

# 立法會

## 調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日 開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜 專責委員會

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第17次公開研訊的逐字紀錄本

日期： 1998年11月17日(星期二)

時間： 上午9時

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### 出席委員

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資訊科技部主管

陳達志先生

### 陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士

香港機場管理局

機場系統及用戶支援經理

林福康先生

**主席：**

多謝各位出席今天舉行的專責委員會第17次研訊。

在未正式開始研訊前，我想提醒各位委員，整個研訊過程必須有足夠的法定人數，即連主席在內共5名委員。

我想藉此機會再次提醒公眾人士及傳媒，若在研訊進程序以外披露研訊上提供的證據，將不受《立法局(權力及特權)條例》所保障。因此傳媒應就他們的法律責任，徵詢法律意見。

在未傳召證人香港機場管理局資訊科技部主管陳達志先生之前，我想徵詢委員的意見，陳達志先生要求帶同以下人士出席研訊：香港機場管理局機場系統及用戶支援經理林福康先生。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許林福康先生在研訊進行期間陪同陳達志先生，但他不可以在席上發言或提示證人回答問題。

如委員對研訊程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊開始，並傳召證人香港機場管理局資訊科技部主管陳達志先生。

(陳達志先生進入會議廳，  
並由林福康先生陪同)

Mr CHATTERJEE, thank you for attending today's hearing. You are summonsed before the Select Committee today to give evidence and to produce papers, books, records and documents related to the Select Committee's scope of enquiry. First of all, the Committee has decided that all witnesses must give evidence on oath. As Chairman of the Select Committee I will administer the oath.

You may either take the oath with your hand on the bible or take an affirmation. Please follow the terms of either the oath or affirmation put in front of you. Please stand.

***Mr Kiron CHATTERJEE, Head of Information Technology for Airport Authority Hong Kong (Head of Information Technology, AA):***

I, Kiron CHATTERJEE, solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日  
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜  
專責委員會

Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances  
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of  
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok  
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

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***Chairman:***

Thank you. Mr CHATTERJEE, the Select Committee has agreed that you can be accompanied by Mr Thomas LAM during the hearing to assist you in the handling of documents where necessary, but he will not be allowed to address the hearing or to prompt you in any way in your replies to Members.

The Select Committee will now deal with the papers, records and documents that the witness has been ordered to produce by the summons dated 29 October 1998.

The Select Committee notes that the witness has already provided the following document pursuant to the summons: Witness statement of Mr Kiron CHATTERJEE.

Mr CHATTERJEE, are you now formally producing to the Select Committee the document mentioned above as evidence pursuant to the summons?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, I am.

***Chairman:***

I now declare that the document mentioned above is admitted as evidence produced to the Select Committee.

Mr CHATTERJEE, I now ask you the first question on behalf of the Committee. Could you please turn to Paragraph 17 of your statement? Paper no. B220 of Mr CHATTERJEE's statement.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, I have it.

***Chairman:***

Right, in that paragraph and the one following, you described your involvement or your department's involvement with FIDS began in December 1996. There you said that it was decided that the Project Division required

support with testing and commissioning of the systems contract, that is 381, 399, and at the time the Project Division simply did not have sufficient staff to carry out this work. And then you went on to describe the Task Force which was formed, which reported to Mr Chern HEED and Mr Raymond LAI. And then, in the next paragraph, you say:

"The role of the Task Force was to act as AMD's expert technical representatives working with the Project Division to ensure the technical operational aspects of the infrastructure systems were fully tested."

Could you please elaborate on this and clarify your exact role in this very complicated structure, and clarify whether you are there in fact to assist the Project Division or are you there to assist the AMD?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

May I refer the enquiry to another document, which is part of my witness statement?

***Chairman:***

Sure.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I believe, if I may just look for it.

***Chairman***

Is it Attachment 2?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I was looking for Attachment 2, that's Paper no. B220.

***Chairman:***

... which is the Job Description of System Task Force?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That is correct. We were very careful in working with Project Division to identify exactly what role that Task Force would have if I could direct your attention to Paragraph 5. We recognised that this Task Force would be in place for a long time and it was important to identify what tasks and when. The table was produced where we were shown the types of tests for each of the systems contracts, the objective of those tests, who was taking the lead, the test specification and cases. This is the job that our Task Force was doing and overall what we were doing. We either observed or actually conducted some of the tests which included inputting data according to the tests and reviewed the results or documented the results so that people or individuals whom we were working for could take an overall review of the quality of the tests.

And then subsequently working with, and that part of it was working to assist Project Division. Then with operational trials, we worked with both AMD and Project Division to review the operations and maintenance procedures. Concerning Item B-4, we worked with the business systems for which we had responsibility, assisted with training as the training became more and more concrete in terms of how the training would be conducted. Concerning item D, we liaised with Government departments and business partners as needed. Does that answer the question?

***Chairman:***

Well, the question is actually quite a complex one that arose from a very complex structure that you outlined for us. If you look once again at Paragraph 17, you said that:

"At that time the Project Division simply did not have sufficient staff to carry out this work."

That seemed to imply that it was not expertise that they needed but staff. It was manpower, a lack of manpower. Is it because of lack of expertise, in which case your expertise would be drawn on, or is it simply because of the lack of staff?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

At that point in time it was lack of staff resources available to help them with the tests.

**Chairman:**

So, you came in as the human resources, in other words, the bodies?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

It was also recognised that the type of people needed should be IT-skilled people as well to help with those tasks.

**Chairman:**

Miss Christine LOH.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Thank you, Chairman. I am just wondering whether I can ask for a little bit of background information so we can have a better understanding of the witness' responsibility over time with the Airport Authority. Of course the witness joined the Authority, or at that time the Provisional Airport Authority, back in 1992 and there was a major restructuring of the IT department in March 1998. Really the witness was not actually substantially involved between 1992 and 1996 until December 1996 and then there was this major restructuring in 1998. My first question is, was the witness involved in any way in the choice of the system?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I was not.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

And between 1992 and 1996 what was the witness' essential task and how did it differ after 1996 in December?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Could you repeat the last part of that question?

***Hon Christine LOH:***

How, from 1996 onwards, I mean, why did it take so long for you to get involved in something that obviously was your field of expertise?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

My initial involvement was to focus, to support the company, the PAA and then the AA, in the internal systems that it required: the Project Division construction systems like the Project Management system or the document control system; the setting up of the network infrastructure, both at Central Plaza and as the construction site grew making sure that the networks that were needed were in place on time; our financial systems; our human resource systems. And there was a need, I think it was recognised that there was a need for that support as the company grew. When I joined it was about 150 to 200 people. As the company grew exponentially over a very short time there was a need for support.

At the same time I was working with the divisions to identify what systems they needed as their own administrative system for airport opening. That resulted also in the approval of 7 systems which are called collectively Contract 398 for our Operations Division, Finance Division, Human Resources and Commercial Divisions.

In terms of why it took so long, or why there was a gap between 1992 and 1997 when the Booz-Allen report came out, I cannot answer that. I don't know what was going, what was in the minds of the directors or the Board in terms of my involvement.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

What I am curious to know about is, I mean, obviously the communications system is a very crucial part of the airport. Since you are the person responsible for that very important task, we are curious to know why your involvement was so late. So the witness is telling us that actually he does not know himself. Is that correct?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Madam, I do not know.

**Chairman:**

You are talking about FIDS, are you?

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Yes, yes. What the witness says, that from his professional experience, that somebody in his position should have been involved a lot earlier?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I think that is a difficult question to answer. Technical people should have been involved right from the beginning. My understanding was that within Project Division they had, they believed that they had the necessary expertise either from the Mott Consortium consultants or from engineers, systems engineers, as part of their design group that was working with the Mott Consortium and then ultimately with the contractor. The responsibility in terms of making or working on those systems fell within Project Division and there were people at that time, during the design phase, who did have that experience.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Well, I just want to make sure that for the witness his involvement in this area really only started in December 1996 and that the witness had very little input, if any, before that date. Is that correct?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is correct. There was involvement during the tender phase for Contract 381.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

And when was that? How long ago was that?

**Chairman:**

That is in 1995.



***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

In 1995 I had 2 people working with the tender evaluation team. Their responsibilities were only to focus on the technology as opposed to the application, in other words, the technology that was being recommended by the contractor but not the package that was being recommended by the contractor.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

So, would the witness say that actually he himself and his team had no direct involvement in the application of the system?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That is correct.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

And my final question, Chairman, refers to Paragraph 17. At that time the Project Division simply did not have sufficient staff to carry out that task. Since the witness was not part of the Project Division, basically that was also completely out of your control?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Correct.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

So that actually when the witness got involved in the FIDS system in December 1996 that was pretty much a fait accompli? You just took it as it was presented to you?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

OK, thank you.

**Chairman:**

Ms Emily LAU Wai-hing.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Thank you, Chairman. I want to refer back to the document that Mr CHATTERJEE drew our attention to. That's Attachment 2, the Job Description of the System Task Force. And in the first paragraph, the second part of the first Paragraph says that:

"The Task Force has been formed to assist Project and to work as representatives of Airport Management Division."

I want Mr CHATTERJEE to explain to us what that means. Because if we look at the bottom of the final page of that document, you will see that there is something written in hand-writing, isn't it?

"Did not obtain agreement from AMD on roles and responsibilities, especially such as E and F ..."

**Chairman:**

Section.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

"... especially section E and F." Can you tell us who actually wrote this and what does this mean? Thank you.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The person who wrote that would be the person sitting next to me, Tom. And there was a grey area in that we could not be representatives for AMD in terms of the practical use of the system, whether it fitted the day-to-day operating tasks of an airport management group. So, we were defining that this was more technical operation, technical operating capability of the system rather than

actually saying on behalf of AMD that a particular function of the system met operating requirements. That job had to fall on AMD as the ultimate user of the system.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

So, what does this line mean then? Actually does "this is especially" mean that you also disagree with A, B, C and D? This is supposed to be an agreement, isn't it, among various departments on the Job Description of the Task Force? Is the Committee given to understand that AMD did not agree with this? I mean, is that your understanding? Of course we should address this to AMD.

***Chairman:***

Mr CHATTERJEE.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I do not remember that as a disagreement. What I do remember is that it was a more clear definition of the roles of each party, what my group plays and the ultimate role that AMD plays.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

A clearer role was needed than what was written here?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Do you mind if I just take a moment to just re-familiarise myself with these paragraphs?

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Please.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I would stand by what I said earlier, particularly if you look at Paragraph E-4:

"Ensure that the entire AMD and other relevant parts of the AA divisions are familiar with the appropriate level of detail, so that they can perform their duties efficiently."

That is not a responsibility that an IT group can comfortably take on. It requires the participation of AMD as well, so we needed to clarify that role with AMD. I think that this statement just merely states that we have at that point in time got agreement from AMD.

**Chairman:**

Did you get agreement eventually?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The answer is yes, but there is no document that I can bring to substantiate that.

**Chairman:**

As far as this Committee is concerned, it is very important that we understand what you know to be clear demarcation of duties and responsibilities of various divisions. I think this document seems to give us the impression that, although it is presented as a paper outlining the main tasks of your involvement or your department's involvement in this, it doesn't seem to be an agreed infrastructure or an agreed structure with all the people concerned. Because you present the Task Force as a coordinating body between the various departments and divisions, but it hasn't been agreed. So, how do we know what actually happened vis-a-vis the work of this Task Force?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is a true statement. I can't answer that.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Yes, because Madam Chairman asked you the first question you immediately referred us to this paper. I guess what you wanted was for us to understand from it what it is supposed to do and it is supposed to represent AMD, and AMD has not even agreed. And now you are telling us that maybe they

have agreed but you can't point to any document. With an agreement we would have thought that it is important to have it in black and white.

And also, while we are at it, can I refer you to Attachment 3 which is notes of the meeting that was held to discuss the work of the Task Force? And again, if you look at the people present, can you help us? Was AMD represented?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No, it was not, Madam.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Why?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I don't know. I cannot remember.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

It is very strange because in the first paragraph of that note it says, "to discuss the work as a representative of AMD". So, you would have thought, well, I would have thought that AMD should be there.

***Chairman:***

Well, I think you have to clarify for us, Mr CHATTERJEE, what are these notes of meeting? Are they notes of meeting of the Task Force or what notes of meeting these are? They are presented to us in the statement as the notes of the meeting of the Task Force but on the paper it says, "IT support to Project Division for infrastructure systems". It makes no mention of AMD. So, is this a record of a meeting of the Task Force or not?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

This is a record of a meeting earlier in December as opposed to when this previous paper was signed, which is in February. So, this took place before the

Task Force was formally agreed, if I remember correctly. The people present were myself and Tom and the remaining people were from Project Division.

**Chairman:**

So, where is AMD?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Not at this meeting but we would have had subsequent discussions with AMD which would have resulted in that Raymond LAI's and Chern HEED's memo. I don't know whether there is a copy of that with the Committee.

**Chairman:**

But Raymond LAI is not AMD. Raymond LAI is in the Commercial Division. This is another question I want to ask you. Why is Raymond LAI involved? How is he involved in all of this?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

He was my boss at the time.

**Chairman:**

So, your boss had to be drawn into this simply because he was your boss, not because he was the person needed in terms of IT expertise?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was reporting to the Finance Director all the way through to November, sorry, after the Booz-Allen report which was round about November 1997, and in all matters to do with work with other groups I had to get my senior manager ...

**Chairman:**

... to be with you in these meetings?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

... to agree.

***Chairman:***

But you say here "reporting to Chern HEED and Raymond LAI". What does it exactly mean in terms of the actual operation of the Task Force? What does it mean by "reporting to"? I mean, do they lead the Task Force? Are they chairing the Task Force? Do they head it? Who heads it? Who is actually in charge of the Task Force?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The responsibility for assigning day-to-day work of that Task Force was Project Division.

***Chairman:***

Who? Who in Project Division?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

On the paper you will see 2 names, one is Rob DUNSTAN - this is Paper no. B220-2 at the back.

***Chairman:***

Yes, and the other?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Mr Rob DUNSTAN is the design manager for the systems contracts and Mr Alistair BLOIS-BROOKE who is the construction manager for all the systems contracts. Mr Alistair BLOIS BROOKE reports to Mr K C TSUI and Mr Rob DUNSTAN reported to Mr Tim SPALL and essentially worked as a design consultant to K C TSUI's construction group.

***Chairman:***

You are describing the organisational reporting structure?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's correct.

