

# 立法會

## 調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日 開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜 專責委員會

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第25次公開研訊的逐字紀錄本

日期： 1998年12月3日(星期四)  
時間： 上午9時  
地點： 立法會會議室A

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### **出席委員**

周梁淑怡議員(主席)  
何鍾泰議員(副主席)  
何承天議員  
李永達議員  
吳靄儀議員  
馬逢國議員  
張永森議員  
陳鑑林議員  
單仲偕議員  
蔡素玉議員

### **缺席委員**

陸恭蕙議員  
劉江華議員  
劉慧卿議員

### **第1節(上午9時至11時25分)**

### **證人**

赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組  
主席  
鄭國雄先生

## **陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士**

怡中機場地勤服務有限公司  
地勤分區經理  
王應聯先生

## **第2節(上午11時35分至下午1時05分)**

### **證人**

香港航空公司代表協會  
副主席  
施禮達先生

**主席：**

多謝各位出席今天舉行的專責委員會第25次研訊。

在未正式開始研訊前，我想提醒各位委員，整個研訊過程必須有足夠的法定人數，即連主席在內共5名委員。

我想藉此機會再次提醒公眾人士及傳媒，若在研訊進程序以外披露研訊上提供的證據，將不受《立法局(權力及特權)條例》所保障。因此傳媒應就他們的法律責任，徵詢法律意見。

專責委員會已傳召兩位證人出席今天的研訊，分別是：

- 赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席鄭國雄先生，他將會出席第1節研訊；及
- 香港航空公司代表協會副主席施禮達先生，他將會出席第2節研訊。

**第1節研訊**

在未傳召第1位證人，赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席鄭國雄先生之前，我想徵詢委員的意見，鄭先生要求帶同以下人士出席研訊：怡中機場地勤服務有限公司地勤分區經理王應聯先生。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許王先生在研訊進行期間陪同鄭先生，但他不可以在席上發言或提示證人如何回答委員的問題。

如委員對研訊程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊開始，並傳召證人赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席鄭國雄先生。

(鄭國雄先生進入會議室，  
並由王應聯先生陪同)

**主席：**

鄭先生，多謝你再次出席專責委員會的研訊。本專責委員會今天傳召你到本委員會席前作證，及出示與專責委員會研訊範圍有關的文據、簿冊、紀錄及文件。請你注意，你仍然是在經宣誓的情況下作供。

鄭先生，專責委員會已同意王先生可陪同你出席研訊，有需要時協

助你翻查文件，但他不可以在席上發言或以任何方式提示你如何回答委員的問題。

專責委員會現在會處理證人於出席1998年11月26日的研訊後提交的文據、紀錄及文件。

專責委員會知悉，證人已提供下列文件：

鄭國雄先生向新機場調查委員會提供的證人陳述書

鄭先生，你現在是否正式向專責委員會出示上述文件作為證據？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席鄭國雄先生：**

是。

**主席：**

我現在宣布上述文件獲接納為向專責委員會出示的證據。

鄭先生，現在我會向你提出第一條問題。你向調查委員會呈交的證人陳述書第15段中，列出7月6日機場啟用當天發生的問題的各個原因。請問鄭先生，這些原因可否預見及可否避免？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

其中有些可以預見，有些不能預見，視乎是哪個問題。

**主席：**

或者我們看看那幾個問題。請鄭先生翻閱第XII冊文件K2，即鄭先生呈交專責委員會的證人陳述書，請看第15段。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

第12段？

**主席：**

第15段。第15段列舉了6個嚴重的問題，影響當天的運作。請告訴

我們哪些問題是你們可以預見的？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

或者我逐項說明。

**主席：**

好。

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“Failure of FIDS”和“FDDS”是不能預見的。因為“FIDS”是由機管局提供，我們在機場進行演習時，在某程度上看到“FIDS”的操作已相當良好，當然還有些問題，但在演習後的檢討會議席上，“AA”表示會糾正及改善有關問題。因此，我們並沒有預計到“FIDS”會出現嚴重的“failure”。

第二項“Inaccurate and Missing Parking Bay Allocations”，我們能預見大部分情況，但不能預見其餘小部分有關缺乏“parking bay”資料的情況。我們曾與“AA”、“AMD”和“Airfield Operations”舉行一個相當長的“CROW meeting”，討論應如何編配“parking bay”。在會議席上，我們曾協議，原則上“parking bay”會以航空公司的飛機按區域分配，而按區域分配時，亦希望可與地面服務航空公司的“agent”配合。在機場啟用前幾天，“Airfield Operations Unit”給了我們一份臨時的樣本，即“template”，告知我們停機坪的“parking bay”的大致分配情況。我們相信他們能做到這個分配。但當日的分配卻與這個“template”完全不同。所以關於缺乏“parking bay”資料的這個重大錯誤，服務公司並不能預見。

第3點是“TMR”的負荷和電話線不足的問題。我首先講“TMR”的負荷。我們與“Hutchison”在合約內和服務標準內已訂明，無論在“channel”和“coverage”方面，他們需要有相當程度的“buffer”。其實根據在啟德的情況，我們也知道他們在某程度上，在“channel”的“coverage”方面會有問題。因此，這問題有小部分可以預見。我相信個別的航空公司亦會多買幾個這類“TMR radio”，而且在進行“grouping”時，會在服務層次上多做些“enhancement”的工作。這方面的問題在某程度上可以預見。

另外在電話線方面，我們早知道機管局不能提供所有電話線給我們的“back office”，我想他們只能提供約三成。在這方面，我們內部已作

出應變，各個作業的公司會購買多些流動電話，確保設有傳真線路，第3點問題在某程度上能預見的。

第4點是貨運站的交收程序。我們已預見部分情況，因為當時由停機坪到貨運站的環節並無問題，但我們亦看到貨運站準備的情況。在我們與貨運站交收的地方，有部分地方仍然在施工，因此我們有點兒憂慮交收程序能否順利進行。我們亦曾向貨運站的“ST1”反映情況。所以在貨物交收方面，我們感覺有少許問題。

至於“passenger disembarkation”或“aerobridges”方面，我們並沒預見操作方面會有問題，因為我們大約在4月已開始訓練操作員，“AA”亦已“certify”了他們的操作能力。因此在操作過程方面，我並沒有預見會有甚麼問題。但在“AOD”前一天，“AA”通知我們，操作“aerobridges”時，由原本用“swipe card”的方法，改為用“turn key”的方法。這並不是涉及如何到達登機橋，而是如何啟動登機橋的方法。我們獲得大約20條鎖匙，以當天的情況看來，我相信20條鎖匙並不足夠。當天相當缺乏鎖匙，所以我們在第二天複製了20條鎖匙，而機管局再多給我們10條，因此，在第二天開始共有50條鎖匙。缺乏啟動鎖匙的情況，我們已在“AOD”前一晚知道了。

至於“Baggage Handling System”，我們並沒預見當天的情況。因為在機場試行運作時，從第4、5次試行運作看來，行李輸送情況也很正常。我是指以“ramp handling”的角度而言，我們只需將行李輸送至正確航班的輸送帶上，而在第4、5次“trial”時，我們成功處理了約90%的行李。因此，我們不能預見當天行李處理方面的混亂情況。

**主席：**

多謝鄭先生。副主席。

**何鍾泰議員：**

多謝主席。請問鄭先生，剛才你提及有幾方面的情況是能夠預見的。之前在聯席工作組會議，即簡稱為“CROW meeting”上，你們曾要求取得這幾方面的資料。我知道你在新機場調查委員會上曾表示，你向機管局提出一些事，機管局應允了，但沒有處理，是否有這情況？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

在會議席上提出的情況，大致上是處理了。當時是有問題，但經過商討後，我相信他們大致上已盡量處理。我不清楚你指的是哪方面。

**何鍾泰議員：**

當時你是否指“FIDS”的問題較多？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“FIDS”是其中一個題目，我相信這問題大約在1997年7月已提出，機管局亦安排“IT”部門向我們講解。

**何鍾泰議員：**

在97年甚麼時候？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

大約在1997年7月會議席上，“AA”邀請它的“IT”部門向我們的“CROW members”就通訊系統作出“presentation”，包括“AODB、TMR、CCTV”和最重要的“FIDS”。

**何鍾泰議員：**

鄭先生，是否只有在那次會議席上講解“FIDS”，之後就沒有？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。之後機管局在舉行會議時講解服務標準和我們的要求，以及收費方法。之後曾舉行個別會議，向用家介紹，由個別用家跟進。

**何鍾泰議員：**

我的問題是，在去年7月後，有否再次召開會議，或者告知你們新的安排？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

