

# 立法會

## 調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日 開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜 專責委員會

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第9次公開研訊的逐字紀錄本

日期： 1998年10月16日(星期五)  
時間： 上午9時  
地點： 立法會會議廳

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### **出席委員**

周梁淑怡議員(主席)  
何鍾泰議員(副主席)  
何承天議員  
李永達議員  
吳靄儀議員  
張永森議員  
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陳鑑林議員  
單仲偕議員  
劉江華議員  
劉慧卿議員  
蔡素玉議員

### **缺席委員**

馬逢國議員

### **證人**

香港機場管理局項目工程總監  
柯家威先生

### **陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士**

香港機場管理局合約經理  
潘嘉宏先生

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日  
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜  
專責委員會  
Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances  
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of  
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok  
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

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**主席：**

多謝各位出席今天舉行的專責委員會第9次研訊。

在未正式開始研訊前，我想提醒各位委員，整個研訊過程必須有足夠的法定人數，即連主席在內共5名委員。

我想藉此機會再次提醒公眾人士及傳媒，若在研訊進程序以外披露研訊上提供的證據，將不受《立法局(權力及特權)條例》所保障。因此傳媒應就他們的法律責任，徵詢法律意見。

在未傳召證人香港機場管理局項目工程總監柯家威先生之前，我想徵詢委員的意見，柯家威先生已通知專責委員會秘書，他將帶同以下人士出席研訊：香港機場管理局合約經理潘嘉宏先生。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許潘嘉宏先生在研訊進行期間陪同柯家威先生，但他不可以在席上發言。

如委員對研訊程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊開始，並傳召證人香港機場管理局項目工程總監柯家威先生。

(柯家威先生進入會議廳，  
並由潘嘉宏先生陪同)

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE, thank you for attending the hearing again, following yesterday. You are summonsed before the Select Committee today to give evidence and to produce papers, books, records and documents related to the Select Committee's scope of inquiry. Please note that you are still under oath when giving your evidence.

The Select Committee will now deal with the papers, records and documents that the witness has produced after the hearing of the 15th, yesterday. The Select Committee notes that the witness has provided the following documents this morning:

- (1) item 7, C302, Special Conditions of Contract, dated 22 September 1994;
- (2) items 1 and 48 of the General Conditions of Contract (Civil/Building), dated 11 July 1994;

- (3) Handover Notices of the Construction Department; and
- (4) List of Emergency/Stand-by Crews for 1 July 1998 to 15 July 1998 and an explanatory note.

Mr OAKERVEE, are you now formally producing the documents mentioned above to the Select Committee as evidence?

**Mr Douglas Edwin OAKERVEE, Project Director of the Airport Authority Hong Kong (Project Director, AA):**

I am, Madam Chairman.

**Chairman:**

I now declare that all the documents mentioned above are admitted as evidence produced to the Select Committee.

我們現在進行研訊。劉江華議員，請你就昨天研訊結束前所提的問題繼續發問。

**劉江華議員：**

主席，我仍然想問柯家威先生有關那個決定。即是說，曾蔭權先生在6月14日參觀機場時，你們曾答允他會在6月22日前，決定使用正式的“FIDS”，抑或是後備的“FIDS”。我相信柯家威先生昨天應作好準備，以便今天回答。

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE.

**Project Director, AA:**

Madam Chairman, I understand the decision was not to use the stand-by FIDS on opening. The FIDS system was considered to be stable enough to use, with the exception of the stand allocation system which would be on the back-up system. That was the decision made by those involved. The procedures set down for introducing the stand-by FIDS system are procedures that have been laid down by the Airport Management Division and it is their decision when they actually bring in the stand-by system.

**劉江華議員：**

主席，柯家威先生似乎只說明了程序是這樣。但我想問這決定或決策有否在正式的會議作出？若有，在何時？

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE。

**Project Director, AA:**

There was a formal decision made on the 22nd and all were present.

**劉江華議員：**

是甚麼會議？

**Project Director, AA:**

It was a meeting with the CEO, the director of AMD, the Head of IT, the other executive directors and, I believe, the Vice-chairman and Billy LAM.

**Chairman:**

Was it a meeting specially called for this decision?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

It was. Do you have records of that meeting?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, but I don't have them with me.

**Chairman:**

Could you produce them afterwards?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, I can.

**劉江華議員：**

好的。此外，我還想就我們昨晚剛收到“AMD, Mr Chern HEED”的“statement”提問。我昨晚閱讀了這份“statement”，現在想就其內容提問。雖然這份“statement”不是由柯家威先生所寫，但由於“Mr Chern HEED”在文件B77號第29段……

**Project Director, AA:**

B77? I haven't got it.

**Chairman:**

Do you have Volume V there?

**Project Director, AA:**

No. We go up to B76.

**劉江華議員：**

我們在昨晚才收到，可能他們還沒有這份文件。

**主席：**

哪一段？

**劉江華議員：**

我想請柯家威先生參看第29段。

**Chairman:**

Do you have it, Mr OAKERVEE?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**劉江華議員：**

第29段中間的部分，“However, performance of FIDS continued to improve and by 19 June, 1998 the FIDS reliability test indicated 97% – 98% reliability which was reassuring”。主席，從這裏可明顯知道，“AMD”這個部門是負責正式操作“FIDS”的，但直至當天為止，這個部門仍然認為這個系統的可靠性達98%。不過，柯家威先生昨天向我們指出，這並非指系統的可靠性。基於你們兩個部門之間的合作是十分重要的，你的部門完成有關工程後，便將這個系統移交給“AMD”操作，但負責操作這個系統的部門主管接收了這樣的信息，請問柯家威先生，你有否向這個負責操作系統的部門提供了錯誤的信息？

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE。

**Project Director, AA:**

Through the Chair, I don't believe I did, because the staff of AMD had for many, many weeks been directly involved with the process. They were with the FIDS system, the same as the IT Division of the Airport Authority and Project. It was a joint team on that. I don't think anybody within AMD, IT or Project was under any misapprehension or illusion as to what the facts were.

**劉江華議員：**

柯家威先生，如你認為他們已知道所有的真實情況，那麼根據你昨天提供的資料，這句說話是否並不正確？

**Project Director, AA:**

I don't think the word "reliability" should be after the 98 per cent. It should be replaced by "availability". As I said yesterday, it is a subtlety of language. The use of it here, as you can see, the two words are interchanged by different people. I took your point or the Committee's point yesterday that, for the uninitiated, we may well have inadvertently misled them. But I don't think there was any question of misleading Mr HEED.

**劉江華議員：**

我覺得這兩個部門似乎都十分“烏龍”。你已經同意用錯了字眼，但我現在所關心的是，究竟是真正負責系統運作的部門自行取了錯誤的資料，抑或是你向該部門提供了錯誤的資料呢？特別是你剛才提到6月22日的會議（這次會議作了重要的決定），如果你當時指出系統的「可用性」而非「可靠性」差不多達到98%的話，可能便需要使用“stand-by FIDS”。當然我們要待收到紀錄後才可清楚知道有關情況。但柯家威先生你是否同意在6月22日當天，你仍然在誤導其他部門的同事？

***Project Director, AA:***

Through the Chair, I wouldn't agree that I was misleading anybody, especially as the AMD staff under the Director had been operating the system with the contractor for many, many weeks and they knew exactly what the situation was, better than I.

***Chairman:***

What about misunderstanding? Is there any room for misunderstanding?

***Project Director, AA:***

I don't think so.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, could I just put a question to see....?

***Chairman:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Was it clarified what the difference is between "availability" and "reliability"? Are you saying that something which is available may not be reliable? Madam Chairman, perhaps at this point it would be useful to clarify?

***Chairman:***

OK. Mr OAKERVEE, what is your understanding of the differences between the two?

***Project Director, AA:***

I think when you talk about reliability it is the system overall, in every part of it, including all the hardware as well. What they were talking about was the availability of the system to receive information.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Reliability?

***Project Director, AA:***

The reliability was high, but in certain areas we had problems, as I said yesterday, with monitors and the liquid crystal display boards, where there were signs of them not being reliable and slightly unstable. So, one couldn't say the whole system was 98 per cent reliable. As I suggested yesterday, with the 2 papers that were presented to the Board at the same time, the fact that the different wording wasn't picked up, certainly on my part, was unintentional.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, probably other colleagues would follow up. I would just like to put down a marker here that if the system was merely 98 per cent available but not 98 per cent reliable, why was it still thought to be operational?

***Chairman:***

Perhaps you can answer that now. I think this is the appropriate moment now. Mr OAKERVEE?

***Project Director, AA:***

I could answer it, but I am a little bit nervous. As I said yesterday, I am not an IT expert and I might be saying something that is misleading. I believe the system was highly reliable. The percentages I can't give you. There were certain known areas which were unreliable, which was in some of the hardware that was visible to the public.

***Hon Margaret NG***



Madam Chairman, I now take your point that it is 98 per cent available but not 98 per cent reliable. At that point was there any assessment of what is the percentage of reliability? If it wasn't 98 per cent reliable, to what percentage was it reliable? Was an assessment done?

**Project Director, AA:**

Not by me personally but this was being constantly assessed by the Head of IT at this time and those that were going to operate the system.

**Hon Margaret NG**

To your knowledge, was there such a test and, if so, who has it and can it be made available to the Select Committee?

**Project Director, AA:**

There would be records of the system, which would indicate the degree of reliability and, certainly, all those records could be made available, if they will help.

**Chairman:**

I think we have to be very clear here, Mr OAKERVEE, because we were told that you didn't actually hand over the system to Operations entirely until it was found to be reliable for operational purposes on 14 June. Now we are talking about 14 June, 22 June. It is a very crucial period, during which a decision was made to press ahead with the FIDS system because it is considered to be reliable enough to be depended on on AOD. I think it is a very, very important point here. I would actually allow a few more questions on this point before we wander off somewhere else, that 98.7 per cent, this particular issue.

單仲偕議員，“are you following on this issue as well?” 對不起，劉江華議員，稍後我會再給你機會發問。現在集中就98.7%這點發問，我相信這點十分重要，我不想輕輕帶過。單仲偕議員。

**單仲偕議員：**

柯家威先生，你是在宣誓下作供的。請你先向委員會清楚說明，你認為97%至98%是指“available”，而不是指“reliable”？你先清楚說明這

點，我才可繼續發問。

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE.

**Project Director, AA:**

I believe it is availability.

**Hon SIN Chung-kai:**

You believe it is available but not reliable?

**Project Director, AA:**

The actual percentage, no, because that percentage comes off a log that was printed out on a daily basis and it was to do with availability. The figure actually comes from that and it is not related to reliability.

**單仲偕議員：**

你知否政府由“ADSCOM”至“NAPCO”，都基於這個逾98%的可靠性作為他們決定有關事項的其中一個因素？我無需在這裏再翻查文件，亦能說出即使是“ADSCOM”，也在不同的文件內指出，是機場管理局的人員告知他們這個逾98%的數據。你知否政府對這個訊息的理解是“reliable”，而不是“available”呢？

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE。

**Project Director, AA:**

Madam Chairman, I would like to go back to something that was raised yesterday. The issue of the words "reliability" and "availability" only came to notice when our Chairman was questioned by this Select Committee. Prior to that, the use of the word hadn't been appreciated. I certainly hadn't appreciated it.

**單仲偕議員：**

我想再問一個問題。柯家威先生，“Mr CHATTERJEE”是否你的“staff”，“Does Mr CHATTERJEE report to you directly”？

**Project Director, AA:**

No, he does not.

**單仲偕議員：**

我感到奇怪為何你……

**主席：**

單仲偕議員，你現在發問的是另一個範圍的問題。除非你就我們現正針對的要點提出發問，否則我便要依照原本的發問次序。

**單仲偕議員：**

好的，我繼續發問關於逾98%的問題。我想你回答多一個問題。你有沒有一個標準去衡量“availability”和可靠性，即……“Do you have any objective criteria to measure reliability and availability”？

**Project Director, AA:**

There are standards but I am not familiar with those standards.

**Hon SIN Chung-kai:**

Who would be familiar with this? Who is responsible for these areas?

**Project Director, AA:**

Kiron CHATTERJEE in IT would have been aware of them and so would my engineers at a junior level who are knowledgeable in these matters.

**Hon SIN Chung-kai:**

Are you saying that you are entirely not responsible for these areas?

**Project Director, AA:**

I am responsible wholly for the contracts but the questions that you are asking me are beyond my technical capability to answer.

***Hon SIN Chung-kai:***

What do you mean by you are responsible for the contract but you are not responsible for these issues?

***Project Director, AA:***

What we had done in the commissioning period and testing period was that: IT went in with my engineers and were making the decisions. With IT Department were also AMD engineers, the staff who were going to use it. They were all involved in the latter stages of testing and commissioning. But the actual system was not handed over formally to AMD until a later date. Madam Chairman, in the evidence I gave yesterday, the date I gave was incorrect. I have managed to look at some more records last night. It wasn't 14 June. As the certificate I have given you today shows, it was signed off on 25 June, not the 14th.

***Chairman:***

Ms Emily LAU Wai-hing.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

I think our colleagues have said very clearly that people in ADSCOM have been misled. The Chief Secretary in particular used that figure to reassure us and to tell us that she was quite convinced that it was correct. We want you to give us figures to show the reliability, if that can be found, apart from availability. I think that is important. Also, when were those figures given to the AA Board and to ADSCOM to show the reliability of the system versus availability?

Also, not just the CS, but your own Chairman was misled. As you said yesterday and again this morning, the whole matter only came to light when you read that Mr WONG Po-yan seemed to be very confused when he was asked, and that is why we have his letter clarifying it. Is it right for us to draw the conclusion that maybe even the AA Board themselves were not sure about the

difference between reliability and availability and, hence, we have the record of the meeting on 25 June this year?

***Project Director, AA:***

I think also, Madam Chairman, that it is probably clear from the way in which I am responding to these questions that, until after the event, I was not entirely sure of the difference between the availability and reliability. I think I assumed the same as everybody else.

***Chairman:***

You assumed what? You assumed that the system was reliable or you assumed --

***Project Director, AA:***

The 97 and 98 per cent availability or reliability was interchangeable.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

This morning you are now telling us that definitely they are not interchangeable and in fact there could be a lot of differences?

***Project Director, AA:***

So I am advised.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

When were you advised? Last night?

***Project Director, AA:***

I clarified one or two points last night after the discussion yesterday. But, as I said yesterday, it wasn't until the matter was raised with our Chairman, WONG Po-yan, that the matter came to me.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

That there was a difference?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Even then you didn't bother to find out the difference between availability and reliability, although then you knew there was a difference?

***Project Director, AA:***

Only to the extent that I have explained today.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

I think that is quite unfortunate. I would have thought that you yourself would immediately have wanted to ask what the difference is because I am sure you would think members here would want to ask you. If the 98 per cent is the availability rate, then the logical question is: What is the reliability rate?

