not given a realistic timetable and that they had to re-do the programme again and again and the programme was squeezed in to fit in with delays in works progress and becoming unrealistic."

Project Director, AA:

To start with, Madam Chairman, this paper is obviously written in the context of an opening date in April 1998 and not the July date, because the date wasn't changed by November.

Chairman:

No, but was this a fact or not? I am just trying to establish whether it was a fact.

Project Director, AA:

I believe it is partially true in as much, it would seem to me the way it is written to be over-emphasising some of the problems we have had. Certainly there were more than one training programme prepared, I believe, by the Airport Management Division. That was partially due to the systems not being ready in all cases and some of the operation manuals were late, but this is talking about systems collectively. Some were on time, some were late, as you would expect. The other thing, I believe, the Airport Management Division were also suffering

from was an acute shortage of manpower at that time and that also impacted upon their training programmes. But that is really a question that would have to be put before my colleagues.

Chairman:

But you are not disputing what is being said here, that in fact there has been delay in your works progress and therefore that impacted on the training programme, which has rendered them unrealistic?

Project Director, AA:

I am not agreeing to the words written here because I think it is over-emphasising the situation. There were delays to some of the systems. There were more than one training programme. As to whether they were realistic or not I am not competent to say.

Chairman:

But factually, factually they were squeezed as a result of delays in works progress?

Project Director, AA:

They were in relation to the April opening date. This is not the July opening date.

李永達議員：

主席，我還想就另一個範疇發問，就是關於柯家威先生提供的證供的第38段及42段，我並不打算詳細讀出，而只會引述部分內容。這兩段證供的中心思想大致是，柯家威先生向專責委員會供稱，從未見過任何大型工程，在開始時可以百分百完成，而期間沒有任何事故發生，故出現問題是必然的事，這種說法亦屬合理且合乎邏輯。請問作為項目工程總監，你有否向機管局或機策會提出這方面的意見？我提出此問題的原因，在於你作為項目工程總監，如能事先向決策者，包括機場管理局或機策會的決策者，說明機場在啟用時必定會出現問題，必定不會完美，則大家也會有充分的心理準備。你甚至可以建議機管局在機場啟用前向公眾交代詳情，使他們不會對機場期望過高，那麼其後便不會因機場啟用後所發生的問題而為之嘩然。我的問題是，以你擁有這樣豐富的經

驗，曾否向機管局或機策會的決策者詳細說明機場在啟用時必定會出現這些問題？

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

Madam Chairman, I think that question is several questions in one. I was transparent to NAPCO. NAPCO had a team of men on site all the time and were monitoring us on a day-by-day basis, and they had full access to all our records. In November '97, which coincides with the paper that we have just read previously, the Works Bureau together with EMSD and the Government IT staff carried out an independent audit on all my systems, which we cooperated fully with and I was very pleased to have it done. And that concluded in its final report that they had cautious optimism that all the systems would be available and ready for operation by April '98 for opening the airport. So, I don't think there is any question that NAPCO and ourselves, especially all through 1997 and following on, were working in total harmony.

I also reported faithfully, and I believe honestly, to both ADSCOM and my own Board as to the current state of affairs at all times so that they knew the problems. Unfortunately the period given to report always wasn't very long but ample written reports were always provided to them.

As to the expectations and aspirations of the public, I agree, I believe some statement should have been made to the public, that warning should have been given that we were likely to suffer some teething problems.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Chairman, my point is that Mr OAKERVEE is a very experienced project manager. My question actually relates to his statement in Paragraphs 38 and 42 that in this kind of big projects there must be some problems in the opening, what you classified as teething problems. My question is whether he has alerted ADSCOM or the Airport Authority so that they could prepare for these kinds of problems which would happen in the opening? Whether he has advised the other directors so that they should take corresponding or appropriate measures to tackle these problems?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I believe my view that on airport opening day the airport would not be complete was known by my fellow directors and the Airport Authority. It was known and reported. You will find it well documented in different areas although I can't point you to anything at present. I mean, that was a known fact by all parties. There would be outstanding works. The principal areas of outstanding works were going to be tenant fit-out. We knew the Ground Transportation Centre, the areas and canopies around the bus station and the taxi areas would not be complete. We knew that Cathay Pacific would not have completed their lounges. That was going to be some time on. Some of the enhancements in terms of signage were not in place that had been required as a result of the trials and also the additional work we need for FIDS and some of the other systems. All those were known.

In recognition of that situation, although I wasn't able to influence in anyway any media statements to the public, we set up two things as a contingency plan to cope with any problems on opening. We stopped before opening of the airport, and for several days afterwards, any construction work. It didn't matter who it was, which tenant, which business partner, no construction was allowed to go on in that airport for the first few days. That was to ensure that we didn't have that as a problem that was going to further exacerbate any teething problems that may arise, and bear in mind we didn't know where the teething problems were going to come from.

So, what I did on a 24-hour basis was had each contractor set up his team of specialists and they were ready to go in and assist the AMD through their Maintenance Department to recover any problem that was there. Those men were on stand-by from 0600 hours on the first day.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

So, Mr OAKERVEE, can you answer me, have you given this kind of warning to the AA Authority or the ADSCOM that they should prepare on Day One of the opening, as there would be some kinds of problems which they should be ready to face? I have checked the papers which showed that you did not attend the last two meetings of ADSCOM before the opening.

Project Director, AA:

Correct.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

You only last attended the meeting on 22 May. You only mentioned about FIDS. I read all the ADSCOM papers, I think, in March, April and May. I don't think you have used your experience to warn ADSCOM so that they could realise they were facing these kinds of teething problems on the opening. Why didn't you warn them and let those in the decision-making process arrange for some kind of relevant action? For example, if ADSCOM realised that this kind of problem must happen, they should hold press conference before the opening, down-grade the expectation of the public, tell the world that these things will happen on Day One so that they will realise the fact. But the fact is that on Day One members of the AA and the members of the ADSCOM were simply caught by surprise that they were facing this kind of problems. Do you agree?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

No, I don't agree entirely. Both AA and ADSCOM, I think, were shocked to the extent of the teething problems and it was really, I think, a cascade effect that was taking place, but rather than the gravity of some of the problems that went on. But the mere fact that we had set up the contingency plans to deal with these problems in any area, because you don't know where they are going to come from, that was a known fact. That was known both by ADSCOM and by NAPCO, and all my colleagues because it was a planned set-up that that would be the contingency measures that would be provided by the Project Division. I believe it was known.

Also, although I was not at the last two ADSCOM meetings, and that was done with the full agreement of the CEO and the Chief Secretary knew where I was, and that was basically with the amount of work we had going on on site at the last few minutes clearing everything up, and the biggest problem there obviously was major cleaning exercises, to try and get everything ready in time, my place and proper position was back at the works and not on that particular occasion attending the meeting. My colleagues and CEO were well able to describe the situation in my absence.

The other thing, I think, that has got to be understood and appreciated that there were several visits by ADSCOM, went round and the problem areas were shown.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

So, Chairman, Mr OAKERVEE, did you accompany the Acting CE, Mr Donald TSANG, on the visit?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I did.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Have you warned him that there must be some teething problems happen on Day One?

Project Director, AA:

Yes ...

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Have you?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, we knew there would be some teething problems somewhere but we had no idea where they would be. The work that was unfinished and would not be finished by opening date was clearly shown.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Another question, Chairman. Did each individual parts of the airport have any kinds of contingency plan for each individual? For example, FIDS, signage, toilet cleaning and waste management, did each individual areas have its own contingency plan?

Project Director, AA:

Well, as I previously said I had arranged it with each contractor that his team of knowledgeable individuals, right from senior level, would be on stand-by 24 hours a day to immediately go at the request of the Maintenance Division, which is part of AMD, to come straight in and assist if anything broke down.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

So, you know, you said you asked them to be on 24 hours stand-by and make man-power available. My question is, did each individual area have a contingency plan? Do you know that?

Project Director, AA:

Well, it depends on what you mean by "contingency". As far as I was concerned on project side we had the experience and the right men available with the right equipment to go in and remedy anything as it broke down, that became a teething problem. If you are asking me "was there a contingency plan to work round by those operating the airport", I believe they did have their own contingency plans but I was not a party to them because the whole of the Project Division had withdrawn from the terminal and the airport generally and were waiting to be done what they were told, including myself, because I was no longer in charge of the facility.

Chairman:

Are you actually saying, Mr OAKERVEE, are you telling this Committee that in whatever you were responsible for as far as AOR was concerned, you had completed your task satisfactorily and that you have handed over whatever you needed to hand over in an AOR condition to all the relevant departments and personnel, and that whatever that happened afterwards were all teething problems?

Project Director, AA:

We believe that to be the case.

Chairman:

Including the failure of FIDS? Including the communication system failures? Including the fact that the telephone lines are not working?

Including the failure of the contingency plans which were supposed to have been mapped out in case these areas failed? All these were actually nothing to do with you?

Project Director, AA:

No. They were not under my control from the time of operations. What I am saying is, to the best of my ability and it was accepted and signed off, that FIDS was, or had reached a stage, although not complete, that it could be used and it had been demonstrated on the previously two trials on the weeks between on a daily basis using the live information from Kai Tak that it was working and reasonably stable. We had problems with some of the monitors and some of the liquid display crystal boards. They were known, and we were dealing with those as remedial works. But the actual being in charge of the airport and access to the airport was through the operations side.

The telephones which you mentioned, no. All the telephones were not in. The public telephones were not in. They were known to be an outstanding task to go on after airport opening. That was one of the items that wasn't ready. The telephones to various business partners in the airport, they were supplied by the various telephone providers. And that is a slightly different story on its own in as much as when we originally designed the airport it was to use our own system of 14,000 lines. There was a change during the life of the airport, I think something like June '97 when OFTA came in and said, "No, you can't do that. All the telephone providers that we are going to introduce must be able to provide telephones", so it then became up to each business partner's own decision as to which of the service providers he chose.

We pressed a lot of our business partners, wrote a lot of letters to sort out which of the service providers they were going to use. Some were efficient in that and others were totally inefficient in that and there was an ultimatum given that if they had not made their order with the service providers and we hadn't been notified by a certain date prior to opening, and I'll have to look at my files as to what that date was, we could not guarantee their telephone lines would be installed and neither could the service providers. So, telephone is a slightly different story.

But the other means of communications didn't fail. The communications that I think you are referring to, Madam Chairman, was the ramp handlers' communication system which was a system that they had brought in themselves

and that system crashed, and that was nothing to do with the Airport Authority.

Chairman:

Well, I mean, not only did some of that crash but SAS also crashed, didn't it, on the day?

Project Director, AA:

The Stand Allocation System?

Chairman:

Yes.

Project Director, AA:

I don't think the Stand Allocation System did crash.

Chairman:

Well, certainly it is contained in one of the documents which you in fact submitted, or AA submitted to the Commission, that the SAS crashed too on 6 July. But anyway, I think we are talking generally about systems and I think that systems, the installation, the tests, the trials of systems fall under your responsibility, area of responsibility ...

Project Director, AA:

Correct.

Chairman:

... with the exception of the contingency plan for the stand-by FIDS, so-called. And what you have been telling the Committee is that on 14 June when you signed them off and it is up to the operational people to make sure that they would or would not work on 6 July, and that you were just standing by and watching when the whole thing just crashed. Now, can you actually tell this Committee where your responsibility ceased if the system that you handed over

was short of training for their personnel and at the same time crashed on the day leading to what you called accumulative consequences?

Project Director, AA:

Can I just clarify one point? That when the systems were handed over it was not done on a unilateral basis. It was done by agreement with the other parties involved and it was signed off. So, it wasn't just me saying "here it is, it's ready".

The training programmes, as I indicated from that statement which you read out from the ADSCOM meeting that I wasn't in, the training programmes were compressed in certain areas where some of the systems had not been commissioned as early as had originally been anticipated, but also there had been trouble in training because, I believe, AMD couldn't always provide the resources that were necessary to be trained.

主席：

何承天議員。

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to establish some facts first. One of which is, when was the practical completion, Certificate of Completion, issued to the contractor for the passenger terminal building?

Project Director, AA:

The Certificate of Completion for the terminal building comprises many completion certificates for each of the different contracts. The principal contract is 302, which is for the superstructure. That Certificate of Completion still has not been issued. The reason it has not been issued is because of the defective glass that we have got, which has got to be replaced by the supplier through the contract, and we have got a contractual dispute on that at the moment. Until we get the terms and the replacement finalised, which are well on the way to being agreed now, we will not issue the Certificate of Completion.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

What are the other Certificates of Completion you referred to?

Project Director, AA:

All the systems have got their own completion certificates.

Chairman:

When did they get them?

Project Director, AA:

They have got them at different times. Some have got them on 6 July, some have got them before and some haven't got them yet.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

First of all, go back to the super structure contract first. You mentioned that the practical completion has not been issued. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr OAKERVEE whether he was aware, I am not aware frankly, of the terms and conditions of the main contract, but maybe Mr OAKERVEE can tell us whether, by using the airport, that is after the opening, the beneficial use of the airport, it would in any case be practical completion from the contractual point of view?