在“CROW”的綜合會議席上並沒有再跟進，但改由“FIDS”的小組以另外一種形式跟進，與用家舉行會議，由個別公司參與這些會議。

**何鍾泰議員：**

你曾否參加這些會議？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我自己沒有，但公司內的“IT”部門有派人參加。

**何鍾泰議員：**

這類會議是否對系統資料有較詳細和深入的講解？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我相信是。多數是講解用家的要求，以及如何把信息傳送給用家。據我所知，開始時“AA”提議由該局提供這項服務，但可能由於價錢問題，後來把合約轉交“Hong Kong Telecom”負責，提供一項“FDDS”的服務。

**何鍾泰議員：**

你在調查委員會內提及，你們從來不知道“FIDS”有後備系統。

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

以我記憶所及，我們並不知道有後備系統。但我們曾提問，信息會否不能傳送給我們？他們表示當然會有應變方法，但以他們的部署和“FIDS”內部的軟件的補充，這種情況不會發生。

**何鍾泰議員：**

你說他們告訴你們，“你們”是誰？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**



即“用家”。

**何鍾泰議員：**

即“用家”，是否沒有在“CROW”的會議席上提及？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我相信我們亦有提及。

**何鍾泰議員：**

他們表示不會有問題，所以不需要有應變計劃。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不需要。關於“FIDS”的應變計劃，“FIDS”只是一個資料系統，如果“FIDS”沒有資料，根據“common sense”和“experience”，我們通常會從資料來源的地方查問，資料基本上是從“air traffic control”和“ACC”，即“apron control centre”，方面取得。應變計劃就是，如果“FIDS”沒有資料，便致電這兩個地方查問。

**何鍾泰議員：**

“打電話”就是你們的應變計劃？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是我們的應變計劃。

**何鍾泰議員：**

即用電話、用傳真機等。

**主席：**

我想問，據我們了解，“FIDS”一直以來並不十分穩定。你們在進行“trial”時曾試用“FIDS”。雖然這個“trial”並非實際的運作情況，但在進行“trial”期間，你們有否覺得“FIDS”並不穩定？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們的用家包括不同的航空公司。我們地面服務公司只需要兩類資料：一類是飛機到港的時間、一類是停機位置的安排。航空公司方面會較為複雜，他們有過磅的地方，有小部分工作需要“operate FIDS”。

**主席：**

鄭先生，測試當天你們是否要依賴“FIDS”的資料運作？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們只是觀看“display”畫面的資料，當時的資料也很正確及齊全，但正確及齊全的資料是指當日試行運作的情況，即3班機、5班機或數班機的情況。

**主席：**

換言之，你無法在機場啟用前，真真正正測試這些資料是否由一個穩定的系統提供，你們只是看到資料。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們只是看到資料，並沒有參與“operate FIDS”的測試。我們只是查察當中的航班有否到港資料、到港的資料是否正確，以及根據演習安排編配的航班機位是否正確。在這方面，可以說我們感到滿意，因為系統顯示的資料也相當準確。至於其他用家，從他們的角度來看，例如航空公司需要將小部分資料輸入“FIDS”，因此他們的參與比較多，而我們只是查閱資料。

**主席：**

吳靄儀議員。

**吳靄儀議員：**

多謝主席。請問鄭先生，你們和“FIDS”接觸，純粹是從用家的角度着眼，用家只需要看系統顯示的資料是否齊全、顯象是否容易看等，是嗎？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**吳靄儀議員：**

作為買家，你還會注意些甚麼？

**主席：**

用家。

**吳靄儀議員：**

是，即用家，還會注意些甚麼？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想是注意他們何時能提供資料給我們，以及資料是否正確。

**吳靄儀議員：**

即主要是速度問題。在97年的討論過程中，你是否知道提供資料的速度會是怎樣？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

在97年時，並未談及細節的問題。

**吳靄儀議員：**

根據試行運作時的實況，你是否知道傳送資料的速度？是否能夠測試出來？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我相信如果以幾班航機來衡量系統的速度快與慢，結果不會十分準確。

**吳靄儀議員：**

即不能衡量。另外，在試行運作時，航班資料、飛機停泊位置可能

有更改，在試行運作時有否測試這情況？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

沒有，系統只是顯示當時的編排，我相信沒有安排一個“scenario”，顯示資料不斷更改，給用家察看。

**吳靄儀議員：**

關於“FIDS”方面，主席，我相信我們是集中討論這方面。

**主席：**

是。

**吳靄儀議員：**

在你們參與的過程中，會否知道系統的進度、工作情況、在測試過程中有否出現問題，以及能否交貨等等？你們是否牽涉其中？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們沒有。

**吳靄儀議員：**

絕對沒有？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

絕對沒有。我們關注的是“FDSS”的網絡能否接往我們的辦事處。這是我們能夠“control”的。

**吳靄儀議員：**

或者請你詳細告知我們這方面的情況。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“HKT”的服務，即從機場資料庫“AODB”裏面的“FIDS”……

**吳靄儀議員：**

對不起，主席。首先我們由較早的時間說起。你說最初在97年時和你討論的是“FIDS”的服務，但後來討論的是“FDDS”，原因之一是否價錢的問題？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。在7月的會議席上，已開始提及準備把將“FIDS”的服務交由“third party”提供，但當時並未具體決定由誰人負責和從何時開始。後來的發展是，我們知道“Hong Kong Telecom”會提供一個稱為“FDDS”的服務。

**吳靄儀議員：**

是甚麼時候知道的？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我不清楚詳細情形。

**主席：**

你可以後補給我們。

**吳靄儀議員：**

是已踏入98年還是其他時間？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

還未……我想大約是在97年年底。

**吳靄儀議員：**

以你們所知，“FDDS”是怎樣的服務？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

服務是從“AODB”的資料庫傳送到“FIDS”，然後從這些資料中選取我們所需的，傳送至我們的辦公室。在我們看來，它只是負責“trunking、

networking”，但資料本身的“integrity”，是由機管局的資料庫負責，是“FIDS”的“system”。當天用家最關注的，是“Hong Kong Telecom”能否準時完成“network”，以及“monitor”會否安裝妥當。我相信“CROW members”的作業公司中，大部分在相當程度上都有“FDDS”的裝置。

以我的公司為例，大約在“AOD”前兩、三天有了這裝置。有了這裝置後亦能看到有“data”在內。這些“data”當然是根據我們的“specification”顯示出來，有航班到港時間、編排停泊的機位，但這是一些“raw data”，並非真實數據。我從用家的角度，預期“AOD”當天系統內會有真正的“data”，但當天的顯示的數據既不正確亦不準時。

**吳靄儀議員：**

你事前做了甚麼，令自己安心在“AOD”當天，“FDDS”能夠顯示正確的資料？有否討論進行任何試測、操作等？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

沒有，因為我們在“trial”期間也看到這些“data”，而我們也相當滿意顯示出來的數據。我們最關注的，是辦公室內是否有“FDDS”的“display”，因為如果沒有“display”，即使“FIDS”沒有問題，也沒有用。

**主席：**

對不起，鄭先生，你是說這些機器是在“AOD”前兩、三天才安裝妥當？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

即在兩、三天前，7月2日或3日才開始在有需要的地方裝上“FDDS display”，時間不是很緊迫嗎？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當然有一個“simulation”，可在他們的“workshop”內看到一個“simulated”的情況。

**主席：**

你是指之前？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“Hong Kong Telecom”在本身的“workshop”內有“simulated terminal”，我們用家亦到那裏看過安裝“package”後的情況，知道會是怎樣的情況。我們比較關注的，只是裝置的時間表。

**主席：**

你們對這麼遲，即在啟用前兩、三天前才安裝，也感到有點憂慮，是嗎？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當然。

**主席：**

但你們也認為沒有甚麼需要做，只不過是在辦公室放置一部機器。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

也不是甚麼也不做，我們每天也和“Hong Kong Telecom……”

**主席：**

我的意思是除了心急之外，在運作方面沒有甚麼可以做，因為只要鋪設了線路，把“display monitor”安裝在你的寫字樓內，便完成了，也不需要你進行操作，資料亦會顯示出來。因此，在你們方面，可以說是無需排練、訓練員工等。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

剛才我提過，這就是地面服務公司的需要，其他用家的需要可能會較為複雜。

**主席：**

因此，你擔心的只是到時沒有機器。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**吳靄儀議員：**

鄭先生，當天機器是否並沒有故障，只是沒有資料？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

資料不齊全、不正確、不太“consistent”，有時候是空白的。

**吳靄儀議員：**

即“FDDS”並沒有問題，只因為“FIDS”出了問題，所以你們得不到所需資料。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