***Project Director, AA:***

I stand corrected.

***Chairman:***

Are you telling this Committee that, as far as you are concerned, your understanding was also that the two things are interchangeable, that availability means reliability?

***Project Director, AA:***

At that point in time.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Madam Chairman, as Mr OAKERVEE pointed out to us yesterday in the paper prepared for the Board, that is Paper no. B62, it did say very clearly that it is availability. Then if we go to the minutes of the Board meeting on 25 June, which is Paper no. B37, if I can just read that sentence to you, Madam Chairman, that is, 2.2.1, in the middle of that paragraph:

“With regard to the stand allocation system, the Chief Executive Officer said that the stand-by system had been operated by AMD staff and management was confident that the system would be able to download the required information into the FIDS successfully. After running the main FIDS for a week, the system was found to be operating satisfactorily at about 98.7 per cent of the time, which was perceived to be acceptable.”

Anyone who reads this sentence would come to the conclusion that that is reliable and that is why it is acceptable. Now you are telling us that is also your conclusion at the time of the meeting?

***Project Director, AA:***

Correct.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Then how do you want us to look at this now, the fact that there has been such a big misunderstanding? It is correct for us to assume that most members of the Board or people attending the meeting, including some of the staff of the AA management, had been misled?

***Project Director, AA:***

I wouldn't go so far as to say misled.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

How would you describe it?

***Project Director, AA:***

What I can't give you an answer to is the subtlety between the 2 words. I can't quantify the difference.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Who would be in a position to explain to this Committee?

***Project Director, AA:***

I think the best people to do it would be IT staff.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

And that person was present at the meeting who presented that paper which referred to availability, but it seemed it was not pointed out, at least it is not recorded in the minutes?

***Project Director, AA:***

No. From my own personal knowledge, I can't satisfy this Committee on that point further than I have already stated. I do apologise for this, but the fact that I was of a similar understanding at that meeting is the truth. It is only from inquiries I am making afterwards. I'm not certain I fully understand it even now.

***Chairman:***

I think it is clear from what Mr OAKERVEE has told this Committee that he believed at the time that the reliability and the availability were actually interchangeable and that the percentage which was actually tested as the standard of availability was taken, even by himself, as an indication of reliability. That is what you have just told this Committee?

***Project Director, AA:***

That is correct.

***Chairman:***

If you would like to follow up on that particular point. I think I will give the floor to Mr Raymond HO first and then Ms Margaret NG.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Mr OAKERVEE, with your 41 years of experience in engineering, you have been involved in the Tai Po Gas Reforming Plant, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Building, as well as the Eastern Harbour Crossing. All these projects, I presume, had systems installed, for instance, ventilation, as well as the computer systems. I am sure these 2 words in the engineering field are rather obvious in their definitions, in their meanings. For instance, ventilation for a tunnel: All the parts are put together, if I put it in very simple terms,



installed together, and then they have to be tested and commissioned. During all these stages, one would be availability of all the parts already installed in the right places and then the testing would tell you whether or not it is reliable? Would you say so?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Would you say that in the engineering field these 2 words would give people very clear meanings?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes, I would, and it was its use in that sort of comparison, ie, mechanical systems and electrical systems, which I am more conversant with, that I considered at that point in time that we were talking about reliability. On this rather complex software system, I hadn't understood the subtlety of the two.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

As the person in the driving seat of the whole airport project, Mr OAKERVEE, didn't you attempt to find out the differences in the meanings of these two terms?

***Project Director, AA:***

No. Because I hadn't noticed there was a problem at that point in time. As I have said to this Committee, it's only subsequently, since it has been raised as an issue here, that it's been investigated by me at all.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

You were actually involved in the reporting to ADSCOM, which the Chairman of the AA did not even have the opportunity to attend. Didn't you feel when this was brought up and it was so critical to the decision of the AOD, you would be very careful in making recommendations to the Chairman of ADSCOM?

***Chairman:***

Mr OAKERVEE.

***Project Director, AA:***

As regards the 98.8 per cent, I don't think I actually made any recommendations in ADSCOM on that. I was present and I didn't criticise it, so it went through. As I said, we all, I think, were of the one understanding.

***Chairman:***

As Head of the Project Division, FIDS had always been a major concern, and this was the last ditch effort to make sure that everything was ready for AOD. What did you do to establish the reliability of the system?

***Project Director, AA:***

Personally, I did nothing, but the tests were carried out and the results of them, I was given to understand, were the reliability of the system.

***Chairman:***

Your understanding was that in fact it was the reliability of the system?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

It wasn't availability?

***Project Director, AA:***

I understood it was one and the same thing in this particular instance.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, there is a very important point: Whether, Mr OAKERVEE, you were told or you were given an impression that it was reliable or that you saw the word "available" and you concluded that that meant reliability? Which was it?

***Project Director, AA:***

It was the latter.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Now, the word "availability" had been used with respect to different parts of the system in this long process many times, do you agree? As different parts of the system became available, and so on and so forth?

***Project Director, AA:***

In that context, yes.

***Hon Margaret NG***

And the word "reliable" had also been used many times?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG***

You understand your job is to ensure that whatever is handed over is reliable, isn't it?

***Project Director, AA:***

Correct.

***Hon Margaret NG***

What did you do to ensure that the system that you hand over is reliable? Do you just look at the word "available" and conclude that it means "reliable" or did you do a bunch of things to satisfy yourself that it is reliable?

***Project Director, AA:***

No. There were comprehensive tests carried out by those competent to do it. As I have clearly indicated, I am not competent to do the tests. That was

done both by AMD staff and the contractors -- sorry, project staff and the contractors, with IT and AMD staff present on a lot of those tests. IT were involved and I - and as I think Chern HEED is likely to say - we were both given the impression that it was reliable enough to use.

***Hon Margaret NG***

How did Mr Chern HEED give you the impression that it was reliable to use?

***Project Director, AA:***

Both in discussion and in meetings together.

***Hon Margaret NG***

What did they say to give you that impression? Did they use the word "reliable"? Surely not, because you are telling us not. You have put it that you saw "available" or "availability". Obviously, they didn't. They ought to know the difference between reliability and availability so, obviously, they didn't use the word "reliable". What did they actually tell you from which you drew your conclusion?

***Project Director, AA:***

Apart from the results of the tests, Madam Chairman, the obvious thing that gave us the comfort that we had was the results of the trial on 14 June, when the system did work.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, did Mr OAKERVEE take any trouble to understand what these tests were and what were they a test of, to come to the conclusion that it worked and what did work mean? It seems to me, Madam Chairman, that the difference as described by Mr OAKERVEE between availability and reliability is not at all subtle. One is that it is there. The other is that it can be reliably used. Did you understand those tests?

***Project Director, AA:***

The test programme that was put together was, I have had confirmed by those who are expert, including the consultants, an adequate and robust testing

programme and the results that were coming through were sufficient to enable the system to work. To that extent, I checked. Beyond that, I did not.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, when Mr OAKERVEE said he was satisfied that the result was that it worked, did he understand what is meant by "it worked"?

***Project Director, AA:***

Understand to the extent that I saw the trial on 14 June.

***Chairman:***

Mr OAKERVEE, it is a little difficult for me now because I have actually come across a paper which gave us all the figures that made up the conclusion of 98.7 per cent. I am trying very hard to look for it because there is so much paper. Can you perhaps point us to that paper because you obviously are the party responsible for the production of that paper, based on which you present your system to the Operations personnel? Can you perhaps direct us to the paper?

***Project Director, AA:***

I don't think you have it in these yellow bundles at all. Certainly, it has gone to the Commission.

***Chairman:***

Would you say that such a paper would exist?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes, it does.

***Chairman:***

It does exist?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

**Chairman:**

It exists within your Division?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Maybe you can point us to that paper. You had better point it out to us because, after all, it is your paper and you are more familiar with the system that you operate

Paper no. C86, Volume II, which is a weekly report. This is the FIDS system server up-time availability. This paper in fact was submitted to us by Mr Dave THOMPSON of NAPCO, I believe. The attachment actually came from you, I think. You can in fact confirm that. This is the FIDS system server up-time availability. There should be another one. Can you assist, Mr OAKERVEE?

**Project Director, AA:**

I have got Paper no. C86, Madam Chairman. Certainly, that FIDS record did come from the Projects Division. As you realise, I hadn't seen this file until it was given to me yesterday. What I have got here that we have found in our own records that we have brought with us are all the records, not just the one sheet that's been taken out. If you remember, yesterday I said that from the 21st through to the 27th the contractor was trying to put the system down and he turned servers off in the night throughout that period and deliberately had down-time. The sheet that has been taken with these lower percentages reflects those activities. I have got the full set here, which I can hand over, which give you the complete story.

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE, can you turn to Volume III, Paper no. B66, which is a weekly status report submitted by management to the Chairman's Group, or you call it the Chairman's Working Committee. Here it says Chairman's Report No.

27. Do you have B66?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, Madam Chairman.

**Chairman:**

Can you turn to the second page of that report? The first page is a report on additional works. The second page is on system status. Do you see that? Do you have it?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, Madam Chairman.

**Chairman:**

About two-thirds down the page: "Reliability of the FIDS passenger system has exceeded 95%, sufficient for AOD use". Do you see that?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, I do.

**Chairman:**

That report was signed by yourself and the Chief Executive Officer but Mr HEED's signature is not on that. Does this represent a view which you have put forward to the Chairman?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, it does.

**Chairman:**

And does it not indicate your recommendation that the system is in fact reliable enough for AOD?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, because that's what I believed at the time.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, we keep going back to the question on what did Mr OAKERVEE base this report. If he says that there are documents available, then let him tell us what were the documents on which he based his recommendation that it is 95 per cent reliable. Let us look at those.

***Chairman:***

Mr OAKERVEE, can you point us to those documents?

***Hon SIN Chung-kai:***

Are you going to say that --

***Chairman:***

One question at a time. What we are trying to ask Mr OAKERVEE to do now is to point us to the documents which support his recommendation on FIDS being reliable enough for AOD. Can he point us to those documents?

***Project Director, AA:***

To the best of my knowledge, they are not in these yellow files, Madam Chairman.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Never mind whether they are in these yellow files. Where? Which? We will find them.

***Project Director, AA:***

I will produce the records that I had.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Is Mr OAKERVEE telling us that when it says here that the reliability of the system is equivalent to the availability, that was also his understanding? Or whether now at this stage you knew there was a difference?

***Project Director, AA:***



No. At this stage I didn't know there was a difference.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Did you or not?

**Project Director, AA:**

I did not.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

You did not. So for the word "reliability" we should read "availability"?

**Project Director, AA:**

I wouldn't jump to that conclusion myself.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

But you say you did not know the difference, although you signed this report?

**Project Director, AA:**

Correct.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

So there is a distinct possibility that this actually means "availability"?

**Project Director, AA:**

There is a possibility, yes.

**Chairman:**

Mr SIN Chung-kai, do you have a question on this particular point? I will allow a very short question.

**Hon SIN Chung-kai:**

Are you going to say you were misled by somebody in order to sign this?

***Project Director, AA:***

I signed it. This was prepared, the draft was prepared by one of my engineers and, in meetings with my engineers, I believed that this was the situation.

***Hon SIN Chung-kai:***

Is it your responsibility to make sure that these documents which you signed are the truth of the facts?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes. To the best of my knowledge, I believed I was presenting the truth.

***Hon SIN Chung-kai:***

Did you use any effort to make sure that what you believed is what is the truth?

***Project Director, AA:***

In discussion with my engineers, yes, but I didn't analyse any records.

***Hon SIN Chung-kai:***

Are you saying that your engineer misled you?

***Project Director, AA:***

I'm not accusing him of anything because I'm not too certain whether he did.

***Hon SIN Chung-kai:***

Who put this to you? Who is responsible for providing you with this information on the reliability of the FIDS passenger system as 95 per cent?

Who is responsible for this fact?

***Project Director, AA:***

That would have come from the engineers responsible for the systems.

***Hon SIN Chung-kai:***

Who? My question is who? The name of the persons?

***Project Director, AA:***

It would have come under K.C. TSUI, who is the project manager for all the electrical and mechanical systems. Whether it was he personally or Paul ADAMS, I'm not too certain. I can't remember.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Now that we know what the problem is, would the witness tell us whether he thinks that was a fundamental mistake, an important mistake? Was that a "yes"?

***Project Director, AA:***

I am contemplating an answer, Madam Chairman. On the surface, from the use of the language, it would appear to be a mistake but, in reality, I'm not too certain whether it is a real error. As I said earlier, I'm not really qualified to comment further than I have.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

In your very long professional life, has something like this ever happened before?

***Project Director, AA:***

Not that I can recall.

***Chairman:***

Sorry. I am containing the line of questioning to this particular issue of

the reliability.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

You cannot assess right now whether this point would have influenced your own assessment of airport readiness, is that correct?

**Project Director, AA:**

Correct.

**主席：**

張永森議員。

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Mr OAKERVEE, I think in your previous evidence you have given, you have established that reliability and availability are technically, materially different terms?

**Project Director, AA:**

So I have been given to understand.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

And at all material times, until the question was put to your Chairman, you have taken the two terms as interchangeable?

**Project Director, AA:**

That would be a fair statement.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

And you have told this Committee that the project team under you, including your engineers, have participated in the test trials, together with the IT team, the contractors, and AMD? That is correct?

**Project Director, AA:**

That is correct.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

After the trials, at that particular level, obviously, availability and reliability being presented to you in charge of the project team, meant the system was reliable?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Do you agree that this particular mistake of interchangeability of the two different terms is a mistake made also by your team and by yourself in accepting availability as reliability?

***Project Director, AA:***

Certainly, it was a fault on my part. Whether there was any deliberate act of anybody reporting to me, I wouldn't like to say.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

You do agree that it is your responsibility?

***Project Director, AA:***

As I said yesterday, everything to do with the project ultimately is my responsibility, so I do take responsibility for it.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

And you do agree that this is something basic, very basic and fundamental?

***Project Director, AA:***

It would appear so in analysing in hindsight.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

On the basis of you being directly reporting to the Chief Executive Officer,

you have made recommendation to the Chief Executive Officer and, accordingly, to the Board and, accordingly, to ADSCOM that FIDS, as far as the Project Division is concerned, is reliable?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes, I did, but it was done with no mischief in mind.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Do you agree that had you technically been competent to distinguish the two terms you may not have made such recommendations?

***Project Director, AA:***

I may not. But I believe that to be hypothetical because, if I had been technically competent, I might have reviewed it in a different light.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

It is part and parcel of your obligations to be able to distinguish a very basic and fundamental term like this?

***Project Director, AA:***

It's my obligation, whether it is basic and fundamental or complicated. Full stop.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

You do agree that this is not something highly complex, this is not something highly unusual in your industry, in your trade?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, I don't agree with that. Otherwise, the misunderstanding wouldn't have been so widespread.