**Chairman:**

You seem to tell us that the Task Force is reporting to Mr Chern HEED and Mr Raymond LAI?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

It was my responsibility to report progress and the work of that Task Force and keep them appraised of testing progress as the systems contracts were being tested. The actual work of testing was the responsibility of Project Division.

**Chairman:**

Well, I mean this is certainly not what you said in the statement so you have to clarify for us because it is very, very confusing for us. When you say "the Task Force was set up reporting to ...", it doesn't mean that, does it, in actual fact? Are you now further qualifying by saying that only part of that work, that is only the testing part, you report to Chern HEED and Raymond LAI, is it? What exactly does it mean?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Could you repeat the question again? It was rather long.

**Chairman:**

Well, you told us, first of all in the statement under Paragraph 17, that the Task Force was set up reporting to Chern HEED, Director of AMD, and Raymond LAI, Director of Financial and Commercial Division. Now, just now you told us that you only report to Chern HEED in terms of testing and so on. Are you telling us that only that part of the tasks undertaken by the Task Force was reported to Chern HEED and the rest was reported somewhere else? I mean, you have got to explain to us because what you have just told us is very confusing.



***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I can understand how it would seem to be completely confusing. The answer is that at that point in time it was important to be supporting also AMD and making them aware of the progress of each of the systems. Therefore the primary reporting would be to Chern HEED as support for AMD as well as Raymond LAI to satisfy my functional reporting requirements.

***Chairman:***

So, it is not the Task Force. It is simply because in the organisation you need to let them know what's happening?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Chairman:***

In fact it is not the way that you have said here then. If we look at the minutes of the Task Force, surely one would expect Chern HEED and Raymond LAI to be chairing those meetings and you would be in fact reporting to them. They would be in charge of those meetings of the Task Force and the progress of the Task Force which has this coordinating function and assists both AMD and Project. But that is not the actual case, is it?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I accept that. In actual fact it was reporting through the Project Division. The Task Force people were reporting to Project Division.

***Chairman:***

OK, so where is the reporting? Have you supplied documents as to how reporting was done to Chern HEED?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

We can go through our previous records and provide that to you.

**Chairman:**

Does it exist? You took part in the Task Force meetings, didn't you? Did you take part?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

You did? So, you would have known how it was conducted, the modus operandi of the Task Force so to speak?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

There weren't actual Task Force meetings on a regular basis. I would join Chern HEED's weekly management meetings which were held as part of his divisional management meetings. At the beginning of those meetings we would be focusing on systems.

**Chairman:**

So, how does the Task Force function if you don't have meetings?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The Task Force was being managed by Tom LAM with Project Division. Tom reported to Project Division. We actually moved the Task Force physically. The word "Task Force" is used as a group of people that are specifically brought together, assembled, moved into the testing centre at Chek Lap Kok, physically there, and working on a day-by-day basis with Project Division.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Madam Chairman, I still want to go back to AMD. Where do they come

in? This meeting on 20 December, if we look at your Paragraph 19 of your statement, it was a meeting held to discuss the work of the Task Force, or this group of people, but how come AMD was not there? I mean, was AMD aware of it? Did they support it? You have got to work with them. Where's AMD?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The answer is, yes. They did support it. There was a joint memo written both by Chern and Raymond, signed both by Chern and Raymond to Douglas OAKERVEE agreeing to the formation of this Task Force.

***Chairman:***

Can we have a copy of that, please?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, I will make sure you get that.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

When was that signed?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

When was that signed? Was that the question?

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Yes.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That would have been also in December 1996.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

But when they refused to sign it, it is in February '97.

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

So, you mean they signed something and then 2 months later they disown it, or he, Chern HEED?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I admit to being lost at the moment. I would like the opportunity to go back and check those documents otherwise I am not going to give you a reasonable answer.

**Chairman:**

Miss Margaret NG, are you on this point?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Yes, just wondering, since they all agreed it became even more bewildering why they were not at that meeting. I mean, since Mr CHATTERJEE was himself at the meeting he surely knew whether or not AMD was invited to the meeting? And if they weren't why were they not invited to the meeting? If they were why didn't they turn up?

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE, perhaps the logical question to ask is, can you tell this Committee whether in your opinion AMD and Project Division are working together?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

It was my impression that they were working together.

**Chairman:**

But separately, not in the same meeting? They weren't sitting together,

certainly.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I am not in a position to be able to say that. I do remember meetings where they were together. There were also meetings where we would sit down with Project Division, discuss an issue and then take it and bring the issues to AMD as well.

***Chairman:***

Well, this is what we are talking about. In fact they are not sitting together so that you are actually the middle man taking messages from one to the other. Is that the situation? You have to tell us honestly. You are under oath.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Honestly, no, that was not the situation.

***Chairman:***

That was not the situation?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No.

***Chairman:***

So, why are they not sitting together?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I don't have an answer for this particular instance.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Thank you, Chairman. Following the same point raised by Ms LAU, in Paper no. B220-2, the document that your Tom LAM signed with the others, now if this draft was written by Mr LAM and then if this document did not receive the agreement from AMD, on 2 sections out of 5, why wasn't this re-drafted in the

first place? That is the first question.

Second one is, why were AMD not invited to join the drafting together with the Project Division so that you have a document which can actually satisfy 3 parties?

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I cannot remember. The memory that I have is that we were very, very careful of making sure that AMD were involved in this process in terms of getting their agreement. We were working with and in one context we were working for AMD because we were going to deliver the systems that they were going to be using.

**Chairman:**

Exactly, this is why we want the ...

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

This is why I raised the question, because I thought it would be logical that you should invite parties or representatives from both divisions to draft the document which can actually satisfy all 3 parties.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes, you are right there. I honestly cannot answer the question without first being allowed to go back and double check the correspondence that we did have.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Surely, this is a very important Task Force and effectively the first task that you were involved in this FIDS, since you joined the AA, and this was only last year. Surely you can remember why this happened. Can you tell us from your memory whether or not AMD was actually invited to join the drafting of this

document but they refused to come in? Was that the case?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No, AMD would have been fully involved. I am going back on memory and this is unsubstantiated, the first thing that I would have asked Tom to do is to come up with a roles and responsibility of the Task Force. Because we were working with Project Division, in terms of supporting Project Division as resources, Tom did the right thing by sitting down with the Project Division colleagues and identifying and agreeing these. The next step, which is missing from this, is to obtain AMD's approval or involvement. Now, at this point in time, this could be a notation without, as a memory jogger that says he still hasn't got AMD's approval and we still need to go and get it. I mean, that context is possible also. It is just that I can't remember the specific reason for having made that entry.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Then can you remember, Mr CHATTERJEE, whether or not you did go back to the Project Division saying that you could not get the agreement from AMD on Sections E and F so that the document was to be redrafted?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I cannot remember doing that and that would be an omission on my part.

***Chairman:***

Miss Christine LOH.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

I think the witness might appreciate that for us trying to unravel these very complex relationships and obviously very complicated activity that was going back some time that we are somewhat puzzled. But are there any personnel problems or are there any personality problems that somehow led to the fact that the crucial divisions and individuals were somehow not working as closely with each other as they should?

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Would you accept that as a personal answer?

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Personal, purely personal, your impression, your belief.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

There are some very strong personalities in the Airport Authority and there were some very strong views in terms of where responsibility stood. That is, in any organisation, there are going to be different personalities and it is the stronger personalities that hold sway. Douglas OAKERVEE has a very strong personality.

**Chairman:**

And that would stand in the way of smooth coordination?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I would disagree with that because looking at the way, in terms of the construction of the airport and other parts that were coordinated, I think, Mr OAKERVEE did an excellent job.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

In your personal opinion, how did the strong personality obstruct smooth working relationships? Well, how did it obstruct smooth working relationships with different departments and different people who had obviously key responsibilities?



**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Not to my knowledge. I think in any project of this size there were times when getting the momentum of people together, it did take time to get people to come together because there were enormous amount of different topics that had to be focused on. But once there is the realisation that we need somebody from a different part of the company to work with us, once that struck I think that the Authority, the different divisions do come together.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Well, maybe if I can try and ask the question in another way. The Project Division was responsible for the construction of the airport, the hard engineering side of the airport. Obviously for different contracts and so on, of putting different types of equipment and so on in the airport itself, would you not say that the airport in the end had to be used by people? It had to be user-friendly? With the communications system that basically didn't work on the day when the airport opened, that was a crucial part of the airport project. How can it not work on the day?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

There are a number of parts to your question. Project Division was responsible for all contracts including all the systems contracts. On opening day when you say "communications systems" that actually means quite a number of systems.

**Hon Christine LOH:**

Yes, that's correct.

**Chairman:**

Information systems.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Not just information systems, Madam Chairman, but also the underlying network and fibre optics that go throughout the building. That underlying network worked superbly. There were other examples, for example, the FIDS. To the users it crashed. To the technician we had performance problems. It slowed down and affected the users, but in the technical explanation the system did not falter in terms of its functionality. I am sure you will come to that later.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

We will come to that later, but I just wanted to talk about the relationships of the different departments in terms of what happened. We know what happened. Was there anything in your opinion to do with the communications, the relationships of the individuals of the various departments that could have led to this? What happened on the day?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Am I right in saying, I may have misunderstood, you are talking about human communications?

***Hon Christine LOH:***

I am talking about human beings, relationships among these departments and human beings. Was that a cause of things not working out in the end?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

My belief is no. I would support that belief by suggesting that if there had been true communications breakdowns in terms of human communications between people, the problems that we had would have lasted a lot longer. Because of the ability to communicate, all of our staff, working at the working level and working very hard, were able to come to grips with the situation, I would say, by the third day and were in control of the situation by the end of the week.

***Hon Christine LOH:***

I only have one last question, Chairman. Did communications between people significantly improve after the disaster happened?

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

A very difficult question to answer. On the face of it, yes. As they became more used to working in the environment that the Airport Authority, that the airport is. It is a vastly different environment to anything they would have been working in the day before, let's say. So, I think a lot of other factors came in, like "I am beginning to become familiar with the airport properly, the building, I am beginning to become familiar with distances between gates and the distances between parking, I am beginning to become familiar with the notation of gates, etc."

**Chairman:**

Right, so ...?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The answer is ...

**Chairman:**

The answer is ...?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I think that was my answer.

**Chairman:**

Yes, thanks. One last question on that, according to the Booz-Allen report it was alleged that there was a lack of team work among the management of AA. Now, at your level and as you look up at the divisional level, would you agree with that? There was a lack of team work particularly between AMD and PD?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

At my level I didn't see it. I wasn't part of the ADSCOM meetings or the divisional, the directors' meetings so I wouldn't have seen that. At my level, where I was working with the general managers of each of the divisions, we were all very intent on doing our part to open the airport.

***Chairman:***

What about the directors' level?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I didn't see it at directors' level. I wouldn't have seen it.

***Chairman:***

You are saying that you don't know whether it exists or not?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I don't know whether it exists or not.

**主席：**

劉慧卿議員。

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Madam Chairman, I just want to wrap this up to get this clear because Mr CHATTERJEE is coming back tomorrow. He is going to bring us the information including notes of meetings to confirm that AMD had actually agreed to the setting up of the Task Force, and also to explain to us why they were not involved in drafting the agreement and not invited to the December meeting. So, you are going to bring all that to us tomorrow?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

But for the purpose of this meeting, can you finally maybe explain to us what does it mean to say that the Task Force will work as representatives of AMD?

**Chairman:**

Before we go into that, can I just wrap that up because you are giving a summing up of the documents which Mr CHATTERJEE has to produce? Specifically, the memo which you said was signed by Chern HEED and Raymond LAI and also records of meetings of the Task Force. OK.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Yes, can you explain to us the meaning of "working as representatives of AMD" to eventual transition of the infrastructure systems?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

To me it is very clear. The owner of the system is AMD, whereas I am a support department that supports the user and the owner with technical operations. The ultimate responsibility for using the system is the operating division which is AMD. That is why we were representatives of AMD as opposed to actually making decisions on behalf of AMD.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Why can't AMD represent themselves?

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

What is it that you can do but they can't do for themselves?

**Chairman:**

Is it because of expertise or is it because of lack of resources?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

In terms of the IT industry it is not possible for every single division to have their own technical people. Therefore IT as a group operates as a support service to the operating divisions. But somebody has to own the system, and where there is a clear owner, a clear user, a primary user, then that should be the owner of the system. For example, IT does not own the FIDS. The owner is AMD. But there are systems that don't span any divisions, like the network, because it is used by all. That network, therefore, is owned by IT as an infrastructure upon which other systems can sit. So, that was the view that we were taking.

***Chairman:***

I think you have to answer Ms Emily LAU's question. Why can't they represent themselves? How do you propose to represent them, which would actually make things any better than they representing themselves? Is it in terms of expertise, you feel you have more expertise?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Technical skill.

***Chairman:***

But how do you actually ensure that they, as the end users, are really represented in the sense that you actually represent what they think is acceptable or not acceptable, and so on?

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

They were not even represented at the meeting when you have discussed this.

***Chairman:***

Yes, how did you go about acting as their representatives? Maybe I think that is the way of asking that.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

By working with them on a day-by-day basis and reporting to them. I will come back to these notes of meetings. These notes of meeting don't necessarily mean that AMD were not involved. It is a snapshot that was provided of a meeting that we had with Project Division, but I would not have made the mistake of excluding AMD in crucial meetings.

***Chairman:***

As far as Members of this Select Committee are concerned, we need to see everything that is there.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, Madam.

***Chairman:***

So, if you just say to us, "well we talk every day", that unfortunately is not quite good enough for us.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That is fair enough.

***Chairman:***

You have to come back with the documents. 李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

“New question”，新問題。

**主席：**

劉江華議員。

**劉江華議員：**

我仍想詢問關於人事方面的內部關係，因這對其後的工作有所影響。據陳達志先生剛才所述，柯家威先生是一位性格很強的人。

**機管局資訊科技部主管：**

對不起，我的中文並不太好，我現正找……

**Chairman:**

There is interpretation. Channel 3.

**劉江華議員：**

可以嗎？聽到了嗎？你剛才描述柯家威先生是一位性格很強的人，你可否再作詳細描述，究竟他的性格對工作，或對你的工作有何影響？又或者對雙方的合作關係有何影響？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is a tough one. I feel uncomfortable actually answering it because I don't think I would be able to provide an answer.

**Chairman:**

How was this strong personality manifested?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I think it was needed. I think when you have got a project of this size with so many contractors, so many people coming together, creating a platform from nothing - nothing was there in 1992 when I first arrived - I think a strong personality was absolutely essential.