Project Director, AA:

That is the argument some of the contractors have put forward who have not yet got their Certificate of Completion, which includes the super structure contractor. The Certificate of Completion under the contract could not be issued, or couldn't be applied for until the commercial operation of the airport, irrespective of if he had finished his work six months early, nine months early.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

I think my question was, I mean, whether a beneficial use would have meant the issuance of a practical completion, Certificate of Completion, in the same sort of, it would mean the same thing as far as the defects liability period is concerned.

Project Director, AA:

No, the defects liability period will not commence until the completion certificate is issued. I mean, that is on the superstructure and that is one reason we haven't issued it.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Chairman, following that, since the practical completion for the super structure contract has not been issued and some of the other practical certificates, completion certificates have been issued rather late. One, I think Mr OAKERVEE mentioned, one was 6 July, the same day as the opening of the airport. Would the Project Director agree that it was a reasonable event, I mean, that the practical completion was issued the same day as the opening of the airport? In other words, there wouldn't be time for the owners to take over the building and do whatever they have to do to make the airport ready for opening and then ensure there are no problems?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

No, I wouldn't agree with that. That's why I mentioned what I did before. It was not possible for a contractor to apply for a Certificate of Completion until 6 July because he could not apply for it until the airport was commercially operational. It was a peculiarity of the contract.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Chairman, could the witness supply that part of the contract for the Select Committee as evidence?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I can do. Not at this moment. If I could follow it up.

Chairman:

Yes, you can follow it up.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Yes, well, one thing, Chairman, that I have also noticed, I want to verify the fact that the mechanical/electrical building services were only completed on 29 June, which is just a few days before airport opening. Is that correct?

Project Director, AA:

The mechanical services are in a huge contract and some of the works were not completed until 29 June. Have you got anything specific in mind?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

No, I mean, the reason why I ask is again it seems that the completion of those services was actually very late, I mean according to the information that we can gather, they were 37 weeks late in this case. Would the witness consider that reasonable to enable the airport to open on that particular date?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I think it was reasonable if we examine the circumstances. Some of that lateness is due to the fitting-out contractors because that contract is responsible for providing all the sprinkler systems, and we had the equipment finished for the main terminal building but not for all the commercial areas and business partners were fitted out. They came quite separately and proposed their own scheme, and the licensed sub-contractor dealt with those facilities. Some of it applied to the electrical systems as well.

I think possibly the thing that we could consider in the same vein as this is the issue of the temporary occupation permits. Temporary occupation permit for the whole of the terminal building, which was No. 2, was issued on 14 February. The reason it was temporary and not a full occupation permit again was because of the exclusion of all the commercial fit-out areas.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Chairman, in any case I would like to ask Mr OAKERVEE whether he thinks that if there were delays of, like, 37 weeks for the mechanical services, 35 weeks for security communication systems, practical completion was not even

issued, I mean, was that a situation which is acceptable for the opening of a very major airport?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

I think these are contractual delays and not necessarily real delays in the contracts that are being applied. These contracts varied as to what their opening dates were. In the case of both the building and mechanical contractors he originally expected to open the airport in 1997 and then it was extended out to April '98 and then eventually July. And his works involved tenants' fit-out works and some of those tenants' fit-outs are still going on because not all the tenant areas have been taken up.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Chairman, many of the problems that you mentioned in the beginning of this afternoon's hearing were related to building services or mechanical problems. I think some of them you may not have mentioned, like escalators. There were about 20 escalators out of 41 or whatever?

Chairman:

59, and twenty was not working.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Yes, 20 was not working. Some of the water supply problem, toilets, fire services, I think, I mean quite a number. I think the question was whether these contracts have been signed off, as Mr OAKERVEE uses the terms, rather in a hurry so that the airport could be open rather than that they have been reliably completed, tested, commissioned?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

The systems have been tested. I mean, escalators, lifts and walkways were not part of the main building services contract. They were a nominated sub-contractor on their own, and those systems have been very well tested. They all received their Form 6's of the EMSD which is, as you know, demands quite rigorous tests and they have been done in good time.

What had occurred on the last few days in some cases was that the fit-out contractors working for the business partners had done damage and got dirt in them but the more acute problem was the sensors on the walkways and escalators proved to be too finely set for the actual loading that it was taking on full operation. As I suggested earlier that the trials we undertook, although well planned and contrived, they were not putting the equipment under the same stress level as it was when we actually opened the airport. I mean the numbers were far different.

Chairman:

Mr Ho?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Chairman, I would like to come back to that stress situation or stress level which Mr OAKERVEE has mentioned quite a few times and also in his witness statement. Would he agree that the project team would have known the capacity of the airport and that once the airport opens it will be under stress condition?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

So, in that case, Chairman, why, I mean, why would he say that in his statement, and this is in Paragraph 58, that "Although each element functioned well in trials, it was always appreciated there could be operational difficulties on AOD itself, in a stressed situation", as if it was not really designed for a stress situation?

Chairman:

Was there adequate anticipation of that stress situation, Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

I think all things were designed adequately as is evidenced by the fact that they are performing well now under stress. But the fine tuning of them that was done during the test, and trials proved to be too sensitive in some of those areas where you have got stop buttons and other sensors and we had to relax them to make them be reliable. They had been pretty reliable under tests that we carried out before and that included putting people on them.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Chairman, in that case is Mr OAKERVEE telling us, as in his witness statement to the Commission, the last paragraph, Paragraph 85, that:

"In my view, however, many of these problems would have been experienced no matter how much time was available to prepare for AOD."

in other words, all those problems that happened on the opening date would not have been avoidable, how much, even though the contract might have been completed much earlier without so much delays and so forth? Is he saying that?

Chairman:

Are you saying that, Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

By and large I am saying that, yes.

Chairman:

And you did not anticipate these problems, and that as and when they came up they were just naturally teething problems and that you somehow had to deal with them as and when they came up?

Project Director, AA:

No, Madam Chairman, I wasn't saying yes to that. I didn't think that was the question I was being asked, with due respect. I thought you said "would the situation had been different had we had more time?".

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Yes, that was my question, Madam Chairman.

Project Director, AA:

I don't believe there would have been any major difference. There may have been difference in the sense that if we could have encouraged business partners to have got their work finished in tenant fit-out, but I don't think they would because it is inherent in their nature that they won't make an investment until the last possible moment, so with the current situation we were in that was even more so. So that work was going on as late as possible, and that would have been the same if we had opened the airport in twelve month's time.

The only area where there may have been some benefit is in further training or some more problems' debugging going on in some of the systems. The work that is still outstanding that was planned to be outstanding on opening date could be possibly have been finished but by and large I don't think it would have made any difference had we opened the airport in April, July, October, December.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Chairman, I think what Mr OAKERVEE has told us is that despite the fact that many of these contracts were delayed for many weeks, i.e. months, all the problems that we encountered on Day One, even Day Two, would have been unavoidable, would not have been unavoidable even though they could, if the contractor had completed sooner. In other words, an airport like this magnitude anywhere in the world when it opens would have the same chaos?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

Unfortunately I think that has been the case with the last 3 big ones that have opened. I did for that reason put in that article from the Herald Tribune into my own witness statement which was written before the airport opened. I mean, to the best of my knowledge there has not been one airport opened that hasn't suffered trials and some of those that have opened before us are still suffering major problems.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Chairman, in that case, actually a similar question has been asked before but I would like to ask it again, which is that if it is his view that this sort of chaos would have happened in any case to any major opening of any major airport, did he ever advise the Airport Authority or ADSCOM of such a fact?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

No, I think, without trying to avoid the answer, answering the question, Madam Chairman, if I could just make a statement before. I think some of the things that you are relating to chaos are not necessarily the terminal building, although it impacted on the terminal building. We did have the other problems with the cargo handling where that impacted back into the terminal building. But I believe it is a hypothetical question in the sense that nobody, and I certainly didn't have the crystal ball, that would tell me what the teething troubles would be when the airport opened and the airport went under stress. As I said before, my contingency plan and my main contingency plan was to have the knowledgeable staff from every contractor, who were working on the terminal building and in other areas of the airport, have their men on 24-hour stand-by so they immediately went in and fixed anything that did go wrong.

Chairman:

Are you actually saying, Mr OAKERVEE, that the situation that we encountered on 6 July was probably something that is generally speaking quite usual in an airport opening and therefore should be accepted as such, should be tolerated and you believe that there is nothing unusual about that situation, that you wouldn't even call it chaotic? I mean, as far as the PTB is concerned?

Project Director, AA:

The degree to which teething problems occur I believe is an unknown event. Certainly the problems that arose or the situation was greater than I had anticipated. And ...

Chairman:

If you say that ...

Project Director, AA:

I mean, I can't disagree with you, Madam Chairman. I mean, no, it is ...

Chairman:

The question that must follow is: In that case, wouldn't you say that in your anticipation you have underestimated a lot of the things which ought to have been anticipated but were not anticipated? Were not in fact done properly in preparation for the airport opening? Surely that must be the logical question to ask.

Project Director, AA:

I accept it is the logical question and the logical answer must be "yes", and I have to take responsibility for any underestimation that went on. On the other hand I think the whole thing is very much more complex than that in as much as I believe human errors that took place, now whether they were greater or smaller than they should be I wouldn't like to say, and I don't think anybody anticipated the cargo problems that we had which impacted very badly on the baggage handling.

Chairman:

That was exactly why on behalf of the Committee I put the question to you

in the first place, "which were the problems that you had direct line of responsibility and which you did not?". I mean, that was exactly the purpose behind that question to make sure that you did have the opportunity to say which were actually under your control and which weren't.

Project Director, AA:

No. I thank you for that, Madam Chairman, but I think on the other hand it is very difficult in the situation that arose on 6 July and the consequences of it, to put things in watertight compartments. It is a collective responsibility and it was a collective problem. And it is very difficult to draw the boundaries between some of those areas.

Chairman:

Last question.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

I would just like to ask Mr OAKERVEE whether he was circulated copies of the situation reports from NAPCO on, I think, a fortnightly basis? NAPCO produce a sort of Sit-Rep, situation report, on the progress of the airport.

Chairman:

What is the number and the volume?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

These are in C, in Volume II from Paper no. C80 onwards or whatever. I mean, I am not asking you particularly about any one piece.

Project Director, AA:

No, the one you are showing me, though?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

But this type or this series of reports?

Chairman:

Have you seen them before?

Project Director, AA:

No, Madam Chairman, I only saw them for the first time when I received the files last night. These situation reports were the confidential reports that went to ADSCOM from NAPCO which we didn't get a copy of.

Chairman:

OK, Miss Christine LOH?

Hon Christine LOH:

Yes, thank you. I would just like to pursue the question just asked by Mr HO Sing-tin about airport readiness on the day, because I believe the witness told us that even if the airport was opened in April the same sort of teething problems would probably have taken place. So, I just want the witness to tell us whether he continues to insist that the airport was ready for opening in April?

Project Director, AA:

The airport was open in April, sorry, was ready but not in such a state of readiness as it was in July. The principal difference being that the Ground Transportation Centre was not available at all in April.

Hon Christine LOH:

Can we just leave the issue of the Ground Transportation. I presume the witness means by that the MTR?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, and the terminal access structure, the structures between their station and the terminal building, and the reason I made reference to them is because we had those works entrusted to us on behalf of the Mass Transit Railway Corporation.

Hon Christine LOH:

OK, if we were to just leave that aside, is the witness still telling us that other parts of the airport, leaving aside freight, was ready for opening in April?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, there was very little work done on the airport, on the physical works between April and July. Most of it was tenant fit-out. There wouldn't have been as much tenant fit-out. You wouldn't be allowed to open the shops as the progress went. But what I think one must realise was when the opening date of July was announced in January the tenant fit-out contract went back automatically to meet the July date whereas it would have taken place earlier than the April date and that would have made life a lot easier for some of the systems contracts, the electrical/mechanical works, because it wouldn't have been out of phase. We were working to the April date still and the tenant fit-out came on later. And I think that's again evidenced, as I said earlier, by the fact that we had the temporary occupation permit from BD on 14 February.

Hon Christine LOH:

I just wonder whether the witness is aware that Government, ADSCOM/NAPCO, did not believe the airport was ready for opening in April?

Project Director, AA:

I am not aware that that was the case, Madam Chairman.

Hon Christine LOH:

OK, I would just like to follow on Mr LEE Wing-tat's question earlier on about the interface between the computer, the testing, obviously trials, getting people ready and I believe the witness told us that the training part was somebody else's responsibility and that the witness' responsibility was to get the computer system ready and it was stable. I would just like to refer the witness to the Booz-Allen and Hamilton study. I believe the witness is aware of that report?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I am, Madam Chairman, but I should advise you that I had never seen it until I received your documents at four o'clock last night. That was a

document that was never passed to the executive directors.

Hon Christine LOH:

Right, that's interesting, but will the witness tell us whether he was aware of the contents, the gist of the problems as seen by the consultants, of the problems within the AA?