***Chairman:***

You are saying that in fact it is complex or it is not?

***Project Director, AA:***

What I am saying is, Madam Chairman, I don't think it is quite as simple as putting the difference between the two words as they are being explained now. I believe, had that been the case, that it was that simple to see whether it was right or wrong, I would have been one of many people.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Your Project Team, in the normal usual circumstances should be able to distinguish, even though personally you yourself would not be able to distinguish, your Project Team, in the usual normal situation, your engineers should be able to distinguish this, the distinction between availability and reliability?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes. They should be able to, yes.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Just then Mr OAKERVEE told us that the whole confusion came to light when the Chairman of your AA came before us on 24 September. If I can refer you to Paper no. B40, which is in Volume III, and that is a letter by solicitors Allen & Overy, dated 7 September. It is the Airport Authority's response to the Commission's questions raised in its letter of 28 August. Can you find that please, that document?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes, I have that.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

If we look at the questions and answers, if we turn to page 9, answer to question 9D, top of the page:

"What was done between the time of testing and the opening of the new airport in order to bring FIDS reliability to 100 per cent?"

This here talks about reliability and that is the thing that most people are concerned about. If you look at the middle of that paragraph, it talks about:

"The '97 to 98% reliability' is taken from the logs of the network management system. The Commission is referred to the attached tables entitled 'FIDS system server up-time availability' (table 5). The results of the monitoring process indicated that FIDS servers and display servers could be relied upon."

I don't know whether you were party to preparing this response to the Commission, but this says quite clearly that it is the availability or the reliability of the servers. It doesn't include software or the whole system. Actually, the Commission was asking about the reliability of the FIDS system. It wasn't really responding to the question. But, even here, as early as 7 September, you would have understood that you are talking about the servers, that the 97, 98 per cent was referring to the servers and not the reliability of the whole FIDS system. Is that correct or not?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, it's not correct, because I had nothing to do with --

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

You didn't know anything about the response to the Commission?

***Project Director, AA:***

No.

***Chairman:***

Do you know who prepared the response?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, I don't, Madam Chairman.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Also, Madam Chairman, earlier we referred to the paper which accurately pointed to the availability and Mr OAKERVEE told us it is the IT people. But the IT people were not present at that Board meeting. Now we are really



confused about who is supposed to be leading the discussion of such technical items to explain to the Board?

**Chairman:**

Did you explain to the Board, Mr OAKERVEE?

**Project Director, AA:**

Not on IT matters.

**Chairman:**

On system matters, surely, we are talking about?

**Project Director, AA:**

On system matters that contained lots of IT, which the FIDS system is, no, I didn't.

**Chairman:**

I think that we have in fact requested the papers which document the meeting on 22 June in which the decision to proceed with the full FIDS system was made and I think that Mr OAKERVEE has promised us that paper. If we get that paper maybe it will be clearer.

**主席：**

李永達議員，你是否就這點提問？請簡短地發問。

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Mr OAKERVEE, do you agree that starting from early 1998 the 2 main problems faced in the opening of the airport is only on FIDS and HACTL? Do you agree?

**Project Director, AA:**

They were the 2 principal problems, yes.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

As Project Director, do you agree that you should put more time concentrating on these 2 areas? Do you agree?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

My point is when you write the reports that were sent to the Authority Board meeting on 9 June, are you saying that you have completely comprehended the statements and sentences in the 2 areas related to FIDS and HACTL?

***Project Director, AA:***

At that point in time I thought I had.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

How can you explain to this Committee what kind of procedures and meetings and what kind of work you did at that time to land you at that conclusion?

***Project Director, AA:***

The engineers responsible and I discussed that area, and I thought I had understood it. If, as it appears possible, there is this great difference between the availability and the reliability in the way it is being used in these reports, then I did not understand.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

You didn't understand?

***Project Director, AA:***

That appears to be the case.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Do you realise that both the Airport Authority and ADSCOM rely on your recommendation for the decision that the opening of 6 July is possible? Do you realise that?

***Project Director, AA:***

My views obviously carried weight but it wasn't the only thing that they relied upon.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

But you are the people concerned in monitoring the whole procedures and progress of the works in the airport?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

So it is a fair statement that both the Board of AA and ADSCOM rely on your recommendation for the decision whether to postpone the opening of the airport or not?

***Project Director, AA:***

The AA Board would rely on me as one of their executive directors. ADSCOM would obviously take notice of what the Airport Authority said. But they have others monitoring the project. They have NAPCO and NAPCO also made their recommendations.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

You agree that the Airport Authority rely on the recommendation for the decision whether they should carry on with the opening of the airport on 6 July or not?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes, that is true.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Are you saying to this Committee that your recommendation actually makes the Airport Authority fail to realise that the reliability of the FIDS system is not what is written in the report so they maybe making a wrong decision at that time?

**Project Director, AA:**

At that point in time when I made the statements and put the reports forward, I did not understand the difference between the availability and reliability of the system. As to how that may or may not have misled anybody, I'm not in a position to say at this moment.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Mr OAKERVEE, you agreed with me at the beginning of the question that you yourself agree that the only two areas of importance in the decision of the opening of the airport are FIDS and HACTL. Then do you agree that you should make sure everything, every sentence and words within those 2 areas - other areas you may have no time to concentrate - but within those 2 areas you should put every word and sentence in a clear statement before you put it to the meeting of the Airport Authority, do you agree?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

But have you done that this time?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, I did. As I think I have indicated or tried to indicate - and I'm sorry if I can't do better - at the time it was done I thought the story that was being presented to everybody above me was the true story.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

The true story is that availability is reliability?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

And now you realise that it may not be?

***Project Director, AA:***

It may not be, but I'm not too certain what, if any, the significant difference is, in reality.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

It is quite inexplicable because, as you told us time and time again, the whole issue came to light when your Chairman came here to answer questions on 24 September and then it twigged. In fact in your reply to the Commission earlier that month that question had already arisen. If that thing came up and your Chairman seemed so confused, one would have thought that somebody would have tried to sort it out. But you are telling us that all you tried to find out was whether there was a difference and you didn't bother to find out the material difference between the two?

***Project Director, AA:***

When that response was made on 7 September I wasn't in fact in Hong Kong.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

OK. Concentrate on your, Chairman, 24 September, when everybody said "Ah, maybe there is a difference". You did not bother to find out what the difference was?

***Project Director, AA:***

The thing I looked at was the difference in what was being reported by NAPCO and what was being reported by us, as to why one was saying 91 per cent and the other was saying 98 per cent in round terms, and that I established. There is a logical answer to that.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

What is the difference? Can you tell us again?

**Project Director, AA:**

Between the 98 and 91 per cent?

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

No. The availability and reliability?

**Project Director, AA:**

No, I can't.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

You did not bother to find out? All you found out was there was a difference between what NAPCO had said and what you people had --

**Project Director, AA:**

I thought that was the real issue.

**Chairman:**

Just a very short question and then I have to go back to Mr LAU Kong-wah.

**Hon Margaret NG**

Madam Chairman, I would like Mr OAKERVEE to look at the witness statement that he gave to the Commission. I believe it is Paper no. B71 in Volume V. Mr OAKERVEE, that is your own statement.

**Chairman:**

Which paragraph?

***Hon Margaret NG***

Paragraph 51. Here you talk about FIDS. The subheading of your statement here is FIDS. At Paragraph 51 you said that you had regular meetings with your experts and your engineers. I see names like Mr K C TSUI, whom you have mentioned. It shows that you say that you have been having lots of meetings and you have been receiving lots of reports from them.

My puzzlement is this: You had had so many meetings and yet you could not understand, you did not realise that there was a fundamental difference between reliability and availability. My question is how could that have happened? Is it because your engineers misled you, or because you couldn't understand them, or because you only take their words at face value and then further misunderstood what they say? This all sounds very serious and I want to be fair to you. Can you explain why, in spite of all that, you did not catch on to the difference between reliability and availability?

***Project Director, AA:***

Because reliability and availability weren't, I don't think, ever discussed as a specific issue in the terms we are discussing it today. At those meetings, which, as you correctly say, were held weekly, they had the contractors there with their subcontractors, EDS being the subcontractor, my own consultants, my own engineers, and both the CEO and myself used to be at the meetings. I chaired it but the CEO is present. That never became an issue in those discussions.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, I am afraid that is not good enough. I understand, Mr OAKERVEE, you accept your job is to hand over something when you are satisfied that it is reliable. It seems to me that you must have done something to set criteria for yourself as to what is meant by "reliability". What did you do to give yourself those criteria? Do you just take what people tell you at face value and then misunderstand what they say?

***Project Director, AA:***

The test results that I was provided with in those meetings indicated that the system's reliability and stability was improving all the time.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, the document that we have just turned up, actually the table, shows availability. Now, you must have looked at the piece of paper. To someone who didn't understand that there is a difference between reliability and availability I would say that availability means availability. What gave you the basis to conclude that availability means reliability?

***Project Director, AA:***

Nothing.

***Hon Margaret NG***

They are two words?

***Project Director, AA:***

Nothing, through the Chair, because the need to establish a distinction between those words never arose.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, the words "availability" and "reliability", these are 2 different words. When an ordinary person sees the word "availability", that person will not immediately consider that to be the same as "reliability". Now, you consider it to be the same. Can you tell us on what basis did you consider the two things to be the same?

***Project Director, AA:***

I never said they would be considered the same. What I said was the distinction between those words never became an issue. Charts such as the ones we have got the 98 per cent on didn't reach those meetings.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, is Mr OAKERVEE saying that he had never been told that there was 98 per cent availability? I heard that he was told that there was



a 98 per cent availability? Am I right? You were told 98 per cent available and you saw those charts?

***Project Director, AA:***

What I can't remember is whether the persons gave me 98 per cent availability at that time or 98 per cent reliability.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, the question remains. Mr OAKERVEE was either told 98 per cent reliable by his engineers, in which case we want to know who told him such a thing, or Mr OAKERVEE was told 98 per cent availability, in which case we want Mr OAKERVEE to say why when he saw availability he concluded that it meant reliability?

***Project Director, AA:***

I am afraid I can't answer the question any better than I did before.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

***Chairman:***

I think Mr OAKERVEE has actually been asked by the Committee to point us to the papers. One is a table which I believe is produced by staff of his division. You will have to direct us to that paper and there we can see quite clearly who made the report, whether that report was seen by Mr OAKERVEE, and what word was used in that report. That is number one. Secondly, we have already posed that question to Mr OAKERVEE, whether there is any report anywhere which has been submitted to you by your people indicating reliability. Thirdly, he will produce to the Committee the paper which represents the decision taken on 22 June.

I think I will draw a line there because there have been quite a lot of questions asked on this issue. I go back to Mr LAU Kong-wah.

***劉江華議員：***

我亦想就此問題提問。對於這兩個字的運用，似乎柯家威先生給了

兩個解釋。第一個解釋是，他沒有資格作出評論。第二個解釋是，當有關工程進行至某一階段時，他便會將工程交給其他部門處理，自己不會再繼續處理。我想問柯家威先生，簡單來說，他的解釋是否這樣？

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE.

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes. There is only one thing I would like to qualify there. It is not a black and white situation. I take responsibility until we hand over and continue with the contractual responsibilities right until the contract is concluded. During the testing phase, all the other parties involved were in that team.

**劉江華議員：**

好的，我想就此兩點再詳細發問。柯家威先生，雖然你不是資訊科技的專家，但你也是土木工程師。請問你在工程師的生涯中，是否從來沒有見過這兩個字的提述呢？

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE。

**Project Director, AA:**

As an engineer and a citizen I have read reliability and availability as 2 words, but --

**劉江華議員：**

請問你是否從來沒有見過這兩個字的提述呢？

**Chairman:**

I think Mr LAU is asking you in your professional capacity. There is differentiation between the two words?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**劉江華議員：**

你曾見過這兩個字的提述，亦有興建地鐵的經驗。那麼地鐵的可用性與可靠性有否分別呢？將火車及路軌建成後，它們可以使用時，是否等如……

**主席：**

劉江華議員，我想提醒你，其實副主席剛才已問了這個“point”，即就專業的判斷而言，那兩個字是否指不同的事物。這個“point”已提問了，或者你“move on to”另一個“point”好嗎？

**劉江華議員：**

好的，主席。我還想問關於交接的問題。當有關工程完成至某一個階段後，便會將系統交給“AMD”。請問交接在何日進行，以及有甚麼需要交接呢？

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE。

**Project Director, AA:**

As I reported earlier this morning, whereas I had led the meeting to believe yesterday that it was 14 June, the actual certificate when I looked at it last night shows 25 June. So, my memory served me wrong. There are various receipts which people sign off, predominantly from the IT section, saying that they accept all the parts. What you have got at the moment is the face certificate from the project manager to the head of the construction. There is a big back-up behind each of those sheets.

**劉江華議員：**

主席，我想問“FIDS”在當日的情況。昨天我曾要求索取一旦“FIDS”出現問題時負責應付的人員名單。柯家威先生給了我們一個名字——“Bill HURST”。這個名字載於今天給我們的文件中。他負責甚麼工作

呢？倘若“FIDS”出現問題時，他可以如何處理？

**Project Director, AA:**

Bill HURST is the Head in charge of GEC and EDS for the whole system.

**劉江華議員：**

他與他的同事能夠在當日處理任何問題，對嗎？

**Project Director, AA:**

That's right.

**劉江華議員：**

那麼請你參閱B68號文件。新機場啟用後，有關方面擬備了一個關於“C381 — FIDS”的報告。最後一段是這樣說： .....

**主席：**

對不起，請你再說一遍，在這文件的哪一段？

**劉江華議員：**

B68號文件第2頁。

**主席：**

“System Status”，對嗎？

**劉江華議員：**

是的，“System Status”。C381最後一點提到一些海外專家要到本港改善系統。請問這些專家負責甚麼工作呢？為何當日沒有臨時的專家去處理問題？

**Project Director, AA:**

These particular experts dealt with, in the first instance, Philips with the monitors and EEV dealt with the liquid crystal display boards. During the operation after opening, the problems that GEC thought they had resolved before opening still persisted and they brought the manufacturers of that equipment out to site, who actually looked into their own product and changed, I believe, some of the software in the intelligent part of that product.

**劉江華議員：**

主席，我想問這些人士，包括“Bill HURST”，當天是否在現場？他們在何時到達呢？

**Project Director, AA:**

This wasn't an incident which you would regard as an emergency. This was a fault that they couldn't resolve and they sent for the manufacturers. It may be better explained as an off-the-shelf piece of hardware, and it was an inherent fault in the manufacture.