這是我們的理解，因為當“FIDS”開始改進時，資料顯示便隨之改進，網絡方面並無問題。

**吳靄儀議員：**

我們在委員會上聽到很多有關“FIDS”的改進、進化過程的講解，你們並不知道這些，是否與你們無關？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們也有參與，當然我們也關心他們何時完成改進，以及內部如何改善等，但進程要在“AOD”後兩星期完成，大約到7月21日，用家才有十足信心使用該系統。

**主席：**

在“AOD”前，你們有否聽到“FIDS”的穩定性出現問題，或者你們對



此事是否有任何懷疑或資料？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們對技術方面並不熟悉，但我們當時對情況的理解是，這是小問題，他們應能跟進和逐步解決。基本上用家需要的資料，他們都能夠提供。

**主席：**

根據你們的理解，這只是小問題。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

這是我們的理解。

**主席：**

你剛才說你在“CROW”的會議席上提出，如果“FIDS”出現問題，即如果資料顯示或各方面出現問題，你說根據“common sense”，當然是用人手、直接通話等方式取得資料，是否這個意思？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。第一是以人手收取資料，而資料的來源不外是“ACT”和“ACC”；第二是如何將資料顯示，所以出現用白板的情況；第三是如何將資料發放給員工，這方面是可以控制的。就公司的應變措施而言，只可在這方面做功夫，就是增加手提電話、傳真和用人手。

**主席：**

你在第14段，即我剛才讀出的第15段的問題的前一段，你提及“JATS”，你公司本身的應變計劃。該計劃是如果停電、電腦發生故障、甚至其他設施發生問題，或“FDSS”出現問題等，你們會作出應變。這是否指你們與員工之間的聯繫？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是，這是我公司內部的應變措施，以應付公司內部的系統問題。當然我們亦視“FDSS”為我們公司內部其中一個連接系統，不過如果“FIDS”的資料有問題，我們無法控制。

**主席：**

剛才副主席曾詢問你，你在新機場調查委員會上表示，“AA”從來沒有與你們討論任何應變計劃。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

沒有。你是指“FIDS”，還是……

**主席：**

是關於“FIDS”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“FIDS”，沒有。

**主席：**

完全沒有向你們提及，如果“FIDS”出現問題，會怎樣處理？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

大家有一個“understanding”，就是如果有問題，通常“AOC”的“AEC”，即緊急中心便會運作。如果遇到問題，我們可以致電緊急中心。事實上，在“AOD”當天6時，我代表“CROW”在場。這是例行的安排，因為當時並未預見會有這些問題，而我是“AA”與“CROW members”之間的溝通和通訊橋樑。這是否屬於應變措施？我相信某程度上算是應變。

**主席：**

單仲偕議員。

**單仲偕議員：**

鄭先生，請問你有否聽過“stand-by FIDS”？在機場開幕前是否聽過？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我本身不清楚有“stand-by FIDS”。

**單仲偕議員：**

你沒有聽過？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我自己沒有聽過。

**主席：**

鄭先生，還有一件事，就是我們在其他證人方面聽到，在“AOD”開始時，行李顯示板的資料有些變更，但這些變更並不準確，不知為何，與應取回行李的地方不同。原本你們的員工已有一張紙載有參考資料，但他們的資料有變，你們想按他們的改變行事，但發現資料不準確，又需要參考紙上的資料。你可否說說當時的情況？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

這是到港行李。其實行李輸送系統很簡單，並沒有“conveyor”，“conveyor”直接到達第三層取回行李的地方。據我們理解，在“AOD”當天，下層地庫的到港行李輸送帶，“FIDS display”並未完善，未安裝妥當。但我們亦有一個“template”，即預先訂定各航班應使用的輸送帶。在出現上述情況前，因為航班的變動很大，以致“template”不能使用，我們原本想根據飛機的變動，決定航班應由哪條輸送帶處理，但因為“FIDS”的問題，下面輸送行李的輸送帶與上面指示乘客取回行李的資料不脛合，造成很大的混亂，最後大家決定不再按“FIDS”的資料辦事，因為“FIDS”根本不穩定，再採用“template”的安排，預定收取行李和存放行李均採用同樣的“template”，在通知乘客方面才能脛合。

**主席：**

這問題持續了多久？影響了多少班航機和乘客？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們與“AOCC”在上午10時開會時，已開始討論這情況。跟着便落實……

**主席：**

是否一開始已經出現問題？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“FIDS”開始有問題時，輸送帶的安排已出現混亂，因為在“FIDS”不能顯示出來。

**主席：**

但我們知道“AODB”在上午6時開始已有問題。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

只是開始，但正式出現混亂的情況，發現情況很嚴重時，是大約在上午9時。上午10時的會議是檢討“FIDS”的問題和處理辦法。

**主席：**

即已持續了兩、三個小時。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

副主席。

**何鍾泰議員：**

我想問關於“CROW”的會議。根據你的證人陳述書，你說在6月初已沒有再召開會議。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。因為我們提出的問題，即在我最初給“AA”的信件中所提出的建議，已全部討論過，我們亦已有……

**何鍾泰議員：**

即你們也感到滿意。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。有了答案和知道如何處理。

**何鍾泰議員：**

但是否有部分需要由他們處理、糾正和提供資料給你們？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

大致上是有的。例如剛才提及的停機坪的初步編排，“AA Airfield”在“AOD”前一星期已向我們提供有關資料，我們亦知道了，並根據編排來安排工作。即討論和跟進的事項，大部分在6月前已落實了，各航空公司各自準備“AOD”的工作。

**何鍾泰議員：**

其實有些服務是由你們向航空公司提供的？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

所有服務均是向航空公司提供的。

**何鍾泰議員：**

你們之間是否有一些協議？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

有的。在客戶，即航空公司方面，我們本身在商務上與他們有很多討論，亦知道他們的需要；在“business partner”方面，始終是圍繞“CROW members”，例如在貨運站、維修等各方面，我們也有“interface”，所以我們除了這個會議外，還個別與“AA”開會，大家也有很多商務上的小

會議。有了默契，便知道如何處理。

**何鍾泰議員：**

即在6月初，你們在聯席工作組可以處理的事情都已經處理妥當。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是，都做了。

**何鍾泰議員：**

後來，你們才發覺“FDDS”仍未安裝，在“AOD”之前3天才安裝妥當，是否會令你們沒有足夠時間去作訓練和試行運作？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

視乎個別情況而定，因為這些事項不會在綜合會議“CROW AA”會上討論，而是由個別公司跟進，因為每間公司在“FIDS”和“FDDS”方面有各自的安排、各自的需要，亦會與“Hong Kong Telecom”或“AA IT”部門定出一個時間表，不能夠在大會上討論。個別航空公司會根據本身的時間表跟進這些細節。

**何鍾泰議員：**

每間公司均有自己的培訓時間表，而“AA”亦需配合你們的時間表，你們才能進行培訓。請問在這方面，是否已給予你們足夠時間？或者是否已給予你們足夠的設施，使你們可以做到你們應做的……

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

應該有。從我們的情形來看，由於我們的專營權內訂明要在4月提供服務，當開幕延遲到7月，基本上我們需要調整培訓課程，與“AA”配合。

**主席：**

吳靄儀議員。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

對不起。

**主席：**

請繼續。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們在“FIDS”方面需要的培訓基本上很少，只是察看。

**何鍾泰議員：**

問題會否在於員工在一個新的工作環境下工作，當“FIDS”未能透過“FDDS”提供足夠資料，便影響你們的工作人員在緊急情況下難以統籌員工去做應做的工作？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

混亂是當然會發生的，因我們不能預見“FIDS”的情況。我們在停機坪方面的部署，對時間方面的掌握是十分重要的，因現時並非只有一間獨家專營的公司，正如在啟德機場時，只有一間公司提供地面服務，在停機坪的所有工作人員和機器均可通用，因此我們在“AOD”前，需要把一些機器設施預先部署在認為是需要作出安排的地點。若當天航機的停泊出現混亂，而需要調動這些機器設施，我們便會疲於奔命，因為機器的速度是受到限制的。

**主席：**

當天就是疲於奔命？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

應該是。

**主席：**

吳靄儀議員。

**吳靄儀議員：**

鄭先生，若取得準確的資料，你們提供的服務其實是十分簡單。實際上是否這樣？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的，所以我說的復原時間應大約是3天。當有白板顯示，有資料提供給我們，以及將停機坪的變動減至最少時，我們提供的服務便開始回復正常。

**吳靄儀議員：**

即是相對而言，你們在“AOD”之前的準備工作亦是簡單的？我的意思是，到了“AOD”時，我們知道其他方面，例如機管局等，有很多準備工作，如建屋、設立系統等，但對你們來說，所需準備的步驟相對而言是較簡單的，是嗎？所以到了“AOD”之前，你們不覺得存在甚麼問題。