Project Director, AA:

No, I wasn't as they have described them here, albeit I was interviewed and some of the statements I made appear to be reflected in what is written.

Hon Christine LOH:

One of the things that the consultant referred to was about the "Senior management has not exhibited consistent teamwork." Would you disagree with that statement?

Project Director, AA:

No, I would not.

Hon Christine LOH:

So, you agree?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Christine LOH:

Could you tell us a little bit more? Is it a problem of interface, for example, between testing and training, or what kind of team work was lacking?

Project Director, AA:

It is not a question of that. It was the way the staff were structured in the Airport Authority which I think comes in there, that there was a matrix system

where you had both functional and line management divided and you didn't have the normal hierarchal form of management and making certain that nobody was working away on something on their own, but actually all pulling as one team. There were difficulties, I believe, in the Authority in that. But you have to forgive me in as much as I have only had a very brief look at this since I received it at four o'clock last night.

Hon Christine LOH:

I don't think it's actually necessary to refer to this document any further since the witness has confirmed to us that there were problems of team work. How did these problems impact on airport readiness, airport opening readiness?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

I think the biggest problem, I don't think you could necessarily say it impacted on AOR alone. It was more global than that. The Project Division, I think, lacked a client from the outset. You might find that a funny statement but we were designing a building project for the Airport Authority but we, from the outset, didn't have a constant operations director who was going to run it, who actually defined the functionality of the airport. We had many operations directors, some of which were secondees and everything. And Chern HEED, the current one, only came on at the latter stage of the airport when the design was really fixed. So, that is one area where there was a problem.

The other, I think it could have been improved, communications between the two which would have improved it, but I can't actually put my finger on anything at the moment which I would actually say "that specifically impaired AOR" because any different form of management, the results are a bit hypothetical at the moment. I would have preferred to see a different style of management.

Hon Christine LOH:

But I think what the witness is saying to us is that it has global, it had global problems to the whole of the construction and getting into operation mode the

airport. Is that what the witness is saying?

Project Director, AA:

What I am saying is my personal opinion ...

Hon Christine LOH:

Yes, I mean this is for you to express your personal opinion.

Project Director, AA:

... is that another style of management may have resulted in a different situation but it is a "may". I can't be specific at all because it's hypothetical.

Hon Christine LOH:

It is hard for us to perhaps understand why it is hypothetical when you agree that there are team work problems and it impacts globally on the whole airport project, but yet it seems difficult for you to point out some examples, or perhaps all the areas? Maybe you want to tell us all the areas were a problem?

Project Director, AA:

I think we were not necessarily working with the degree of cohesion that was necessary on some occasions, and where there were differences of opinion it was very difficult to get a resolution because nobody was making the decision in that sense.

Hon Christine LOH:

Well, perhaps we can ask some structural problems. I mean in terms of how you saw, for example, your responsibility, who you reported to, if a decision is needed, where do you have to go? I mean, how did you have to interact with the Board, for example, with NAPCO, with ADSCOM, and could you help us with describing your relationship with these key bodies?

Chairman:

And the fact that you seem to have a direct sort of line and working

relationship with the CEO rather than to be sort of, you know, on par with all the other directors. Is that also part of the problem as well, that we look at the organisation chart and it seems that you are, particularly after January, you seem to have a direct line to the CEO rather than like the other directors as part of the team? Is that also part of the problem as well?

Project Director, AA:

Chairman, that was news to me when I saw the Booz-Allen report last night, the way we were structured. I have never seen that structure before. But what ...

Chairman:

You haven't seen that structure before?

Project Director, AA:

No.

Hon Christine LOH:

Well, perhaps the witness can describe to us the structure as he understands it?

Chairman:

Right.

Project Director, AA:

Up until the beginning of 1998 all executive directors reported directly to the CEO. In the absence of the CEO either the Finance Director or myself acted in his stead. I think mainly because I had been there since 1991 I had probably done it more than most. When Mr LAM came in, in January '98 as the Deputy Chief Executive Officer, there was a memo issued which put all staff under him except myself, and I was to continue to report directly to the CEO. Fortunately Billy LAM and I had known each other for a long time and while he was Director of NAPCO we had good relations and those good relations continued to go. And Billy LAM and I, I believe, work as a very efficient, a very good team

together. So, the fact that I saw these rather harsh lines on the Booz-Allen report did surprise me.

Hon Christine LOH:

Yes, I think it would be very helpful if you described to us what you think is the sort of line of command. I mean, if you reported directly to the CEO, you know, this change that you were just telling us about, what was the reason for that change? What were you told why that change was necessary?

Project Director, AA:

The only reason I got, I am trying to remember what the memo said now, was basically with all the work that was coming on towards airport opening and the extra duties that would be involved it was thought necessary to ease the CEO's workload.

Hon Christine LOH:

Did that measure improve team work?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I believe it did because Billy LAM organised meetings every Monday and got the various directors, including myself, together. And although this chart is written in this way and the memo said that I was responsible to the Chief Executive Officer, I think he and I overcame that because it never was a problem between us and we worked together and I believe I have worked through Billy ever since.

Hon Christine LOH:

Really my last area of question, Chairman, is, would it be right to say therefore that you had always informed the Chief Executive Officer and anybody who cares to ask the question, whether the airport was ready for opening, that you always confirmed that the airport was ready on 6 July?

Project Director, AA:

Well, I believe that was a shared opinion.

Hon Christine LOH:

But it was also your firm opinion?

Project Director, AA:

It was my firm opinion, yes.

Hon Christine LOH:

Thank you.

Chairman:

Ms Emily LAU?

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Chairman, I want to follow up on a question by Mr LEE Wing-tat and then by Mr Edward HO about whether Mr OAKERVEE had given warning to the AA Board as well as to ADSCOM about the problems that could arise. I think when Mr LEE asked you, you said "yes, but you were not able to put your hands on the paper but it is somewhere", so I certainly would like you to locate that paper for us because we have got all these ADSCOM and AA Board minutes of meetings and so on. But then I think when Mr HO asked you a similar question you seem to have back-tracked. So maybe would you like to answer this for a third time on whether you did, (a), that you were aware of problems, more than teething problems, and (b), that you did tell AA and/or ADSCOM about them?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I think there are 3 things. Teething problems, as I have said before, nobody knew where the teething problems were going to occur, and that's why

the contingency plan was to have experts from each of the contractors involved having full knowledge of all the systems and all the facilities installed available so they could immediately react.

What was known was that the areas of outstanding works that existed which impacted in quite a few areas. That was known by all parties involved.

As to explaining the teething problems to everybody, the mere fact that I got the contingency plans and the known contingency plans, and we all thought it was necessary to do that, I believe clarifies the fact that we were all expecting teething problems but didn't know where they were coming from. But I obviously wasn't able to define them.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Well, Madam Chairman, my question was very simple, on whether you had given them warning, and in your initial reply to Mr LEE you said you did, and you said it is somewhere in the papers which you cannot immediately put your hands on, and that's why I asked you to go back and put your hands on them and let this Select Committee have the record of that. Because it is very important for us to know that certain people, particularly an influential person like yourself, have known that there are problems and have advised the decision-makers, and if they ignore your advice then it is their problem. So, I want you to tell me the date and the occasion on which you raised the alarm, if you did. So, your answer is, you did, and you would help us with the date at a later, you know, maybe this evening or tomorrow. Anyway, you are coming back tomorrow so maybe you can help us tomorrow. Is that the answer, that you did serve the warning and you can track down the date and the time, and what you actually said to ADSCOM and to the AA Board?

Chairman:

And the documents relating to that?

Project Director, AA:

I will do my best. I am not too certain we are speaking exactly on the same line here. I know your question is ...

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

... very simple and precise.

Project Director, AA:

... very simple and precise but it ...

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Did you or did you not give warnings?

Project Director, AA:

I did, but it was ...

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Good. Give us the date.

Project Director, AA:

... some of it was, we were talking, the question before was about outstanding works, I believe.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Madam Chairman, I think we are talking about, you know, warning the ADSCOM in particular, and AA Board that "if certain things are not in place, not ready then we could have big problems, so let us have this ready." Did you say those things to them? Because from our reading of these papers my impression is that you people seem to have quite an optimistic view of what's going to happen.

Project Director, AA:

The things that they were aware of were those works which were outstanding and the impact that would have on the operation of the airport. What wasn't known and was impossible for anybody to give was what the

teething problems were that we experienced on the day. I didn't know that. Nobody did, so there is no record of me, obviously, telling them something I didn't know.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

So, Madam Chairman, maybe we can leave it so that Mr OAKERVEE can go back and look at his papers and if you can track down any warnings that you have issued to the AA Board or to ADSCOM telling them to be prepared for trouble, for problems on opening day, please let us know.

Project Director, AA:

There is no such record.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Ah, that's funny because when you answered Mr LEE Wing-tat you said that.

Project Director, AA:

Yes, but I answered, I believe, a different question.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Well, anyway, now you say you have never given any warning. OK, let me move on to the next question.

Project Director, AA:

No, if I can, Madam Chairman, complete the answer to that, because I said to Mr LEE Wing-tat that the AA's works were not complete just before opening. They were identified and the possible impact of that result. But as for things I didn't understand, i.e., the teething troubles, I couldn't possibly advise anybody of those problems, and in the case of FIDS we had all signed off believing it was a competent system and able to work.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

I think my question is very simple. It is for whatever reason you

anticipated some problem, and then you said you told the relevant authorities that "because of this, this may happen so let us get ready. I am a bit worried that this may happen." Did you or did you not serve such warning?

Project Director, AA:

Well, I did do and everybody was aware of, so one can consider it a warning. As I have said several times this afternoon, I had set up specialist teams from every contractor so that they were waiting in the event there was a problem in any area we could go in and deal with it. That was, so that I had a contingency plan that covered every area where anything could go wrong.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

How many people did that involve?

Project Director, AA:

Several hundred, it went into 3 figures. I can give you the teams because we generated the directories and lists for that. I can provide that tomorrow.

Chairman:

I think, Mr OAKERVEE, it would be quite helpful if you can let this Committee have any notices which you have passed on to various parties alerting them of the existence of this team and what they are supposed to do and what they are supposed to be standing by for. So that it does give people some idea, at least, what you are anticipating. I mean, the areas where you think the problems might require the service of that stand-by team that you have actually prepared for the occasion. I think that would help to a certain extent answer that question. But I think what you also said just now is that you don't have a piece of paper warning people what teething problems might be. Is that what you said just now?

Project Director, AA:

It is indeed because I didn't know where the teething problems were going to be.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

I think we would appreciate information on those few hundred people as Madam Chairman said, which Board or Committee had been informed about the existence of those people and whether they had gone through any test or trial run or whatever, to do what they were expected to do. So, if you can supply that information ...

Project Director, AA:

Yes, that can be supplied.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

... to us we would be grateful. Madam Chairman, I also want to ask Mr OAKERVEE about what he said at the very beginning in reply to your question. He said that he handed all the things over, the works, the project, over in mid-June so to, mainly to Airport Management Division and so on. Do you have any idea of the exact dates, the figures about the slippages? Because we have read a lot about slippages in various projects. Mr Edward HO referred to a few earlier, some in weeks, some in months. So, those you would be responsible for because after you handed over then whatever problem these guys have, it is their problem, But, when you handed them over in mid-June can you give us the dates of the slippages and maybe a brief reason, because those you would be responsible, isn't it?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I would, but bear in mind that I have got virtually a hundred contracts under my control so ...

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

So, can you give us maybe tomorrow a whole list of the hundred and the slippages and why each and every one, why do we have the delay. And I am sure when Mr HEED comes here he will want to tell us the impact on him and his staff.

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

Well, Mr HEED will obviously want to tell you whatever he wants to tell you. We can provide those lists tomorrow but I think what you have got to understand is the mere fact, I am saying, there is outstanding works in areas means that when we have handed everything over to them, it was handed over in a state to be operationally ready. It wasn't in a state necessarily to be contractually complete, and they are two different issues.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Well, Madam Chairman, well, no doubt we will learn from all the other people who inherited the thing whether the thing was operationally ready. We hope they were, but also these people needed time to train their staff, and that's why you said in your statement about human error. How did these human errors arise? Because lack of training could be a very good reason. Some one may need 6 months to train, and they may ended up having less than a few weeks or a few days.

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE, do you agree with that?

Project Director, AA:

I am not in a position to agree or disagree, Madam Chairman, because I wasn't responsible for training. What I was responsible for was providing the trainers from the contractors to train the trainers in the Airport Authority, and I believe my colleague in AMD, when I was advising the state of the works, also advised the state of his training, and I believe he was also, although training may have been compressed, I believed he had had adequate time.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

But anyway, Madam Chairman, I think Mr OAKERVEE undertook to give us a list of the hundreds of contracts you were responsible for, with the slippages, saying the target date for completion, and the slippage and a brief reason why. May we have that, I don't know whether you can do it for tomorrow? If not I guess we will accept it at a later date.

Project Director, AA:

Madam Chairman, I can do the contractual one very easily. I think it needs merging two things together, as I've said. Operational readiness completion was one target. Contractual completions was a quite different target.