**劉江華議員：**

我現在是問有關“Bill HURST”這人。倘若“FIDS”出現問題，他需要向你負責。他在何時到達機場呢？

**Project Director, AA:**

He arrived right at the beginning of the contract. He's been there throughout the contract.

**劉江華議員：**

不，我的問題是：新機場在7月6日啟用當天，這班工程人員是否在現場，準備應付可能出現的問題？

**主席：**

劉江華議員，請你……對不起……“sorry, Mr OAKERVEE”……你可否告知我們你現在正在參閱哪份文件？因為我們今天才收到這些文件。

**劉江華議員：**

好的。我正參閱第3頁的圖表，名為“Emergency Telephone Contact Numbers”，他是唯一的人士……C381的中間部分……

**主席：**

C381……

**劉江華議員：**

對。中間的部分，Bill HURST，一旦發生事故，便需要找他。我想問在機場啟用當天，這人是否在現場？

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE.

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, he was present at AOD, yes.

**劉江華議員：**

柯家威先生，可否向我們詳細敘述當日發生事故後，你所做過的事情？

**Project Director, AA:**

I personally did nothing when it failed because I was not in charge of the airport at that point in time. It was the maintenance teams that then called out these experts as and when they needed them, when they had a problem. The log sheets which Airport Management Division have got would reflect who and when came at any time. As I said, I haven't got that information with me.

**劉江華議員：**

你甚麼事情也沒有做！根據你的理解，到了新機場啟用當天，你已無需為“FIDS”這個系統負上任何責任，對嗎？

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE ◦

**Project Director, AA:**

I think there has to be a very clear distinction here. When the airport opened, before the airport actually opened, a couple of weeks before, it came under the control of the AMD. The movement of people coming in and out of the airport is strictly under the control of them, and also the access to equipment. Even contractors only go in there with permits now once they have been approved by AMD on their maintenance side. It was the Maintenance Division who were responsible for maintaining and operating and who called in these experts. We made everybody available and responded to whatever they wanted us to do. We couldn't rush in there and start interfering with an operating system, obviously, because it would interfere with the safety and security of everything.

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE, just for the record. You gave us a whole pile of handover notices. Can you point us to the one which is relevant, which is the C381 handover notice, for the record?

**Project Director, AA:**

I haven't got them in front of me. I think, from recollection, 381, 73, is it? 73 or 74?

**Chairman:**

That is dated 31 August?

**Project Director, AA:**

That is correct.

**Chairman:**

But the handover date was 23 June? How do you explain that

discrepancy?

**Project Director, AA:**

I haven't got the sheet yet.

**Chairman:**

73?

**Project Director, AA:**

73 is missing from this file.

**Chairman:**

This is the one received this morning, 73.

**Project Director, AA:**

The paperwork and certificates, fair copies, which have been brought up to date after the opening. If you see the date of the handover, it has all the detailed information. There is 23 June.

**Chairman:**

I asked the question how do you explain the discrepancy between the date of the document and the date of the handover? What happened in between?

**Project Director, AA:**

Madam Chairman, the pressure of work over this period with some of these persons, they got behind with finishing the fair copies and the paperwork and this was done after the event.

**Chairman:**

What actually took place on 23 June? You keep saying that you handed over, you see?

**Project Director, AA:**

The various receipts were signed off, which are not attached to these. As



I said earlier, each of these sheets has, in itself, a large back-up of papers that go with it.

**Chairman:**

Can you just briefly describe, when you hand over a certain system, you hand over to the user, what actually takes place there? You hand over because on behalf of Project, AA, you are satisfied to accept the system on behalf of the AA and then hand it over to the user? Is that the procedure? What is the actual procedure when you say you sign off the system?

**Project Director, AA:**

In the back attachment to my witness statement there is the actual procedure that goes with it. In essence, what it is, all the test results are made available, the Maintenance Division of AMD are quite frequently observers at those tests, the final tests, and they satisfy themselves that the work has been done to their satisfaction and they are prepared to take it over. There have been cases where they have rejected.

**劉江華議員：**

負責“FIDS”的公司是“EDS”。這間公司在過往曾否參與這樣大型的航班系統？

**Project Director, AA:**

Just to correct that. As far as the authority is concerned, the contracting party is GEC and EDS is their subcontractor. But, yes, EDS have been involved in other airports. As I said yesterday, John F. Kennedy, the new one there is one of their systems as well.

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE, as this is such an important point, regarding the handover, could you let us actually have any supporting papers which would indicate the actual handover on the 23rd and also exactly what understanding both parties had - when I say "both parties" I mean the Project Division and the AMD - had regarding this handover, exactly what it means? All right?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes. I can do that, Madam Chairman, yes. Just for that one?

**主席：**

李永達議員，你是否想“follow-up”？何承天議員，你是否想“follow-up”？

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Mr OAKERVEE asked whether it was just for that one. In fact I would like to ask whether also there was a handover exercise for the passenger terminal building, which I cannot find here?

**Chairman:**

It is actually your turn to ask questions, so you can proceed now. Mr OAKERVEE?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes. It follows a slightly different procedure, more complex, but I can give you the information, the documents that comprise that handover.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

First of all, I would like to continue my line of questioning from yesterday when I talked about practical completion. Now that we have some documents provided by Mr OAKERVEE I would like to pursue that.

First of all, we don't have the complete set of contracts. We only have excerpts of several clauses taken out from the special conditions and the general conditions, so I have to rely on those excerpts. My first question is that in the general condition of contract clause 48.1, the contractor can actually apply for the so-called completion certificate once he has satisfied himself that the works have been substantially completed. However, this has been amended, as far as I can interpret, in the special conditions of contract under 7.4:

"The contractor shall not request the issue of a Completion Certificate for the works prior to receiving from the Project Manager a notice stating the anticipated airport opening date."

which, Mr OAKERVEE, I think you also said so yesterday. Perhaps I should stop there and ask for the rationale of why the addendum was added, so that when the contractor finishes substantially his works, he cannot apply until the notice was given to him about the airport opening date?

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE.

**Project Director, AA:**

The rationale to that was when these contracts were let back in 94, 95, the conditions of contract were changed because we didn't know when the opening date was going to be and we didn't know when we were going to start operating the airport. This is back in the step-by-step funding days when we didn't have all the money to complete the total amount of work. It was to enable the duty of care and maintenance to remain with the contractor until such time as the airport opened. Otherwise, we would have had contracts finishing at all different times, without basic care and maintenance following through. That was why those special conditions were drafted.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Chairman, is the witness saying that the contractor would have an open-ended date as far as the completion of its contract is concerned? At that point in time, when the contract was let, he didn't know when the opening date was to be. In fact it was supposed to be in July 1997. Then of course later on it changed to April 1998 and so on and so forth?

**Project Director, AA:**

It was open-ended as far as care and maintenance is concerned. That special clause demands that he has to be notified by the project manager so many days before the anticipated opening date. But, as regards the works, there were various key dates in his program which demanded that he reach different stages. They, in the case of 302, which is a superstructure contract, were extended because the nominated subcontractors couldn't be awarded it on time. Under the contract he got those dates revised.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Are we told that even though the contractor might be able to finish earlier, he wouldn't be released? As far as the substantial completion is concerned, he would not be paid for that portion of the work and he would have to wait six months, a year, whatever, whenever the owner wanted to open the airport? Is that the situation?

***Project Director, AA:***

That is correct.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Chairman, may I ask whether the witness in that case thinks that that is very abnormal and unusual and perhaps would have a major impact on cost of that kind of contract, because the risk is unbelievable?

***Project Director, AA:***

It is certainly an unusual contract in that sense, but it was a very unusual project in the sense of not knowing when it could be opened or completed, so some special provision had to be made. As regards costs, it appeared not to have any major impact. What we did have though was a monthly charge that they put in their bid for extended periods. They got an extra monthly charge for the care and maintenance of the works. The main thing was to keep all the bonds, performance bonds and parent company guarantees in place.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I will not pursue that point because I don't think we are talking about costs at the moment. On the same point, yesterday Mr OAKERVEE told us that the contractor cannot apply for the substantial completion until the commercial opening of the airport. I think that was what he said. However, we read now in the special conditions in fact he can, provided the project manager shall give him notice stating the anticipated airport opening date. In other words, if the project manager told him in October, November, whenever, of 1997 that the opening date would be April 1998, he can actually apply for the completion certificate if he feels that he is substantially finished? Is that correct?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, it isn't correct. The project manager has to give -- I forget what it is.

21 days before the anticipated opening I believe it is.

**Chairman:**

28 days?

**Project Director, AA:**

28 days.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

But he can request though. The first sentence reads:

"The contractor shall not request the issue of a Completion Certificate for the works prior to receiving from the Project Manager a notice stating the anticipated airport opening date."

As soon as he is told about the airport opening date he can request the issue of a certificate?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes, but the project manager didn't know the date and the procedure within the authority was that he didn't do it until --

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

I appreciate that. I am just clarifying in my mind the position with the contractor vis-a-vis the contract. Now, in 7.5:

"Subject to clause 48 of the general conditions, the Project Manager shall issue the Completion Certificate for the works on or as soon as reasonably practicable after the airport opening date."

Again, I would like to ask what is the rationale of that, that the completion coincide with the date of the opening? In other words, there is no opportunity at all in between the substantial completion of the contract and the opening of the airport for any sort of eventualities, anything that could happen prior to the opening, that something could be done if something went wrong or whatever?

**Chairman:**

In other words, why can't they come before the opening date, Mr OAKERVEE?

***Project Director, AA:***

Sorry? Can I clarify that question?

***Chairman:***

In 7.5 it states that:

"-- the Project Manager shall issue the Completion Certificate for the works on or as soon as reasonably practicable after the airport opening date."

Why can't it be before?

***Project Director, AA:***

Because the Airport Authority in its policy did not want anybody to receive a completion certificate before the commercial operation so that the contractor was responsible for care and maintenance up until that date.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Does that also mean that the contractor can actually work, with all his workmen and so forth, up to the minute of the airport opening date and that he would only move out, say, at 6 am, or whatever, when the airport opens? Is that the situation contractually?

***Project Director, AA:***

Contractually, I think that is the situation. It wasn't the situation in practice though because we put down a mandatory period when people could not work.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

So, contractually, that is the situation. The scenario that the contractor would be still finishing the last finishing touches could arise?

**Chairman:**

That is what the contract allows in that situation.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

I would like to refer to the witness statement of Mr OAKERVEE to the Commission. He said in Paragraph 2 - and I am sure he would agree - that he was responsible for not only overseeing the design, construction and everything else, but, in the last line, construction support and contracts. I would like to ask him how much was he involved in the drafting of these conditions?

**Project Director, AA:**

I was a party to the drafting of the conditions.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Can he elaborate on that because when I asked him the previous questions he gave us the answer that the Authority wanted this, the Authority wanted that, and so on. As a professional person, the expert in the group, a very senior position, responsible for contracts, would it be correct to assume that he has a major input as to how these contracts were drafted?

**Chairman:**

Were you actually responsible for the drafting of these contracts?

**Project Director, AA:**

I was partially responsible for the drafting of the contracts. Legal Division obviously took key responsibility on it and the Legal Division presented the principles to the Board before those documents were agreed to be used.

**Chairman:**

According to your brief, basically, the adoption of such contracts is just a matter of procedure, isn't it?

**Project Director, AA:**

The drafting of the contracts themselves was quite a major issue within the

Provisional Airport Authority.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Perhaps, Chairman, I would like to ask whether he himself would find that this provision of completing the contract on the same day as the opening is a satisfactory condition?

***Project Director, AA:***

You made the statement quite correctly earlier on that you had only been given extracts which I took out of the contract last night. If you look at the full contract, there are key dates which demonstrate that the works have to be complete against those key dates. The contractor finished those against those key dates, which meant I think in the terms you have been using, which is a term that is not recognised by our contract, practical completion would have been achieved by the key dates preceding the completion.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I also want to turn to Page 1 of this document, Paragraph 6.1.4, which says:

"After the issue of the Completion Certificate for the works or any section  
--"

Then reading down:

"-- do all the things required in relation to the performance tests, to which the provisions of clause 39 of the general conditions shall apply, to enable the performance tests to be passed."

That is after the completion certificate, and the certificate will not be issued until the airport is opened. Is it only after that that performance tests can be done? Is that the real situation, according to the contract?

***Project Director, AA:***

There are 2 sets of tests under the contract. It does vary which contract we actually go to by their particular technical specifications and special conditions. In general principle, all the basic tests are done obviously in the course of the works and by the key date. What we do have is further tests, confidence tests, after the airport is opened, on certain of the contracts. The



baggage handling is one, for instance, where, a contractor, when we have an operating system under full stress, has to carry on and do his confidence testings and then present those documents.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Unless there are other documents to show it, this is a very all-inclusive term, performance tests. To my understanding, this would include, for instance, wind tunnel tests for large glass and windows and of course systems testing and everything else. It is a bit strange to me that you cannot perform those tests until after handing over of the building?

***Chairman:***

I will have to ask for the relevance here. What is this line of questioning leading to?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

The relevance, Chairman, is that I contend that the contract is not properly drawn up so that the Project Director was not able to control the completion of the contract until the very moment of the airport opening and that left no room for testing, for trials, or anything else - contractually anyway. This is the relevance.

***Chairman:***

You want to establish whether that was actually what happened, right?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes. We can pursue that. I am sure that a lot of the things that happened, like the escalators, the water supply and the power - I don't know how many problems - could have been serviced if the building was completed much earlier.

***Chairman:***

Mr OAKERVEE, would you agree with that contention, that if the work was contracted to finish before the airport opening date that we wouldn't have had that predicament on 6 July, with all the human errors and this, that and the

other?

***Project Director, AA:***

I don't think that would be the case at all and I think Mr Edward HO is disadvantaged at the moment because I have only provided him with extracts of the contract. Really, to explain it properly I need to provide the whole contract.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Chairman, then in that case I will pursue a related issue, which is the supplemental agreement which was reached by the AA with the contractors to accelerate the programme. I think this was in September 1996. I think, as Members remember, there was close to \$2 billion, \$1.8968 billion additional payment to the main contractor, contractor 302 for the Passenger Terminal Building, as well as the M & E contractor 320, \$396.8 million. In exchange for that supplemental agreement and additional payment the contractors were to waive all claims, as well as to finish the contracts by April 1997. So far am I correct?

***Project Director, AA:***

Correct. The only amendment I would make to that is that they agreed to waive all claims up to 30 June 1996.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I accept that. My question, Chairman, is has the contractor performed within the provisions of the supplemental agreement? Have they delivered?

***Project Director, AA:***

He performed, but he was due extensions of time rightfully under the contract for various events that took place after that supplemental agreement.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Were these variations within the control of the Project Director?

***Project Director, AA:***

They were variations that I sanctioned, yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Maybe the next question then is when the airport opening date was moved to July, how does that affect the supplemental agreement?