**主席：**

鄭先生。

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

操作上是比較簡單，但準備方面的工作卻十分複雜，因我們需要認識很多新的設施，亦必須知悉新的機場運作守則及指引、機器的“specification”規格、安全守則等。但在操作上，知悉這些規則後，我們的準備工作便是熟習這些規則。在操作方面，其實是與啟德機場或其他國際機場大致相同的。

**吳靄儀議員：**

你剛才講述的一系列事項，如安全守則等，在準備方面，你們在時間上沒有問題，對嗎？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

對，並沒有問題。

**吳靄儀議員：**



所以問題其實集中在一點上，就是“應變”，你依賴準確的資料，但當時並沒有準確的資料，而機場的停機坪發生混亂，你們如何應變？問題的關鍵和重心是否就在這裏？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。當時我們並不“expect”情況會是這樣混亂。

**吳靄儀議員：**

所以在應變方面，直至現在，你唯一可以提出的應變方法是，若出現緊急的情況，“AEC”便會開放，你便會前往該處。但當日出現一些不能預見的情況時，你們是由誰人負責指揮應變方面的工作？你們做了些甚麼工夫？你們在事前有否考慮到，由於新機場是新環境，很多事情在事前是無法預計的，若啟用時出現混亂情況，你們會怎樣處理？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我不想講述其他公司的應變方法，相信他們內部亦會有大概相同的計劃，如“JATS”方面，我們亦有一個類似“AEC”的“Emergency Centre”，可隨時“activate”，裏面有電話和傳真機，加強這些應變安排。

**吳靄儀議員：**

但當日由誰人作指揮？尤其是你提到事前已知道啟德機場和赤鱘角機場的最大分別是，啟德機場只有你們一間公司負責有關工作，但在赤鱘角則有數間。有否想到在發生混亂時，各公司之間怎樣聯絡？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

所以設有“CROW”，以集合各間提供此等服務的公司，並由一名代表反映那些特別影響他們的情況。

**吳靄儀議員：**

純粹談到“AOD”當天，你們事前有否提過，在“AOD”當天若出現混亂，你們如何互相聯絡和統籌？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我的“statement”內亦有提及，“CROW”代表8間公司，遷往新機場後，我們首先和這8間公司的“Control Centre”，建立一個“contact”，若有甚麼特別情況，我們可以互相聯繫。至於有何應變方法，是有很多種，視乎情況而定。

**吳靄儀議員：**

你對“AA”說，若當日出現混亂，你會前往緊急中心。那麼你們“CROW”有否作出安排，說明在出現緊急情況時，有關人等如何集合在一起討論或互相溝通？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是有的。

**吳靄儀議員：**

情況是怎樣的？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們只能以業務合作的形式處理應變，不能考慮到別家公司的問題，亦不能知道別家公司會發生甚麼問題。舉例來說，在貨運站出現混亂情況時，我們“CROW”把一些工具組織起來，集中在一個“pool”使用，以“handle, deal with”這“situation”。這是合作的精神。

**吳靄儀議員：**

在當日？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是，我現在是說貨運的問題。你談及“CROW”內的應變情況。

**吳靄儀議員：**

當天是否如此？

**主席：**

我相信吳靄儀議員的問題是，應變並不是在你看見事情發生時才作出的，亦不是當事情忽然在你面前爆發，你才匆忙考慮怎樣應變。問題是你們“CROW”方面有否在“AOD”前作一些準備，萬一出現這種情況時，你們會怎樣處理？有否這種計劃？你們自己的公司有這種計劃的，甚至有清楚的資料提供給我們，但整個“CROW”方面有否聚在一起討論這事項？尤其是剛才聽到你提及資料來源對你們的重要性，沒有正確的資料，你們便無法工作。在某程度上，你們是較為被動的，對嗎？當工作出現時，才安排人手處理，如行軍一樣。若是這樣，資料來源便十分重要，因為那是觸動整個行動的。資料是你們的命脈，若沒有資料，你們便不知道如何處理。在這方面，你們“CROW”有否進行討論，有何應變方法？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

在資料來源方面，剛才我提及，“AA”在某程度上給我們很大的信心，我們有這些資料。

**主席：**

你一定要把這些資料提供給我們，若有這方面的文件，你最好提供給我們。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

文件方面，我想是在演習後的討論會議上所列出的問題，如何把這些問題的嚴重性分類，以及何時……

**主席：**

是與“CROW”舉行會議的？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是，是全部參與演習的公司。

**吳靄儀議員：**

主席。我的問題重心其實是，你們事前有否討論過，萬一當天出現一些事情，不單在資料方面，因為有很多事情是不可預測的，你們有甚麼方法互相聯絡，互相溝通？你們事前有否提出若出現問題，大家便要聚集在一起討論，研究如何處理？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

這個“CROW”並不是在6月後便結束，現時仍同樣運作。我想我在“statement”內亦有提述，會再成立一個會，專責應付貨運的問題。當然，若有影響“CROW members”的嚴重問題，便會舉行緊急會議。但若是講述“FIDS”的問題.....

**吳靄儀議員：**

不是“FIDS”的問題，請你忘記“FIDS”。我說的純粹是不可預測的事項，由於是數方面的人員同時在同一個地方工作，你們是其中一分子，你們之間有否互相溝通？依我們所見，當天出現混亂後，似乎你們需要等待“AA, AEC”在上午10時30分舉行會議時，才互相溝通，以解決問題，然後到了下午4時，亦是一同參加“AA, AEC”的會議，似乎在你們之間，並非已預先安排一套互相聯絡的方法，以及有互相聯絡的默契。情況是否這樣？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

或許你可參閱我提供給新機場調查委員會的“statement”，後面有兩份是“CROW member fax”給我的文件，是關於當天的問題，這些文件可以證明我們是有溝通的。

**主席：**

我們有那份文件。

**吳靄儀議員：**

哪一份？

**主席：**

即“PAPAS”和“HAECO”那份。但我相信吳靄儀議員詢問你的是，有否一個“CROW”，包括你們全部。我們並不是說你們完全沒有互通消息，而是說在應變時，有沒有一個預先安排的機制，供你們在發生特別事故時，“CROW”便會立即舉行緊急會議，或是討論如何溝通。似乎我

們在文件中找不到這些資料，但只知悉你曾參與“AOCC”的兩個“meetings”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

若說正式“identify”在何種情況下要如何應付，這是沒有提述的。因這個“CROW”並不可以……“CROW Chairman”，就是我，不能“monitor”、“insist”或“enforce”他們準備一些應變計劃。

**吳靄儀議員：**

原因首先是當日“ramp handlers”發生大混亂，這本身是一個大混亂，當然，這可能是由於你們沒有資料，但無論是甚麼原因，這是你們之間的大混亂。第二是你們之間發生的大混亂，亦影響了貨運方面出現大混亂。所以我想了解當天你們是如何互相溝通，在事前是否準備有何默契互相溝通，以避免這些大混亂的發生？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

就這些大混亂，我們當然有個別的解釋。你所說的是貨運站本身單方面觀察出混亂的原因。其中當然有很多原因，所以你問有何溝通，當然是有的。在“operation”的階層一定是有溝通的，有甚麼問題，如交收的程序不妥善，應如何改善。貨運站內每天均舉行會議，這並不是較“high level”的“Cargo Crisis Meeting”。另外，在“operation level”方面，每天均在“ST1”舉行一個有關“Cargo”的會議，這是一些基本工作，以處理“operational level”的問題。但在“policy”方面亦有舉行會議，“Cargo Crisis Meeting”由“Mr SIEGEL chair”，所有“ramp handlers”均參加，專注處理貨運的危機問題。

**主席：**

或許我們現在不具體講述貨運方面的問題，相信大家稍後在這方面還有很多問題。其實剛才吳靄儀議員只針對一個問題，透過貨運的例子發問此一問題。你剛才說啟德機場只有一個“ramp handling operator”，現時在赤鱘角機場，單是“baggage”方面已有三個，其他方面還有，總共是8個“CROW members”。整件事便變得複雜化了。在統籌等各方面的事情便較為重要，若不是互相存有默契，可能會造成混亂。若是這樣，究竟這默契是否存在？你如何肯定這默契不會構成一些因互相之間不協調而產生的混亂？其實那是你們之間的最主要事項，例如你們的“procedure”是否一樣？或是你們在互相分派工作方面的溝通是否很足