How it manifests itself in terms of the work that we did, is that it was very



clear to me. For example, where there were things that I was not responsible for and therefore I was not consulted. That is one manifest from a personal point of view. But in terms of any other outside of my sphere I find it is going to be very difficult to answer.

**劉江華議員：**

陳先生，剛才是你主動提出這情況的。你身為中間人，有需要與雙方接觸。倘兩個部門合作不夠緊密，對你的工作必定有所影響。相信你也同意此點。所有文件均顯示AMD和PD這兩個部門曾於1997年年中在合作方面出現問題，甚至陳方安生女士也曾呼籲他們不要搞對抗，要多些合作。你可否坦白告知我們，據你觀察所得，這兩個部門的合作情況究竟如何？對你的工作又有何影響？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I wouldn't have been involved in the relationship at that level. I believe that that relationship probably manifested itself or appeared at the director level and at other meetings to which I wasn't present. So, I would not be able to comment on why, for example, Anson CHAN made those statements.

**劉江華議員：**

關於主席剛才提及的管理層報告，管理顧問公司有否與你接觸，詢問你對機管局的意見？

**Chairman:**

It is Booz-Allen.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes, they did come to us. They worked with us. There were no questions about the culture of the company. There were questions about the technical

skills and expertise that we had within our group, within the IT group. There were questions on my views in terms of what IT, my group, should be responsible for from airport opening. But there were no other questions about the working relationships at the director level.

**劉江華議員：**

你是否肯定管理顧問公司沒有向你問及關於工作關係或對機管局董事局的意見？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**機管局資訊科技部主管：**

我肯定他們沒有向我問及這一點。

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE, can you just answer one last question on this? When the Task Force was formed, obviously the decision to go ahead with the Task Force was to ensure there is coordination and cooperation across the divisions. Given that we have the papers from you describing what should be done by the Task Force, given also the scribbled note that indicates the lack of agreement from AMD and given that you work on a day-to-day basis with all these people, did you feel that AMD in fact was resenting the fact that this whole thing was being run by Project? It was a fact, wasn't it, that in fact the 2 people you mentioned were people from Project and they were actually spearheading the thing? Did you have a feeling that the strong personalities and so on, the strong position of the Project Division at the time somehow tipped the balance so that AMD was in fact not willing, not willing participants in the kind of structure that you were putting together?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I did not get that feeling. The feeling that I got was that we were recognising that there was a transition. We had to begin the transition from a project culture to an operational culture and I consider that to be the beginning of the movement, if you will.

**Chairman:**

Well, who are "we", when you say, "we recognise"?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I use "we" as the Airport Authority in the general context.

**Chairman:**

You feel that everybody accepted that there was this movement that was needed and everybody was working towards it?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I believe so, and it ended up with the Booz-Allen study to help propel that along.

**主席：**

李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

主席，我想就另一個新的範疇提問。1995至96年度期間，機管局工程項目科曾就航班資料顯示系統的規格問題，即“specification”，與英國公司“EDS”進行詳細討論。陳達志先生，你有否參與這部分的討論？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I did not.

**李永達議員：**

但你是否知悉有進行這些討論？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was aware of the discussions after they happened.

**李永達議員：**

這是否表示，你在他們討論完畢，以及整個規格“specification”有新的改變後才知悉此事？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is correct.

**李永達議員：**

自1996年年底起，情況開始變得惡劣，原因是規格“specification”不但尚未完成，而且還延誤很久。其後，機管局決定於1997年年初派遣徐景祥先生前往英國考察。你在證供中亦指出逐漸有較多機會參與此事。你是否知悉決定派遣徐景祥先生前往英國考察的過程？又或者你有否參與有關討論？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I was not.

**李永達議員：**

你是否於項目工程科決定後，才知悉徐先生前往英國考察一事？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is correct.

**李永達議員：**

徐先生回來後，相信你也認為可就很多方面進行討論。據你在證人陳述書內所述，柯家威先生自那時起是否較多邀請你參與這部分的討論？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Which paragraph?

**李永達議員：**

你自那時起是否有較多機會參與有關航班資料顯示系統的討論？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

There was substantial involvement from about April '97 and then an invitation from Douglas OAKERVEE to get more involved in late December 1997/ January 1998.

**李永達議員：**

陳達志先生，你剛才提及自1997年4月起有較多機會參與討論。你可否指出於1997年4月參與有關航班資料顯示系統的討論時，主要的工作為何？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was not involved in any of the decisions concerning the delivery of FIDS. It was more attendance at, for example, the Board workshop where EDS gave presentations on their schedule. As a result of the meetings with Chern HEED and his management meetings on a weekly basis, I became more aware of the views of AMD.

**李永達議員：**

陳達志先生，你於1997年4月起參與討論時，是否開始瞭解到整個航班資料顯示系統的工程已延誤很久？你是否知悉這事實？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The first time I realised or heard about that was in June '97 when I was present at a Board workshop with EDS and GEC. And I believe that is part of my statement.

**李永達議員：**

那時你是否知悉延誤已很嚴重？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Sorry, can I just chip in here? You mean that when you started on the Task Force you weren't aware of the fact that contractually EDS should have delivered the system at the end of '96?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I was not.

**Chairman:**

You were not aware of the delays that were taking place with the EDS contract?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was aware that there were delays but no specifics. That was under the control of Project and that agreements had been made to change, but not the ... When I was answering Mr LEE's question it was in respect of the revised schedule that was agreed in April.

**Chairman:**

No, I think he asked you about the delays generally.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Generally.

**Chairman:**

Did you know that EDS was supposed to deliver, the end of the contract

should have been end of 1996?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

When the Task Force was formed, when your substantial involvement started, did you know that?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No, I did not.

***Chairman:***

Did you know there was considerable delay?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I learnt after the fact, yes.

***Chairman:***

After the fact when?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

In terms of when, the first memory that I have is of hearing third hand that EDS had come in with GEC to visit AA and discuss a revision of the schedule.

***Chairman:***

So, that was mid-1997, then?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That was first quarter 1997.

**Chairman:**

April?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Round about that time, yes.

**Chairman:**

But what was your Task Force doing in the meantime, between January and when they came in?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

We were working on the ... Please remember that there were several other contracts that were also being worked on: Contract 399 which is the backbone and testing, backbone communications system, the AODB; there was the testing for the PA systems and testing for the CCTV. All of those, FIDS was one component of this Task Force.

**Chairman:**

But FIDS was the heart of the entire information system.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Well, we didn't get involved with FIDS until it was ready for testing. We were getting involved with all the other contracts. And again, if I can go back, this table doesn't say which contracts but it was for all the systems contracts: Contract 399, Contract 382, the telephone system, the voice and cabling, the CCTV as I have mentioned. There were some 9 to 10 different contracts that the Task Force was working on.

**Chairman:**

You didn't know that the top management was getting really worried about FIDS by early 1997?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**



Not before any decisions were made, only after decisions were made.

**Chairman:**

You did not know that K C TSUI went to Hook to try and resolve this?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I knew about that after he had gone.

**Chairman:**

After he had gone?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In other words ...

**Chairman:**

He did not in fact even consult you, talk to you about it?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, he did not.

**Chairman:**

And you did not know that AMD was very worried about this whole thing?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The concerns that I had from AMD concerned TMS which is the stand allocation. There was concern about the implementation in Vancouver because TMS was being implemented in Vancouver. As a result of that it was agreed that Vivian CHEUNG and Tom would visit Vancouver to identify the reasons why the Vancouver installation was so late.

**Chairman:**

Only TMS?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Only TMS.

**Chairman:**

And what about deferred functionality which EDS was talking about? What about the consideration that perhaps AA should switch or EDS should switch to a ready package, or that you were left out of that discussion?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes, Madam.

**Chairman:**

You weren't aware of that discussion at all?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was not aware of those discussions.

**李永達議員：**

陳達志先生，你應瞭解航班資料顯示系統的核心是一個資訊科技系統“information technology system”。這次機場管理局高層委派徐先生前往英國考察，其實在3位同事當中，沒有一個是資訊科技的專家。你是否知悉此事？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Now, I knew, yes. In other words, after it happened.

**Chairman:**

After the event. He already answered that.

**李永達議員：**

你身為資訊科技部主管，雖然所負責的工作主要屬於支援性質……

**Hon Margaret NG:**

May I just clarify one thing before Mr LEE goes on? What I want to clarify with this witness is whether or not he is the highest IT person in AA?

**Chairman:**

Are you the highest IT person in AA?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In the structure, yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Thank you.

**李永達議員：**

你事後才知悉機場管理局高層委派徐先生前往英國考察。儘管他只是一名“Project Manager”，項目經理，但所考察的卻全是資訊科技的項目。你事後知悉自己未獲知會，亦沒有參與有關討論，會否感到很奇怪？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I believe that the reason K C TSUI was sent was because of 2 things. Number one, he is the contract representative on the contract. He is the person nominated by AA to control the contract. The second reason is that the discussion was focused not on the functionality but more on the contractual delivery dates, programme dates and re-scheduling of main milestones, and it is for that reason. I don't know whether there was actual discussion on the technical aspects of FIDS.

**Chairman:**

You don't even know after the event, or when you say you don't know, you mean you didn't know at the time, or ...?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The honest answer is right now I cannot remember but I do not remember whether technical things were actually discussed.

**李永達議員：**

徐先生自英國回來後，有否與部門的同事舉行會議，討論有關問題？

**主席：**

再問一次，對不起，請你再問一次。

**李永達議員：**

徐先生於1997年4月自英國回來後，有否與部門舉行會議，討論航班資料顯示系統現時的狀態及需要更改的地方？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I believe that there were.

**李永達議員：**

你有否參與？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was not there.

**Chairman:**

Who were there?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I believe it would have been with AMD specifically to discuss deferred functionality.

**李永達議員：**

你剛才亦有提及“deferred functionality”的問題。因此，你先前指出徐先生僅討論時間表及“milestone”，相信事實並非如此。他亦有討論功能上的延誤。當中大部分是否為“IT”事項？是否屬於你的專業範圍？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's true.

**李永達議員：**

你是否於事後才知悉沒有獲邀討論一些與你專業有關的事項？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes. I was, yes.

**李永達議員：**

你有否向上級反映？譬如，當時已有副行政總監，甚至總監……

**Chairman:**

CEO.

**李永達議員：**

對不起，當時只有“CEO”。你有否向總監反映你的觀察或不滿？假設你作為專業人士，對他們所進行的考察，既不知悉亦沒有參與。儘管你僅屬支援部門，他們回來後所討論的事項，正是你專業部門所知曉的事項，但你卻沒有獲邀參與討論。對於他們不尊重你部門的專業知識一

事，你事後有否向總監反映不滿？

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The answer is that I was concerned. I did reflect that. I can remember probably reflecting that to Chern HEED, for example, but not in writing.

**李永達議員：**

“Mr CHATTERJEE”，正如吳靄儀議員指出，你是“IT”的“Head”。當然，你的工作心態可以是接到指示便做，沒有指示便不做。不過，你應知道自己的專業範圍和水平。任何與機場管理局資訊系統有關的事項，你應是最有發言權，最有話事權的人。你知悉自己於整個過程中沒有獲邀參與，但竟不向上級匯報。難道你認為這是不當的做法，所以不應反映意見嗎？

***Chairman:***

Mr CHATTERJEE.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The responsibilities that I was given didn't include FIDS, even though, yes, you are right, perhaps I should have voiced my concerns a little louder and a little more vocal. But it was absolutely clear to me at that point in time that the responsibility for the contract was Project Division.

**李永達議員：**

我再問下去。你於事後才知悉有“deferred functionality”，即功能上有些項目無須於機場開幕時使用，並可予延遲。身為機場管理局最高管理層的資訊科技部主管，你認為這些“deferred functionality”對系統會否有很嚴重或很重要的影響？

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No, my understanding at the time was that deferred functionality were those functions that were agreed as not being crucial for airport opening and that they were reasonably minor, back-office control and fine-tuning of displays. I was assured by both Project and in discussion with Vivian ...

**Chairman:**

Vivian CHEUNG?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Sorry, that's not true. That's not true. Vivian actually disagreed with some of the functionality. But I was assured that that was not needed for airport opening but there was disagreement on the part of Vivian at AMD.

**李永達議員：**

因此，你是知悉“Vivian CHEUNG”與項目工程科對這些“deferred functionality”持有不同的意見的。

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is correct.

**李永達議員：**

你是即時知悉此事的。當有不同的意見出現時，你已知悉此事，而非於事後才知悉，對嗎？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Sorry, was I aware of that after the ...?

**李永達議員：**

當時……

**Chairman:**

At the time they were raised, the disagreement that Vivian CHEUNG had, at the time they were raised they were actually reflected to you as well?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

So, you knew?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In the May time frame in 1997, yes.

**李永達議員：**

當時你是否已開始參與討論？又或作為“IT”的負責人，你有否於討論過程中利用你和同事的專業知識，從而作出一個較佳及較合理的結論？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I did not.

**李永達議員：**

原因為何？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Because I believed that the decision had already been made irrevocably by Project Division.

**李永達議員：**

主席，我覺得很奇怪。“Mr CHATTERJEE”，你身為機場管理局資訊科技方面的最高負責人，你和同事在這方面應是最有權威的，但你竟置身事外，明知工程與管理部門有不同的意見，仍不參與討論。你可否再作解釋，為何於這階段仍不參與討論？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**



As I said, the responsibilities that I had been given were very clear cut. Project Division also were working very closely with AMD. You are right, I should have intervened or could have intervened but the way the contracts had been structured, very clearly the decision-making was coming from Project Division.

**李永達議員：**

陳達志先生，我完全無法接受你的解釋。即使沒有白紙黑字載明你需要負責這方面的事項，你亦應清楚知道自己須擔當一個很重要的支援角色。我相信你一定同意自己須就支援方面負責，因你是“IT”的“Head”。即使你無須擔當任何支援角色，亦應詢問上司“Mr TOWNSEND”如何處理此事，但你卻任由兩個並非專業的部門決定專業的事項。“Project”的同事是工程師，並非“IT people”；管理科的同事負責的是機場管理而非資訊科技的事宜，而你卻是負責資訊科技的。但世上竟出現了如此荒謬的事，由兩個沒有專業知識的部門決定你應負責的工作，而你卻置身事外，不發一言，任由他們決定。我真的想問第三次，為何你於這階段仍不參與討論，亦不向上司“Mr TOWNSEND”反映此事？你應以專業角度來處理這個專業問題，為何你不向上司反映意見？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In hindsight you are absolutely right. Why? I don't know.