***Project Director, AA:***

It doesn't affect it at all. The only thing is it goes back to the care and maintenance I was talking about earlier. Because the period was prolonged he got additional money for taking that responsibility.

***Chairman:***

For care and maintenance?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

I think the question of Mr HO is in the first place whether that supplemental agreement has actually been honoured in terms of all the works finishing by April 1998. That is the question?

***Project Director, AA:***

That supplemental agreement has been honoured to the word, other than where it has been amended rightfully through the contract.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I think, Chairman, that when the supplemental agreement was signed there was information, at least provided by the Airport Authority. I don't think Members have it because I just got it through the Secretariat of the Legislative Council.

***Chairman:***

Let us know what it is.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Anyway, there were programmes outlining the key dates that the contractor would have to comply with once they had entered into this supplemental agreement. For instance, for contract 301, which is for the Passenger Terminal Building, the final site handover to the M and E contractor was 4 October 1996. Did they achieve that date?

***Chairman:***

1996?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

1995, actually. I don't know why.

***Project Director, AA:***

With respect, I think what you are looking at in the document - and it is a long, long time since I saw it - that is reflecting the programme of events from the start, isn't it?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

The revised completion date was November 1997. The revised completion dates for C302 and 320, they were in November?

***Chairman:***

Revised date?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes. Were these accomplished?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, those dates were not accomplished, but not through any fault of the contractor. They received extensions of time rightfully under the contract.

They were issued by the Project Manager responsible for the contract.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Chairman, I think that maybe the witness has to explain to us why, after having paid \$1.89 billion to accelerate the programme, there was not a tighter control as far as the Project Director's side is concerned to ensure that there was no more slip, no more variation, to enable the contractor to extend his completion date?

***Project Director, AA:***

There are events that occurred for which the contractor rightfully had an extension of time. Madam Chairman, I have not come prepared at all this morning to answer questions on this subject. I didn't think it would arise.

***Chairman:***

I think that certainly the works that were leading up to the opening is actually relevant, I have to say. Mr OAKERVEE, what you are telling the Committee is that even though we have paid the \$1.89 billion and even though we have been more or less assured of a cut-off date by April 1998, all contracts to be completed on the works side, they have been granted extension of time because the supplemental agreement allows it?

***Project Director, AA:***

The contract allows it.

***Chairman:***

The contract has been amended, right, because of the supplemental agreement. The supplemental agreement has actually been signed on the basis that there has to be a much stricter timetable in terms of the completion of the works?

***Project Director, AA:***

The supplemental agreement was to provide a new programme because the circumstances which brought about that supplemental agreement were close to putting the contracts we had at large, putting both money and time at large on the

original contract as it stood. In very simple terms, the reason was that they were funded -- 302 was on the step-by-step funding and when we came to the Legislative Council at the time we got, from memory, \$5 billion for that contract and the overall value of the works is approximately \$10 billion, and the works that weren't funded became the subject of nominated subcontracts. Nominated subcontracts weren't awarded until we became an authority and had the ability to borrow money.

***Chairman:***

You have covered that already in your statement. I think we are talking about the supplemental agreement, specifically, about the supplemental agreement. The supplemental agreement was signed on the basis that the works have to be somewhat guaranteed to complete by April 1998 and it was the Project Director's job that with this additional \$1.89 billion the programme would not slip any further. I think what Mr HO's question relates to is in fact, as Project Director, whether you ensured that that was done? I think that is the question.

***Project Director, AA:***

With respect, I thought I was answering the question on those lines. The reason the supplemental agreement was signed was to put the contract back and have a programme once we were able to award those nominated subcontracts because the contract had suffered, all in all, some 11 months delay. We signed the supplemental contracts and you quite rightly say that there were specific dates in that which he was to achieve. In other words, the contract was reinstated with realistic dates. Events occurred during the project which have given rise under the contract for him rightfully to have an extension of time.

***Chairman:***

This is the key point I think. You would need to tell us because, after all, the public paid \$1.89 billion to make sure that the dates which were actually put down in the supplemental agreement were kept. Now you are telling us that they have been granted extension of time and rightly granted extension of time?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

You would have to satisfy this Committee that those extensions of time were, indeed, reasonable and contractually allowable and that they have not in fact impacted on the rest of the programme. I think what we are here to look at is how and why the problems occurred on 6 July and how the various links in the whole project impacted on that and caused the problems. It may not have been directly caused by you but it might have been indirectly caused by slippages in your programme.

***Project Director, AA:***

I understand the nature of the question.

***Chairman:***

You have to satisfy us. You have to produce to us what has actually slipped --

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

What were the events that led to the extension of time.

***Chairman:***

-- and what made you give that permission for extension of time?

***Project Director, AA:***

I can give that chapter and verse and would be pleased to do so.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I think, Chairman, to come back to my original point, I personally would feel that the building should be finished, all the finishes and equipment running, commissioned, tested and all that. If you want to keep the contractor on the site contractually so that they maintain it, fine.

***Chairman:***

Care and maintenance.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

The problem now is that contractually they don't have to finish until the very last day. Since that has been pursued, I don't want to labour that point any more, but just to finish by asking --

***Project Director, AA:***

Could I just supplement before we do that so there is no misunderstanding?

***Chairman:***

Yes, Mr OAKERVEE.

***Project Director, AA:***

One of the other reasons why the policy was adopted by the Authority not to issue Certificates of Completion until the airport opened was because of the all important defects liability period. We didn't want a contractor finishing a contract nine months or more before we opened the building to the public and it wasn't put to fair wear and tear and have his defects liability expire three months after the airport opened. We wanted a clear 12 months period of defects liability while the airport was operational. I think that is quite an important fact and, hence, the rather unusual terms and conditions in that contract.

***Chairman:***

OK. That is clarification. We will have the break now.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I have started off about the handover notice. I hope that the message has been clear, that there is no evidence here that the Passenger Terminal Building has actually been handed over and, if it hasn't, then Mr OAKERVEE is still responsible for everything happening in the building, not like yesterday when he said "It's signed off".

***Chairman:***



First of all, has it been handed over?

***Project Director, AA:***

As I said yesterday, the Certificate of Completion has not been issued on contract 302 because we are in a contractual dispute about the glazing.

***Chairman:***

So it hasn't been handed over?

***Project Director, AA:***

It's been handed over. The issue of the Certificate of Completion on this is very much a contractual issue because we have a contractual debate on the replacement of the glazing.

***Chairman:***

Has it or has it not been handed over?

***Project Director, AA:***

Physically, it's been handed over, Madam Chairman, but the contractor has not received his Certificate of Completion because that would release bonds and securities which the authority is not prepared to release while there is a major debate on the glazing.

***Chairman:***

This is a very important point because either it has or it hasn't and that determines the responsibility, doesn't it?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I think in the normal course of action the contractor would have to hand over the building to the client or to the owner and say "We have finished". Then the client, or in this case the Project Director, I guess, he will hand over to the user. "That is done. Now you take over. From tomorrow onwards I am no longer responsible for the construction of it. You will have to maintain it".

***Chairman:***

Similar to the FIDS system, in other words.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

I don't think we are very clear at the moment on what actually happened.

**Project Director, AA:**

Madam Chairman, all those things that you have stated have happened but, contractually, we have not given the Certificate of Completion which was requested by the contractor because we are not prepared to relieve him of the financial bonds and liabilities he has until we have resolved the mechanism by which the glass is going to be replaced.

**Chairman:**

We will break now and come back in 15 minutes.

*(The hearing resumed at 11:25 am)*

**主席：**

我們繼續研訊。李永達議員。

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Yesterday I made a request to Mr OAKERVEE that I want a list of contingency plans provided for each individual parts of the opening of the airport. Today I received a paper from Mr OAKERVEE about a list of emergency stand-by crew. I want to ask Mr OAKERVEE is this another word game again that you confuse my request? I am asking for contingency and you misunderstood it to be emergency, just like you misunderstood availability and reliability. I asked you for a contingency plan and you gave me an emergency telephone list. Did you confuse that too?

**Project Director, AA:**

I didn't confuse the two and I'm not playing games, Madam Chairman. In the event of a contingency, as regards projects are concerned, it would be an emergency and they were entitled the emergency teams. The contingency plans

during the operation of the airport are AMD's responsibility and I thought we did clear that yesterday, that Mr HEED has all the contingency plans in the event that things go wrong in the airport.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Are you saying to this Committee that you don't have a contingency plan for each part of the operation of the opening of the airport?

**Project Director, AA:**

As Project Director, I do not, no. The operation of the airport is the responsibility of the Airport Management Department. They have their contingency plans. The contingency plans that we had were the teams on stand-by to meet any problem that should arise, which in that context would be an emergency.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Is this fair to say: That, even during the discussion about the FIDS system, you are heavily involved with the stand-by and also some kind of contingency plan if the main system cannot work? Do you agree with that?

**Chairman:**

I think Mr LEE Wing-tat is referring to the so-called workarounds for FIDS.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

For the working or the implementation of the contingency, it is the responsibility of the Airport Management Director. But, for designing and also for deciding whether there should be a contingency plan and for the works within this contingency plan, it is your responsibility? Do you agree with that?

**Project Director, AA:**

No, because I really don't understand the word "contingency" in that context on design. Contingency, once the airport opened, was purely on operational issues.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Mr OAKERVEE, are you saying that you were not involved in the discussion and design of the stand-by system of FIDS and it actually is a contingency of the permanent system?

***Project Director, AA:***

As I explained to this Committee yesterday, I had no involvement in the design of the stand-by FIDS system. The only involvement I had was to undertake part of the negotiation with the contractor to assist the IT Department to get it back within price.

***Chairman:***

Mr OAKERVEE, perhaps I ought to remind you that these papers that you produced to this Committee today are the result of your evidence given yesterday to the Committee that there was a team of people standing by that day, waiting to be called to help out in case something happen, and they weren't called. This is what you said to the Committee.

***Project Director, AA:***

That's correct.

***Chairman:***

As a result of what you told us we asked you for the list of people who were actually standing by but somehow they weren't called, you said. Are you telling us that this is the list you were actually referring to, these people's emergency telephone numbers? This is it? This is the list? Are you telling us that?

***Project Director, AA:***

What I was able to get last night - we didn't get back to Chek Lap Kok until quite late last night - was the actual list of contact numbers. Each of those names has a team of men behind them, which is information still outstanding to this Committee.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Put aside that because of time you cannot get all the things. The main point I want to ask is whether the contingency plan of each part of the operation of the airport is under your responsibility? Are you involved in that?

**Project Director, AA:**

Not in the contingency, no.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

In what?

**Project Director, AA:**

I made arrangements. Our contingency was to have those emergency groups on stand-by that would respond to any need put to them by the Maintenance Division or Maintenance Department of the AMD division.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

So your understanding is contingency is equivalent to emergency?

**Project Director, AA:**

To react to any problem we had those emergency teams on stand-by and that was the Project Department's contingency.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Do you agree that actually you know the contingency plan for the FIDS system. Do you know?

**Project Director, AA:**

I don't know the contingency plan.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Do you know there is a stand-by system for FIDS.

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes. I know there is a stand-by system for FIDS, but I'm not involved in it, nor do I make the decision as to when to implement its use.

***Chairman:***

To be fair to Mr OAKERVEE, he has more than once stated that the stand-by FIDS has nothing to do with him, that it comes under Mr HEED, I think. What we want from you, Mr OAKERVEE, is the list of people you said were standing by under Project, the list of people standing by that day in case there are, whatever you call them, problems, teething problems, things that happen on the day, unexpected, and so on? Is this the list or is there another list?

***Project Director, AA:***

That is the contact numbers that the hotline rang up to get those teams in. What I haven't got and still is outstanding to you is the names that go behind those individuals in that telephone directory.

***Chairman:***

In fact there is no team standing by in Chek Lap Kok PTB under Project that day? There is just a list of telephone numbers?

***Project Director, AA:***

Those telephone numbers are the men stationed at Chek Lap Kok, but they are not in the terminal building, they are in their own premises on Chek Lap Kok, their own offices.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

So this is Mr OAKERVEE's own contingency plan, although he is not a party to the bigger contingency plan. What I want to ask Mr OAKERVEE is: These people on the list and more names that are to come, are you aware whether they are actually part of the real contingency plan, or are we talking

about two separate groups of people, some with the contingency plan and these are the emergency?

***Project Director, AA:***

You are talking about two separate groups of people.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

So these people don't need to handle any contingency things? What I am worried is whether these people feel confused?

***Project Director, AA:***

I don't think so. That is why we drew this line in the sand, if you like, with the contractors and the Project staff. This applies to my staff as well. On opening day we were all on stand-by 24 hours a day. AMD had taken charge before opening of the airport and the actual working of the equipment comes under the Maintenance Department. When a problem arose, obviously certain problems they could deal with immediately themselves. Others they needed greater knowledge or greater facilities to overcome the situation and that is the time they called in the team. We wanted the teams on stand-by at a location where we knew exactly where they were with their equipment and could move fast into the situation.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Were these people and the names to come given any training? Was there any trial on what was expected of them?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes. They were the people who installed all the equipment. They were the contractors responsible for it. They were the ones who had total knowledge and, in some cases, were the trainers who did the training.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Were they called out on opening day?

***Project Director, AA:***

There were certain people called out in certain instances. Again, there is a log of them. One of the other things that is related to this that you asked me for was the log and I said the log for 6 July was created afterwards. Those logs continue to be kept all the time now. AMD keep those logs. So I put a request across to Airport Management Division to produce the logs so that they can be submitted.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Were they able to help?

**Project Director, AA:**

Where they were called out, yes.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

It seems there was quite a bit of chaos on that day?

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Chairman, can I --

**Chairman:**

Let him answer this final question.

**Project Director, AA:**

Where they were called out, I believe they helped, yes.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

In spite of the fact that we saw what happened on that day?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Mr OAKERVEE, is it your understanding that there are actually two groups of people concerned with the opening day's contingency/emergency, and one



comes under your control, this list of people related to emergency, and there is another group of people under AMD called the contingency group? Is that your understanding?

***Project Director, AA:***

No. You have got the AMD staff in their department. Mr HEED is the one to answer this question, not me.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

You only understand that you have a group of people who are called emergency people, is that right?

***Project Director, AA:***

They are people on stand-by, to be called in if there is an emergency that needs to be dealt with by the AMD staff.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

For the facility owners, no matter whether it is gates, FIDS, or other things, when they have a problem is there any directive from the Airport Authority management given to them that if you have a problem you phone the emergency people or contingency people, which group they have to phone? Or do they have to make two telephone calls to try to find someone to fix the problems?

***Project Director, AA:***

There should only be one person making the telephone call and that is the staff and managers of the AMD department. They got straight onto the hotline and then those people were called out.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Mr OAKERVEE, you are very sure that if a facilities user has a problem on the day of opening, it is very clear that they make one telephone call to one particular person and then they can fix all the things, is that right?