夠？或是其中有些“missing”？因我們另外有些“evidence”，有些人對我們說，甚至“AA”本身在7月7日進行檢討時，亦說“ramp handlers”方面沒有“management”，他們是這樣說，我們並不一定“take”他們的“word entirely”，我們是要知道……

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想他們只是針對某些公司。

**主席：**

他沒有說明是哪些公司，只是一般性的說法。所以，請問你作為“CROW”的主席，是否肯定互相間有……你剛才的“statement”是甚麼意思？是否說某些公司並不協調？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是。你所說的“management”的問題，以我的理解，這並不是“general”的說法，我想是指某些公司。至於在協調方面，在我提供給調查委員會的“statement”內亦有列出很多“meetings”是關於“cargo”的“interface”，包括全部兩間貨運站，三間“ramp handlers”，一起討論在貨運方面如何協調。我想最少舉行了十多次會議。在行李方面，因行李系統是“AA sub-contract”的系統，我們“ramp handlers”，以及他和“airlines”均派員參與這些“baggage”的“interface”的“meetings”。我有一份“list of meetings”的“dates”和參加會議的人員名單，載於“attachment”。我們舉行了多次會議。

**主席：**

副主席。先跟進這個“point”。

**何鍾泰議員：**

是，就是這個“point”。請問鄭先生剛才提到在貨運協調方面有很多會議，是否等於“CIP”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。

**何鍾泰議員：**

但根據你提供給我們的資料，至6月初大家才互相決定一個最後的程序。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。

**何鍾泰議員：**

問題在哪裏？為何有這麼嚴重的延誤？你們的培訓亦不能進行。我想知為何如此？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想這是時間表的問題，但對於培訓方面並無影響。這只是一個“guidelines”，讓“staff”參考應如何處事，而且我們的處理方法亦不是和啟德機場或其他機場完全不同。

**何鍾泰議員：**

鄭先生，就是因為有所不同，這是一個新的環境，現時有3間公司，而過往只有一間，由於是全新的情況，所以只要出現小問題，便會做成十分混亂的情況，是否這樣？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

你說得對。雖然是新的公司，但“ST1”亦曾在啟德機場經營，3間“ramp handlers”，其中兩間約佔了90%生意的公司，均是曾在啟德經營的公司，這是基本的結構。所以大部分工作已有了認同，其他工作則專注在新機場的“difference”，如何處理不同之處。

**主席：**

李永達議員，請跟進這問題。

**李永達議員：**

主席。我想跟進剛才的問題。我們得到一些關於當日現場情況的證供。初期沒有甚麼問題，但當機器不斷運作、運送行李和卸下貨物時，便發覺出現問題。我們前往參觀的地方是按不同的“ramp handling”公司劃分區域的。貨運站方面的說法是，到了某一階段時，工作人員已不理會應把行李放在哪間公司負責的區域，因航機不能停留太久，最終也是要離開的，所以要把行李全部卸下，只要是“石屎地”便把行李放上去……

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

你說的是貨物。

**李永達議員：**

是。所以到了中午或較後時間，你們自己也不知道貨物放在甚麼地方，總之是整個貨運站外可以放置貨物的地方，均放置了貨物。問題是這是否當時的一個現象？若是，你們實際在地面工作的總負責人看到這種現象，曾以甚麼方法盡量避免這種現象發生？因我們所得的證供，指出在黃昏時，整個貨運站外可能已放置了很多貨物，但不知來自哪一班機，要逐一檢查才能找到資料。

**主席：**

鄭先生。

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

關於貨運站的情況，由於航機是按原定計劃抵達，我們對航空公司承擔的責任，是卸下這些貨物和行李，把它們運送至指定的地方。若我們不處理這些工作，便是未能履行工作上的責任。有關貨運站的問題，我想各位議員已獲悉其中的原因，就是內部的“Systems”問題。以我們的“procedure”來說，行李到達時他們派員接收，我們放下行李，他們簽收，要在30分鐘內送進去，“make available”有空間和供應一些工具給我們運作。當時的情況發生後，他們未能完成這部分的工作。由於貨物是不斷運抵機場的，我們始終要把貨物放置在盡量接近接收的地方。若全部原定接收的地方已滿載貨物，我們只能放置在最接近的地方。

**李永達議員：**



你們作為處理這些工作的運作人員，應知道貨物運抵後需要有空間放置。你們在地面工作的同事，當知道那些空間已放滿貨物，他們有否試圖與貨運站，或機場貨運停機坪的負責人商討，如何處理不斷運抵的貨物？當然，從你的角度看來，把貨物下卸至地面便完成了責任。我假設，若你們之間，即機場管理局、貨運站和你們“CROW”的數位地面總負責人之間存有默契，最少可以減輕現時出現的問題，商討貨物可放置在某個區域，那麼至最後執拾或檢查時便較為容易。請問在當天，你們曾否這樣處理？或是你們有這樣做，但地面的負責人說已沒有地方，只要卸下貨物放在最接近的地方，完成了責任便可離開。實際上是哪一種情況？

**主席：**

鄭先生。

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

在當天的過程中，大家均希望解決這問題，因貨運站如何恢復運作，這是否一個短暫的問題，我們都不能預知。

**李永達議員：**

鄭先生，你無需這麼詳細講述此事項，只要答覆具體的問題……

**主席：**

鄭先生，李永達議員的問題很簡單，當日出現你剛才講述的問題，即未能接收貨物時，各公司同時面對這個問題，你們之間有否作出安排，以期在混亂的情況中，作一些較有秩序的處理安排。你只需針對這個問題作答。

**李永達議員：**

或是你曾要求“AA”或“HACTL”指揮你們如何處理，只是他們不懂安排，你們才胡亂處理。情況是怎樣？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當時未能想到具體的解決方法，因為貨物不斷運抵機場，但又未能送到指定接收地點，於是很快便舉行“Cargo Crisis Meeting which deals with”這些“accumulative cargo”。

**李永達議員：**

當時是甚麼時間？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想各位亦十分清楚，是把貨物送回啟德機場。

**李永達議員：**

但那是甚麼時間？

**主席：**

那不是當天的事吧。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當然，那不是當天的事。

**李永達議員：**

正是如此。鄭先生，我想你具體地回答，其實你那位在地面的同事有否嘗試接觸機場管理局的負責人，或“HACTL”的負責人，尋求指示，使你們數間處理行李的公司在地面的指揮人員，懂得應如何處理，令混亂的情況能稍有一些秩序。或是你們覺得沒有此需要，而你的同事亦沒有這樣做，只把貨物卸下，放在地面便算完事了。

**主席：**

鄭先生。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當日在“AOCC”的會議上，我們反映了這個問題。

**李永達議員：**

不是當日。鄭先生，你總是不肯答覆我的問題。問題是當日你在地面負責指揮的同事，可能不是你本人，可能是你的下屬，當他見到貨物漸漸在地面堆積的現象，是否已意識到，或你曾給他訓令或指示，應該向“HACTL”或機管局的某負責人尋求指示，以作處理；或是你的同事根本沒有這樣做。

**主席：**

鄭先生。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我的同事把這種情況向公司匯報。

**李永達議員：**

那你們怎樣處理？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們公司亦向“HACTL”講述當時的情況，但因為情況非常混亂，在“救火”的時候，他們亦沒有甚麼明確的解決方法。

**主席：**

你的意思是，當時是在“AOCC”的會議上？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是。我們本身亦有向他們提出這個問題，後來在當天約四時許的“AOCC”會議上，我們亦提出這個混亂的情況。他們亦十分明白。

**主席：**

即是說，你直接向“HACTL”提出，問他們有甚麼方法。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們詢問有甚麼方法可直接把貨物快捷地送到收貨地點，若沒有一個明確的解決方法，我們只能履行本身對顧客，即航空公司的責任，就是把貨物送到他們的地方。

**主席：**

那是幾點鐘？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

這個我不記得。但我們是有溝通的，並非沒有溝通，這是在“operational level”方面。

**李永達議員：**

鄭先生的意思是曾接觸“HACTL”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當然。

**李永達議員：**

你沒有收到任何良好的指示，說明你應怎樣處理問題。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。

**李永達議員：**

你可否憶述當日你提出的問題和所得的答覆？

**主席：**

即不是由你詢問他們，而是“operational level”提出詢問。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

這不是我詢問的，是由我們的“operational level”提出詢問。我想這是一個很明顯的問題，現時貨物積聚，我們把貨物運來時，沒有地方放置，

我們會問他們有甚麼解決的方法。

**李永達議員：**

你的意思是“HACTL”沒有指示你們如何放置堆積的貨物，以便在混亂的情況下，稍為有一些次序。他們連這些指示也沒有。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是沒有明確的指示的。