**李永達議員：**

你自己也說“I don't know.”

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

May I finish my answer, please?

**Chairman:**

Yes.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

My responsibilities were still to Raymond LAI at that time. I was not reporting to CEO.

**李永達議員：**

你有否將此事向“Raymond LAI”反映？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, I did not but I remember talking to Chern HEED. And expressing the same concerns with Chern HEED.

**Chairman:**

But, Mr CHATTERJEE, you were one of the parties mentioned in a memo which Mr Chern HEED sent to Mr Douglas OAKERVEE on 3 April and in there Mr Chern HEED said very specifically, categorically:

"We ask that Project Division's approach to be not accept any deferred functionality and push ..."

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Sorry, which? Where is it?

**Chairman:**

Sorry, this is Paragraph 18 in Volume X. Can you show the witness this, Matthew?

"We ask that Project Division's approach to be not accept any deferred functionality and push EDS to recover all lost ground by airport opening."

You were copied this memo?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Was there any discussion between you and Mr Chern HEED or any of his staff regarding this particular strong feeling on the part of AMD?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I believe so, yes.

**Chairman:**

And did they ask you to come up with some assessment as to whether deferred functionality was acceptable?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Thank you for showing this to me. I think that the reason why I would have been included would have been a result of discussions with Chern HEED as to the concerns, and therefore Chern would have written to Douglas with "cc" to the right people.

**Chairman:**

Yes, but where is your opinion on this, being the most senior IT man in the organisation?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Sorry, I didn't quite understand that.

**Chairman:**

Where is your opinion? Did you express any opinion as far as this particular aspect of the action of Project Division is concerned? Obviously AMD and Project Division are disagreeing, concerning deferred functionality.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

This would have been a result of discussions between myself and Chern HEED, therefore resulting in this memo.

***Chairman:***

Yes, but the memo is written by Chern HEED. I am asking how you yourself, as the most senior person of IT, has expressed your opinion regarding deferred functionality.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Through the preparation probably of this memo.

***Chairman:***

You are sent a copy. This memo, it doesn't reflect any opinion or view on your part.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam Chairman, what is very clear from the existence of this memo is that the witness could not have been right that he wasn't involved at this stage. He was very clearly involved already in April 1997. And in fact, Madam Chairman, in his own witness statement, Paragraph 23, he refers to the June meeting which he attended. He couldn't have attended the meeting out of the blue. That is the FIDS progress review presentation by GEC and EDS. I think that by then he was very fully involved. So, it doesn't appear to me right what he has just told this Select Committee.

***Chairman:***

I think, Mr CHATTERJEE, you have to consider your position very carefully. You told this Committee earlier on that many of the things you didn't know until after the event. It is not quite true because, as far as deferred functionality and so on is concerned, this actually took place before K C TSUI's trip to Hook. So, you were aware of that discussion about deferred functionality. Now, could you think of that very carefully and answer us because you did give us a very different answer before?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I have obviously made a mistake in terms of my timing and my memory, and I apologise for that. Seeing these is actually helping bring back the memory.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Can we start all over again because what we just heard earlier was that this witness wasn't fully involved until December of 1997, you see. And so now we know that it is much earlier, I mean, as these documents have obviously jogged his memory. So, could he start again and tell us when he started to get involved in the FIDS discussions?

***Chairman:***

Mr CHATTERJEE.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

I mean, if it helps, obviously the beginning point was December 1996.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I was just about to say that, yes.

***Chairman:***

Miss Margaret NG, let Mr CHATTERJEE answer your question. Give him a little room.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

You are right, Miss NG. It was December 1996 when the Task Force was formed and that was when I began to get more and more involved. My statement about December 1997 was that when I was, and I considered myself, fully involved and being, sorry, January 1997, consulted. But it was not consistent involvement from December '96.

***Chairman:***

Mr CHATTERJEE, you have to consider your answers very carefully. We really would like you to give us answers which are correct. You told us earlier in the morning that you were not aware of the delays, of the serious delays of EDS; you were not aware of the deferred functionality negotiations between EDS and AA until after the event; you did not know that K C TSUI went to Hook until after the event.

Now, the evidence that we see is that in fact you were informed of the deferred functionality before agreements were reached on deferred functionality. You in fact told us, which I think we need to question you further, you told us that in fact your view on deferred functionality was already reflected in a memo which was written by Chern HEED to Douglas OAKERVEE.

Now, can you perhaps tell us clearly what your views are and what were the views expressed to Project Division? It is very important. At the time what was the view expressed to Project Division and to top management regarding deferred functionality?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I have already said that I apologise for having a memory lapse. This has brought it back. The view was that deferred functionality was unacceptable.

***Chairman:***

Was that made in any memo, any note to anyone that it was unacceptable? If it is that strong and you believe it to be unacceptable, was that view put forward to the relevant divisions?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Not in a separate memo by myself, but it would have been in discussions with AMD and with Chern HEED, resulting in the Chern HEED memo which is a director-to-director level memo.

***Chairman:***

But Chern HEED in his memo did not mention that he had your view, the professional view that deferred functionality was not acceptable.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is true.

**Chairman:**

He was just stating his view that it was unacceptable.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's true. Chern was also working with people below him, including Vivian, myself and Tom in order to formulate those views.

**李永達議員：**

陳達志先生，你的意思是，在決定不能接受“deferred functionality”的過程中，不獨你曾與“Mr Chern HEED”討論，你的下屬其實也曾與他的下屬進行討論？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I believe so, yes.

**李永達議員：**

不要說“believe so”。請你……

**主席：**

有或無，“Yes or no?”

**李永達議員：**

我給你時間，讓你慢慢回憶此事。究竟是你與兩位總監，還是你屬下的“IT”同事和他們的“AMD”同事進行討論？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

It would have been discussions at the working level with Tom and Vivian but no formal record or black and white minutes.

**李永達議員：**

因此，相信你會記得“Mr Chern HEED”、“Tom”、“Vivian”和你等4人曾參與討論，達成共識，指“defer functionality”不能接受。情況是否如此？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That should be my memory. I can't remember a specific discussion that took place that long ago.

**主席：**

“Deferred functionality”，劉江華議員、吳靄儀議員、劉慧卿議員。

**劉江華議員：**

我覺得陳達志先生在兩項證供上都出現矛盾：除了在知悉與否的證供上有矛盾外，對功能上是否可予延誤方面，前後亦有矛盾。尤以剛才所提及於1997年4月已向韓義德先生提出意見並表示有關延遲不可接受為甚。但你今晨回答李永達議員的提問時，卻指出這僅是小問題並可予接受。你表示這些只是調較上的問題。為何你當日的判斷與今天的證供完全相反，一方面指不可接受，而另一方面則指這僅是小問題？

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I didn't mean to give conflicting statements. It was just that my memory hadn't been reminded, if you like, until I saw this. But it was not meant to be a conflicting statement.

**劉江華議員：**



陳達志先生，你可否清楚說明，究竟這做法是不可接受，還是如你先前回答李永達議員時表示，這僅是小問題並可予接受？答案只可以是二擇其一。

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE. Which is it?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In terms of the deferred functionality. Is that what you meant?

**Chairman:**

Yes.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

We believed at the time that it was unacceptable.

**Chairman:**

Right.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Madam Chairman, may I ask the witness this? Unacceptable is a conclusion and it is a pretty strong conclusion. I don't imagine that you could arrive at such a conclusion out of the blue. So, there must have been previous to April a series of discussions whereby you familiarised yourself with the whole system, the whole plan and all the problems. Is that right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No, there was not, Miss NG. I came into these discussions or I was made aware of these discussions after I found out that EDS were looking for a revision in the delivery of their system. And there would have been a review of what type of functionality was being deferred. That functionality essentially is user

functionality and it would have been important for the owner, AMD, to provide the view on what was important and what was not important.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

In order to arrive at that conclusion of unacceptability you must have first understood what the user required, secondly what the system was supposed to provide, otherwise you cannot have arrived at a conclusion of deferred functionality being unacceptable.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I personally did not have a clear understanding of the functionality of that system because up until that time I had not been exposed to the functionality of that system.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

But Madam Chairman, how can Mr CHATTERJEE give so strong a view affecting a whole management decision without fully understanding the problem? I would strongly suggest that in fact by that time you had gone into the problem through more than one meeting with various people.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That did not happen.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Now, could you look again at the memo, Volume X, under Paragraph 18, the memo of 3 April, and if you look at the second paragraph ...

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Sorry, which ...?

***Chairman:***

This is Chern HEED's memo to Mr OAKERVEE.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Copied to you.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Second paragraph?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Paragraph number 2, right? Now, Paragraph number 1 refers to the opinion of unacceptability. Then it says:

"Notwithstanding the above, EDS has offered a very aggressive recovery plan. Given their past history with not meeting these dates and the difficulties ..."

So, the past history of not meeting dates was mentioned in this paragraph, right?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Right.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

So that the whole unacceptability recommendation was set in the context of past history, right?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Right, plus ...

***Hon Margaret NG:***

So, don't you agree that if you were at all involved in this discussion arriving at this conclusion, this very strong conclusion, you in fact had been given an understanding of the background of the whole thing.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, that was after the, and in April 1997 we had what was then 12 months for airport opening and we were very concerned that 12 months had gone by and we had got to this stage and we were still 12 months away from getting a system.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Yes, but Madam Chairman, I want to ask this witness whether he would accept that the real situation was that by 3 April, he had a clear enough understanding of the background of FIDS, what it is supposed to do, the delays as well as the concerns in order to arrive at the conclusion that any functionality delay was unacceptable.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Basic background of the functionality, yes. Background of the history in terms of EDS' delivery and the work so far, yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Right, so you were quite well aware by that time. Thank you Madam Chairman.

***Chairman:***

Ms Emily LAU.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Madam Chairman, I just want to follow up on what some Members have asked already. It is for Mr CHATTERJEE to produce some documents to show that you did express your strong reservations. Are you able to do that or not?

***Chairman:***

Does it exist?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No, not as I said earlier. My strong reservations in terms of a separate

memo addressed separately to these individuals, no. I was working collectively with Chern HEED.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

And you did not reflect your strong reservations to the top?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

As a separate ...?

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

As whatever.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

So, you just had reservations. When those were brushed aside you did not do anything to follow up?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Through this memo.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

This memo? What has that got to do with you? It was only "cc" to you.

***Chairman:***

It didn't even mention you, Mr CHATTERJEE.

***Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:***

Well, except for the "cc".

**Chairman:**

No, within the context.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Taken at its face value that's right, but again these memos would not have been created by an individual. They would have been brought together through the contribution of a number of individuals.

**Chairman:**

Yes, we have heard that. We wouldn't lose time on that, but I think Ms Emily LAU's question in fact has been answered. He doesn't have the documentary proof that he raised that strong reservation. Mr Edward HO first.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Sorry, Madam Chairman, could I just close with one more question, one more statement? Mr CHATTERJEE, what I want to say is that at this point, by April, you were consulted by Chern HEED, by AMD, on FIDS and you gave your opinion, which was taken into consideration. You agree?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is correct.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Thank you.

**Chairman:**

Mr Edward HO.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin**

Chairman, actually my question follows on from Ms Emily LAU in that, but perhaps not so particular as to this memo. Nevertheless I still want to ask the question. when Mr Chern HEED and Mr CHATTERJEE and your other colleagues in IT department met on matters such as what was discussed on 3 April memo, some very major concerns, is it just an informal chit-chat or are these working group meetings? If they are working group meetings, would there be written minutes or notes covering the discussion?

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The forum for which these would have been discussed would have been 2 places. One is at the AMD management meetings, the weekly management meetings for which I joined, and the second would have been at the working level. The notes of meetings for the AMD management meetings were kept by AMD although those were action minutes and notes rather than an actual record of what was said. So, the answer there is no. And at the working level I am not aware of any notes that were kept.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin**

So, Chairman, is the witness saying that for the working level meetings it is not customary for any notes to be taken? It is just people getting together and talking about it and then disperse. Is that what we are told?

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin**

Even to the extent, Chairman, that when a discussion was focused upon

some very serious matter, some serious concern, even these meetings?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No, I would disagree with that. I believe that people who were at these meetings were professional enough to recognise where they believed that notes would be taken, and so that where it was important notes would be taken. There would be other instances where notes wouldn't be taken. I am actually not giving you a clear answer because I can't, because I don't have direct knowledge of exactly what happened at those levels of meetings.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin***

No, but this, Chairman, we were told that as a result of some meetings in which Mr CHATTERJEE actually also participated, and I think some advice was probably given also, Mr Chern HEED wrote a memo dated 3 April to Mr OAKERVEE. My question is, were there any notes taken of this discussion prior to this memo being made?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I cannot remember. That is something which, with your permission, I can search for.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin***

Yes, can you do that?

***Chairman:***

I think you mentioned 2 different levels. One is the AMD management meeting, the other one is working groups on a working level. Maybe you can go back and see what notes you can find on those 2 levels and come back to us on those.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, Madam.



**Chairman:**

Mr Raymond HO.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Thank you, Chairman. Just a very quick point to follow the previous questions. Now, if you come back to Paper no. B220-2 to do with this System Task Force. Now, Paragraph 2, the title is "Role of the System Task Force". In the beginning it says that:

"This Task Force will act as the expert representatives of the AMD to work closely with AMD and Project Division staff ...", etc.

So, you were actually acting as their representatives, technical representatives?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Technical representatives, on the technical aspects, yes.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Right, although at the same time you told us that you were and you are the Number One IT person in the Authority?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I am not sure I understand how. What's the connection between the two?

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

No, I am saying that you did tell us that you are the most senior person?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In terms of structure as a department head, yes.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

But on expertise are you supposed to be the one who knows more about IT than others? You are supposed to give advice on IT aspects to other divisions?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Within the roles that I have been given, yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Can I ask you about this CSE role? Did you have communications with CSE?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Not directly, no.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

And when you were made aware of the problems at Hook in connection with EDS, EDS' performance, now earlier on you told us you were aware of this in April?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

And then you were aware that in fact you were involved in some discussions on the problems at Hook?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Did you make any suggestions at all at that stage as to how the performance of EDS should be improved?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I cannot remember.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Just now it seems that you were not actually making any, taking any initiatives to make suggestions to your seniors. Are you saying that, it seems that you give us the impression that you are a passive and laid-back person. Maybe is that to do with the very strong personalities at high levels?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Those strong personalities did have a bearing on the way people behaved.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Making you being a passive and laid-back person?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I am not a passive and laid-back person.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

But you had to keep a lot of your opinions not voiced out because of the strong personalities at high levels?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That is a very difficult question to answer.