***Project Director, AA:***

That's right.

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE, perhaps you can assist members. Was there ever a meeting between AMD and Project prior to 6 July, at which you actually planned what would happen, as far as people, the stationing of people is concerned, on the opening day? Was there such a meeting between the two departments?

**Project Director, AA:**

There was a whole raft of meetings between the 2 departments and other departments within the Authority bringing about operational readiness and those matters were covered in the --

**Chairman:**

I mean specifically for 6 July, when you are preparing for opening and you know that there are certain things which may not be running as smoothly as you would like. Even if you take 98.7 per cent, it is still not 100 per cent. Given the background of FIDS and so on, surely there must be some concern. Even you yourself said there are always teething problems which crop up which are unexpected. Was there any meeting between your division and the AMD, between the staff or the management staff of those divisions, to get ready for the situation that might occur on 6 July? Was there such a meeting?

**Project Director, AA:**

There were meetings that covered those problems for 6 July.

**Chairman:**

Can we have papers of those meetings?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

If you can supply us with the papers it would be very good and then we will understand a little more as to what the staff of the two divisions expect of

themselves and of one another.

***Project Director, AA:***

Right.

***Chairman:***

Do you want to follow up on that, Miss Margaret NG?

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, in fairness to the witness, there is a difference between contingency plan and emergency situation. An emergency is something which you don't foresee. It is totally ad hoc. Suddenly something --

***Chairman:***

Crops up.

***Hon Margaret NG***

We are very interested to know whether there were contingency plans set up. I understand Mr OAKERVEE has said the contingency plan for AOD is not his business, it is AMD. Is that right?

***Project Director, AA:***

That's right. They were masters of the contingency plan.

***Hon Margaret NG***

In that context, we would still like to know what the contingency plan consists of. The nature of a plan is that you can switch to it. If there was a contingency plan, no doubt this would involve people, that is to say, should something happen to FIDS then we might have to go to the contingency plan, in which case we would need more people, we would need them from various departments. Do you get the gist of what I am trying to say?

***Project Director, AA:***

I do, indeed.

***Hon Margaret NG***

If there were such a contingency plan involving people, would you have been involved in providing these people?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG***

I think I have to ask 2 questions. First, was there such a meeting at which you were present to discuss precisely what to do and what kind of people you can bring on to help?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes, there was. The emergency teams were where the extra resource would come from with knowledge, as and when they want it. That would respond to a crisis situation or a contingency plan that was being implemented that needed resources.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Can you point us to the date of that meeting and who took part in that meeting?

***Project Director, AA:***

I can't point you to the documents here because I don't know whether it is in it, but I will certainly provide it.

***Hon Margaret NG***

The date of that meeting and who were at the meeting, and then certainly we will ask you for the records?

***Project Director, AA:***

There was a series of meetings where it was discussed. It wasn't in one meeting.

**Hon Margaret NG**

When was the last meeting held to discuss what would happen on AOD with respect to people that you were supposed to --

**Project Director, AA:**

I am sorry, Chairman. I can't be precise.

**Chairman:**

I think we have posed that question to the witness. He will supply the document. I have to point out it is quite important that the witness appreciates what is being asked here. We are talking about two things. One is emergency, unexpected problems that crop up. The other is contingency plan, likely problems that might crop up and, if you are faced with those problems, you have a contingency plan. We would like to know whether there has been discussions on both for AOD and, if there was, can we have the records?

**Project Director, AA:**

There have been discussions and obviously Project Division staff were part of those discussions, but so were other departments within the Authority.

**Chairman:**

Yes?

**Project Director, AA:**

The custodianship of those contingency plans and the final formulation of those plans is very much AMD.

**Chairman:**

We understand that. The point is, with such a contingency plan, your staff are bound to be involved as part of that contingency plan. We would just like to know how you featured in the make-up for that contingency plan and how your staff are actually involved and how they were actually deployed on the day.

I think these are points that we want information on.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

For the facility user, no matter whether they are airline staff or security guards, when a problem arises, do they know that the problem is an emergency or do they know there is a plan waiting for them to call in other people belonging to your colleagues in AMD? Do they realise that?

***Project Director, AA:***

I believe AMD circulated those lists, together with other lists from other departments, to all the facility users within the terminal building and airport-wide, because it is not restricted to the terminal building alone.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

One more question. As an example, if the FIDS system cannot be operated on day one of the opening, is it a problem within your area or a problem within the AMD area?

***Project Director, AA:***

It was AMD's responsibility to call that team in. The team with all the experts were waiting there and actually a large number of those people were housed in the terminal building.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

So any personnel within this list related to FIDS?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes. HURST is the leader of that team and the team is underneath him.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

What is his responsibility?

***Project Director, AA:***

His responsibility -- he is the Project Manager for the GEC EDS contract.

He was on duty all the time and when he wasn't there his deputy was in charge and EDS staff and GEC staff were there.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Are you advising this Committee that once a problem within the FIDS happens it is the person within AMD who triggered the mechanism and called your staff to come to a meeting?

**Project Director, AA:**

That is correct.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Did it happen on that day? Did anybody within the AMD staff call your staff on the list to correct the problem?

**Project Director, AA:**

Some staff were called but we would need to consult the log to see who and when they were called.

**Chairman:**

We will get the logs. We will also get the people, the team behind the names given here. Miss Christine LOH?

**Hon Christine LOH:**

The broad area of questions I would like to ask is about the telephone system. But I wonder, Chairman, whether you would allow a clarification on something the witness said yesterday about his interpretation of airport readiness or whether you would like me to ask this on another occasion?

**Chairman:**

Is it going to be short or long?

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Hopefully, short.

**Chairman:**

Let's hear it first.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Yesterday the witness mentioned about his understanding of what is meant by airport readiness. We were discussing, Chairman, about smooth opening and all of that. I believe the witness said that in his mind it had to be safe, the building was finished, and the hardware was in place. Those were some of the key aspects. Is that correct, Mr OAKERVEE?

**Project Director, AA:**

That's correct.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

I think we were questioning whether that was sufficient and to what extent. Actually, there was a meeting which Mr OAKERVEE attended, it was an ADSCOM meeting, and it is Paper no. A37.

**Chairman:**

Which meeting is that?

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Airport Development Steering Committee meeting on 1 April 1998, Paper no. A37. I would appreciate the witness looking at Paragraph 27 of this document.

**Chairman:**

Give the witness a little bit of time.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Of course. A37 paragraph 27.

**Chairman:**



Have you got it, Mr OAKERVEE?

***Project Director, AA:***

I have indeed.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Since Mr OAKERVEE was at this meeting when this issue was discussed, I would like him to refer to the penultimate paragraph, where it says:

"If these systems could not function in their tip-top form, they should at least work as best as could be secured in the circumstances."

I just wondered what actually took place at that meeting and what is understood by allowing the airport opening to go ahead and systems not working in tip-top form but that the work must be as best as could be secured. Is there some understanding between the Airport Authority and Government as to the extent of smoothness of operation of the airport?

***Project Director, AA:***

The word "smooth", as we discussed yesterday, how you apply that is one thing. Certainly, with this penultimate sentence in paragraph 27, there was an understanding between those involved, who were principally those from NAPCO, who had explained it to ADSCOM in their own way before we had, and ourselves. It primarily related to FIDS and one or two other systems where there were workarounds to be carried out in order to operate the system.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

"System" seems to refer to FIDS, telephone, public address system, quite a few things?

***Project Director, AA:***

That's right.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Is the implication that, as long as something did work, even if it did not work very well, that was acceptable and was that the goal that you were all working towards?

***Project Director, AA:***

The goal we were working towards was to do the best we possibly could. The point of this meeting was that there were some shortcomings and we were required to work around them as best we were able.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

If I can ask about the telephone system. All these documents in Volume III where we get updates and the document that we went through yesterday together at the very beginning of the hearing, if we look through the problems of the telephones, it seems that it just simply didn't work on the day and people were not able to communicate in order to cope with the chaos that took place. This area is under your direct responsibility, is it not?

***Project Director, AA:***

I think we are talking about a very wide subject here which involves four different telephone -- different means of communication, some of which are the Airport Authority's and some of which are not the Airport Authority's. The communication system which broke down - I think you are primarily concerned with where people couldn't communicate at ramp level to direct buses to aircraft. Is that where we are asking the question? Is that the level of communication?

***Hon Christine LOH:***

I believe we have a number of problems. I believe people were not able to call to baggage, to transport. People just not being able to communicate when there was already chaos going on?

***Project Director, AA:***

The means of communication there was trunk mobile radio telephone and the ramp handlers had their own system. They had elected to go with their own system, I think it was Hutchison. Their system got overloaded and crashed in the early part of the opening. That relationship and the provision of that service did not involve the Airport Authority. That was their own choice of

connections.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Was it not the Airport Authority's job to make sure that it all worked because if some part of it was insufficient then the whole airport came to a halt?

***Project Director, AA:***

It did work on the trials that they had but, on the day, the system was so overloaded because the service provider had sold the system to others around the airport and, as I understand, it crashed for those reasons.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

What is your responsibility in this area?

***Project Director, AA:***

None at all.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Are you sure that that is the case, that you have no responsibility?

***Project Director, AA:***

In respect to the trunk mobile radio that the ramp handlers used, my responsibility is the Airport Authority's trunk mobile radio, which did function on the day and has functioned well ever since, the installation of telephones, land line telephones, to our own internal offices, and providing the connections, the main terminals for the service providers to install their telephones to others. There is another commercial lease with public pay telephones, with commercial on that, but it was my responsibility to facilitate that supply, New World Telephones, with the cabling system that went to their various points in the power supplies.

***Chairman:***

That was under your responsibility?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Let's refer to that list of problems which we were working to, Paper no. B39, which is the 14 July list of problems. Of course there we are talking about PTB. It looks like there's been quite a few problems on the day relating to the telephone system in the PTB and under the control of the AA. Do you have that?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Paragraph 16?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes. The number of telephones that were available were well short of the ultimate number to go in. There were some land side installed and very few air side installed.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Can I just ask, Chairman: When you are designing this as to what your needs are going to be, if there was too few cabling whose responsibility was it?

**Project Director, AA:**

Too few cabling, if it was a known provision and I didn't put enough cable in, it was my problem. This service provider, New World Telephone, came on very late in the day and then only started its installation work about a month before the airport opening. We were doing their requirements at the last moment.

**Chairman:**

Why was it so?

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Why was it so late?

***Project Director, AA:***

The commercial arrangement with them, the public telephone licence, myself I wasn't party to. The reason they came in late I'm not entirely certain but they didn't come in until a month before and then we found we had to do some more wiring for them.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Does it have anything to do with the fact that you couldn't let them in because what they needed was not ready?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, not as far as I am aware, because a lot of it was still available for them after the airport opening.

***Chairman:***

Sorry?

***Project Director, AA:***

These telephones were not completed till some time after the airport opening.

***Chairman:***

I think the question is why did they come in so late? That is under your supervision, isn't telephone under your Division? New World and so on?

***Project Director, AA:***

As to accommodate their needs.

***Chairman:***

Miss LOH's question was is it because other works were so late that they

couldn't have come in before?

***Project Director, AA:***

That is, in my view, not the case.

***Chairman:***

So what was the cause?

***Project Director, AA:***

They chose not to come in earlier.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Earlier on, I believe the witness, the first time he answered this question actually said he wasn't sure. Are you not sure or is it because of some fault of the telephone company that they decided to come in late?

***Project Director, AA:***

As far as I understood it, they decided to come in late.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

You were totally ready, the airport was totally ready to receive them, and somehow they chose to come in late. Isn't this the sort of situation where you would really want them to come in to make sure that the airport worked? Otherwise, what happened was precisely the chaos that we had?

***Project Director, AA:***

Some of the equipment we wanted in -- we weren't anxious to get the public telephones up because we were already having damage and theft. A lot of those items, the later you can leave them the better.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

You preferred them not to have come in earlier?

***Project Director, AA:***

It didn't concern me, no.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

I am trying to find out why they came in late. Was it because you preferred them not to come or that they decided to come late?

***Project Director, AA:***

As far as I understand, they decided to come late. I certainly didn't issue an instruction to say to come late.

***Chairman:***

But you did not issue an instruction to get them to come in at the point it is felt that it is necessary to have the proper communication between different parties in PTB either, did you? In the interests of time I would not go into the papers, but elsewhere in the papers and also in the evidence given to the Commission in fact the airlines also complained about cabling and telephone lines and fax lines and so on. Would you consider that as part of your responsibility, to ensure that cabling, wiring and so on for communication, for telephones, for fax, is part of your responsibility?

***Project Director, AA:***

On the latter ones that you are talking about, on the ones to airline offices and that, yes. In respect to the public telephones, yes, we had to get the optical fibres and the power supply to those phones. When we opened the airport we did not have it to all of those phones.

***Chairman:***

You didn't think it was necessary? It wasn't AOR critical?

***Project Director, AA:***

In the AOR program 100 per cent completion of the public pay telephones was not a requirement.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

If we can just go back to the airline. They were not able to help the situation. Would you say that that was your responsibility?

***Project Director, AA:***

The telephones to their offices and not communicating on the ramp, as I said earlier. In the case of telephones, the cut-off date I think was 24 June, where we advised any tenant who wanted it - and an airline is a tenant in this regard - if he wanted telephone lines by opening date we must have his application in by 24 June from his service provider, whether Hutchison, whether Hong Kong Telecom, whatever it was. In certain cases those didn't come in. I have got some figures with me here.

On 26 June we had had 6,833 applications for terminals to be provided, which they connected. Not the actual installation of the telephone, which is their own service provider's requirement. Out of those 6,800-odd, we had actually completed 5,100. When it came to 4 July, the applications, despite our request for the 24th, had gone from 6,800 up to 7,545. We had already connected 6 and a half thousand of those. Then by 30 July, ie, well after the airport opening, the 7,000 had grown to 9 and a half thousand. It is a two-sided story.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

This question about the provision of how many telephone lines are sufficient for the airport to operate smoothly, are you saying that that responsibility fell on the airlines to estimate? Did the Airport Authority have anything to do with that?

***Project Director, AA:***

No. It is purely up to the tenant to decide how many telephones he wants. I think what you have to bear in mind is the space rented out to each tenant is only shell and core. He fits his own office out. He decides who he is having in and how much space he wants and, therefore, all the other services go with it.

***Hon Christine LOH:***



Chairman, I think we might need to come back to this point at some stage about whether that is the case. It seems extraordinary to a lay person like myself. Obviously, if the airline cannot function on the day, then you are going to have chaos in the airport. Would you consider this a contingency or an emergency?

***Project Director, AA:***

I would say it was an emergency, that. I wasn't controlling it. I provided what was asked of us.