**主席：**

他們有否向你們說在“HACTL”內由誰人負責處理這已出現的危機？有沒有人對你們說，應找某人？有沒有？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想當時是“Operation Manager”負責，因為是他負責操作的事宜。

**主席：**

這是你所想的，還是你知道？為何我們一定要知道……

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

這個問題是那樣嚴重，已到了很高“level”，好像是由“K.K.YEUNG”負責。

**吳靄儀議員：**

可能鄭先生沒有預料會有這個問題，可否請鄭先生詢問你的下屬，當日最初你們是何時與“HACTL”聯絡，以及與他們哪一方面聯絡？

**主席：**

好的。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想我們有幾位負責不同崗位的下屬，均提供了一些“statements”

給調查委員會，我可以把那些“statements”提供給你們。

**主席：**

好的，請提供給我們，並請答覆一個問題。你們是其中一間處理有關工作的公司，除了你們外，其他處理同樣工作的公司，亦不能進入“ST 1”。你們各公司之間有否作橫向的商討，研究由於現時無法把貨物運進去，在停機坪積聚的貨物愈來愈多，該怎樣處理？當時有沒有作任何橫向的商討？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是有的。你是說停機坪服務公司？

**主席：**

是的。面對“HACTL”沒有答覆的情況，幾間公司之間的商討。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。當時的情況當然是先照顧各自的利益和責任上的事項，以及向“HACTL”提出如何解決問題。而當時最嚴重的問題，或許各位已聽過，是“dolly”短缺的問題，因為這會直接影響我們的運作，我們需研究如何處理這問題。

**主席：**

因貨物未能卸下，所以積聚起來。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

工具是愈來愈少。在這方面，在“AOD”前，我們三間地面服務公司已把這些工具集合在一起，以一個“pool”的形式使用。

**主席：**

你提到“dolly”，我亦順帶詢問一個小問題。其中一個說法是，你們把客運大樓的“dolly”亦用作運載貨物，實際上是否有這種情況？令客運

大樓亦出現問題。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

客運大樓的“dolly”？客運大樓並沒有“dolly”。是不是指機管局的“dolly”？

**主席：**

不是機管局吧。他們那兒是否亦有一些“車仔”？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

他們說的是“手推車”還是……？

**主席：**

是的。當時有人對我們說，客運大樓的“dolly”被你們使用了，因為你們貨運方面不敷應用，便使用了他們的“dolly”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

關於“dolly”的運用，無論是行李的“dolly”或貨物的“dolly”，均是由我們靈活使用的。這是沒有關係的。當時他們說的是否“手推車”，即運送手提行李的……

**主席：**

英文均是“dolly”，我不清楚是指哪一種。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

那些是“self-help trolley”。

**何鍾泰議員：**

那是“trolley”。“dolly”是較大型的。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

那些是機管局的，手推用的，與我們的不同。

**何鍾泰議員：**

主席，“dolly”約有千餘架，大概是1,030架。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

大約是1,050架。

**何鍾泰議員：**

是否大部分(佔800多)屬“HACTL”的，其餘是你們的？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是，大部分是我們的。

**何鍾泰議員：**

大部分是你們的？有800多架是你們的？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是，我們3間公司加起來，約有1,000架。在啟德機場獨家經營的香港地勤只有500多架。

**何鍾泰議員：**

主席，我還想問“HACTL”本身是否擁有一部分？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是有少量。最後他們好像增購了300部，這是“AOD”後的事。

**主席：**

陳鑑林議員。

**陳鑑林議員：**



主席。我想了解的是，鄭先生剛才講述，在他們的範圍內的“FDDS”，是在“AOD”前兩三天才安裝完成，以致基本上你們沒有時間與“FIDS”連接起來，你是否真的看到有關的運作情況？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們是沒有可能看到“AOD”當天的資料。

**陳鑑林議員：**

我知道。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

但至於“simulation”，在“Hong Kong Telecom”的“workshop”可看到該“format”是否符合我們的要求。這只是一個“simulated”的形式。

**陳鑑林議員：**

是的。但最重要的是“FDDS”所接收的資料是由“FIDS”轉來的。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。

**陳鑑林議員：**

雖然是由“Hong Kong Telecom”提供的間接資料，但實際上你是否知道，“FIDS”和“Hong Kong Telecom”的“interface”是否成功？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是有的。我們的“IT”部門是跟進着“Hong Kong Telecom”在“FDDS”方面的時間表，雖然時間表是十分緊迫，至最後“AOD”前一兩天才裝置完成，但我們有內部的“IT”部門跟進着時間表。

**陳鑑林議員：**

所謂跟進着時間表，是實際的串連，還是由“Hong Kong Telecom”提供資料？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是實際的串連，裝置完成，而且可以把“FIDS”的“information”供應給我們。

**陳鑑林議員：**

那為何在兩三天前才能裝置完成，原因為何？你們有否追問他們？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想原因是“Hong Kong Telecom”和“AA”本身的“IT”部門配合情況，以及訂單的問題。因他們的客量和工作量均十分大，這是他們的壓力。

**陳鑑林議員：**

據你們預先所知，“FDSD”應在何時安裝在你們那處？而工程又延遲了多久？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

關於這具體的延遲程度，我現時沒有資料。但我們的最後期限是“AOD”前的兩、三天，而差不多是到了那時候，我們才裝置和看到畫面，時間當然是非常緊迫。

**陳鑑林議員：**

但事前你們亦曾作出警告和告知“AA”？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。“Through”我們的“IT”部門跟進這事項。

**主席：**

鄭先生，你在陳述書第37段中提及有關泊位方面的事項。當初你對我們說這問題是未能預計的，但在這裏則說，地面上有些劃線是錯誤的，以及有一個“Automated Docking Guidance System”，當日不知何故關閉了，你說是“shut down”了。可否說明這兩件事？這是你事先沒有

預計的，當時實地泊位時，才發現“marking”不對。為何會出現這樣的情況？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們是不能預計的，因為這問題需要一架真正的飛機進行泊位才能看到。若我們在演習時，有飛機到新機場進行演習，便沒有這問題。

**主席：**

演習時沒有這問題，是否因為飛機數目太少。到真實情況時，則全部飛機亦會使用。不是全部都出現問題吧？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是全部。

**主席：**

只是其中一部分？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。

**主席：**

但你們沒有測試，到時真有飛機到來停泊，才知悉是劃線錯誤。是否這樣？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的，就是這種情況。

**主席：**

劃線的工作由誰負責？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想是屬於“Airfield Operation”統籌範圍內的事情。

**主席：**

“Airfield Operation”。當然是工程上的一種錯誤。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。

**主席：**

但要確定責任誰屬，就是“Airfield Operation”？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

以我所知，若我發現這些問題，便通知“Airfield Operation”。

**主席：**

那麼“shut down of Automated Docking Guidance System”的情況是怎樣的？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

這是與“stop-lines”，即“marking”有關。

**主席：**

即是有關連的。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

他一定要關掉該系統。

**主席：**

“OK”。單仲偕議員。

**單仲偕議員：**

對不起，主席。我想詢問的是鄭先生的“statement”中，第34和35

段的事項。你在證供中說明，在首三天你差不多均是在“AOCC”，即“Airport Operation Control Centre”內，特別是在第一天，你在上午6時已到該處報到，跟着在上午10時便舉行緊急會議，問題愈來愈大。根據你的敘述是“Airline Operators Committee and the Government”，可能是你的敘述不夠詳細，我相信“AA”，即“Airport Authority”亦有人員參與.....

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

那當然是。

**單仲偕議員：**

那“meeting”由誰“chair”？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是“AA”。

**單仲偕議員：**

你在“statement”內敘述有關由上午10時至正午12時的情況。到了正午12時，你們發覺問題可能十分大，需要動用“whiteboards”。這裏敘述在正午12時要“set up whiteboards”，以提供航班抵達和離開機場的時間。請問那些白板是否早已備妥，還是當其時才前往購買？還是怎樣？為何要.....