Chairman:

I think we are looking at operational readiness, aren't we? And the fact that you signed off to another department in the AA and they accepted as such that it is operationally ready. So I think that really ...

Project Director, AA:

Yes, but I think the document that Mr Edward HO was reading from was relating to contractual dates.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Anyway, you know what I am looking for right now.

Chairman:

We were talking about operationally ready.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Are we going to get that document?

Project Director, AA:

You are going to get that document but could I ask ...?

Chairman:

I think perhaps it is a bit much to expect Mr OAKERVEE to come up with a list of hundreds of contacts, the dates of, operationally ready dates for hundreds of contacts. But I think that if he would look at the list that we started off with on 14 July, look at the main problem areas, look at the main contracts in those

main problem areas, and give us that list first to be supplemented later with the others.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Yes, I think that would be useful.

Project Director, AA:

Thank you, Chairman.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Or any other contracts that Mr OAKERVEE thinks of being significant or important that the Committee should be aware of, because no doubt, Madam Chairman, when some of his colleagues come I think they would also want to refer to it because of the slippage and the delay had a direct impact on their work.

And also Madam Chairman I want to refer to the ADSCOM minutes that you referred to earlier. If Mr OAKERVEE would look at Paper no. A25 at which you were not present at that meeting. That is 7 November 1997. Madam Chairman referred to Paragraph 5, talking about the impact on training and so on. I want to draw Mr OAKERVEE's attention to the very short Paragraph 6 quoting, the Director of NAPCO at that time was Mr Billy LAM. He said that:

"...the joint study carried out by NAPCO on AA's AOR programme had in effect forced the two divisions [that is, your Division and the Airport Management Division] to start talking to each other, which was something they should have done months ago."

Is that actually true that you don't talk to Mr HEED and his colleagues? This is November 1997.

Project Director, AA:

Sorry, through the Chair, could you tell me which paragraph?

Chairman:

This is Paragraph 6 of A25.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

The ADSCOM minutes of 7 November 1997. Paragraph 6 at which Mr LAM told ADSCOM that you two are not talking to each other, and he brought you together. Is that true? I mean, it is either true or not true, and Mr LAM is coming on Saturday anyway.

Project Director, AA:

I think as Mr LAM made the statement he'd be more qualified to answer why he thinks he brought the two divisions together. I think what he is saying is it is not a question we didn't talk together. I think he improved the amount of effort that was going in, and it was, I believe, as I said ...

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Madam Chairman, it was a very simple question. Were you talking to each other or not?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Yes or no?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

You were?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

So, Mr LAM was misinforming or misleading ADSCOM?

Project Director, AA:

No, I don't think so. He is talking about degrees there.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Well, to what degree were you talking to each other then?

Project Director, AA:

Quite a lot but I believe what he is talking about was bringing more junior staff together and working together.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Well, Madam Chairman, we are concerned if senior people don't talk to each other or not. No doubt we will ask Mr HEED and Mr LAM when they come but we are giving you an opportunity to tell us your side.

Project Director, AA:

As I indicated before, the method or management style that the Airport Authority adopted, which wasn't necessarily my management style but it was the one I was required to work with, did not in my view, because you had unclear functional and line management lines, engender close communication at lower levels sometimes, and we had to go in and sort it out. I mean, I experienced it on one or two occasions where I sorted it out. I believe that Mr LAM brought the Airport Management Division closer than it was to Project Division.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Madam Chairman, I want to ask Mr OAKERVEE whether the slippages had anything to do with souring relations between the two divisions?

Project Director, AA:

No, I don't think so. I don't think so.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

They told you they didn't mind?

Project Director, AA:

There is no question they didn't mind. It doesn't work that way, does it? It's trying to integrate a team and pull a team together to deal with common problems.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Well, Madam Chairman, we know that some people had to wait for you to finish before they could start, and if they are waiting and waiting and waiting I think I could understand if some people could, you know, get a bit frustrated.

Project Director, AA:

But it is not a question of waiting for me. It is the Authority's contractors who had not managed to achieve some of their targets that were intended, in some cases for their own reasons and in other cases not their reasons.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

And to what extent are you responsible as Project Director?

Project Director, AA:

I oversee and manage those projects.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

So, if there are slippages, which there were, you were responsible?

Project Director, AA:

For overseeing the slippages, yes, but it doesn't necessarily mean to say I am personally to blame for the slippages.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

No, I mean, we just want to make sure who is responsible for what.

Project Director, AA:

No, no, I mean, if I may, Madam Chairman, I think there are two different issues at stake here. There is one that you are trying to suggest, that I am personally to blame for a contractor being late. That's one thing. And the fact the contractor is late is quite another thing, and I don't think I have hindered or held any contractor up.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Oh, I don't think we were saying that, of course. As a Director you have the responsibility to go and get those people and say, "Hey, hurry up! What's the problem? What's holding you up? Get it, get it ready!"

Project Director, AA:

Well, Madam Chairman, I really object to suggesting I didn't do that.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

No, we are asking you whether you, as a Director, did all that? That's why we want to ask you for the chart with the dates and with the reasons.

Project Director, AA:

I think I am very well known to be a progress chaser, and I believe that I got those contracts operate as efficiently as they were able.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

That's why we want the chart and then we can look at how severe the slippages are?

Chairman:

And the fact of the matter is, Mr OAKERVEE, perhaps you don't regard it as your area of responsibility, being the Project Director, but the fact of the matter is that even if it is the fault of the contractor, the fact that the FIDS system didn't actually come up to expectation and kept on being delayed in terms of the integration process and so on, and the slippage that resulted from that impacted quite heavily on the training programmes. It's a fact, is it not?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

It is a fact. So, if you look at it from the AMD's point of view he has a job to do too. So if he has to keep working round a schedule which you dictate, I mean, wouldn't you be frustrated if you were in his shoes?

Project Director, AA:

I would be disappointed if I were in his shoes.

Chairman:

Not frustrated?

Project Director, AA:

No, I think the point is, Madam Chairman, yes, I am not suggesting for one moment that as regards projects the buck doesn't stop with me. It does. I am not trying to wriggle out of that at all. What I am saying is on the project and where the Authority was trying to pull together to open it by a certain date, a date that was given to it, that we were working together. And ideal plans, ideal solutions and programmes had to be amended and compromises made. But the compromises weren't made on a unilateral basis. They were made together, and I believe that Mr HEED will say, "Yes, he would have preferred more time but on the other hand he considered that the training levels he was able to give in certain areas were sufficient for AOR."

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Well, Madam Chairman, let me ask Mr OAKERVEE my final question. If you would refer to your own statement, Paragraph 38 of your statement in which you said that:

"It was never envisaged that the airport would be 100% complete on AOD, just that it would meet the requirements of Airport Operational Readiness, a process which was devised by the Authority in conjunction with ADSCOM. Essentially this meant an airport which operated safely and met users' basic requirements."

We have met with the Chairman of ADSCOM, and she gave us a few more adjectives apart from "safely". She also mentioned being smooth and efficient. I think those were her requirements for opening day. Are you aware of such requirements, and do you think you met the requirements on that day?

Project Director, AA:

I believe that those involved, including myself, believed that when we opened the airport on 6 July that we would have a safe and efficient airport as was perceived by the AOR plan. The fact that for the first three days or so it was far from smooth ...

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

... or efficient.

Project Director, AA:

... efficient, no, but on the other hand it remained safe, I believe.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

So, it met one of the three criteria?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, it met, well, it should have met all three criteria, I agree.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

Yes, I just want to check with you that you actually agree with the Chief Secretary when she mentioned those three adjectives because you only used one here. You only used "safe", when she emphasised that it must be efficient and must be smooth. And you talk about the basic requirements of users, I don't know what they are. I mean, can you tell us, tell this Committee very briefly what you think basic requirements are?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

In terms of operational readiness?

Chairman:

On Day One?

Project Director, AA:

On Day One we expected the flow of passengers and their luggage to go through smoothly and we also expected cargo to go. The word "smooth" is a word that I wasn't aware of until I saw it after airport opening, but I am not going to quibble over it. But what we did expect was teething troubles and we did not expect to reach the efficiency in operation that we would do over a period of a few weeks.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing

So, to what extent would yourself and your Division, or should you be held responsible for what happened on the first few days?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

Obviously I have a collective responsibility with the Airport Authority, with the other executive directors that were involved, and if anything could be specifically identified to a system or a part of the facility that I was totally responsible for obviously I hold responsibility for it.

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE, going back to the line that Ms Emily LAU was just quoting from which is, "met users' basic requirements". Are you satisfied that in fact what happened in the first week met with users' basic requirements, without quibbling over smooth, efficient or whatever? Do you think that those basic requirements have been met, cargo aside?

Project Director, AA:

It is very difficult to put cargo aside, Madam Chairman, because that impacted heavily on the baggage handling system and the delays that occurred of people leaving the airport and actually receiving their bags. The whole thing is totally integrated together and it is very difficult to divide those two items up. I mean, Chern will explain this, I'm certain, much better to you when he, Chern HEED.....

Chairman:

But, I mean, looking at the list of problems that were quoted from the paper of 14 July, you think if we put the HACTL problem on one side, you think the other problems would in fact, with all those problems, the users' basic requirements have been met?

Project Director, AA:

No, we have still got to establish the FIDS issue. That to my mind is a problem with the system and a problem with the input to the system. There are two quite diverse points of view on this. I don't share either one of them. I think it was a combination of problems that the system failed in certain areas when it came under load. The question is, should it have come under the load if

it was being used properly?

Chairman:

I think we will have a 15-minute break now. Members please go to Conference Room C.

(The hearing resumed at 5:07 pm)

主席：

我們繼續研訊。副主席。

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

I would like to ask Mr OAKERVEE, do you consider yourself to be in the driving seat of the project, being the Project Director of AA?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE.

Project Director, AA:

In the driving seat of the Project Division, but member of the airport executive, you know, and obviously working with NAPCO and ADSCOM. So, in the driving seat that 'yes', I drive the contracts but also take instruction from above.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

When you say you "take instruction from above", exactly what do you mean?

Project Director, AA:

Well, obviously, from time to time, out of ADSCOM and from the Board room, I have received instructions which I follow.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Do you say that you attended most of the ADSCOM's meetings during the 2 years prior to opening of the airport? You had the responsibility of giving accurate information to ADSCOM?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And you were able to tell exactly what's to be expected on AOD, when this item was brought up at the ADSCOM meetings?

Project Director, AA:

I would like to just turn it another way, if I may, slightly. The emphasis on the ADSCOM meetings, were we meeting the AOR programme, and that's what I reported against, and that we would be ready for AOD, but, going back to what we said before our adjournment, was I able to tell them what the 'teething problems' were.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

OK, I'll come back to the AOR in a minute, if I may, because really I think that there are some differences in our interpretation of degree when you were talking, whether or not you were talking to Mr Billy LAM, or whether you consider the sort of chaos that we all encountered at the new airport, you consider them as 'teething problems'. I think that there are some differences in the interpretation, but, first of all, I'd like to come to the second paragraph of your Statement, if I may, where you describe your responsibilities, Mr OAKERVEE. Now, in here, Madam Chairman, I would like to ask Mr OAKERVEE why, in the second sentence in this paragraph, he did not actually include systems?

Project Director, AA:

Nothing mischievous in it. I take that to be all part of the construction.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

You consider systems to be part of the construction?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, and the engineering.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And the, but you were saying that you were not experienced in systems?

Project Director, AA:

I'm not experienced. 'No', I am not experienced in systems, 'no', other than that systems is, such as the Eastern Harbour Crossing there, I oversaw those going in, but, again, not a specialist in that field.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, Mr OAKERVEE, you had 41 years' experience in the construction industry, and could you tell us whether or not you had been involved in any airport project anywhere in the world prior to your being involved in the Chek Lap Kok New Airport project?

Project Director, AA:

No, that was my first airport project ever.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And, so, all the time since 1991, when you started to become full-time, permanent employee of the Airport Authority, or at that time PAA to start with, you relied on support from others?

Project Director, AA:

Well, as it applies as specialist airport work, 'yes'. I mean, as you will appreciate, a large amount of it was heavy civil engineering, basic project manager's work, which wasn't peculiar to an airport.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Well, wouldn't you agree that in the implementation of the whole project, apart from infrastructure of building works, the two main concerns frequently mentioned at AA meetings, as well as ADSCOM meetings, were FIDS or systems in addition to FIDS, and also HACTL?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, certainly they were.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

These were the two main areas of concern?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Right, and if that's the case, you must be giving or devoting a fair bit of your attention to these two areas? Was that so?

Project Director, AA:

Yes. I was in a general management area, 'yes'.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, could you tell us: in systems contracts how many were there?

Project Director, AA:

How many systems contracts are there? At least ten. I can't give it to you 'off the cuff'. I'm sorry.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, at least ten main systems contracts?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

I can tell you that. I can give you the full names of the contracts, but I am sure you are familiar with them. Now, I would like to come back to the response that you gave to some of our colleagues here earlier on. You were saying that, after the trial on 14 June, you had to sign off a lot of the areas to other colleagues of yours; so you just, you know, were not responsible for them any more? Is that the case?