***Chairman:***

The question is: Did you provide what was asked of you? I think we have quite a few people who want to follow up on this point and I will follow this order: Emily, Edward, Margaret and CHOY So-yuk. Short questions please.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I am referring to the transcript of the Commission of Inquiry. Maybe you don't have it in front of you, but it is very brief. I will just read it out to you. It is dated September 18, and that was questions put to Mr TOWNSEND by Cathay Pacific's lawyer, Mr HUGGINS. On Page 78 Mr HUGGINS said that as far as Cathay Pacific is concerned, their requests had been put in way before 24 June and that their telephones and fax lines had not been installed according to the assurance, and that is the assurance you referred to earlier, if they put it in before 24 June.

Then, on the following Page, 79, they said Cathay Pacific had only been supplied with 112 out of the 256 telephone connections which it considered it needed for immediate use, which is less than half of its immediate requirement. On 15 July, sometime after opening day, Cathay said that only 118 telephones were available to it. Then the cabling, which is your responsibility, was finally completed for all 256 immediate usage telephones on 22 July. Are you aware of this situation?

***Project Director, AA:***

I am aware of that statement in the Commission.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Are you aware of the fact that they put in the request early and you did not help them?

**Project Director, AA:**

That whole situation, as you would rather expect, is under investigation and I think we had better wait for that investigation.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

We are investigating it too, Madam Chairman. That is why we want you to assist?

**Chairman:**

As a witness, Mr OAKERVEE, you have to answer the question. We do not in fact excuse witnesses simply because the questions are being asked elsewhere.

**Project Director, AA:**

Maybe I phrased it not very well, Chairman. What I meant was that the facts are being investigated at the moment and I have not got the outcome of that investigation. As soon as I have, I will give you the facts.

**Chairman:**

You mean your own investigation?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes. Our own investigation into that.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Madam Chairman, I think that is important. If you can't answer us today I am a bit surprised because I thought you had come ready to answer. Anyway, you should know because these are all facts, when did people put in the application?

**Chairman:**

I think it should be pointed out that in fact your Chief Executive Officer has not disputed these facts when they were put to him.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Madam Chairman, in fact he said that he was not in a position to comment. He did refer the lawyer to other people within the Authority. Because cabling is Mr OAKERVEE's area, that is why we put it to you. But you seem to say, although it is your area, today you cannot assist this Select Committee?

**Project Director, AA:**

No. Because, as I said, I have an investigation going on. What you have stated are facts we don't know are facts yet. They are a statement by another party.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

We will be supplied with the result of the investigation?

**Chairman:**

I think there are two things. First of all, we need from you confirmation or otherwise of this fact, supposedly, this information which was put forward, and you have to tell us whether it is true or not. That is number one.

**Project Director, AA:**

Correct.

**Chairman:**

Secondly, I think there is this wider question - and this is probably the subject of your own investigation - the wider question of when and how you were able to satisfy people who had actually applied for telephone lines.

**Hon Margaret NG**

Madam Chairman, with respect, I don't think the Select Committee should

be content with that answer because a minute ago the witness, in answer to Christine LOH's question, gave an assuring answer to this Select Committee that the applications came in and that he was able to meet these requests and, generally, they had done a very good job. Now, confronted with what Emily LAU read out, the witness says "Well, I am not clear about the facts." Now, is he or isn't he clear about the facts? Before he comes to this Select Committee, does he clear up about his own facts or not?

**Chairman:**

Mr OAKERVEE?

**Project Director, AA:**

First of all, Madam Chairman, I never suggested or said we had done a very good job. Those weren't my words at all. All I gave you was the situation as at 26 June, 4 July and 30 July, as to the number of applications received and the number of telephone terminals that had been provided.

**主席：**

何承天議員。

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

I would like to ask the witness something which I don't think he has answered very well, a question put to him. Would it be the job of the Consultant and, hence, the Project Director, that the number of lines required for an airport like this would have been estimated in the beginning, without waiting for applications from tenants and so on and so forth?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes. I think I said yesterday originally the building was designed with a PABX system, which was the Authority's system that everybody was to use, so we were all on a common facility, and that had 14,000 lines attached to it. OFTA came in I think in June 97 and said that other service providers would be there. So we had to change the system in June 97 and lay more cables and put in more facilities to facilitate the new service providers. It wasn't until the tenants came in with their application that we knew who their service provider was.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

The switch to this new arrangement took place a year before the airport opening. There was ample time for the project team and the consultants to estimate again what the cabling requirement was or the number of lines?

***Project Director, AA:***

With respect, whilst we could make estimations, it would be very much needed to have the service providers on board to see what they intended to do. In fact all service providers had not come into the terminal building. We had to change the backbone of wiring through, which we did, but it is still then going from the central communication block cabinets on those to take them out to the various terminals where the service providers then connect up. That wiring is done at the last moment.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

There are actually two sorts of cabling we are talking about?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

One is the trunk cabling from the telephone company, whatever number of lines, whatever capacity, to take care of whatever is needed in the terminal building. Then the other ones are the distribution network within the building?

***Project Director, AA:***

Correct.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Perhaps the witness would tell us when he referred to this change and the causes of the problems, was he referring to the trunk cabling or just to the network within the building?

***Project Director, AA:***

We had to make changes to the trunk cabling and additions, which were done in a satisfactory time-scale prior to need, and it was the secondary distribution scheme where we needed --

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I refer to the letter from the Chairman of the Commission, from the Airport Authority, 10 August 1998, which is Paper no. B70-1 in Volume V. In part 2 of that very thick response -- the paging is very funny, but it is the response of the Commission, Item 12, on the public telephones. You can see that on the top. This is on public telephones but I guess the same comment or question could be applied to other telephones. At the bottom of the page, Page 1 of 2, it says:

"Further, the authority had not completed some aspects of the following:

- some fibre optic cables and circuits were incorrectly jumpered or allocated;
- some voice and data outlets (vdos) were missing or had different numbers between the drawings and the labels on site;
- some phones did not have sufficient power connections."

Can the witness explain what these problems were? They seem to be problems created by the Authority itself, rather than the tenants, because they were not completed or they were incorrectly installed?

***Project Director, AA:***

As I have spoken earlier, these are the public telephones and not the tenants' telephones, where New World put all this equipment in. We did have more fibre optic cables to put in for those and, as it correctly says there, when we came to do some of the connections - that was the part where we delayed the public telephones - that there was incorrect jumpering in there.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Chairman, we have at least established one fact, which is, that the Authority did delay the installation of some of these phones.

**Chairman:**

The public phones.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Public phones, yes. I think the earlier answer was that the tenants came late and it was not our fault.

**Chairman:**

Not the pay phones, I think, to be fair to Mr OAKERVEE. It is divided up. We are talking about all sorts of phones here. This is the public pay phones, the public phones.

**Project Director, AA:**

That's right.

**Chairman:**

Then we went on to the tenants' phones.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Yes, I know, but I think when he answered about the public phones he also said the same thing, that the tenants chose to apply late, and so on.

**Chairman:**

At New World, I think.

**Project Director, AA:**

Can I just clarify? The installation of New World's equipment didn't start till a month before we opened the airport, or approximately a month. When they started installation we found some of their shortcomings.

**Chairman:**

Can you confirm? These problems outlined here, the three points here, are they in fact the responsibility of your division?

***Project Director, AA:***

They are, Madam Chairman.

***Chairman:***

Are there any more questions on tenants' phones?

***Hon Margaret NG***

With reference to what Emily LAU just read out, the complaint of Cathay Pacific about their telephone lines not being installed, were you aware of the complaint at the time? Around the end of June to July, were you aware of their complaint and the complaint of other tenants?

***Project Director, AA:***

I was aware of certain tenants but I certainly wasn't aware of the problem that Cathay Pacific have cited there now.

***Hon Margaret NG***

You were aware of complaints of this nature, although not specific, and you can't tell us exactly how large?

***Project Director, AA:***

What I think has to be appreciated, and I hoped to do it by the numbers I was saying, is that the applications for telephones were coming very, very late and that was why we put the edict out that unless you supply an application by 24 June you will not get a telephone by 6 July, because the sheer quantum couldn't be handled in the timeframe, not only by us, but also by the service providers.

***Hon Margaret NG***

But were you aware of the complaints at the time that they were not getting it?

***Project Director, AA:***

We knew the complaints and we were dealing with them in a priority order.



***Hon Margaret NG***

To save the witness' time. At this meeting you told us earlier about, this meeting with AMD to consider the contingency plan, the very latest before AOD, did you have an overall assessment of if the contingency plan should have to be activated whether you would have sufficient equipment to deal with the contingency plan, including telephone lines?

***Chairman:***

Communication equipment you mean?

***Hon Margaret NG***

Indeed. Including telephone, fax and so on? Was that discussed?

***Project Director, AA:***

Communications were discussed but I'm not entirely certain and I can't recall at what level it was discussed as it applied to tenants themselves.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, I mean the overall assessment of whether there is inadequacy of communication equipment so as to activate successfully your contingency plan?

***Project Director, AA:***

They were not my contingency --

***Chairman:***

The AA's contingency plan.

***Project Director, AA:***

The basis of those contingency plans was, I believe, that we had sufficient means of communications.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Was that based on an assessment or did you just have a subjective feeling?

***Project Director, AA:***

Certainly, the number of telephones connected was known.

***Hon Margaret NG***

You are telling us that, in spite of so many late applications which, either because of your fault or their fault, could not be dealt with, on an assessment you were satisfied that there was enough communication capacity should the contingency plan have to be activated, is that right?

***Project Director, AA:***

The matter was discussed.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Were you content?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes, I was content, yes.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, referring to the witness statement, Paragraph 38, is that why you said: "I did not want or need any further time"? You did not think that that was too soon? You did not think that there was problem?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG***

In the light of what happened later on, do you think you ought to revise that? Would you agree that your assessment was sadly out, if you did any assessment at all?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, I wouldn't wish to change that statement.

***Hon Margaret NG***

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

**主席：**

蔡素玉議員。

***Hon CHOY So-yuk:***

Madam Chairman, the witness mentioned earlier that the service providers themselves chose to move in late, I mean the telephone operators. Were you aware of this before they moved in, that they would choose to come in late?

***Project Director, AA:***

Can I just clarify by way of an answer? The telephone service providers, as regards the other companies, Hong Kong Telephone, Hutchison, etc, that had to build their facilities, they came in and did their work, but it took time and it was work we hadn't anticipated. With respect to the public pay telephones, they came in about a month before to install their equipment.

***Hon CHOY So-yuk:***

Were you aware, I mean before they came in, that they decided to come in late, because you mentioned --

***Chairman:***

This is the tenants' telephones we are talking about now. Not the public phones. The tenants' telephones. Yes, go on.

***Project Director, AA:***

We were concerned and through Commercial Division particularly we were chasing up tenants to make their applications to the service providers because we were becoming concerned about the volume of work that they suddenly expected both the telephone service providers and ourselves to do.

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

I am aware about the tenants who applied, that you alerted them. You were mentioning earlier that it was the providers who chose to come in late?

**Project Director, AA:**

That is why I was trying to clarify that earlier on. It was the pay telephones that came in late.

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

You thought that the operators, the service providers came in in time? Is that what you are now referring to?

**Chairman:**

For the tenants' telephones?

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

For the tenants.

**Project Director, AA:**

For the tenants' telephones they came in in time, but the pay telephones came in late.

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

You are now saying that they came in on time without problem?

**Project Director, AA:**

I never said the service providers were late. The service providers had the same problem as we did, except they were trying to secure their customers.

**Chairman:**

To clarify. Put the public phones aside. We are talking now about

tenants' telephones. On tenants' telephones, you told us earlier on that they were late because they applied late?

**Project Director, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

That was the message. You gave them a 24 June deadline. They did not apply in time. Suddenly, there was an upsurge of work that was required and, therefore, not all the demands could be met until after AOD, right? That was what was told to us?

**Project Director, AA:**

No. If I can just recap on what I said. I said on 26 June we had just over 6,800 applications and by 26 June we had fixed 5,105 of those. Two days before opening on 4 July that had grown to 7 and a half thousand, and then by 30 July it had grown to 9 and a half thousand applications. We were processing them all the time but they were still growing after we opened the airport.

**Chairman:**

Surely the question must be how many of the ones who applied before or by 24 June were actually met? How many of those requests were actually met by AOD?

**Project Director, AA:**

It would be about 80 per cent.

**Chairman:**

Could we have some documentary evidence to prove that?

**Project Director, AA:**

Sure.

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

Madam Chairman, on this question. What happened to the rest, the 20

per cent, who were not installed with the telephones, in spite of the fact that they had actually applied before the dates which you asked them to do so?

***Project Director, AA:***

They were connected on a priority basis. They were prioritised as to their applications.

***Hon CHOY So-yuk:***

They are on a prioritised basis, but you set the date on the 24th, which would suppose that if they applied before that day, they would be installed by AOD. What was the reason for the incapability for that 20 per cent?

***Project Director, AA:***

The 20 per cent was on the same day. On 26 June, 6,833 applications had been received and we had completed 5,105, leaving 20 per cent of those applications received as at 26 June. They were progressively cleared.

***Chairman:***

Mr OAKERVEE, would you please answer the question. The question is: You set a deadline. People applied by the deadline. Then you have a number which evolved from that which you look at on the 26th. These are supposed to be cleared on AOD because the date of the 24th was given by yourself.

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

Your commitment ought to have been that they would be given the telephones by AOD?

***Project Director, AA:***

I believe that was achieved, Madam Chairman.

***Chairman:***

I thought you just told us 80 per cent?

**Project Director, AA:**

No, I was talking about on 26 June. That was the situation there, and the figures grow as we progress.

**Chairman:**

Never mind about the figures that come after. Can you give us a definitive answer on how many of the ones who applied who met your deadline were actually supplied with the phones that you promised them?

**Project Director, AA:**

I think all but a few exceptions.

**Chairman:**

Can you give us the proof of that? We do know that there have been complaints, specifically, the Cathay Pacific one. Generally speaking, we know there have been complaints from tenants but, specifically, that case needs to be answered. I think the general case also needs to be answered. I think Miss CHOY is asking how many of the ones who applied by the 24th had actually been given phones.

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

Madam Chairman, can I also have a small point clarified. Could we have the date when the letter was issued to the tenants telling them the deadline of 24 June if they wanted to have the telephone line installed by AOD?

**Project Director, AA:**

I can provide that.

**Chairman:**

You will supply all that. The key point is the 24th. You use that as the commitment point, let's put it that way. They commit to you that they would have the telephones. You commit to them that they would have it on AOD. I think those are the figures we are looking for.

Do you have another question on telephones?

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Madam Chairman, I want to refer to the ADSCOM meeting of 4 July this year, Paper no. A46. At Paragraph 8 on Page 4, the communication system was discussed. Paragraph 8 of A46, can you find that, Mr OAKERVEE? You were not present at that meeting. Some of your colleagues were.