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

先說這個問題。

**單仲偕議員：**

好的。

**主席：**

首先這個“meeting”由誰人“chair”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是“AA”。

**主席、單仲偕議員：**

是哪一位？

**主席：**

是由哪一位“chair”？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

根據我的記憶，通知我參加的是“Mr. Eric WONG”。

**主席：**

我知道。但上午10時的會議由誰人負責？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

上午6時的時候，“Eric WONG”在那兒。

**主席：**

上午10時的會議由誰人“chair”？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

上午10時是“Mr. Chern HEED”。

**主席：**

“Mr. Chern HEED chairs”的。“OK”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想後來“Mr. SIEGEL”也參與。

**主席：**

你說的後來是指甚麼時間？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是當日下午4時的會議。

**單仲偕議員：**

主席。或可簡單具體一點，上午6時的會議由誰“chair”。你在這兒說……

**主席：**

單仲偕議員，不用了，剛才已答覆了。上午6時的會議是“Eric WONG”請他出席，“Chern HEED”則“chair”上午10時的會議，至下午4時便是“Mr. SIEGEL”。鄭先生，請你繼續答覆“whiteboard”是早已備妥還是臨時購買的問題。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“AOCC”是一個原定的“setup”，以前啟德機場和其他機場均設有應變中心。應變中心當然有很多設施，以我記憶，其中是有“whiteboard”的。但“whiteboard”是較為標準的“size”，也有電話、“fax”機和一些“CCTV”，監察有關的地點。當會議開始時，討論如何應付“FIDS”的問題。有一個討論的過程，並不是前往東涌買白板，或是其他事項，而是如何前往“ATC”和“ACC”收取資料。當時有數個方案，亦討論了是否由本身的用家，派專人前往“ACC”收取第一手資料，或是通過航空公司提供。這些是其他討論過的方案，最後決定採用一個“centralised”白板最為有效。當時的白板不足以容納全部的航班資料，我相信是向其他的“offices”找一些白板回來。在下午4時，有一個過程討論如何加入這些資料，“ETA”應在甚麼時間收取。有些認為要在航機着陸後才能提供，有些則說用家航空公司需要一小時前收到。但若在一小時前收到，其中可能有很多更改。愈遲收到便愈少更改，但愈遲收到，對我們的準備工作亦會構成問題。討論過程就是這樣，但白板這個決定並不是花太多時間。

**主席：**

鄭先生，可否更準確地說，你們在事前根本完全沒有任何討論，無論是與“AA”或其他“parties”均無任何討論，關於可能因資料不準確、或沒有資料所產生的問題。但當時其實就是正正發生這樣的情況。你們根本沒有就這個可能性作任何討論，直至當天忽然發生這事件，你們便覺得事出突然，才開始考慮如何作應變。情況是否這樣？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

情況並不是這樣。我在開始時已講述，若收不到資料或資料不準確，我們便往資料來源追尋，即致電“ATC”或“ACC”，或親自去拿取資料，這已是既定的方案。但當時，我想其他人亦知道，那麼多人致電“ATC”或“ACC”，根本無法接通。我們把這情況告知“AOCC”，這個方案根本無法實行，因為當時已達到無法取得資料的階段。

**主席：**

換句話說，你們根本上沒有考慮過當天出現的情況，因為你們依賴一套基本的傳遞消息方法，即派員拿着一張紙傳遞也可，利用電話也可。你們根本沒有考慮當時有很多人同時需要索取這些資料，並不單是你們。即使只有你們，亦已包括很多人。事實上，“airlines”也要，這個“party”也要，那個“party”也要，根本是沒有人負責統籌。直至當天問題發生了，你們才坐下來討論，發覺原來這麼多“parties”均受影響，然後才商討如何應變。情況是否這樣？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想是，我們當然只是想到與本身有關的方法。

**主席：**

我明白。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

但這個方法是否可行，或引致一個“global”的問題時，其後如何處理這最大的影響，這是我們“AA”或其他個別部門均沒有想到的問題。

**單仲偕議員：**

主席。對不起，我有幾個問題。



**主席：**

單仲偕議員。

**單仲偕議員：**

你剛才提到自己在首3天均在“AOCC”內，我見到你的“statement”敘述自己在那處上班。你說在下午4點，會議由“Mr. SIEGEL”主持，當時他仍是民航處處長，他是否算是“take over”或“in charge”，還是擔當甚麼角色？“Chern HEED”是負責甚麼的？“Chern HEED”是否在場？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“Chern HEED”當然在場，他在“AA”或“AMD”的角色需要配合，我們是一個“service provider, airlines as clients”。

**單仲偕議員：**

我們亦到過那房間，其實那房間並不太大。在“AOCC”內，約有多少人參與會議？例如8時30分的一次，“sorry”，或許說上午10時決定用“whiteboard”那次，和下午4時那次。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想大約有30人。

**單仲偕議員：**

接着在第46段，你敘述在首3天你均在那兒，“I was mainly at the AOCC at the first 3 days of airport operation”。其實你感到在這3天內，你在該處的作用是甚麼？以及有甚麼工作是在該處完成的？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

均是圍繞着那幾個重要的問題，“FIDS”、貨運、行李、“ramp parking bay”的調動問題及公司本身的人手、資源問題……

**單仲偕議員：**

其實是依靠“AOCC”得到各方面的資料，你再通知你的“members”……

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

你說的是否當時討論的情況？

**單仲偕議員：**

你在該處是參與會議還是“operational”，處理一些工作？

**主席：**

他在下午4時是參與會議……上午10時是參與會議。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是參與會議，而所得的解決問題方法或方案則由個別公司負責執行。

**單仲偕議員：**

在你的敘述中，未有詳載第2天和第3天的會議情況，可否對本委員會作簡單介紹？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

剛才我已提述，是圍繞數個問題不斷跟進，進行“review”。

**單仲偕議員：**

在那兩三天後，由誰人“in charge”那些“meetings”？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

也是“Mr. Dick SIEGEL”。

**單仲偕議員：**

“Dick SIEGEL”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是的。

**主席：**

以你的理解，是否在上午10時仍由“AA”負責統籌？但由下午4時開始已由民航處“take over”，並由民航處接手處理。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“Take over”的問題是……

**主席：**

我覺得你作為其中一個“party”，一定要對我們清楚說明你當時的理解。在上午10時，由“AA”負責某些事情，但我們亦得到一些證據，說明由上午10時至下午4時，情況並沒有甚麼實質改善，有些事項根本是無法處理的。事實上我們亦可看到航班受阻的情況不斷惡化，停機坪和貨運處理均發生混亂情況。是否由當時至下午4時便由民航處“take over”統籌工作？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我記得是在下午4時後，便由“Dick SIEGEL run”那個“meeting”，我不知道他當時是代表民航處還是以民航處處長的身份出席。我的“impression”是會議是由他“chair”的。

**主席：**

“OK”。鄭先生可否講述在上午10時的會議後，你們是在正午12時開始使用“whiteboard”等各項設施……

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是在正午12時決定。

**主席：**

在正午12時才決定，不是在上午10時決定？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

上午10時開始討論應如何處理，至正午12時作出決定。

**主席：**

好的。在正午12時決定採取這種處理方法，到了何時才準備妥當，開始應用？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

在正午12時的會議已決定在下午4時實行。

**主席：**

正午12時決定，下午4時才實行。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

換言之，你們是否需要4小時才能完成“set up”的工作？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是。就機場、飛機升降而言，正午12時至下午4時是較為清閒的時間。我們在這段時間籌備各項工作，通知機場各個“parties”我們要實行這項措施，並要求他們派人員到“A OCC”抄寫白板的資料。

**主席：**

你們在上午10時開會，討論至正午12時才決定採用白板這項安排。換言之，你們並非一早已有了這項“contingency”安排？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我想不是，因為我們曾討論多個方案。

**主席：**

鄭先生，我可以告訴你，根據其他證人向我們作出的證供，他們一早已安排“workarounds”，一旦“FIDS”有問題，他們會採用“workarounds”，其中包括使用白板。不過，根據你的證供，你們在上午10時開會，考慮不同方案，最後決定採用白板，即大家同意這個方案後才付諸實行。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當時有人提議使用白板，並可以直接取得白板。我們圍繞3個方案討論，最後決定採用白板。我不清楚在“AA”的腦海中，是否已有這個方案，作為解決問題的辦法之一。

**主席：**

即你們在會議席上曾討論……

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們曾討論採用甚麼方法，將信息取得、顯示並發放。當時有人建議每組均須派一位代表直接前往“A OCC”索取第一手資料，再自行把資料傳達所屬公司。經討論後，我們認為統一使用白板的安排較佳，航空公司藉此安排可向我們提供抵港航班的資料。不過，這方法始終美中不足，因為我們不知道停機位的安排。

**單仲偕議員：**

我想提出一個問題。

**主席：**

單仲偕議員。

**單仲偕議員：**

請問在討論的過程中，該3個方案(包括使用“whiteboard”)是否由“Chern HEED”提出，供你們考慮；是否由他向你們推薦使用

“whiteboard”；又或是在討論的過程中，有不同人士提出不同方案，最後大家選擇採用白板？

**主席：**

鄭先生。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不是由“Chern HEED”提出使用白板。簡單來說，這方案並非“in the mind of AA”，並非由他們提出供我們考慮，而是有人就當時的情況提出這項建議。