Project Director, AA:

I'm responsible for the contract, but the system in the building was received by the AMD.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And then you were still giving a sort of overseeing eye on those contracts? You would not just leave all this to AMD?

Project Director, AA:

No, no. Correct.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And in what way did you sign off the various contracts that you thought were actually ready for AOD? What sort of procedures did you adopt?

Project Director, AA:

There's an acceptance procedure, which, when I say "signed by me", I'm saying that metaphorically. It's signed by the Division, the persons responsible in the Division.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

So, there was actually?

Project Director, AA:

Not, in other words, me personally, but I take responsibility for it.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But you are saying that you will not take any more responsibility once these were signed off?

Project Director, AA:

No, no, no, not at all. What the situation was that they had reached a state where they were ready for airport operational readiness, and the system then came under the control and use of the AMD. If there's work to be done by the contractors, whether they be defects or additional works, obviously we would instruct them on the advice of the requirements of AMD.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And there are records of the acceptance of other colleagues?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Or for these contracts?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

On various dates where it's, in respect of various contracts?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Do you think you could give us that information in due course?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I could in due course, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, I would like to come to the related point, because concerning FIDS, you actually gave it your, the favour of your personal attention?

Project Director, AA:

Indeed.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Apart from making visits to EDS in UK, you also wrote to them?

Project Director, AA:

In a management role, yes, and I started weekly meetings earlier this year with EDS and GEC.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But, in fact, did you actually allow them to take short-cuts, or not giving enough attention to the contract? If I may refer you to Paper no. A33, a meeting of ADSCOM on 14 February, 1998, which you attended? Paragraph 8. A33, Paragraph 8. Meeting of the date was 14 February, 1998. Now, it says here you were reporting to the meeting that the Pre-Site Acceptance Test, was actually brought to an end, although it was only 60 per cent complete. Because of the change of the personnel, people had to bring, had to be brought to work on site earlier. How do you deal with that sort of problem?

Project Director, AA:

Can I just have the benefit of reading the paragraph, Chairman?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Yes, surely.

Project Director, AA:

Right, Chairman, I was faced, faced with a problem here. We had the second trial due and we needed this part of the FIDS to be installed and used. They had gone through 60 per cent of the Pre-Site Acceptance Test and they had shown all signs of reasonable results. So, we cut them short, in order to deal with - where are we? - the second trial, which was on the following day.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Although you are not an expert in systems, Mr OAKERVEE, you must realise that Pre-Site or Site Acceptance Test is most important in any system?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And did this not give you a kind of warning that it was prematurely brought to an end before the next stage was engaged in? In the preparation of the system?

Project Director, AA:

The site test was carried out again. It was in order to get this ready for second trial. I should emphasise that, when I say "I", I took responsibility for doing it, but I didn't do it on my own account. I took due notice of those who do understand systems.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, you refer to AOR just now, Airport Operational Readiness Status Report. This one dated 30 June 1998, Paper no. A47, it says in Paragraph 8, Page 83 in the report, it says here the Board (refers to the AA Board) endorsed the Management's recommendation that the permanent FIDS system was actually satisfactorily, sufficiently stable, etc. Were you involved in this decision-making, or before this was actually put in?

Project Director, AA:

No. I wasn't involved in the Board's decision-making other than as a voter, because I have got a vote on the Board, but I was certainly part of the meeting, as were NAPCO and IT and AMD. It was, it was collective information that was being put in, and nobody, no one sector of information bore sway against the other. It was the combined view.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, it comes to the important point, Mr OAKERVEE, that there were 5 trials, and do you know that, whether there was any integrated systems test at all?

Project Director, AA:

The first trials had few integrated tests, and in the last 2 there were integrated tests.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But the last one actually took place on 14 June?

Project Director, AA:

Correct, and the previous one to that was 2 May.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And there were still some problems that had to be resolved during the fourth and the fifth tests?

Project Director, AA:

In the fourth and the fifth tests, it was mainly hardware problems that were involved. As I explained before, the actual FIDS system was reliable in those last two tests.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Can you tell us if this FIDS system was a new software? Was it a software upgrading the existing one?

Project Director, AA:

No. If I can just give a brief account of the contract 381 which is the FIDS contract? Originally, when the contract was awarded, it was primarily based on software that EDS had already had in their possession, and they were intending to upgrade it. The software that they've upgraded, were to upgrade, is actually the same software that's in J.F. Kennedy Airport, but with the functional requirements that have been specified for ours as they continued on through 1996, they found that their risk profile in adapting and modifying their existing software was getting too severe for them to accept any longer. They spoke to Henry TOWNSEND and myself in late '96, and indicated that they had this problem. This was the Director that got the sack subsequently in '98, and then by the first quarter of '97, they came to us with a new proposal and programme and they had to start writing the software from scratch again in 1997, and it was from that point in time onwards that FIDS became a major concern, but only for the Authority, with ADSCOM, and it's from about that point in time that you'll find the greatest reporting on FIDS. So, they were always up against a very tight programme from that point in time. They rewrote the whole of the FIDS programme from scratch at that time. The only areas I think they were able to salvage, from memory, were two important ones. One, important in terms of programme which interfaces with others, was the relationship between the baggage handling contract on 360 and the queue contract with the airlines.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, not being experienced in this area, did you just rely on your consultants, CSE?

Project Director, AA:

Obviously, I was quite worried. With the agreement of my colleagues and Henry TOWNSEND, we did take other measures. First, I put a project manager of my own in to Hook in the UK and secondly, EDS was to make sure that adequate resources were being applied and that the appropriate skills were there.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

This is Steve ROOT, is it?

Project Director, AA:

That's Steve ROOT, yes. GEC, to my mind, were treating their sub-contractor more than a sub-contractor. They treated EDS as an associate and GEC were just facilitating the arrangement for them. So, I made them put a project manager in and also I had CS, Sea-Air consultant, increased their strength and put men in there. We had these 3 parties in there overseeing it. Obviously they reported back to us on a very regular basis, so we knew the progress and the degree of advancement. I went to look on several occasions, not to judge anything as an IT expert, but more as a project manager to chase the whole thing forward, make certain we were meeting the programme dates and where slippages occurred, increase the resources.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, the whole software was actually written in the UK. Is this Mr Steve ROOT still in the Airport Authority?

Project Director, AA:

No. He's left the Airport Authority.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

He's already left?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

So, that means the whole thing was prepared in the UK. The system is so sophisticated and complex, is anyone in the Airport Authority actually able to take over this project and service it or look after it in the future, or do you have to actually rely on EDS forever?

Project Director, AA:

That's a decision that's being made within the Authority now. There is a separate review going on under Dr WONG to look at all the FIDS, what happened, what is going to be the future, and they haven't come to their findings yet, and they've also employed other consultants to look at this.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Sorry, which? Give us a full name. Dr WONG?

Project Director, AA:

Dr K. K. WONG, Peter WONG.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

OK. Now, you were saying that, at that time, you just rely on the work being carried out in UK by EDS and you actually did not send anybody from the Airport Authority to work alongside with them, and, in future, when the contract is finished, you have got nobody who has knowledge of the software prepared by this company?

Project Director, AA:

No. Steve ROOT did work for the Airport Authority, and unfortunately.....

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But he's already left you say?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, but that's unfortunate. The other people that kept constant eye on it all through this latter period was Kiron CHATTERJEE. He's the Head of IT, and also K.C. TSUI, who's my project manager on systems, and other engineers. Paul EVANS also was involved.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, last question, if I may ask you, Mr OAKERVEE. Now, when you were given information that the new AOD would be 6 July on 13 January this year, did you actually do any reprogramming of all the contracts under your control?

Project Director, AA:

More to do with the training; we looked at the time available and adjusted the training, but tried not to use that time because it was available, but I think we've got to recognise the problems that the Authority faced with the opening date in general. We had been looking for confirmation of the opening date from Government from the middle of 1997, and it had not been forthcoming. It was our mandate. We've got an instruction to complete the Airport by 19 April '98, and that was the decision that had been made in 1995. The Airport Authority and I, in turn, had maintained that stance with all my contractors, but, as we went on further and further into 1997 and the discussion that went on through the media and, well-knowing that the programme for the Mass Transit Railway and the Airport Authority were not in line with each other, the credibility with the contractors, we had demanded that we would be opening on 19 April 1998, began to lose a bit, and I had great difficulty in keeping those contractors nose-down with the right resources, because, in many cases, a lot of them were spending a lot of money and the fact that the announcement of airport opening in July came so late, I'm afraid we lost some of the momentum in certain areas, and, although there was no change in resource level in EDS or GEC, I don't think it helped us very much. If we could have had a date much earlier, we could have kept the pressure on all the time.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

You are saying that because of this postponement, all the people involved were becoming relaxed, they lost the momentum, and hence resulting in all these problems on AOD?

Project Director, AA:

I think that was a contributory factor. As you well appreciate from your professional experience, if there's no change in resource, it's very difficult to detect a level of complacency that may occur because somebody, somebody's taken the pressure off your shoulder, and given you an extra nine weeks, but there was, I believe, an element of that.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Mr OAKERVEE, are you, or did you use any management tool, at all? Such as Critical Path or PERT, or whatever?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, yes. We use Primavera, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Primavera. And, surely, as you are also an experienced engineer in running or managing a project of this size, once you know that the end date is changed, obviously you must have reprogrammed the whole thing, and all the lines and dates would have been adjusted?

Project Director, AA:

No. We didn't, other than using it primarily for extra training and experience. What did happen was that, on the initial trials that had taken place since January, some of the things that were found to be wanting, or there was a preference to change them. Enhancements and the like made additional works, they were carried out in that period of time. I mean, we built some extra toilets at 'meeters and greeters' level. We also, it was the opinion of some that the distance between the immigration desks and the screen was insufficient, and we had to move those back several metres, extra signage and items of that order went on.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But you were responding to Mr Edward HO's question earlier on, a lot of the contracts were actually certified complete either on 6 July or shortly before

AOD. Now, are you saying that all these were actually on your programme?

Project Director, AA:

Just to correct one statement, Mr HO, I didn't say that anybody got a Certificate of Completion before 6 July. I said the first people got a Completion Certificate on 6 July, because the contract wouldn't permit them to apply for a Certificate of Completion before 6 July. I'm sorry, I've lost the other half of the question.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Are you saying that all these dates were actually the same as on your Primavera programme?

Project Director, AA:

With any complex Primavera programme obviously there were delays shown and time we were catching up, where we accelerated works.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Thank you.

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE, I have to follow on this, because it's a fairly important point. In your statement, Paragraph 68, you said that the contractors did not have a confirmed date on which to focus and you lost credibility with the contractors by insisting on preparation for an April date, a date which many, many did not take seriously. I mean, we understand that. When the later date of 6 July 1998 was announced, the contractors inevitably relaxed somewhat and the project lost some momentum. This delayed date probably led to an increase in expectation as to the level of service. That we understand as well; but can you explain how that relaxation - and one can understand the psychological effect it would have on contractors - how that relaxation and that loss of momentum have, in fact, impacted on the, the whole, you know, readiness, and whether that relaxation, in fact, accounted for the problems which arose on 6 July?

Project Director, AA:

The area where it did impact badly was on the ground transportation system and that was the reason the canopies over the bus and taxi-ways were not complete, and some areas of landscape and some of the road works were less complete than we had originally intended. The terminal building, despite the fact, as I said earlier, although the contractor of the superstructure hasn't got his Certificate of Completion, that's really a technical issue over, over glazing, but he, he was finished. The other area, where it did impact heavily, as again I think I might have touched upon earlier, was on tenant fit-out. The fit-out contractors and the actual approach of the tenants slowed down considerably and they eased off for the July date. That, the area obviously where that did compound problems was in things like telephones and that, because the orders did not go in. So, so those things.

Chairman:

Well, we will come to that later, because I believe that there is some question as to, you know, deadlines which weren't met, which actually were questioned by some of your tenants in another place. Anyway, I think that we should concentrate on the point in hand. Now, somehow, logically, it's difficult for me to conceive that you're arguing that, because you delay the date, the opening date, that you would actually cause further delay because of the delay in the opening date. I mean, logically, it doesn't, it doesn't make sense, because, you know, surely one can understand that, if you argue that some of the improvements that resulted from the trials had to be put in, but that's another matter. We are talking about works which ought to have been completed for an April opening date, but still were not completed in July, for 6 July opening date. Surely, it's difficult for us to accept your logic that, because of this relaxation on the part of the contractors, it has actually caused further delay. God knows what would have happened, if the airport were opened in April.

Project Director, AA:

It's mainly fit-out contractors that I'm talking about, and the GTC.

Chairman:

So, here, you're only referring to fit-out contractors?