**Project Director, AA:**

Paragraph 13, was it?

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Paragraph 8 on page 4. You have got that?

"On communications systems, S for W cautioned that telephone and fax lines must be working given their impact on operation. CEO/AA (That is, Mr TOWNSEND) or reassured ADSCOM that good progress had been made. HIT/AA (Mr CHATTERJEE), said that requests received before 24 June would have their lines available by airport opening. Requests received after that date would be met on a best effort basis, within the first week of airport opening."

You were not present at that meeting but, as we can see from one case, the Cathay Pacific case, this assurance had not been fulfilled. As the Chief Secretary told us when she came before this Committee, if there was any sign that you were not ready, then they may have to reconsider opening the airport. Can you help us with this further? Although you were not at that meeting, you were responsible for the cabling and you should know whether the area of your responsibility, all those things were ready for the tenants?

**Project Director, AA:**

I think, Madam Chairman, what I have said this morning is consistent with Paragraph 8. What we have yet to establish is the problem with the Cathay Pacific situation. I have seen those facts in the transcript and those are the ones I am investigating because certainly earlier on I wasn't aware of that.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**



Madam Chairman, I think we want to get the result after the investigation, to know whether ADSCOM had again been misled. Here I think they were given quite a categoric assurance by the Authority that all those people who put in their requests before 24 June would be OK?

***Project Director, AA:***

That is correct.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Then we are told from the transcript I read out by Cathay Pacific that they did put in their request way before that and they could not get even half of the lines?

***Project Director, AA:***

As I have said, Madam Chairman, already, I am investigating it to find out the facts because obviously it is a very important issue.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

When do you think you will finish your investigation?

***Project Director, AA:***

Within the next few days. It is well on the way.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

I hope that this Select Committee will be supplied with the information immediately?

***Project Director, AA:***

Of course.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Madam Chairman, is it possible to ask a follow-up question on this point?  
***Chairman:***

Yes. Before you do that, I would like to draw members' attention to Paper no. A47, which is the Airport Operational Readiness Status Report as at 30 June 1998. This is ADSCOM paper 36 and this is for information on 4 July 1998. I think Mr OAKERVEE would have to tell members under paragraphs 13 and 14. This is Paper no. A47. This is the report. This is actually following on Ms LAU's point just now. This is reporting to ADSCOM, giving ADSCOM the comfort level or confidence level. It says in fact all requests received prior to the 24th have been completed. In other words, it has been honoured, and more than 95 per cent of the telephone sets have now been installed in the PTB and the system is being given the final configuration and so on and so forth. The public enquiry service hotlines will be available from 1 July. In fact if we see the problem list on 14 July, these are not working, these were not working on the opening day.

In Paragraph 14, cabling connections have been completed for voice, fax and data lines for all tenants, Government departments, FTNS operator requests, and, for the pay-phone and flight data distribution system requirements, each operator is working with tenants and end-users to clear up the final minor faults and confirm that these requirements will be ready for airport opening.

This of course is a very reassuring report to ADSCOM. It does give the picture that nothing is wrong with the communications system. Could Mr OAKERVEE tell this Committee whether this is actually the position on opening day with the communications system?

***Project Director, AA:***

Very close to that, Chairman. We thought that was the case when we presented this report. Certainly, not all the public inquiry phones were working on 1 July.

***Chairman:***

How could that be possible, Mr OAKERVEE? This was actually given to ADSCOM, reassuring ADSCOM that cabling connections, blah, blah, blah, for all tenants, Government departments, and so on and so forth, have been done. You say "Very close to that". What exactly does that mean?

***Project Director, AA:***

All the cabling was done for the Government departments.

***Chairman:***

Tenants?

***Project Director, AA:***

And the tenants, as I understood, that had applied. The case with Cathay Pacific may be an exception to that, if the facts are right. I'm not suggesting for any one moment that Cathay have tried to mislead the Authority. Until I check that out, I don't know why. But, certainly, I thought that was the case.

***Chairman:***

This is very crucial I think for the Committee. I will allow Miss Christine LOH because she is leading these questions.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

I would like to ask the witness: Did you take your eye off the ball?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, I don't think I did take my eye off the ball. There was a lot going on and I believed that what was in Paragraphs 13 and 14 was and would be the case.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Did you take your eye off this ball? Maybe there were lots of balls up in the air? It is very complex, I can understand that. But, did you take your eye off this ball?

***Project Director, AA:***

I don't think so. I think it got a share of my attention.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Who is the largest tenant amongst the airlines at the airport?

***Project Director, AA:***

Cathay Pacific.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Did you take your eye off the ball? This is the Hong Kong airline. If you couldn't assure your biggest tenant that they are not going to have this kind of problem, did you take your eye off the ball?

***Project Director, AA:***

No. I wasn't aware of that problem.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

How could you not be aware of the needs of your major tenant? You are running an airport where airlines come in and out. How is it possible?

***Project Director, AA:***

The needs of the major tenant were known, as they had been applied for, and I thought those applications had been fulfilled as they were received by 24 June.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

Were you poorly informed by your subordinates or did you take your eye off the ball?

***Project Director, AA:***

I shall better be able to answer that question when my inquiries are finished.

***Chairman:***

It is a bit late, isn't it? Miss Margaret NG

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, again, I don't think the Select Committee should accept

the answer of the witness to your question. Here in Paragraph 14 is a statement of fact: "Cabling connections have been completed". It is quite clear. When Madam Chairman, you asked the witness was that the position on AOD the witness said "Very close to it". Upon further questioning, it seems that he isn't very sure. Why is that if he is not sure today that he could so confidently give such a direct description on that day, on the day of the report to ADSCOM?

Moreover, Madam Chairman, my same complaint obtains about Cathay Pacific. How can the witness say "I am not sure. I have to investigate"? If the position is that he had kept track, or his eye on the ball, as Miss Christine LOH puts it, then he ought to say "No, I'm quite sure it didn't happen because I have assured that it didn't happen". Madam Chairman, can we ask the witness to explain this lack of certainty in his answer? Why is he not surprised that things had not gone the way he thought that they had gone?

***Project Director, AA:***

Referring to Paragraph 14, Madam Chairman, on the cabling, one of the problems we found at a later stage after this report is that some of the cabling that had been completed was damaged. Some had been cut and others had been damaged by contractors working for the fitting out of tenants, and we had to re-lay cables. At the time I wrote that that was thought to be the situation.

***Chairman:***

Surely at one point, at one point, the cabling would have been completed for you to come up with that report?

***Project Director, AA:***

It was complete at that time. The faults weren't found until after, when we were connecting other equipment.

***Chairman:***

Can you in fact supply us with the documentary evidence to support that? It is extremely important that you can substantiate what you have said here, because this is what you put to ADSCOM, and it is on this basis that ADSCOM believes that the communications system is OK on AOD?

***Hon Margaret NG***

Madam Chairman, no doubt the documents would help us clarify the situation in case Mr OAKERVEE has misremembered. With respect, again, the two answers are not the same. When you say the cabling connections have been completed, this is a very different answer from close to having completed and, again, very different from the answer that, yes, they were completed but they were later damaged. We have been given very different answers. Madam Chairman, can the witness clarify?

***Chairman:***

I think it is up to the witness to convince this Committee of the 2 factual statements given, one in Paragraph 13 and the other in Paragraph 14. The Paragraph 13 one is "All requests received prior to 24 June have been completed" and that was supposed to be the status at 30 June 1998. Then in Paragraph 14 "Cabling connections have been completed" for this, that and the other. You will need to convince, or let the Select Committee know, particularly in view of your earlier statement - "close to it", that certainly doesn't give us any comfort - how are these statements of fact substantiated for AOD?

***Hon Christine LOH:***

I would like to ask the witness whether anyone in Cathay Pacific ever tried to contact the witness directly to put their case across prior to the airport opening?

***Project Director, AA:***

No.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

We might have to go back to Cathay Pacific?

***Chairman:***

Sure. 李永達議員。

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Can we refer to Paper No. C92. It is the Monthly Progress Report, August 1998. On the telephone system on Pages 1-3 are the trunk mobile radio systems.

***Project Director, AA:***

We do not have Paper no. C92.

***Chairman:***

Which volume is it?

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Volume IV. I think this report is drafted after the opening of the airport because it is 1 August report.

***Chairman:***

Do you have it, Mr OAKERVEE?

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes, I do, Madam Chairman.

***Chairman:***

Which page?

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Pages 1-3.

***Chairman:***

Current Status, right?

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Yes. Mr OAKERVEE gave a reply to Miss Margaret NG that it may be because on the particular dates you have completed all the works and after that

there is some kind of damage. I want to know the system within the Authority

--

**Chairman:**

Sorry. Where exactly? I am lost?

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Pages 1-3. On the telephone system.

**Chairman:**

This is Paper no. C92, is it?

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

Yes. It is the Monthly Progress Report, August 1998. Pages 1-3, not 13.

**Chairman:**

OK.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

My question is if there is any major damage to the system of communications, do your department or your staff have to report to you and also to NAPCO so that NAPCO when they draft this report will write down the facts of the damage here? When I read the paragraph there is nothing related to your statement that there is a possibility of damage after the completion of the telephone system or communications system?

**Project Director, AA:**

With respect, Madam Chairman, I don't believe this is our report. I think you will find this is NAPCO's report.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

I am aware it is a NAPCO report. I want to ask the question that there must be a system or reporting procedure. If your department found something that is really important is it very certain that you had to report both to the Airport



Authority and also to NAPCO?

***Project Director, AA:***

NAPCO would be aware automatically by their presence at this date.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

You read this paragraph. NAPCO does not mention anything on the damage of the cable or the communications system?

***Project Director, AA:***

No, it doesn't.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

So is it the result that there is no reporting of any kind of this thing to NAPCO?

***Project Director, AA:***

NAPCO, by August, were part and parcel of the task force and that is where they were getting all their information, which was meeting daily at this point in time. They were aware of everything that was going on on a daily basis and that is where we shared all information.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Is it generally that all major damage on this kind of very important communication system had to report to NAPCO?

***Project Director, AA:***

There is no reason. In any case, the damage I am talking about is July. This is in August.

***Chairman:***

Do you have anything documented?

***Project Director, AA:***

There will be reports. There is no direct report to NAPCO though.

**Chairman:**

I think what we would require are reports on those damage and how that would have impacted on AOD. I think it would be only relevant if it has impacted on AOD. If it came after AOD, then I don't see how it relates to that report, the status report as at 30 June. 蔡素玉議員。

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

Madam Chairman, on the damage and the cuts. Can I ask when did these damage and the cuts happen and when were you aware of these damage and the cuts?

**Project Director, AA:**

I will have to report those when I --

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

When were you aware of it? At what time, at what date were you aware that there were damage and cuts? I think this is a question which you should be able to answer?

**Project Director, AA:**

I am afraid I can't answer it without the information in front of me, to be specific under oath.

**Chairman:**

How is it relevant?

**Hon CHOY So-yuk:**

Because I would like to know whether he was aware of this and whether the parties were duly informed before AOD of the possible chaos.

**Chairman:**

I think we just dealt with that. I think Mr OAKERVEE will be supplying

us with whatever documentary evidence there is. I have actually pointed out the relevance of that to AOD.

Now, the time is quarter to 1. I am afraid that we haven't quite finished. We have called our witness for tomorrow and of course you are not in town next week. I would like to put to you that we will resume after you return, which is the first week of November. We will of course be summoning you again. The summons in fact will continue to have effect, the one that you have received. It is a continuation of that summons. We expect this session to continue from 3 November.

***Project Director, AA:***

Just one thing I ought to let you know, Madam Chairman. I don't think it affects the situation. The Commission have summonsed me for 30 October and 2 November.

***Chairman:***

Anyway, as far as we are concerned, we intend to continue from 3 November. We have given you notice. Also, the documents you will actually be supplying. Slippage of projects. We need the slippage of projects. Now, we do have the handover notices but I think the question that was put to you was actually how they have slipped, these various contracts, how they have slipped? We need that. What we require would be the target completion dates of these projects and the actual completion dates eventually, so that we can see how they have slipped. In your reply you seem to imply that some of the slippages are actually accepted as being an extension of time. So you will actually let us have the reasons behind your granting of the extensions? The dates when you signed off those projects to other departments of the Airport Authority, the ones that have slipped?

***Project Director, AA:***

Right.

***Chairman:***

Miss CHOY So-yuk, would you like to put your question now so that Mr OAKERVEE can also supply you with the document that you need?

***Hon CHOY So-yuk:***

I would also like to ask for the list of the items which caused the delay at the various stages, the delay or the slippage of OP issuing. Could we also have the defect reports of the fire protection system issued by the Fire Services Department, the three reports issued immediately prior to the AOD? If there are any undertaking letters issued by the AA, if yes, then we would like to have the undertaking letters. If not, then the reports based on which the Fire Services Department issued the permits?

**Chairman:**

The Occupation Permit. This relates to the OP. The date of the OP has also slipped, so we would like to know by the time the OP was issued what was the list of defects which you had to make good?

**Project Director, AA:**

Right.

**Chairman:**

Also, in addition, of course there are the documents which we have asked for vis-à-vis the communications.

**Project Director, AA:**

Right.

**Chairman:**

When do you think you can supply them before 3 November?

**Project Director, AA:**

Firstly, can I ask a question? Would you like them all together or can we supply them progressively?

**Chairman:**

Of course we would like them as soon as possible, but not necessarily together. As soon as they are ready, then if we can have them it will give members a bit of time to digest them. Can you first supply us with a list of the

actual documents, that is number 1, so we can do a check, and then let us have the documents?

***Project Director, AA:***

The beginning of the week after the next?

***Chairman:***

That would be 2 November?

***Project Director, AA:***

No. The week before that.

***Chairman:***

The 26th. OK.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

It is very important that we get all of them before the 3rd. I think Mr OAKERVEE is giving us an undertaking that we will get all of them before the 3rd. Otherwise, if we get it after that, then we may have to call you back again and we don't want to do that.

***Chairman:***

Why do we do this? Mr OAKERVEE has agreed to let us have all these by 26 October. We will run through the list and, if there are any missing ones we feel we would need to be supplied, we will in fact contact the witness and ask for them.

***Project Director, AA:***

If there are any shortcomings in what we have given to you?

***Chairman:***

Yes. So that does give us a bit of time.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

When I asked about the contract Mr OAKERVEE said that they only gave us the excerpts. I wonder whether we could have the whole of the building contract? Of course you can take out the contract amount or any commercially sensitive parts.

***Project Director, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

The hearing on the 3rd will be in the morning, starting from 9 o'clock.

***Project Director, AA:***

Will it be a whole day session?

***Chairman:***

No. Half a day. If we don't have any more questions, then we will adjourn here.

***(The hearing ended at 12:50 pm)***