***Chairman:***

The answer is yes or no.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Sorry, could you repeat the question?

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Is it because of the very strong personalities at high levels of those people above you, you actually refrain from making active proposals and voicing out your personal opinions on technical matters?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No, when it came to those that were under my responsibility. Yes, when it came to those that were not under my responsibility.

***Chairman:***

Mr CHATTERJEE, just to go back to a question which the Vice-Chairman asked, you said that you have no direct association or knowledge of CSE. Now, it is very important because they are in fact the AA's consultants on the IT side, your area in fact. How could it be possible that you don't ... Sorry?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin***

This point.

***Chairman:***

How could it be possible that you don't have any direct contact with CSE?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I took the answer to be direct contact during that time.

***Chairman:***

No, during all the time, since you became substantially involved. I mean one would have thought that they would have been the first people you go to, talking the same language, same professional language.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

My involvement with CSE started in 1993/1994 when I asked them to do some work for the IT department for some of the systems that we were working on. There was no involvement at that time by CSE.

**Chairman:**

I am talking about from December '96 onwards when you became substantially involved in the systems.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The answer is no. There was no direct involvement.

**Chairman:**

No direct involvement? In your Attachment 2, when you described the main tasks of the Task Force and under Paragraph 5, "Main tasks: sign off for AMD and IT", some of those tests, and you told us before that you were actually representing AMD in the conducting of those tests, the lead were actually CSE people.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's correct.

**Chairman:**

Yes, so you must have had some contacts with CSE?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Tom LAM had contacts with CSE through the work that he was doing with the Task Force. I did not have direct contacts with CSE.

**Chairman:**

So, CSE was fielding monthly contacts, well, monthly reports, progress reports to the AA on this development of the EDS and so on and so forth. Did you receive those reports?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I did not. They were cycled through Project Division.

***Chairman:***

So everything was actually focused in Project: Project was 'calling the shots', Project was telling you what to do, Project was actually going in and saying, "Deferred functionality", Project was saying, "No Ferranti, but just," - you know - "Go with EDS starting everything from scratch", and so on and so forth. It's all Project, isn't it?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

So, Project was actually 'running the whole show'? Was it?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That would be the case.

***Chairman:***

Including your area of expertise? Was it?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Chairman, that is part of my question, actually. I would like to continue with Mr CHATTERJEE.

***Chairman:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Thank you. Now, in fact, you gave us part of the answer because CSE was assisting the Project Division. In fact, according to the same paragraph which I read out to you just now in the Job Description of the System Task Force, you were acting as the expert representative of the AMD. So, you represented AMD, CSE assisted the PD, Project Division?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Right. And you told us that because Mr OAKERVEE had very, very strong personality, he was actually conducting the whole show. He was bulldozing all the issues all the time, so you just kept quiet all the time? Is that true?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That was a long question. Can you just repeat that again, please?

***Chairman:***

Well, you know what the question was.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

I'll put it very simply, very simply again. You represented AMD?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

CSE assisted Project Division. You told us Mr OAKERVEE had very

strong personality and he was actually conducting the show. He was sometimes actually bulldozing issues even on technical matters. That's why you kept silent?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Even on technical matters?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I can't talk to bulldozing. But I can talk to the structure that was set up under which these contracts would be delivered. The Task Force, or the group of people, if you will, that were put together to support Project Division in these systems were under no illusion that they were working under Project Division.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

You were saying to us that you didn't have direct contacts with CSE, but your Mr Thomas LAM had?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Is that because of Mr OAKERVEE's personality you would like to have your subordinate to even handle very difficult, most important issues on FIDS, rather than yourself?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I don't know that. I don't know that.



**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Can you say 'yes' or 'no', rather than you 'don't know that'?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I can't. I honestly don't know the answer to that question.

**主席：**

李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

主席，我想再多問一個範圍，據主席提及，關於1996年年底……

**主席：**

稍等一會。何承天議員是否想問“deferred functionality”？

**何承天議員：**

我想問“CSE”。

**主席：**

他想問“CSE”，讓他先問。李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

我亦想問“CSE”。

**主席：**

“OK”，李永達議員，請先發問。

**李永達議員：**

主席，對不起，何承天議員。

**何承天議員：**

不要緊。

**李永達議員：**

1996年年底，“CSE”曾到英國作“audit visit”。你是否知悉此事？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

At the end of '96?

**李永達議員：**

是。

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Again, after the event.

**李永達議員：**

你肯定於“visit”後才知悉此事？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**李永達議員：**

希望你不會再誤解我的問題。於“CSE”進行視察後，他們曾研究可否將部分系統轉交一間名為“Ferranti”的公司承辦。你是否知悉此事？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I do not know. Was it part of their report?

**Chairman:**

No. Well, I think the question is, after that visit there was discussion within AA about whether that part of the work that EDS was taking on should

actually involve Ferranti. Did you know about this?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was aware of those discussions. Yes.

**李永達議員：**

你知悉此事，但你有否參與有關討論？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Formal discussions, 'no', but discussions with AMD and Chern HEED, at some point in time, 'yes'.

**李永達議員：**

你是否知悉有關討論涉及找另一間新公司來承辦部分系統，而這事項其實是屬於你的專業範圍？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

It falls within my portfolio?

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

My question is the discussion about whether EDS should put aside some part of the system to employ a new company, Ferranti, to do the job. Is that true in your IT professional area? Do you agree with that?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes. I do.

**李永達議員：**

於整個討論過程中，你有否爭取機會表達意見？你有否竭力向上司及同事，包括柯家威先生和“Mr Chern HEED”，表達意見？

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I remember certainly to Chern HEED, not to Douglas OAKERVEE. The discussion was in 2 parts; whether to replace EDS with another organisation that had a track-record, which is Ferranti, given that they were already working with us on another contract, Contract 399, or whether there was scope for replacing them on a partial basis. My views were given to Chern, but not to Douglas.

***Chairman:***

What were your views then?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

My views were that it was useful and it would be in our interests to explore the option further. With something like 12 -13 months left, we needed a very, very fast-track project, and an organisation that already had something working.

***Chairman:***

So, a ready package, bringing in Ferranti, which was, in fact, at the end of the day, Vivien CHEUNG's recommendation to Chern HEED, and Chern HEED forwarded it back to top management?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

As well. Right.

***Chairman:***

So, you were actually behind, you know, in support of the approach?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

Of that approach?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Did you make it known in any form, documentary form?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Again, 'no'.

**Chairman:**

Which forum was the forum that you voiced this opinion in?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The AMD forum.

**Chairman:**

So, can you go back and look at the minutes of the AMD meetings, management meetings, to see whether you can produce to us the...?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I will do that.

**李永達議員：**

我想繼續問陳達志先生，你是否知悉最後你、“Vivian CHEUNG”及其他同事的意見不獲採納？

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The answer is 'yes'. Yes, they weren't accepted.

**李永達議員：**

你知悉他們沒有接納你的意見。我想將這兩件事合併討論。相信你會同意我以下的分析，其實於討論當中，有許多地方是屬於你的專業範圍，而我們先前討論的延誤功能，“deferred functionality”，亦屬於你的專業範圍。儘管未能提供任何白紙黑字的紀錄，你於3至4個月內曾參與兩次大型討論並提供意見。正如你回答吳靄儀議員的提問時表示，你曾提出強烈的意見，覺得當中有些地方不能接受。經過4個月，你的專業意見遭到兩次拒絕，相信你對此亦會感到不悅。為何至4月底，你仍不向最上級，即“CEO”，提出此事？就此，你有否考慮自己不僅需負責“IT”的問題？事實上，機場系統價值不菲，有關款項是由所有納稅人提供的。你的專業意見遭到兩次拒絕，為何不向最上級反映不滿，要求他們重新考慮你的意見？

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I don't know the answer to that. In hindsight, I think that you are right. I could have reflected it more strongly. At the time, with everything going on, there was this feeling that the decision had already been made, and therefore bring in as much support to get that decision implemented properly.

**李永達議員：**

但陳達志先生，你是否認為自己已緊守專業崗位？倘你相信那兩次的分析正確無誤，為何不堅持己見，甚至以最強硬的語氣或以書面向總監及機場管理局表示你不同意這樣做？我曾檢查機場管理局於1997年4月的會議，發現你從未表達你的意見和憂慮。當然，機場於啟用時發生事故的理由眾多，不宜在此進行辯論。但當中會否涉及你身為一個專業的部門負責人，因沒有堅持自己認為正確的意見，而導致某些對系統不甚認識的人士作出不正確的決定？

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I believe that whether they have the skill, there were people within Project Division that do have IT skills. These decisions were made around the April/May time frame. By that time, the work had already started. Apparently, there had been agreements and, at that point in time, again, there was this view that says it was an irreversible decision from a contractual stand-point, for which I didn't have because I didn't have the contract. I didn't have any view of the contract. Put all that aside, I accept that, at that point in time, I could have made my views more strongly known. I didn't. That was a mistake.

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE, do you know Paul EVANS?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I do.

**Chairman:**

Did you discuss with Paul EVANS who is a member of the Project Division but who shared your views about Ferranti? You are aware of that? He shared your views. As opposed to CSE who felt that EDS should continue along the path that they had started with on the one hand, Paul EVANS, AMD, Vivien CHEUNG, yourselves, on the other side. With all the IT expertise and with all the knowledge of EDS - you know Paul EVANS and so on - you actually felt that something very major, a major decision, had to be taken at a crucial point, one year before the planned opening day at that time, which was April 1998. In view of the fact that EDS did not deliver up to that point, that major decision, involving a very important change of direction, had to be made. Paul EVANS was the man in Project, you said, that had expertise. Paul EVANS was the man. Did you talk to him to discuss how this change of direction could be brought about?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I did not.

**Chairman:**

Did you discuss with Paul EVANS at all about Ferranti, about the new approach?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I did not.

**Chairman:**

You did not. Being the IT person, you did not attempt to talk to the person responsible for this whole thing in Project?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I did not.

***Chairman:***

You didn't feel that there was a need?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I don't know how to answer that one. I didn't think I knew Paul EVANS, at that time.

***Chairman:***

You did not think? You'd better think about that because Paul EVANS was very much sitting on top of C381 at that time?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

He actually wrote the Report?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

On Ferranti, and everything-else?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.



**Chairman:**

So, you mean you weren't aware that Paul EVANS was actually the man?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I wasn't.

**Chairman:**

You didn't know him?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I wasn't aware that Paul EVANS was having that view and I had not met Paul EVANS at that time.

**Chairman:**

So, how did you know he held that view?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I found out afterwards.

**Chairman:**

Mr Edward HO.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Yes. Chairman, actually I was going to follow on a question that you asked about a statement that was made by the witness regarding his contact with CSE, because, looking at that Job Description of System Task Force that - you said it yourself - in that particular document. Does Mr CHATTERJEE know the document?

**Chairman:**

Paper no. B220-2.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

In that document, Paragraph 4. First of all in Paragraph 3, "The team will report to Kiron CHATTERJEE for the overall running of the System Task Force". Right? And then Paragraph 4.1, "Factors that are critical for the success of the System Task Force: 1, working as a seamless team with AMD, Project Division and CSE". So, Mr CHATTERJEE, you were tasked to have the overall running responsibility of this Task Force which was supposed to have a seamless, to run as a seamless team with, among other divisions and departments, CSE. So, how could you say earlier that you didn't have any contacts with CSE? How could you run a seamless team with them if you don't have any contacts with them?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I can direct you to.

***Chairman:***

Mr CHATTERJEE.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

If I can direct you to Item no. 3.2, Mr HO. "The team will report to Rob DUNSTAN for testing and commissioning and working with Project Division."

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes, but, Chairman, that is only for testing and commissioning. CSE's role, as I understand it, they have an independent monitoring role. They give a monthly report on the progress of the systems development and so on. It's not really just on testing and commissioning?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The first task was testing and commissioning. That was the most immediate one. This Task Force began to come together in January. We began to move people from Central Plaza over to Chek Lap Kok, setting up the offices. For the first couple of months, an integrating process was going on. We were being introduced to the rest of the teams, or Tom LAM and the Task Force were being introduced to the rest of the teams. FIDS would not have been the first system that they worked on. I don't know which is the first contract that they worked on, but there will be records, and I can provide that to you.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes, but, I mean, it seems that, Chairman, in Paragraph 3 there were 3 sort-of reporting procedures. Nevertheless, Mr CHATTERJEE, you are the one who is responsible for the overall running. Right?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Of this Task Force?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

And then 2, yes, testing and commissioning, a Mr DUNSTAN was supposed to be the one, you know, that people reported to. And then 3, also, you and Mr HEED were also responsible. You know, people were also reporting to you, and all these things CSE has a role in it. Isn't it? I mean, you can, of course, repeat what you said, which is that you don't have any contact with CSE. If you do, then my question is, do you mean to say that you just delegate these matters to your subordinates and you don't play an active role in that?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Delegation, 'yes'. Keeping monitoring, 'no'. I I will keep close control. The risk, the first task, as I said, was testing and commissioning. When we moved over, when we move across to transfer of the infra-structure systems over the day-to-day operations that will be a dual reporting with Chern and myself. The overall running of the Task Force meant that the overall responsibility for the well-being of those people, in terms of the staff, they were still IT staff. They were still staff that reported to me for their departmental HR, Human Resources.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Mr Chairman, you mean to say that the Head of this Task Force is only concerned with the well-being of the staff, rather than the successful running and completion of whatever task?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No. I didn't mean to say that. The responsibility for the completion of the work of the Task Force, the monitoring responsibility was mine. I was, I was adding explanation.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

All right. Testing and commissioning. I mean, are you telling this Committee that at any time during that period, testing and commissioning were never any problem. Everything was able to be handled by Mr Rob DUNSTAN without referring to you. There wasn't any or no opportunity that it was necessary for you at all to get involved or to contact CSE, or to even talk to them?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That is correct. Madam Chairman, can I give an additional explanation?