Project Director, AA:

And that's the biggest, by and large, and the GTC. As I've just said to Dr HO there, in the case of EDS, although they didn't change their resources, I wasn't confident that, in fact, between January and April, there wasn't some degree of relaxation compared with what there had been. I mean, I think it would only be human nature, if you suddenly found you had another nine weeks, but the trial on 2 April, the FIDS was up and running, and the previous trial had been back end of March, so I believe the FIDS was even in the same state, or similar state for April as it was in July.

Chairman:

But the GTC, I'm talking about the GTC, surely the GTC suffered from the contractor's problems. I believe, you know, elsewhere it was actually stated that, because of possible financial problems on the part of the contractor that it ran into difficulties. What has it got to do with the fact that the date has been moved from April to July?

Project Director, AA:

Because the amount of investment that was being made by the main contractor eased back.

Chairman:

Sorry?

Project Director, AA:

The amount, on the GTC, the contractor was spending an enormous amount of money, because he has lost a lot of money on that contract. At the moment, he knew he had a longer period to do it, he eased back his actual rate of expenditure, and that, that then got mixed up with sub-contractors, in this later date, having a problem with their own finances, as we know.

Chairman:

But that, that surely is just one of many, many contracts that you were

actually looking at. So, we are looking at one single case which might have encountered some problems. But here, you are putting it in as a general statement, as if a lot of the contractors there.

Project Director, AA:

The biggest one was the fit-out, where there are a lot of contractors, Madam Chairman.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Madam Chairman, can I take up a point that Mr OAKERVEE made just now? Thank you. Mr OAKERVEE, you were saying that, as far as FIDS is concerned, whether or not the AOD was April or 6 July would have been the same status. You were saying that, were you? Were you not?

Project Director, AA:

I was saying on 2 May that the FIDS, using the Kai Tak information, as it did on 14 June, stood up. Again, the only problem we were having was with the hardware on the monitor side.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Sorry. I don't think that's what you were saying to us just now. You were saying that, as far as FIDS is concerned, whether the Airport was opened in April, or it was opened on 6 July, the new airport would have been the same status, same situation?

Project Director, AA:

I believe it would have been a similar situation, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

How, how would you believe that would be the case?

Project Director, AA:

From the results.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

On what basis?

Project Director, AA:

From the results of the trials.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Because only on 14 June this year, you were able to have some real time information faxed through from Kai Tak, it was not possible before. Does it mean that you would allow the airport to be opened even without this exercise to be carried out?

Project Director, AA:

I thought we had real time information on 2 May.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But that was not a successful test. The first 2 tests, there were quite a number of problems to be resolved?

Project Director, AA:

There were previous trials. There were 5 trials with FIDS.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But there were problems in the earlier ones, even in the fourth and fifth ones, according to the Sit-Rep, which you claimed you had not seen before, still say that the system was not quite stable, still there were problems to be resolved later?

Project Director, AA:

Stability improved by 14 March, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But, of course, all the time, you are saying in your statement that the systems are always liable to settling periods for any system, any contract to resolve, and it's quite normal to have these chaos, what you call 'teething problems'?

Project Director, AA:

I think I'd like to get the record straight on the latter, if I may, Madam Chairman. I said they're 'teething problems'. What they caused is something quite different. I mean, they caused chaos. I acknowledge that, but still think they were a series of 'teething problems' that together caused the chaos. I am not trying, I am not trying to, as I said earlier on, undermine or belittle what went on. I am as conscious of it, and as embarrassed by it as anybody.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Last point, Madam Chairman, can I ask Mr OAKERVEE to tell us whether or not he has kept a 24-hour chronological event account for 6 July 1998?

Project Director, AA:

On the systems? The systems have their own logs.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

On all the problems that you encountered on the AOD? A 24-hour detailed account?

Project Director, AA:

There are, there are logs of some of it, but, I am sure you will appreciate it, we were all working flat out to try and resolve matters, and the logs may not be as complete as one would have desired in a normal state of affairs, and most of those logs were completed after the events and not on the day.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Do you think you could have a log record of this type, because I am sure in the post-mortem you have gone through all the problems?

Project Director, AA:

Oh, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Why that, why those happened, and you have kept detailed record of those. Do you think we could have that information?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I think so. I think there's a document already submitted.

Chairman:

Not the logs. We have had the report of the Task Force, the papers of the Task Force, the first one being 14 July. So, it would be helpful if you could supply us with the logs first?

Project Director, AA:

I'm probably getting confused with what we've provided the Commission and what we've provided you.

Chairman:

Yes. So, we would appreciate your letting us have the logs. 陳鑑林議員。

陳鑑林議員：

請問柯家威先生，剛才你提及機場由4月延期至7月啟用，造成承建商有些"loss of momentum"，所以引致更嚴重的耽誤。請問柯家威先生，這種觀點是現時才提出，還是在政府宣布機場在7月6日啟用時，你已發覺有問題？

Project Director, AA:

I'd been concerned and made my concerns throughout the back-end of '97 or earlier than the back-end, in the last two quarters of '97, that without a confirmed opening date being published, and the dispute of, debate that was going on as to when it would open, it would undermine the progress of the works, and it did, as I've said earlier, towards the end of 1997, and we did lose momentum in certain areas, and we had a great, great difficulty in getting that forward. The only problem, the thing that probably saved us was during 1998, the shortages of labour that we had been experiencing throughout '96 and '97 eased, and we were able to pick up local labour much more readily and not be dependent so much upon imported labour. But, 'yes', I mean, it was always a concern, yes.

主席：

陳鑑林議員。

陳鑑林議員：

在1997年底，柯家威先生曾說，若不盡早定出啟用日期，工作人員便會失去動力。到1998年1月中，新的啟用日期公布後，你亦說工作人員失去了動力。當時你是否認為所公布的啟用日期有很多問題，你有沒有提出意見？

Project Director, AA:

No. We were still on target in January, as you will appreciate, to open in April, and the loss of momentum was against the April date, but it took a lot of effort by moaning in some of the contracts to get it round, but it was the latter contracts, as I've said earlier, the one that was up in advance was the super-structure contract and I didn't really suffer from this.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，即是說在1998年1月公布機場在7月6日啟用，其實並無問題，是不是這意思？

Project Director, AA:

The lateness of the announcement had caused problems, and that was what I had been saying, but, having had the date determined, it was a question of

endeavouring to make certain they didn't cause a problem. We overcame any problem.

陳鑑林議員：

我認為柯家威先生的答覆有些地方自相矛盾和不合邏輯，因為你在證供中多次提及，機場根本可以在1998年4月啟用，即準備工作可以完成。可是，正如你剛才說，你認為1月中公布的啟用日期並沒有問題。事實上，實際啟用日期延遲了兩、三個月，因此根本上不應出現問題。所以，你在證供第69段說因為機場7月6日啟用而令承建商失去了動力，是否自相矛盾？

Project Director, AA:

No. I am not contradicting myself. They did relax in certain areas, but the biggest culprit of this was the fit-out works. Fit-out works are very substantial in the Terminal Building, very substantial. I mean, it's 35,000 square metres of commercial area there, and that's really where the delay occurred and, and in completing their parts of the work and the fire systems that apply specifically to those fit-out areas and offices, there was delay there, because it got out of sequence and some of the other facilities, but the basic physical works were ready to open in April, but the tenants weren't there.

Chairman:

But I have to jump in here, Mr OAKERVEE. You kept sort of, citing the fit-out work. Wouldn't that have been equally a problem for the April opening date as for the July opening date? In other words, did you, when you pushed for the April opening date, count the fit-out work as well, as part of the schedule that you have to allow for, because surely, I mean, you would have needed that same period of time for fit-out work for April date as July date?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, but it would have started much earlier.

Chairman:

When would it have started?

Project Director, AA:

It would have started 2 or 3 months earlier. I mean, I think one has got to acknowledge that the fit-out work is being conducted not by the Airport Authority, but also by individual tenants.

Chairman:

Yes.

Project Director, AA:

They are in the Airport.

Chairman:

Were you prepared to hand over the premises at that point in January, February, to the tenants?

Project Director, AA:

For them to do their building works, yes.

Chairman:

You were actually ready?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

To, to hand over? Well, well, anyway!

陳鑑林議員：

柯家威先生說機場在4月啟用並無問題，請問在7月6日前，機管局曾與多少位承建商簽署補充協議，要求他們加快工程，以期可在7月6

日完成工作？

Project Director, AA:

I don't recall signing any particular acceleration agreements for 6 July at all. It was all done prior to that for the April date. I would have to check, Madam Chairman, that I'm not guilty of perjuring myself on one or two accounts, but I can't recall any major one.

Chairman:

Fair enough.

陳鑑林議員：

或者由我提示你。你知不知道空運貨站公司曾與機管局簽署一份要求加速工程的協議？

Project Director, AA:

It did not enter into an agreement with AA to expedite the works. It entered into an agreement with its own contractors to expedite the works.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，我希望知道柯家威先生是否知道有這件事。

Project Director, AA:

Yes. I was aware of it.

陳鑑林議員：

協議的主要目的是甚麼？

Project Director, AA:

The purpose of the agreement with HACTL goes back to last year, when their contractors were falling way behind and the pressure was being applied by the Airport Authority onto HACTL and indeed by Government, and they entered into negotiations with their contractors at around September '97, I think it was.

But they didn't conclude and sign an acceleration agreement until March '98, and, in fact, the contractors both approached me around Christmas time of '97 and asked me what was going wrong with the acceleration agreement that they were negotiating, because they'd been given to understand that the Airport Authority and they assumed I, as Project Division, was actually holding the situation up, which was not true at all. What HACTL had endeavoured to do was to persuade the Airport Authority to order the acceleration, and it's the interpretation of the contract, if we had ordered the acceleration, we would have had to pay all HACTL's costs for their own delays, which we, we did not do. What we did allow them to do, in the end, when they came back and reviewed their contract again, was to include those costs into the capital cost of the works for the calculation of the internal rate of return, and that, that was the negotiation ploy strictly between HACTL and its contractors, and not the Airport Authority.

陳鑑林議員：

很多文件提及，柯家威先生是唯一的"person to drive the project"，我最想知道，作為整項龐大工程的推動者，我相信你十分清楚各個項目的進度，特別是你的"statement"第51段提及，你十分清楚航班資料顯示系統對機場啟用十分重要，所以在1998年年初，你每星期均與一些有關人士開會。在第53段，你亦提及曾多次向一些承建商解釋，航班資料顯示系統的可靠性十分重要。到了第58段，文件亦提及經過多次測試後，你對航班資料顯示系統充滿信心。我希望知道，柯家威先生是否曾親自瞭解整個測試的資料？

Project Director, AA:

Can I start from the back-end first? I think, oh, go through Paragraph 53, which he referred to is, is the letter that we discussed earlier, where I was concerned that the Managing Director of EDS had been sacked, and Paragraph 54 carries on from that. Paragraph 58, I believe is quite a different subject. This is referring to the trials and the test results which were what happened in the trials, and it was deemed that FIDS performed as it was expected to perform.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，第B37號文件第2.2.1段表示，航班資料顯示系統經測試後，整個系統的順利及滿意運作程度為98.7%。柯家威先生可否告訴我們，當時行政總監向機管局作出這樣的匯報，你認為是否屬實？98.7%代表甚麼？

Project Director, AA:

What that came out of was the system was available during the four-day test at 98.7 per cent availability. The system was working continuously without any problems.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，但我們知道，機管局主席黃保欣先生曾向我們解釋，98.7%並不是整個系統的運作成功率，而只是兩個"server"的運作，與整個系統的關係似乎不大。所以我想知道，柯家威先生是否認為整個測試有問題？

Project Director, AA:

No. I think, I think on this particular subject, there's been some cross-talk, because there are two reports that use different languages. One was in the AOR report at about this time that went to the Board and further on, and it spoke about 98 per cent reliability. It wasn't 'reliability'. It was 98.7 per cent availability, which are 2 different things. NAPCO, later on, wrote a report criticising that, which I am certain you've read, which stated that there were 9 per cent down time. There was a period of time when we were doing these tests and the 98.7 per cent, from memory, took place between 14 and 18 June, and then we carried on, because we got a good result on the availability. We were then testing to try and bring the system down and create fail-overs, and switching things off, and these were deliberate acts, and the figure that NAPCO used included the down time that we had incurred on that, which were actually down time that we had caused, or the contractor had caused, deliberately trying to break, fail the system, having got 98.7 per cent availability in the first 4 days of the test. So, there was a complete mix-up of language, if you like, in the reporting that went to different people, and when, when our Chairman spoke to you previously, I don't think he was necessarily aware of that level of detail.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，柯家威先生說他是刻意使系統失靈，若不這樣做，是否完全沒有問題？

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

I believe it got very close to a 100 per cent.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，另一份文件是新機場工程統籌署6月29日的報告。雖然柯家威先生剛才說，由於這份文件是新機場工程統籌署呈交機策會的文件，因此他不一定曾看過，但文件內多次表示，航班資料顯示系統仍然出現問題。

Project Director, AA:

I've got Paper no. A51, Madam Chairman. I don't know what the report says on 29 June.