***Chairman:***

Yes, Mr CHATTERJEE, please.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I think it's important that the environment in terms of testing is appreciated. The Project Division set up some 8,000 square feet facility called 'Interface House'. It's a testing and benchmark centre and that was beginning to come 'on stream'. Every single contractor in terms of assistance contractor had to put equipment into this facility, so that they could be inter-connected and then inter-connection tests could be run. CSE were placed in this facility as well. The initial task of the group was to prepare for the testing, create the test scripts, and, when the systems that were being manufactured were brought into Hong Kong, they would first be installed at Interface House before going into the PTB. Now, we are talking about very large systems. We are not talking about just small testing and commissioning of PCs. We are talking about inter-connection over a very complex network. It was this reason why this Task Force was required by Project Division in terms of additional staff.

***Chairman:***

Yes, Mr CHATTERJEE. We are not doubting the need of a Task Force. Up to now, we have been asking the question on how the Task Force could have actually functioned as the proper co-ordinating body, representing the user and ultimately the owner, when you told us about 15 minutes ago that the whole show was actually being run by Project at the end of the day? Everything was being reported to Project. CSE which function as a consultant on the expert matters of IT were reporting to Project. AMD was not represented. You were supposed to represent AMD, but your understanding was that Project was running the whole show. Even when you expressed a difference of opinion, they were never taken on board, because there were already 2 or 3 examples of vital importance where this has happened. Now, as far as this Committee is concerned, we would like to ask where does the user come in in all of this? How was the user represented in the testing and commissioning? To tell you that, to put forward the message that you put forward a minute ago, unacceptable, that certain things were unacceptable. Who represented?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I think in particular how does Mr CHATTERJEE come in in all this?

***Chairman:***

Yes. I mean you, as representative of the user, were put in. OK. AMD and PD were not talking to each other we were told in an ADSCOM minute. So, you came in as the expert and you came in to represent the user. Your views were not put forward very robustly to the various senior people who could have made a difference. You did not. We could not see documentary evidence of that. You said that they were mentioned somewhere. OK. You let us know where. But we just don't know how the user's views and the user's opinions at the end of the day were protected. There was no evidence. I mean, we looked at the Task Force as some hopeful forum where this could be done. It wasn't done, or, at least, it hasn't been proved to be done. So, you have to tell us, was the user's interests and views and so on protected? Where does your expertise tell you that they should have been protected, and did you, in fact, fulfil that role?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

This Task Force was specifically, in the beginning, set up to help on testing and commissioning according to the contractual tests that had to take place. Right? And that role was fulfilled. After the testing and commissioning, the role was to change into hand-over of systems.

***Chairman:***

OK.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Are we talking about testing that took place over 9 to 10 months because systems were coming in at different times?

***Chairman:***

We will go into testing. Don't worry. We will go into testing in very, very detailed form because we we have actually all the material at hand. In fact, I was putting to you the view which you shaped this morning and unless you disagree, you have to provide us with the documentary evidence to disagree, that, in fact, you had a role to play. You were the expert brought in to represent AMD. How was that role manifested effectively in the whole working of the

co-ordination? Mr Edward HO, do you something to say?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Chairman, I mean, Paragraph 4. I don't think Mr CHATTERJEE has answered me first of all. I mean how could this seamless team be accomplished without him even in contact with CSE? Further down, point 4, Paragraph 4.4, meeting over a timetable for airport opening, so, I think he has simplified it into just testing and commissioning. Reading this, the Task Force has much more responsibility than just testing and commissioning. Could he answer those questions?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Madam Chairman, may I? I would answer by saying 'yes'. The responsibilities were to grow, but the first task - and that was made very clear to us - was testing and commissioning as the systems came in. As we approached airport opening and the systems became ready for handover to the user, it was at that point in time that our role would grow further. So, it was a phased set of work.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

No. I don't think he has answered my question. I mean, first of all, maybe one by one, can you explain to us how this so-called seamless team, in Mr CHATTERJEE's opinion, was to be accomplished?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Madam Chairman, may I?

***Chairman:***

Yes, please.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

To bring together a group of people representing AMD, Project Division working with CSE, as a cohesive team to run, and view and report on the results of tests to the systems.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Well, the way I read it at Paragraph 4, Chairman, does not just concentrate on tests.

***Chairman:***

Right.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

It's more an overall sort-of relationship between the different parties to accomplish a number of tasks which I admit include testing and commissioning.

***Chairman:***

Would you agree with that, because you describe the main task under Paragraph 5, but I think 4 are the factors which are critical? So, you know, it's in general terms, and they are not mentioned to be phased. I mean, this is where you all started work. You look at all these factors and everybody should have identified with these factors, unless you tell us otherwise?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I believe that the memo that was signed by Chern HEED and Raymond LAI will explain that more fully.

***Chairman:***

Right. I think we break here. We come back at quarter to twelve. We go to Conference Room C.

***(The hearing resumed at 11:47 a.m.)***

**主席：**

Right. We will move on to the GEC/EDS presentation in June 1997. Who would like to ask any questions on this presentation? 哪一位先問？原



本是單仲偕議員先舉手的，但他可能正有其他工作需要處理。Perhaps let me start first. Referring to Paragraph 23 of your statement, in that presentation to the AA Board, I believe, you have Software Build Programme Progress, and you gave us a timetable from Build 1.0, which is the BHS/TODC right up 'til 1 March 1998. Can you explain to us whether this was a timetable which was already agreed prior to the presentation and, in fact, even prior to the visit of the Project Division's representative, Mr K C TSUI, to the UK?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I don't know whether it was agreed prior to K C TSUI's visit, but, at the presentation, the view is quite certain that this was already an agreed schedule.

***Chairman:***

Two of the Builds were actually Builds which would have taken place even before the presentation. Right?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Chairman:***

Right. Can you tell us your awareness of this Software Build Programme Progress? What was your understanding then when it was presented? What was your understanding of how it was agreed and so on, and, as far as you are concerned, what was your understanding of your role in all this?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

In terms of agreeing to the dates and the delivery, I had no role. My understanding, at that time, was that the delivery had been agreed with Project Division. This was an approach where the different components, the main components of the system, would be built separately and then brought together at something called Build 2.0.

***Chairman:***

Given you had the Task Force, was the Task Force consulted or were you

consulted as far as this approach was concerned?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

This context had no relation to the Task Force, the work of the Task Force. This was separate.

***Chairman:***

No, but, I mean, the whole, it was a change of approach. Would you agree? You know, setting all these milestones, and so on?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Chairman:***

Yes. The purpose of which was to try and make sure that EDS was delivering on time?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct and to assure the Board.

***Chairman:***

And to assure the Board, but, as far as you were concerned, as far as the Task Force was concerned, as far as AMD was concerned, were you aware of any consultation, prior consultation, which had taken place before this approach was adopted?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No. I'm not aware of any consultation.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Chairman, noting that this Task Force is responsible for testing and

commissioning, and, you know, all these revised dates of delivery certainly would impact on testing and commissioning. Can Mr CHATTERJEE explain why the Task Force was not consulted or involved?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The Task Force again is a word that was, the aim of the group was to help Project Division at the lower levels of testing, detailed levels of testing. There was no responsibility of the Task Force to monitor overall the delivery of systems.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes. Chairman, if the date of delivery leaves very little time or inadequate time for testing and commissioning, surely the Task Force has a role to play. I mean it has to speak out if that is the eventuality. We see here, for instance, the final delivery of Build 2.1. I guess you could say that Build 2.1 could be delivered after AOD - I think I read somewhere - but anyway, it's very close to when the airport was supposed to open. That was in April 1997, at that time still, so, 1998. So, surely, the Task Force would be concerned about this late delivery. Would it?

***Chairman:***

Mr CHATTERJEE.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The Task Force was not working at that level. It was working at a much lower level as a resource to Project Division and the Project Management Representative, PMR. That responsibility in terms of review of all, the suitability of all of these dates and whether they would fit still rested with Project Division.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

So, Chairman, is Mr CHATTERJEE telling this Committee that the Project Division would decide everything: specifications, when they would be delivered and all that. At the end of the day, the user's department, that is AMD, and, of course, Mr CHATTERJEE, the sort-of IT Head, would just take whatever it

comes and whenever it comes, without any need to get advice on, say, timing for testing, commissioning and training, and so on?

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The responsibility for the contract and the control of that contract was Project Division, 'yes'.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

But maybe I ask the question in another way? Was there any agreement between Project Division and AMD as to when is the last date when these systems were to be completed and handed over, so that adequate testing, commissioning, training and all that could take place?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Agreement? Let me understand, was there an agreement between Project Division and AMD?

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Yes.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I am not aware of any.

**Chairman:**

With yourself?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

There was no consultation with me.

**Chairman:**

Would you consider that an example of bulldozing?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No. There was no bulldozing involved.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Would you consider that as desirable or undesirable. I mean, the fact that the end user has no part to play in determining the...?

**Chairman:**

No, no, sorry, sorry. I really would like an answer to my question. When a certain division determines a timetable which would impact on everybody-else, that decision was actually made and agreed with an external party without consulting any member of those departments and divisions which are going to be end users. The users are without any chance or opportunity of putting their views forward before the decision was made. Would you consider that as an example of bulldozing?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The reason why I can't give you an answer is that I don't know the background.

**Chairman:**

No, no. Never mind the background. I mean, would you look at the situation. You are presented with a *fait accompli* in June. You yourself and AMD are both user Divisions; you were together, you were supposed to represent AMD. There was no prior consultation. You were being presented a *fait accompli*, which would impact on your testing and all the, you know, sort-of acceptance, and this, that and the other of a very vital system, which is the heart of the airport. Would you say that there is an example of bulldozing?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I know of no direct evidence to show that that would be bulldozing. My understanding, at the time, Madam Chairman, was that this was a schedule that had already been agreed at some point in time.

**Chairman:**

Agreed? Agreed with whom? Between whom?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Contractually, by the Project Division.

**Chairman:**

Yes. With an external party. That was what I said.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I don't know if there was any bulldozing involved.

**Chairman:**

No? But I asked you whether there was any consultation. You said there was no consultation?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Not with me, and I also said I was not aware of any consultation with AMD.

**Chairman:**

Right. So, you are the end users. You were not consulted as far as these decisions were concerned?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's correct.

**Chairman:**

Yes. And the commitments were made with an external party without any agreement or consultation with yourselves?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Right.

**Chairman:**

Or with AMD who are the end users. Would you not consider that as bulldozing?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I don't know what other consultation did take place at the Board or at the director level.

**Chairman:**

You are Head of IT. You have just assured this Select Committee. Did they or did they not consult you?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No. They did not.

**Chairman:**

Did they or did they not consult Chern HEED?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I am not aware of whether they consulted Chern HEED.

**Chairman:**

Right. So, you were the 2 people representing AA?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I am not aware. They may have, but I am not aware.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam Chairman, just to follow up on that point. As the IT man acting for AMD, did you ensure that Chern HEED was consulted? Did you do anything to ensure that he was consulted?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I didn't.

***Chairman:***

After you learned that they had actually come up with this, did you actually ask to be consulted? Did you raise any objections that nobody consulted you?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

No, Madam Chairman, could I just ask a simpler question of whether Mr CHATTERJEE asked Mr Chern HEED whether or not he was consulted?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I do not remember asking. The answer is therefore probably 'no'.

***Chairman:***

So, how did you come to the conclusion of an answer just now that as far as you know, they weren't consulted?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Because I hadn't asked Chern HEED whether he had been consulted.

***Chairman:***

Well, I mean, your answer would have been you didn't know whether they had been consulted, but you said, as far as you knew, they were not consulted?



***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I said that?

***Chairman:***

I mean, you consider very carefully. You'd better answer this Committee accurately. We don't want you to go back on things that you've said; every time 15 minutes later you came out with a different answer.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I said I was not aware, which is the same thing as 'I do not know' whether Chern HEED was consulted.

***Chairman:***

As representative of AMD, would you not say that it was your duty to be aware whether they were consulted or not?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

As representative of the Task Force in terms of testing?

***Chairman:***

No, no, not representative of the Task Force. In the Task Force job description, you represent AMD and in every document that we look at it's AMD/IT, when it comes to accepting for the users?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

So, you are a partial user, if I may use that word?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Together with AMD?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Yes. So, as representative of AMD and as a partial user, did you ask to be consulted on this change?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No. I did not.

**Chairman:**

Why did you not? Why did you not?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was not aware of this until this presentation. I was not aware that the schedule had been agreed.

**Chairman:**

You were not aware of the schedule being discussed, or you were not aware of it being agreed? I think there is a difference there.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

At the presentation, it came across as being a schedule that had been agreed. I was not aware and I was not consulted in the days or weeks leading up to this presentation.

**Chairman:**

But I thought you told the Committee before the break that you were aware that K C TSUI went to Hook to discuss timetables?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Yes.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

And I will stand by that, but the result of the programme and the agreed schedules and when they were, I did not know after he came back.

**Chairman:**

Miss Margaret NG.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Madam Chairman, Mr CHATTERJEE, when you attended this meeting and you saw this schedule, you know at the time that great concern was expressed as to whether the delivery would be maintained. Did you, at least, after the meeting, come back to your client, AMD, and ask, 'Look, there is this schedule. Have you been consulted? Did you agree to it?' Did you do that?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No. I did not.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Why not?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I cannot remember why.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Don't you think you have a duty to do that? To make sure that your client was consulted, and that it was all right by him?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The impression that I got was that it was accepted.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Where did you get the impression?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

At the presentation.

**Chairman:**

By whom? Accepted by whom?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Did you get that impression? Sorry.

**Chairman:**

Mr CHATTERJEE.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Sorry. There were 3 questions there.

**Chairman:**

By whom? By whom?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

By Project Division, but not by Commercial. I do not have - sorry - not by....

***Chairman:***

AMD.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, AMD, because I do not, I did not specifically go and ask that question.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Right. Now, Madam Chairman, is it right that you had already a precedent in a previous incident in April, when AMD's views were very different from Project Division? Yes?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

There is. Could I come back to that question in a minute with your permission? Because this presentation was agreed as needed at the Board level and it was the Board that requested a workshop that EDS provide an up-date, at that Board, Chern HEED would have been present. Any discussions that took place in that Board I wouldn't have been aware of.

***Chairman:***

Sorry, we can't quite understand your statement here?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

My memory is that this workshop came about as a result of a request by the Board.

***Chairman:***

Yes?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

There must have been a discussion in the Board about FIDS.

**Chairman:**

Yes?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

And Chern HEED would have been at those Board meetings.

**Chairman:**

Yes. So, what has that got to do with your role as far as this revised Build was concerned?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In terms of knowing the new schedule, Chern HEED would have been aware of it.