陳鑑林議員：

對不起，應該是第A52及A53號文件。截至6月22日的"Update on New Airport Projects"報告，對航班資料顯示系統的評論是："Overall FIDS remained unstable as revealed by problems in the trial on 14 June"。剛才柯家威先生表示，他認為6月14日的試驗是成功及令人滿意的。在第A53號文件，截至6月30日，對航班資料顯示系統的評論仍然是"Overall FIDS remains unstable. During a 312 hours continuous test. From 14 June to 27 June, the FIDS host server was down for 9% of the time. This translates to about 2 hours downtime in a 24-hour period"。整個系統在7月之前仍然不穩定，但柯家威先生卻認為沒有問題，表示系統超過98.7%的運作是可以接受的。關於此點，你從工程角度的看法是否與他們對實際情況的瞭解有差別？

Project Director, AA:

Chairman, if I can come on to the paper on 30 June written for ADSCOM, I presume, by NAPCO, this is, or minutes. I'm not too certain, but that relates to what I was trying to say earlier. Over the 312 hours where the continuous testing was done from 14 to 18 June, it was allowed to run uninterrupted and we were getting up to 98.7 per cent availability on the system. That was considered

after the 4 days to be correct, and we allowed it to carry on through to 20 June uninterrupted, and then, on 21 July, up until 27 June, sorry, not July, June rather, we then, or the contractor then, with the agreement of our IT Department, started to play with the system to try and bring it down, to try and fail it, and they cut servers off and everything else and what this report doesn't take account of is those deliberate acts, and the actual down time that they were down, as a result of the deliberate act, was about 9 per cent of the time, because the availability rate on the particular end of that period or the mean was just over 90 per cent with the actual deliberate acts that the contractor was carrying out to try and stall the system.

陳鑑林議員：

可否請柯家威先生告訴我，你是在甚麼情況下刻意指示工程人員令系統失靈？你給予他們甚麼指示，刻意造成系統失靈，然後再重新啟動？

Project Director, AA:

I, I gave them no instruction on this, but this was part of the site test that they were doing. This was planned with their own engineers and IT Section, as well as the contractor.

Chairman:

I think, I think the key question here really is, Mr OAKERVEE, that the impression was given to the AA Board that the system performed 98.7 per cent satisfactorily. That is reliability, as you have pointed out. You know, you were talking about availability. Their understanding was reliability, and that was, in turn, put to ADSCOM as the reliability of the system. At the end of the day, and according to Mr WONG, your Chairman of AA's letter to us, 98 per cent should be referring to the availability of the whole servers and the display servers only. That is, only the hardware; not even the software. So, I mean, it's a very different picture that you're giving to ADSCOM to generate the kind of confidence level that shouldn't be generated, because NAPCO is saying, 'Look, it's not stable'. You are saying 98 per cent, 98.7 per cent according to the minutes of the AA meeting, 98, the system, the system was found to be operating satisfactorily at about 98.7 per cent of the time. Now, surely you have to tell members why is it that you conveyed that impression to the Board of the AA and, in turn, that impression from the AA Board and Management to ADSCOM that

the confidence level was at 98.7 per cent overall, where, in fact, it was just availability of the hardware at that percentage? Surely, I mean, there is a huge difference between the two. Wouldn't you agree?

Project Director, AA:

The availability statement is correct, and that was what was given to the Board in the report, when, unfortunately, the AOR report, which was also given there, had conflicting information to our Board. So, you had the 2 statements, and I, I, or IT never picked up the difference in the AOR report, and you're quite right, that AOR report went straight through to ADSCOM with the word 'reliability' in it, which is quite incorrect.

Chairman:

But, in fact, I believe - you know, were you there when, when the AA Board was looking at this - yes, you were there, weren't you? This is Paper no. B37. This is the AA meeting on 25 June, where this was discussed and this was recorded as part of the minutes, "...the system was found to be operating satisfactorily at about 98.7 per cent of the time...." So, the impression that was formed, and recorded, and not disputed obviously, because that's part of the record, that the impression gained was that the confidence level ought to be the result of this, such a, such a report. Now, you see, the whole point that, you know, we're trying to ask of you is whether there has not been a false impression given to the AA Board, as well as to ADSCOM regarding the reliability of FIDS at a crucial time, because, you know, as the CS told us, at the slightest hint that the whole thing might fall apart, she would do something about it as far as the date was concerned. Nothing, nothing, nothing, in fact, reminded her of that, but surely this is a very critical point? Wouldn't you agree?

Project Director, AA:

I do, Chairman, but I'd also like you to recognise that the Board paper - Paper no. B62 in your files - was also discussed at the same time, which has the accurate information in it as regards the 98.7 per cent. The erroneous part, on my part, and others present, who were some of them more informed than I am on the systems, was we never picked up the language in the paper that had been written in AOR that it said 'reliability'. We saw the figure was the same.

Chairman:

You want to follow up quickly on this?

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

I want to follow up Paper no. B62, the AA Board paper on Page 2, the last paragraph on FIDS. It did say that after 4 days the cumulative availability of the host servers and display servers was in excess of 98%. That's correct?

Project Director, AA:

Correct.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

But I think that, Madam Chairman, it was also correct in pointing out that somehow maybe some of the Members of the Board did not understand it, and then you people did not help, and then it seems everybody, including the note-taker of that meeting, got the impression that it was 98.7 per cent satisfactory. So, you had misled. If that had been the case then I think those people at the meeting had been misled, and, when the CS was here, she also thought that it was the satisfactory rate, and not the availability rate, although you have got it in this paper, but nobody explained it to the people at the meeting.

Project Director, AA:

In the discussion that went on, Madam Chairman, at the Board meeting, as I said earlier, the AOR paper that the actual use of the word 'reliability' was not picked up by anybody and the difference, and I, that was transferred on to ADSCOM in the same AOR paper using the word 'reliability'.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

So, Madam Chairman, I want Mr OAKERVEE to confirm that he now also agrees that people had been misled by the, I mean, it had been the availability, but now most of the people thought it was the reliability?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, in hindsight, I would agree that, but I don't think, I don't think, at the time, in the Board meeting, it was realised that anybody was misleading anybody.

Hon Christine LOH:

Is this the first time that Mr OAKERVEE has realised this today at this meeting?

Project Director, AA:

No, it wasn't at this meeting. It was at the time our Chairman was questioned on this subject and we looked into it, and that was the first time it was realised.

Hon Christine LOH:

So, it was at this enquiry?

Project Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Christine LOH:

Thank you.

Chairman:

Just one more question on FIDS, if I may? 你問完沒有？你先發問。

陳鑑林議員：

柯家威先生是否知道，在你的"statement"第53至54段提及航班資料顯示系統設有後備系統。你也曾告訴我們，應該可以非常放心，因為即使主系統出現問題，另外還有一個獨立運作的後備系統。請問你是否

知道，何時開始決定不使用後備系統？

Project Director, AA:

Sorry. I don't think I assured anybody about stand-by system. I said there was a stand-by system developed and it was not in my bailiwick, at all, that system. As to why it wasn't switched on, I am not too certain, but, other than the fact that I've learned since the event that their procedures that they've got laid out for the implementation of that system, but the criteria hadn't been met, but I can't, I can't speak with confidence or authority on it.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，即是說柯家威先生根本沒有承諾設立一個後備系統。這是因為你沒有提出要求，還是認為不需要有後備系統？抑或你根本不知道有這件事？

Project Director, AA:

It's not a question of that. In fact - I'm just looking at Mr SIEGEL and I, this record of us - I believe it's our Board meetings, rather than ADSCOM. We agreed earlier on, because of our concerns, way back to end of '97, on the FIDS that a decision should be made in December '97 for a stand-by system to be introduced, and in December decision wasn't made, and the instruction to actually implement the stand-by system, having known that there had been some preliminary design work done by IT and then a budget, or an anticipated cost, established, and I think from memory that would have been around March '98 that the Board instructed them to put the stand-by system together.

Chairman:

February, to be exact.

Project Director, AA:

February, is it? Sorry. The only involvement I had with it, as, I think, I mentioned early, was when they were having some contractual difficulties in negotiating with GEC and I assisted on that basis - that was to do with cost, not to do with design, or the style of the stand-by system.

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE, it is right to say that you argued very hard for sticking to the April opening date, back in November, December 1997, were you not?

Project Director, AA:

It was indeed.

Chairman:

That was before the stand-by system was actually worked out, wasn't it?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, it was.

Chairman:

So, you were quite, in fact, quite happy for FIDS to just be used, or just be prepared for April opening without stand-by FIDS? Is that correct?

Project Director, AA:

No. No, it isn't, Chairman. As I said, just a moment ago, Mr SIEGEL and I, and it is minuted, I think it's in the Board minutes, and it said, in the back end of '97, that the decision should be made in December 1997 to adopt the stand-by system, if we weren't satisfied, and that decision was never taken.

Chairman:

That decision was taken, in fact?

Project Director, AA:

It wasn't.

Chairman:

In February?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, but it wasn't taken in December, as Mr SIEGEL and I advocated earlier on.

Chairman:

Yes, but, nevertheless, even though that decision was not taken, you pushed for an April opening without actually having done any of the tests and trials of the integrated system at that point? Was that right?

Project Director, AA:

At the back end of '97, yes, I did press for it.

Chairman:

End of '97?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I did press.

Chairman:

November, December, you assured the Board that, in fact, you were prepared to open, but that was before you actually had FIDS as a system, even going through the first tests and trials in the PTB?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, that's perfectly correct, but, again, Madam Chairman, that wasn't done in isolation, or being bull-headed.

Chairman:

But what gave you that degree of confidence?

Project Director, AA:

From my own observations when on the construction work, and the thing that on the systems that gave me most comfort was the fact that there was an audit conducted by Works Bureau, involving three other Departments of Government, who did it entirely independently on all systems, and their recommendation it showed the problems up in that report, but the actual conclusion was they were cautiously optimistic that the airport could open in April '98 with all systems functioning.

Chairman:

But wouldn't you say that that was a bit reckless on your part to go for an opening date in April, recommending that to the Board, even before, in fact, the system was actually put together and tested and tried?

Project Director, AA:

There had been testing on the go-through, back end of '97, with a lot of the system. I don't, I don't consider it reckless at all.

Chairman:

But surely...

Project Director, AA:

I think it was a reasonable judgement on the information placed before me.

Chairman:

What information?

Project Director, AA:

I mean, I've just said, on the systems, we deliberately had, in October and November, an independent report carried out, which the Secretary of Works undertook with the Government Departments, who, after their examination in the independent audit of the whole thing, say that they were cautiously optimistic that the April date was achievable with the systems functioning, which concurred with

my own engineers' view. So, I think with those two pieces of evidence, two reliable sources, that I was not unjust in saying that we should be able to open the airport in April. Also, at the same time, the AMD Director concurred with that view.

Chairman:

But you can confirm that, in fact, it was before even the first trial?

Project Director, AA:

It was before the first trial, yes, because I was asked the question before the first trial, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

Right. Miss CHOY So-Yuk?

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Before I ask my questions. I would like to refer to Paper no. B55, which is the notes of meeting of the 67th Project Committee meeting on 17 February, and I would like to refer to paragraph 8.01, where a member of the AA asked about the follow-up actions that had to be taken to resolve the long checklist of feedback arising from the first and second trials. So, there seems to be a checklist of the problems that arose from the first and second trials. Then, in Paragraph 8.02, it further says that "Meetings chaired by Mr D.E. OAKERVEE had also been conducted to review the series of problems and prioritise actions that needed to be taken". I would also like to further refer to paragraph 8.09, where a member also mentioned that "the fundamental concern was that major improvement work might be necessary, and Management should go ahead immediately to work out the design and programme in order to assess the impact to airport opening." So, can I ask Mr OAKERVEE, firstly, could we have the list of the checklist which you had conducted - I mean, you had reviewed - the list that you mentioned, that mentioned in this point 8.02, which were identified as problems and prioritised actions?

Project Director, AA:

Madam Chairman, yes, I can provide that. I must add it doesn't relate, from memory, to systems. It relates to other physical features within the airport.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Well, anyway, we would like to know, I would like to know what are in this list, and why were the systems not included after the trials, then?

Project Director, AA:

I'll provide the list. The checklist wasn't prepared by myself. These were items, if I remember correctly from this minute, that actually arose from the trials and were the surveys that were conducted by AMD during the trials, and then items were picked out, which they thought needed improvement. To give an example, some, some were the toilets - people didn't like the size of the cubicles and the colour, others didn't like the black granite; it was a question of the screens on the immigration; there was a question of signage, and it was things of that matter, but, yes, certainly I can provide you with the list.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Madam Chairman, can I also be confirmed that no problems of any system type arose from the trials?

Project Director, AA:

In the early trials, yes, the first two that the FIDS system in particular crashed. Then, on the third trial, more functionality and there was an improved performance, but it still wasn't satisfactory. 2 May and 14 June, it was much improved, although, although stability on 2 May was needed to be improved upon. We thought it had been by 14 June.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

So, now, back to this request to work out the design programme, in order to assess the impact on airport opening, was this carried out and, if 'yes', when?

Project Director, AA:

Yes. This was carried out more or less following on this meeting. In fact, I think it was in progress before the meeting started, and it's, it's, from memory, it's appertaining to the additional works that were required as a result of the surveys undertaken in the various trials, and, again, it relates to physical works.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Yes, have you had the assessment made on how the physical works impact on the airport opening, then?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Could we have that assessment?

Project Director, AA:

Yes. I mean, I mean, a lot of the works we did, and some was decided to leave until after airport opening, and some bridged the airport opening, but we can give you the information.

Chairman:

OK?

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Madam Chairman, well, actually, although it is not related to the system, Mr OAKERVEE did, pointed out that they were concerned with structures and so on, as far as we understand, also on the opening day, a lot of structures seemed not to be completely, satisfactorily working. So, can I also ask when did you actually feel that you have all those problems which were identified to be completed?

Chairman:

Which structures are you referring to?

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Here, it mentions, I mean, just then, Mr OAKERVEE mentioned about toilets, about signage, about all those structures. So, when did you actually sign off those structures to be totally completed before AOD?

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

It varies according to which one it was, as it goes back to the need to give the assessment on the impact on the airport opening. Some of those additional items, modifications, enhancements - whatever you want to call them - were conducted before airport opening, some bridge the airport opening and some have been done afterwards. I can look at the whole issue of these additional works, which are well documented and pull out the programmes that go with it to show you.

Chairman:

I think what Mr OAKERVEE can actually assist us on is actually to look at that paper that I mentioned to you at the opening, you know, early on at 2:30 pm. And you look at that, and you look at the items that you have identified which have been under your control before you signed them off before, immediately before airport opening, and let us know which of the works that are supposedly directly under your control, such as signage, for example?

Project Director, AA:

All right.

Chairman:

Were not, in fact, completed.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

OK.

Chairman:

So, I think that would be most helpful, and then we can, in fact, trace that.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Madam Chairman, can I ask another question?

Chairman:

Yes.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

It's related to software, which was mentioned in Paper no. B42, for the Projects Committee meeting dated 17 April 1997, Paragraph.1.07, which said that, "Following which, EDS realised in February 1997 that they could not adapt the existing software to meet the Authority's requirements and this had been brought to EDS highest level to review the situation". My question was why did AA decide to have existing software adapted. I mean, the old software to be adapted, instead of having completely new software designed for the new airport right from the beginning?

Project Director, AA:

That, that was the basis of the tender that was submitted to the Authority in June '95, and it was on that basis that the contract was awarded.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

And when was AA aware that the EDS system could not be, you know compatible with the existing software?

Project Director, AA:

As, I think, I said in the first half of this session, that the first indication came when the Director responsible for EDS advised Dr TOWNSEND and I, towards the end of 1996, and then they went away and double-checked, and came back and confirmed it in early '97 that the risk that they were facing, or the risk

profile that they had in adapting the software that they already had in their possession and had been put into other airports, was, in fact, too high for them to tolerate and they would have to start again, and this came about from the functional requirements that were issued.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

And in this case, what kind of remedial actions have you taken to, you know, amend this problem?

Project Director, AA:

It's not a question of what remedial action I've taken to amend the problem. It was a fact that the contractor came to us and said that. Now, it's his contractual responsibility to overcome that. What I did do, as I think we spoke about earlier, perhaps, perhaps I didn't make it clear enough, that this is a related issue, was I put a Project Manager in to Hook, I had GEC take full cognisance of their responsibilities and put a man into EDS's office, and I also increased the specialist consultants to go and look after it.

Chairman:

You have actually given us.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

OK.

Project Director, AA:

But, I mean, one thing that may be worth recording is that the contractor that was awarded the contract for FIDS was not that recommended by the Project Division, as the bull papers stated.

Chairman:

Mr LAU Kong-wah?

劉江華議員：

柯家威先生的供詞由第62段開始表示，整個工程有7個可能會做成混亂的情況，包括：第一：中英爭拗、第二：勞工短缺、第三：日期改變、第四：電訊條例、第五：商戶裝修、第六：機場搬遷、第七：開幕典禮。請問你是否暗示以上7點，是造成啟用當日情況混亂的直接或間接因素？

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE?

Project Director, AA:

Sorry, Madam Chairman, I was catching up with the translation. What, what I am saying is they are the challenges that I went through with the project, which had to be overcome. The consequences of those were, by and large, in many areas, funding was on a step-by-step basis, which enabled just in time construction through a large period of that time, and, as some Members know, I've been before the predecessor of the current LegCo to explain the reason why I entered, or the Authority, entered into supplemental agreements. That covered that period, but what it also meant was some of the works got out of sequence during '96/'97, which didn't make life particularly easy, and the other challenge which is a fact was labour, which, I think, as we are all aware of, caused different delays at different times, but we managed to overcome the problems that these challenges caused, by '97 largely, and that was by the help of a lot of people, including Members of the Legislative Council with their assistance at different times, and also Government. The other, the other issue, the last one, is a real one. One of the things that went on between April and July was the fact that we were, had lots of ceremonies there, lots of shows within parts of the airport having signage which had to be taken down to enable the construction of stages and the like, and the biggest effect that had on the workers was that, when the rehearsals were on, we lost 800 to a 1,000 workers watching the rehearsals. All at a key time. When it went on, also the number of visitors that came to the airport during those last weeks, was enormous. All of which caused a general interruption to the period.

劉江華議員：

主席，我想指出，他提出這7點，沒有一項與他的部門有關。如果你現時回顧一下，對"EDS"這間承辦商的表現是否十分滿意？

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE, I think you started telling something, telling us something about EDS. You might want to finish it?

Project Director, AA:

I think the ability of the engineers involved in the writing of the software between the Spring of '97 and the opening of the airport is a tremendous achievement and credit to those engineers involved. The fact that they were required to do it is no compliment to EDS, in my view, and EDS should have known from the outset the limitations of their own software, but, even to mitigate them, I believe some of the functional requirements that developed from operations side of the airport was different to that which was originally specified in the contract, and was the subject of a very major claim.

劉江華議員：

我的問題是，你是否滿意這間公司的表現？你直接負責監督這間公司，無論這間公司找哪個承辦商，但"EDS"是你直接的主要合約人，時至今日，你是否很滿意它的表現？

Project Director, AA:

I would have preferred a better performance, Madam Chairman, from EDS. It would have been largely resources. We could have used more resources, and I think this is shared by all those parties that were involved in the overseeing of this software. They couldn't get the resources, or didn't choose to get them at the right time, and then, when we needed a lot of resources at different points of time, there was absolutely no point in taking them on, because there wasn't sufficient time for them to go through the various learning curves that were necessary. So, that those staff that they had were never adequate in terms of resources, and what concerned many of us, was the fact that they were working exceedingly long hours and 7 days a week, which is not the best way to treat what are really academic persons doing academic type work, which software is and programming.

劉江華議員：

主席，我想詢問，當曾蔭權先生在6月14日巡視機場時，柯家威先

生有否陪同他一起視察？

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

劉江華議員：

大家有否討論關於航班資料顯示系統的問題？

Project Director, AA:

Yes, but, when we discussed the problems relating to FIDS, it was good news, because we'd had a very good day on 14 June.

劉江華議員：

你可否憶述曾蔭權先生當時提出的問題？

Project Director, AA:

Yes. He asked how it had performed, and he was told, not so much by me on the FIDS, but the IT and AMD side of the Authority, that they were happy with the way it had performed.

劉江華議員：

我的問題是，曾蔭權先生當時提出甚麼問題？是有關航班資料顯示系統或是有關後備航班資料顯示系統？

Project Director, AA:

As I say, all I can recall - I must admit I didn't take a note - was, one of his first questions was 'Has FIDS worked or let us down today?', and we said 'It had worked'. It had. It was a true statement, and we were all pleased and thought we'd got over the hurdles that we'd had in the past with FIDS. I mean, we'd had two trials with it working.

劉江華議員：

請柯家威先生翻閱第A52號文件第2頁，關於航班資料顯示系統的最後一段，這裏說："AA during FS's visit on 14 June promised that a decision would be made on whether to adopt C381 FIDS or stand-by FIDS by 22 June." .

Project Director, AA:

Sorry? Yes. Got Paper no. A52.

Chairman:

Page 2, bottom of Page 2. Do you have it?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

劉江華議員：

從這段很明顯可以看到，曾蔭權先生是代表政府或機策會前往視察。他們特別強調機場啟用第一天，一定要使用後備系統。到了這一天，即6月14日，你們告訴他說，仍未作出決定。為何會這樣？

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE.

Project Director, AA:

I didn't tell him that. That was a decision of the Authority at the meeting on 22 June, which I think was the next Board meeting. Whatever meeting it was, that was when the decision was going to be made and that decision was not my decision.

Chairman:

Whose decision then?

Project Director, AA:

That was primarily the Director of AMD to decide and the CEO to be

satisfied, and the Head of IT.

劉江華議員：

柯家威先生是否告訴我們，在這日期之後的決定，你完全沒參與，沒有提供任何意見？

Project Director, AA:

I didn't, and quite rightly so. I mean, I was at the decision-making process but I wasn't the instigator of it, because I'm not the user of the system. The only person who could make that decision is the user of the system. He had to be comfortable with it.

劉江華議員：

主席，這是一個重要的決定，而柯家威先生似乎在告訴我們，他們沒有在任何一个場合、或是在會議席上經一起進行討論後，才決定不使用這個後備系統。

Project Director, AA:

No, I am not saying that at all.

Chairman:

He didn't think he said that. Could you, could you answer? Could you?

劉江華議員：

是在甚麼場合進行討論？

Project Director, AA:

It would have been discussed on 22 June, and I cannot remember in what form, what that meeting was, whether it was a Board meeting or a special meeting.

Chairman:

I think the time is getting late. I would really rather we continue this line of questioning tomorrow. I wouldn't like to just cut it short like that. It is an important point. So, why don't we leave it now, and then we come back to it in the morning?

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

主席，請容許我提出一些簡單的問題，讓他可以作準備。

主席：

不如你明早才提出，好嗎？因為你現時提出來，他也不能作答。你是否需要他準備一些文件？

劉江華議員：

是。我怕明早提出問題時，他不能提供這些文件。這些文件比較重要。

主席：

好，你說罷。

劉江華議員：

我希望他提供兩方面的資料。第一，是在檢討時他曾表示，當日有些操作員犯了一些錯誤，使航班資料顯示系統失靈。我希望他提供一份名單，列出誰人曾在操作航班資料顯示系統時出錯，以及這些人曾接受訓練的時間？

Chairman:

Mr OAKERVEE, have you heard what Mr LAU has asked?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, I did.

Chairman:

Is it something that you can supply, or is it Mr HEED?

Project Director, AA:

Mr HEED.

主席：

這與他無關，因為這是"operation"方面的事情。

劉江華議員：

第二方面的資料他應該可以提供的。他曾表示有一批專家在機場開幕當日在現場候命。我希望他列出當天有哪些專家在場，同時這些人當天在甚麼時間到達機場，以及他們準備就甚麼事項進行挽救工作。

主席：

你是單指航班資料顯示系統，還是各個方面？

劉江華議員：

我只是指航班資料顯示系統。

Project Director, AA:

I've already agreed.

Chairman:

You said there is a stand-by team and all that?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

I think specifically Mr LAU wants to know which of these people were actually attending the FIDS?

Project Director, AA:

Yes. We've already agreed to do that.

主席：

Fine. 我們暫時討論到此為止，明早9時繼續研訊。Mr OAKERVEE, do you understand that Members have requested you to produce a number of documents? You've got them down, have you?

Project Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Yes. When, when do you think you can let us have these documents?

Project Director, AA:

Well, I was going to raise this question, so thank you for giving me the opportunity. Bearing in mind that the list has grown quite rapidly throughout the afternoon, and that we meet at 9 a.m. tomorrow. Could I be excused from bringing them with me tomorrow morning, unless one or two we can put our hands on?

Chairman:

I think the primary ones, the key ones, the list, you know, the signing off and also the list of problems directly related to the works, you know, in 14 July problem list?

Project Director, AA:

Right.

Chairman:

Those two are actually quite keys.

Project Director, AA:

Right.

Chairman:

But the rest, you know, logs and things, you can leave until when you're ready.

Project Director, AA:

Right. We did take the opportunity, when we had the adjournment, to ring some people back in the office, who are putting some things together, but it may still be difficult before, by 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Chairman:

Well, you just have to do the best you can. I mean, we understand.

Project Director, AA:

Certainly we will endeavour, if it's in order and to your satisfaction, to get everything in by noon on Saturday?

Chairman:

Fine. OK. That's fine. Thank you. Oh, sorry, hang on. You are aware, of course, that you have to be here at 9 o'clock tomorrow?

Project Director, AA:

Yes, Madam Chairman.

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜
專責委員會

Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

Chairman:

Yes. Thank you. The Clerk wants to make sure of that. Will Members go to Conference Room C, please.

(The hearing ended at 6:43 pm)

055/ts981015.doc/man