**Chairman:**

Well, what about you as the Head of IT?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

As I said earlier, I was not aware of it until this particular presentation.

**Chairman:**

You were not aware of any discussion that went on between Project Division and PDS concerning this approach?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Except for the agreement that would have come forward from K C TSUI's

visit to the UK.

**Chairman:**

When were you aware of that?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

It would have been very close to when he went.

**Chairman:**

So, it would have been almost 2 months before this presentation. Right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

April, May.

**Chairman:**

So, you were aware before this presentation. Right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That K C TSUI had gone, 'yes'.

**Chairman:**

No. With this Build. I'm talking about this approach, you know, this breaking it up?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I was aware that they were breaking it up into various Builds? I was not.

**Chairman:**

You just told this Committee you weren't aware until this presentation?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Because the Committee just asked me on dates and the timetable.

**Chairman:**

No, no, we asked you whether you were aware of this discussion, this commitment, before this presentation and you said that you weren't aware until it was actually brought to the attention of the Board at this presentation. Now, can you answer that question again? We seem to be going back and forth, you know, Mr CHATTERJEE. Can you tell us at which point you became aware of the fact that there was a change in approach with EDS that they came up - they, what I mean 'they' is Project Division and EDS - came up with this Build. You know, separating the Builds and then doing it in phases. When did you become aware of that?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

As I said earlier, I was aware of the philosophy before this presentation. It was clarified for me at this presentation.

**Chairman:**

What do you mean 'philosophy'? Can you elaborate?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In terms of breaking it up into component parts and delivering those component parts at certain times.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

When? When did you first become aware of this philosophy, as you call it?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That would have come back after K C TSUI's visit, and upon his return.

**Hon Margaret NG:**



In April?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

From Hook.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

In April?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes. Whenever he came back. I can't remember the dates that he actually got back.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Right. So, you say that it is in this June meeting that you were aware of the dates, the schedule for the first time?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Right. Now, when you looked at the schedule at the meeting, did you consider whether this schedule is safe from your client's point-of-view? Was it acceptable?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes. I did consider it on 2 bases. The message that was coming across from EDS, which is the only one we could go on, was based on dates that seemed attainable plus the additional resources that they were placing onto the project. EDS came across very strongly, very confident and very positive.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Right. Now, I'm not asking you about the confidence of EDS being able to deliver on the days scheduled. I'm asking you about the schedule as such. Are you comfortable with this schedule? Are you comfortable with the fact that Build 2.0 would only be deliverable on 21 October 1997? Do you identify, in other words, with this schedule?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I was comfortable with the schedule, Miss NG. For example, Build 2.0 would have given us something like 6 months before airport opening.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Right. Now, looking at your Paragraph 24, at that time, you were comfortable with it. Was it because of the fact that EDS's assured that Builds 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 could be run as standalone systems?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

How much does that have to do with your feeling of comfort with the schedule? How important was that a factor that these could be standalone?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Very.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

All right. Now, at that time, what did you understand the standalone system to be like?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

OK. That the Airport Authority could run essentially 3 components separately. These were Builds 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5. Now, 1.3, Flight Display is

managing displays, sending information to displays and that's reasonably straightforward, as well as some of the in-built logic. 1.4, CUTE is an application by the airlines and installed by the airlines, by SITA on their behalf. That already works as a standalone. What they were expecting, what they were putting in here was an addition to CUTE, which is a small part. Then the allocation system was also very important.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Yes. So, Mr CHATTERJEE, the idea is that you are all going for Build 2.0 - right? - Build 2.0. That is an integrated system. There is an amount of risk of whether this would work, but the idea is, if it doesn't work, if the integration system has not been shown to work, then you would fall back on standalone systems?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That is correct.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Right. Now, that was what gave you comfort at that time?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

At that time, I mean, how do you understand the switch from the integrated system to the standalone system? What was involved?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Are you asking my view?

**Chairman:**

Your understanding.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Your understanding at the time.

***Chairman:***

At the presentation, at the time.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

At the presentation, OK. That EDS would continue working on each of the Builds individually and then, once finished, they would knit together those 3 Builds into Build 2.0.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

So, is it right that on the basis of this schedule, when Build 2.0 is delivered by 21 October 1997, the standalone modes will no longer be available. Was that your understanding at the time?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Sorry, which chart are you looking at, please?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

I'm looking at your Paragraph 23, Mr CHATTERJEE, the schedule.

***Chairman:***

I think the question should be turned around. I mean, at the presentation, would your understanding be that your degree of comfort, which Miss Margaret NG asked you a minute ago, was derived from the fact that you could actually unknit, so to speak, the various pieces, because the various pieces were just knitted together?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

**Chairman:**

As you use that word?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

So, if some part of it fails, all right, you can easily unknit. Then you have the standalone and some, I don't know, manual or?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

We were assured that that is the approach and that that would be possible.

**Chairman:**

So, in your mind, these are separate components knitted together?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

But could be unknitted almost instantaneously in a standalone fashion?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

With appropriate amount of work, 'yes', it could be unknit.

**Chairman:**

What do you mean 'appropriate'?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Not being a knitting expert myself, exactly what was involved? What would the unknitting involve as you understood it in June of '97?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I don't know what was involved but I can answer the question from an integration perspective in terms of technology. When you bring 3 components or 4 components together, you don't just knit the outside, you don't knit the skin together and then unseam. There are amendments within each component that one has to make - like the inter-change of data from one component to the other. There has to be amendments within the core also. So, that's what I meant with the 'appropriate' amount of work. We were assured that the amount of work necessary would be minimal.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Yes. Well, what was minimal?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I'm sorry?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

I mean, what was minimal? Quantify it for us if you like? Your understanding?

***Chairman:***

And also define the amount of work. The amount of work to be done before airport opening, or was it the amount of work?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

I'm sorry, Madam Chairman, may I?

***Chairman:***

Done on the spot?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

That would make things more complicated. Could I just ask, with your permission, what is the minimal work you have, you understood at the time? Could you quantify it in terms of resources, in terms of time, in terms of the way it has to be done?

**Chairman:**

No. Just describe it. Never mind quantifying. Just describe it.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes. Quantifying would be impossible, because we....

**Chairman:**

Describe it. Describe it. The minimum work. What did you have in mind?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Yes.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

When they brought the 3 components together, it would look like one, but it would be actually 3 components working internally within that one. Therefore all that they would have to do is to back away, back out and reverse what they've done, still leaving with those 3 components. Now, sorry, that's another.

**Chairman:**

In order to do that, would it require some work prior to that integration to ensure that they can back out of that very quickly?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I don't know the answer to that question.

**Chairman:**

No? But surely you must have had a picture in your mind to support your degree of comfort. You know, you felt comfortable, you said, as a fall back. So, in your mind, were you thinking that should something happen in the future when the system was not working or operating, should something happen, is this a very quick fall-back position that you can revert to on this standalone?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Oh, um.

**Chairman:**

What were you basing your degree of comfort on?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Yes. I'm afraid you have to try to answer this because it was so essential to your acceptance of this schedule.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Off the top of my head again, no more than 2, 3 weeks' work to unknit it and bring it back into a state that we could use.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Right. OK. So, firstly.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That sort of order of magnitude.

**Chairman:**

So, 2, 3 weeks of work, which could have been done before AOD - right? -before the integrated system?



**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Yes. So, you were assuming that 2 or 3 weeks' of work was done before. Right? Would have been done before? Was that it?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes. We would.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

So, Madam Chairman, let's clarify this. You were comforted. First, because fall-back on standalone would be available?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Secondly, should you resort to going back to standalone, the work involved would be in the order of magnitude of 2 or 3 weeks?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

2 weeks, yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Right. Now, my third question is, in your understanding at that time, when do you have to decide to go back to standalone? When does that crucial decision have to be made?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Looking at a 6 months.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Looking at that, Mr CHATTERJEE?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Well, looking at a 6 months' time frame.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Yes?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

For delivery to airport opening, giving us that 6 month testing and settling down period, beginning of September.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Sorry. Now, let's look again, assuming 21 October '97 is the delivery day of Build 2.0, all right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

That is what you will test, not Build 2.1. It's Build 2.0 which you are going to test. Right? Am I correct?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's correct.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Right. Now, is it the idea that if you then start to test this Build 2.0, and

then, at a certain point, you would arrive at the conclusion?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Ah.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

That it is not safe.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I understand.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

That you have to go to your fall-back and unstitch it? Right? Is that the idea?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes. Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Are you saying that? What would that date be?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Round about the time, before the, well....

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Looking at that schedule?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

November some time.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

So, about a month after the...?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Delivery, you would have to do that?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Because we would have to go through Site Acceptance Tests through the SAT before we began to get a clear view of the performance. So, we would be looking at a month.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

At the SAT would take a month? That's what you're saying. Is that right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

SAT would take several weeks - time to review the results, take the decisions.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Good, and you think that, given that delivery day, you can do it? Right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That I don't know. I can't answer it.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

No? Sorry! It has to be, because, at that time in June, you felt comfortable with the schedule. It must be because firstly, standalone is available; secondly, the order of magnitude, 2 to 3 weeks' work, manageable; thirdly, delivery day is 21 October that you have to make the decision some time

in November and that would still give you time. Right? These are all.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Very important. Now, is it right, Mr CHATTERJEE, that, by the time you arrive at February '98, when the standalone system was again discussed, you advised against it. At that point, you thought that it would no longer be possible to unstitch or no longer viable?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Was it viable or possible? Was it not viable or not possible?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

My view was it was not possible.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

From the position in June to the position in February, can you tell us when, in your opinion, it started to become impossible?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Madam Chairman, I don't know. I don't know because I have no way of knowing how EDS then subsequently progressed with their development and the methods they used for their programming. So, I would be giving an answer based on....

***Hon Margaret NG:***

No. By February, you were aware. Your opinion was that it's no longer

possible to go back to the standalone. Right?

**Chairman:**

Can I refer Mr CHATTERJEE to the memo which he sent to Billy LAM on 10 February 1998, which is Paragraph 45 in Volume X. Just now, Miss Margaret NG asked a question whether you advised AA, at that time, that it was impossible or whether it was, what was the adjective you used?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Viable.

**Chairman:**

Viable. Whether it was possible or viable? In Paragraph 1, you gave an analysis of the EDS Build system, the phases, and you said, "EDS have moved forward completely with this version with no ability to fall back on a previous version of the software." Then you went on to explain that the features have already been integrated. And then, over the page, "In addition there are connecting features that work between the functionalities to pass data from one to the other. To unstitch Build 2.0 into a component working modules will take longer than the effort to stabilise Build 2.0". Now, are you actually saying that that means that going back would be impossible?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

At that point in time, based on the reviews that we had done, and I had called for some reviews, because I remember this, I had one of my staff in Hook, a lady called Rita LEE. She did put together a draft report on the complexities of unstitching and, on that basis, I was saying 'yes', it would take longer.

**Chairman:**

Were you caught unawares then, or was it because in June you, in fact, over-simplified the whole question of standalone that you landed yourself in this position? You landed AA in this position that they expected they could unstitch, but, in the end, they couldn't?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No. In June, it was a firm comfort that unstitching was possible and it was based on EDS's.

**Chairman:**

Yes. What happened in-between? I mean.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Exactly. Madam Chairman, in June, unstitching was both possible and viable?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

That gave you comfort. You so advised your client in AA, AMD. Right? Now, when did you first become aware that you have reached a point when this is no longer viable or no longer possible?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Especially, Build 2.0 arrived in December.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Right. Now, at that time, has it become either unviable or impossible?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

We still hadn't looked at the system yet because it had just arrived. We were trying, we were going to be doing testing on it.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

So, on 21 December, you didn't know?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

On 21 December, that's the date that the software was available for us to look at and we did not know.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Right. Now, then you started to do some testing in January. Is that right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's correct. There was a Pre-SAT.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Right. Now, in January, I think by 19 January thereabout, have you been able to arrive at a conclusion whether or not it was possible or viable?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In January?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Yes.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Towards, during the time of the SAT, I had asked for this to be looked at by my staff at Hook.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

What? And did you then still have the view that it was either possible or viable?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

No. It wasn't confirmed until this memo, 10 February, that it was not viable.

**Chairman:**



Sorry. This memo was written by yourself?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Chairman:***

To Billy LAM?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Chairman:***

So, you must have come to this view by that time?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

Right. So, you are telling us that between 19 January and 10 February, you came to the view that it was not possible or viable?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Chairman:***

Yes. So, can you answer my earlier question? Were you, in fact, taken by surprise, because in June, you were actually under the impression that it could be unstitched?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Sorry. I didn't understand the question. The answer is taken by surprise?

**Chairman:**

Yes.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Specifically? Yes, I was.

**Chairman:**

You were taken by surprise?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

But, with respect, Mr CHATTERJEE, you couldn't, you shouldn't have been taken by surprise. You knew that whether it is viable and it is always possible given time. Is that right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Now, whether or not it is viable depends on how much time you have left before AOD to test and to decide whether or not to go back on the standalone. Right?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

So, as delivery day slipped that viability diminished. Wouldn't you agree?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Now, it must have diminished to a point of no return at some point. Do you agree? You understand me?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Basically, yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Well, if, for example, if they don't deliver by January, you knew that you can't possibly do it. So, have you been watching out for the date of no return?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, and continuously - sorry - 'date of no return'?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Day of no return.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

We said that the date of no return was, as discussed earlier, November, according to the June schedule.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

All right. Now, when you arrive at November and no delivery of Build 2.0?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

There was continuous focus with Project Division to.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Never mind that. So, when you arrived - I'm sorry I have to be as blunt as this - because I want to keep the line of questioning. Now, isn't it right that by November you have reached a point of no return? If Build 2.0 were delivered as yet untested in November, that decision of falling back would have become unviable. Is that right?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

If you look at that in its own, in single context, 'yes'. But then, if I may, other factors were that there were explanations as to the delays that were being expressed.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Never mind the explanations. But, at that time, did you then warn your client, AMD, "Look, that standalone mode is rapidly becoming unviable"? Have you done that?

***Chairman:***

Well, he didn't know until the thing arrived.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

No, no. Not at all. Madam Chairman, you see, after the thing arrived, if it is wonderful, that's fine, but it is no longer viable, according to Mr CHATTERJEE, in November, because if he had tested it, and if shown to have problem, he would no longer be able to fall back.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I understand the questioning. The concern grew. We were meeting on Friday with Chern HEED at the AMD meeting. So, yes, concern did grow.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Yes. Did you warn them, "Look, in June, I advised you this is comfortable with the schedule because, if it fails, we can fall back on standalone. Now, we are standing in November. I have to tell you I am no longer comfortable because your going back to standalone is rapidly becoming unviable". Did you tell them this?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Not in writing, but certainly there were discussions in November, where the concern at AMD meetings was raised.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Did you tell them in so many words that falling back on standalone is no longer viable?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

No. I did not. Not in November.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Did you do so in December?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

In December, the software arrived. It arrived in Hong Kong on 5 December for installation at Interface House. It was installed on 21 December, ready. There was a presentation or there was a demonstration by Project Division to both AMD and ourselves. Then the start of the compromise SAT or the compromise FAT, if you like, and it wasn't until the middle of January that I started looking for specific.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

But isn't it right by your own evidence that the date of viability had evaporated already by 5 December, when it arrived?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Don't you agree that this is something very, very important for AA to know and to advise ADSCOM? Don't you think that this is a vital piece of information because everyone had relied on standalone?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

In that context, 'yes'.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Why didn't you do it?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

It was being done, Ms. NG. It was being done but not in the form or the method that you are asking in terms of hard-copy evidence.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

No. I mean, did you appreciate the importance of the evaporation of the viability of the fall-back on standalone?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

We all were concerned.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

I'm sorry. I just asked you. As far as you're concerned, did you appreciate the importance?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Did you make enough noise to make sure that everybody appreciates that now, from now on, they can no longer rely on the standalone?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

There were concerns being raised, 'yes'.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Why did you have to wait for February? I mean you could write as well in December.

***Chairman:***

Well, actually, I'm sorry. I have to confess I am a little lost. I don't know whether that is being shared by other Members. I cannot understand why that follow-through was not done in the first place, when, in June, at the point where the question was actually asked whether there was fall-back and the reply was that there was this fall-back with the standalone. All right? If there was supposed to be this 2 or 3 weeks' work, as Mr CHATTERJEE put it, why was there no move to ascertain that the work was being done then to ensure that the fall-back indeed existed on AOD. Do you see what I mean? I don't quite understand why you had to wait 'til October or delivery date before you could decide on that, because obviously there was a very important contingency plan, a fall-back, that if there is no, if there is failure in the system and so on, you have to fall-back. That was the basis of your degree of comfort in the first place, in June. I can't understand why you made no effort to ascertain that, in fact, the fall-back was indeed an existing fall-back, if you see what I mean. If you knew that 2 or 3 weeks of work had to be done, instead of leaving it until the delivery in October, then you decide. I do not know what you were waiting for. I'm sorry. I know, of course, that Miss Margaret NG was asking what was the latest point you can leave it until, and you could say November.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Chairman, perhaps there should be some clarification as to what is the meaning of 'fall-back'?

**Chairman:**

Yes. The fall-back is the one given under Paragraph 24.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

I know. I know, but I think for most of us....

**Chairman:**

Yes?

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

We will interpret as if the system fails on AOD.

**Chairman:**

No, no, no. Sorry.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Some of us would interpret that as we have a system that we can fall back on. So, if the main system fails, we have this standalone system that one can switch on whether in 15 minutes, 30 minutes, whatever, and the system, and various standalone would still be running. Right?

**Chairman:**

Yes.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

I think this is one interpretation.

**Chairman:**

Yes.



***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I think Miss Margaret NG's interpretation would be that, if Build 2.0 arrived in December....

***Chairman:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

And that proves to be a flop, then, you know, you can go back to the standalone system, so that those could be operated on AOD. Can we get this straight, you know, clarified, which version, which interpretation are we talking about?

***Chairman:***

Yes. Mr CHATTERJEE, could you please elaborate on that? I think we, too, may have a different, slightly different view.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

No, Madam Chairman. It's not my interpretations. It's the words used by other witnesses.

***Chairman:***

Yes, OK. Mr CHATTERJEE, can you clarify, please?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

We are talking about FIDS main system, the ability to unstitch back to standalone components.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

When was the fall-back situation?

**Chairman:**

This was in June.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's correct.

**Chairman:**

You knew that. It was in June, exactly, maybe we can turn to Paragraph 43 which was where the presentation took place.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Sorry. This is June '97 we are talking about?

**Chairman:**

June '97, when the presentation took place. In fact, it has actually been clarified in the record that in the question and answer session. Look at it, the question and answer session, over the page, Mr SIEGEL asked, "If the integration in January/February 1998 fail, can you revert to the 3 standalone systems, or are we already committed to an integrated system?" Then Mr REES said, "The 3 standalone systems are always there as a fall-back", always there as a fall-back, and Mr SIEGEL said, "Will there be additional staff required for standalone Builds 1.3 and 1.5. A view needs to be taken on 18 September, as well as on the integrity of the system and staffing of AA". And then, Mr REES says, "Yes, EDS will provide the support should the standalone option be taken". So, on that basis, we are talking about a decision that could be taken in November?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes. If you add the fact that Build 2.0 comes in October.

**Chairman:**

But why is it that Mr SIEGEL says if the integration in January/February fail?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Which paragraph are you looking at?

***Chairman:***

This is a question/answer. Page 2 on question/answer session.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

Do you see it? Top of Page 2 of the questions and answers. Do you find it?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The second page of the questions and answer at the top?

***Chairman:***

Top of the page. Do you see that?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

The one that I've got is the.

***Chairman:***

Can you explain?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Page 4, or 3 of 4, or 4 of 4?

***Chairman:***

Page 4 of 4.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I'm sorry.

***Chairman:***

Top of the page.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Right.

***Chairman:***

Can you explain because this is very, very important for us? At that point, we were still looking at airport opening in April 1998. What does it mean? Can you explain to us exactly what it means?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I cannot remember, Madam Chairman.

***Chairman:***

No? On that, that must have jogged your memory on the presentation. You were there, were you not?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

And, in fact, you asked the question about staffing as well, at the bottom of the page?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

**Chairman:**

But anyway, what was your understanding about this whole fall-back business? Can you?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That, it would be that the 3 Builds in standalone would be available at any time.

**Chairman:**

So, it wasn't dependent upon the test in January or February or anywhere. It should have been there right from the beginning?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

The assumption was that it would be available at any time.

**Chairman:**

So, in fact, there didn't need to be any deadline. Right? They should have done it when they delivered?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

But, at the same time, following Miss NG's line of questioning, I was following up from October delivery of Build 2.0, as well.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Madam Chairman, it seems to me clear from this record of meeting that, at least to someone as concerned as Mr SIEGEL, the impression given was that the standalone system would always be available. Standalone means that, instead of there being linked, you just have extra people to link it manually and to feed in information manually. Right? And that is why Mr SIEGEL was interested in extra staffing and that is also what your question suggested. If we go back to the fallback on the standalone system, who is going to provide the staff? Would you agree with me that in this record of meeting, there was no hint that the

falling-back to standalone system would require prior notice and prior work of something like 2 or 3 weeks. Would you agree it didn't give that impression?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's true.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Now, your understanding in June was otherwise. Your understanding in June was that it would cease to be available after a certain deadline and that, at any time.

***Chairman:***

No, no. Sorry. Can we just sort-of stop it there. I think you are going beyond what the witness has actually said. The last question, Mr CHATTERJEE has already answered you. You know, his impression, he confirmed that it was the impression gained at the presentation that it was available at any time.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam Chairman, the question I wanted to ask the witness was that his understanding was clearly different from the impression we get from the record.

***Chairman:***

No, no, no. Can you confirm that?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam Chairman, may I finish asking the question? You then can over-rule me.

***Chairman:***

OK.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

My question is about his understanding. Was his particular understanding communicated to other people in AA?

***Chairman:***

First of all, can you confirm that Miss NG's understanding of your impression was different from the impression that we gained from the record? Or is it the same? I think we have to ascertain that first. Right? Mr CHATTERJEE, can you answer whether your impression of the time was that it was there available, the fall-back already, or whether something needed to be done to it?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

My impression based on the tick was that it would be ready at all times. If we looked at Build 2.0 and Build 2.0 was not going to be able to work we could then fall back. There would be some limited unstitching, there would have to be, because amendments to a new version are going to be made and because of changes to or corrections of errors, correction of problems or defects that come up.

***Chairman:***

So, you have actually confirmed. Well, Mr Edward HO, you want to supplement that question?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

I mean, it's contrary to what is recorded in this Q and A session and I want to follow it up.

***Chairman:***

Yes. Can you follow that up?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes, on the first page of Pages 3 of 4, the Q and A session, when Mr SIEGEL said, "You mentioned about the 3 standalone systems, i.e. Build 1.2, Build 1.4 and Build 1.5", can you explain what this meant? Was standalone impracticable in operations term. I think this is a very common-sense question and the answer was from a Mr REES, "Assuming that the 3 systems have to be operated on a standalone basis during operations, data will be input manually." That means during that day. Right? During operations, these standalone systems would be able to be fall-back on a manual basis?

**Chairman:**

You see!

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Not requiring a few weeks to unstitch.

**Chairman:**

Exactly. I think we have to sort that one out first. Sorry, Miss Margaret NG. You see?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

My answer. I still hold to it. I think you can look up the transcript. It's very clear. I asked Mr CHATTERJEE why he felt comforted the time, that is, in the meeting in June, and he explained what he understood by going back to the falling-back. He understood that it requires unstitching. He understood it would be a 2 to 3 weeks' job, but he thought that it was viable at that time.

**Chairman:**

Yes, OK.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

That's what he answered to my question.



***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

***Chairman:***

OK. Mr CHATTERJEE, as different from what Mr Edward HO just said, which was the impression as Miss Margaret NG described it, impression given during the meeting and particularly after what Mr Edward HO said that, you know, you can revert to the 3 standalones during operation. You knew even then and there that you needed the 2 to 3 weeks' work to unstitch?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

It was never my understanding, Madam Chairman, that there could be an instant, if that's what you are looking for, an instant reversal, reversal back to 3 standalone modes.

***Chairman:***

Was this appreciated within AA that the work had to be done?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I believe it was.

***Chairman:***

It was, and November was the point of no return?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

November is the date upon which we agreed looking forward to. Based on these dates, taking nothing else into account that would have been the date that we were looking at coming to a conclusion.

***Chairman:***

So, past November, it was the point of no return? November was the point of no return? So, beyond November, you really didn't have a fall-back any

more?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Taking that there were no other acceptable explanations given for changes, 'yes'.

***Chairman:***

But wouldn't you say that that was a very risky situation that AA has landed itself in?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Taken in its, taken in its. I'm having difficulty because there was continuous focus, there was continuous reporting by Project Division on schedules and whether the schedules had been slipped. We are talking about 21 October for Build 2.0. It finally arrived on 5 December. So, we are looking at 6 weeks' slippage. During that time, that slippage would have been explained and was explained to the satisfaction and the acceptance of both AMD and IT.

***Chairman:***

No, no. We are not talking about the slippage. We are talking about the situation that AA landed itself on at the end of 1997. Essentially, as far as FIDS was concerned there was without a fall-back position. Wouldn't you say?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

It was risky.

***Chairman:***

It was probably unacceptable risk, would you say? There was no fall-back?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

That's correct.

**Chairman:**

Did you voice that?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

There were 2 options one could take. One is no fall-back or press-forward with the integration system. I didn't voice in December but we voiced it in February.

**Chairman:**

Pressed forward with the integration system?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

The fallback was to cater for failure in the integration system but pressing forward with the integration system, how would that cover the other thing? How would that cover that you didn't have a fallback?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

I don't know how to answer that question. I wonder if we could approach? Could you repeat that again?

**Chairman:**

If you pressed ahead with integration, the fallback was there to cater for failure of integration. Pressing ahead with integration, how would that cover the problem of no fallback?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's true. The overall functionality, the overall specifications that were

agreed, apparently asked, not apparently, did call for a reduction in manpower and falling-back would have required manpower.

**Chairman:**

No. We are not talking about manpower. We are talking about whether you have fallback or don't you have fallback? And, at that point in time, you had no fallback, and your answer was press-ahead with the integration system? Right? You just answered just now. The answer was press ahead with the integration system?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

In terms of my memo, on 2 February.

**Chairman:**

No, no, just now, you said.

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

Yes, but I was referring to my memo of 2 February, my February memo too.

**Chairman:**

No. My question is how would pressing ahead with the integration system help with no fallback? I mean, how would pressing ahead with the one thing sort-of provide you with the fall-back or the contingency?

**Head of Information Technology, AA:**

That's true. It wouldn't.

**Chairman:**

Mr Edward HO, maybe we will ask one last question on this, and then we'll close.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes, I'm just referring to the Q and A session. I still cannot explain to myself what the true questions and answers were. I mean, I thought this standalone system were to provide a fall-back during operation. On the next page, Mr REES also said the 3 standalone systems are always there as a fall-back. This was in answer to a question from Mr SIEGEL, when he asked if the integration fails, what happened? Or if the integration, are we committed to the integration and he said, " No, the fall-back, the 3 standalone systems are always there as a fall-back"?

***Chairman:***

Mr CHATTERJEE has just told us that he always understood it wasn't going to be the press of a button, that some work had to be done, and that work had to be done before the system.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

But how can that happen during operation?

***Chairman:***

Not during operation, but.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

But there it's in black and white, though?

***Chairman:***

No. To facilitate that to happen during operation, 2 to 3 weeks' work had to be done.

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

And that was Mr CHATTERJEE's answer. He answered us already.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Well, it doesn't jive with what is recorded but, anyway.

***Chairman:***

OK. Well, anyway, that was the understanding anyway.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Madam Chairman, I would like to have a clarification. Maybe I can leave my second question 'til tomorrow?

***Chairman:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

But the first one is to do with job specification of Head of IT. Now, Mr CHATTERJEE, you are the Head of the IT Division. You are reporting direct to the CEO, Dr TOWNSEND. Have you ever been given a job specification for your position?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, I have.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Can you supply us with that document?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes, I can.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Before tomorrow?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

Yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Thank you.

***Chairman:***

Right. OK. Our hearing today will end here, but Mr CHATTERJEE please attend the hearing to be held tomorrow at 9 a.m. to give further evidence and to produce the documents we've asked you to produce. Can you forward the relevant documents to the Clerk this afternoon, say by 5 p.m. hopefully?

***Head of Information Technology, AA:***

I will make an effort to do that, 'yes'.

***Chairman:***

Right. You may now withdraw. Thank you. Can we just briefly stop at Conference Room C?

***(The hearing ended at 12:48 pm)***