**主席：**

即當時……

**單仲偕議員：**

換言之，不是“Chern HEED”或機管局的高級職員向30名與會者提出方案，建議應如何解決當時的問題，並徵詢各人的意見。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

沒有這樣斬釘截鐵的“guidelines”。

**單仲偕議員：**

好，接着我想就下午4時以後，第2天及第3天在“AOCC”內的情況提問。以你作為一個參與者、用家的角度來看，根據你的印象，你認為“Dick SIEGEL”是否，不要說“entirely”，已主要由他“control the situation”？。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我認為主要由他“control the situation”，尤其是貨運、“embarkment”、行李及“FIDS”等方面的問題。

**單仲偕議員：**

“Chern HEED”當時的角色為何？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“Chern HEED”負責屬他職權範疇的問題，例如“FIDS、terminal”內的問題。當然，我剛才所說的是我關注的問題。“Terminal”的多個問題（例如“PA, office conditions”）也有提及，因為“AOC”亦有參與。剛才我提及的是我自己……

**單仲偕議員：**

純粹從你的角度去看。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當提到“PTB, terminal management”的時候，當然“Mr Chern HEED”要回應。

**單仲偕議員：**

“OK”，“Chern HEED”要回應。“Dick SIEGEL”在第二天、第三天負責主持會議。該兩天通常舉行多少次會議？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

至少兩次。

**單仲偕議員：**

是否早一次，晚一次？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**單仲偕議員：**

是否有30多個“parties”參與？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

由於時間較為緊迫，我們稍後會有另一節研訊，希望大家盡量兼顧其他範疇。或許我們現在可以討論有關當日負責消息傳遞的多個系統，看看各同事有否問題。我首先提問。據你剛才表示，當日只有30%的電話可以使用。

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我是就我本身公司而言，並非代表“CROW”發言。

**主席：**

總之，這不是一個理想的百分率，你公司只有30%的電話可以使用。據你所知，其他“CROW”會員曾否就可以使用的電話數目作出投訴和表示不滿？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我不清楚其他成員有沒有提出激烈的投訴，但他們始終認為可以使用的電話數目不足。

**主席：**

在電話服務方面，你們是否有多個“service providers”？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

究竟是“AA”還是其他“service providers”未能為你們提供電話方面的服務？



**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當然我們有要求我們的“service provider”跟進處理，但根據架構，在“network”、“conduit”及“trunking”方面，始終由“AA”的“IT”部門負責統籌。

**主席：**

是否由於“AA”始終沒有提供“blockwiring”及“trunking”，以致無法接通電話，所以你們的“service provider”也無能為力？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。就我們公司而言，當日我們最後只有20條線左右。

**主席：**

請問是多少條線中的20條線？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們需要80多條。

**主席：**

即所提供的電話線不足30%。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

差不多。

**主席：**

你們是否在6月24日前作出申請？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是，當然是。我們是按照時間表作出申請的。

**主席：**

即你們很早已作出申請。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

很早申請。

**主席：**

你亦提到，由於當日“TMR overload”，因此和記需要處理線路的問題。根據第43段，你們當時很依賴電話，你們的工作人員帶同和記的工程師前往處理線路問題，希望能盡快提供服務。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

不過，你在第43段提到，由於他們沒有證件，所以不能進內處理線路問題。你特別強調此點。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

請問那些工程師結果何時才可入內？鑑於當時情況緊急，電話不能接通，為何出現沒有證件的情況？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

除我們外，在機場提供服務的公司約有90%是聘用“Hutchison”的服務的。作為“CROW”的主席，我以這個身份協助他們入內。當時約有10名機械技術工程人員，為了讓他們入內，唯一及最快捷簡單的方法便是由我“escort”他們入內，當然他們必須申請證件和辦理若干手續。

**主席：**

他們是否也需領取臨時證？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是“on-the-spot”在“gate house”立即發出的臨時證。

**主席：**

但你在這裏表示“could not obtain”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我不清楚“Hutchison”向“AA”申請證件時有何阻滯，可能他們未能提供某方面的資料，以致申請證件有困難。由於當時情況緊急，我們作為用家，唯有“escort”他們入內。作為“escort”，我們需陪伴他們工作。

**主席：**

你意思是否指，他們雖然取不到證件，但由於有你陪同，所以他們可以進入？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是，他們以一個被擔保的形式入內。

**主席：**

大家就“HACTL”方面還有沒有問題？我們剛才已提出一部分問題。馬逢國議員。

**馬逢國議員：**

我想就第15點提問。剛才提到的6個問題中，有些是可以預計的。據你先前表示，你曾就貨運站預期出現的問題預先向“HACTL”提出意見。請問你們是在甚麼情況下提出意見；而這些意見有沒有向“AA”反映？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們曾進行“trial”，當我們把貨物運往貨運站作“simulated handover”時，我們看到周圍環境仍是“under construction”，我們對此較為關注。不過，“HACTL”亦通知我們，在“AOD”當日，他們會按照我們的“procedure”，“designate”一個地方作“interface”，供我們交收貨物。

**馬逢國議員：**

有沒有證據證明你們曾就此方面的問題往來文件？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

沒有。

**何鍾泰議員：**

主席，我想就此點跟進詢問。你提及有一個地方供你們交收貨物，那地方是否指大樓的東面？那處是否堆積很多建築廢物？

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。那處的確堆積一些建築廢物。

**何鍾泰議員：**

是否還有一些空車在阻塞空間。

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

也有。我們盡量放進去，由於有建築材料堆積在內，因此空間並不多。

**何鍾泰議員：**

但你曾說，你們之前已就此方面溝通及協調。

**赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

他們說會清理。

**何鍾泰議員：**

但結果如何，他們是否沒有騰空地方，沒有清理廢物，以致那兒仍有很多建築廢料？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

以我們觀察所得，仍有相當……

**何鍾泰議員：**

相當多建築廢料。你們是否不能進入東面，因而搬往北面？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不能說不能進入。

**何鍾泰議員：**

是否地方不夠？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是，地方不夠。

**主席：**

馬逢國議員。

**馬逢國議員：**

你們是預先在會議席上反映這些情況，還是在很“casual”的情況下表達意見？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

由於我們在6月後沒有正式的會議，因此只在“operational”方面，尤其是在演習時我們才發現這情況。他們說這些廢物會在“Day 1”前全部清理。

**馬逢國議員：**

結果仍然有廢物。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們在“Day 1”仍然發現有相當多的廢料。

**馬逢國議員：**

你們有沒有採取措施克服困難？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

由於那處地方是“ST1”的“property”或“premises”，我們只能告訴他們這情況會影響“operation”，並請他們立刻清理場地。

**馬逢國議員：**

這情況如何影響“operation”？你們是否不能交收貨物，抑或不能依照程序處理貨物？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們仍會依照程序處理貨物，那裏是“interface area”，我們仍會把貨物交到那裏。但這已變成小問題，因為貨物根本不能搬進去，一直堆積。

**主席：**

“OK”。我想跟進詢問，當旅客下機登上“airbridges”方面的情況。你剛才提到，本來是用“swipe card”的，但忽然轉用鎖匙。你是否前一晚才知道這項新安排？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。大約在7月4日。

**主席：**

7月4日才忽然通知由“swipe card”轉為鎖匙。你知不知道為何要作出這項安排？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我認為可能“swipe card”內的“response”系統並非十分“stable”。

**主席：**

你們本來有多少張“swipe cards”？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不，我們使用本身的證件，即機場證。

**主席：**

你們是否直接用本身的機場證“swipe”便可以，無需另做新證？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不錯。

**主席：**

你們曾否與他們交談或舉行會議，藉以向他們反映，若根據新安排行事，你們便要很多鎖匙才能運作？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們有向“Stephen”提及此事。他交鎖匙給我們時，我們也提出鎖匙不足。他們說會在“AOD”多給我們鎖匙。不過，在“AOD”，我們沒有收到更多鎖匙，在翌日才收到。但“AOD”當日我們已自行複製20條鎖匙。

**主席：**

我想清楚知道那個“party”是你們的對口？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

“Airfield Operations”。

**主席：**

是“airfield operations”，不是“contractor”？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

據我了解，我們“directly deal with AA”的“airfield operations”。我們不知道他們如何與“contractor”討論，我們不會直接和“contractor”討論。

**主席：**

鎖匙不足的情況如何影響當日的運作？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

大家要“share”。若停機坪不是經常轉換，20條鎖匙也可以應付。但由於飛機停泊在不同位置，鎖匙便需迅速送往別處。若非出現我們不能預見的問題，20條鎖匙也勉強夠用。在那些情況發生後，鎖匙便不夠用。因此，我在“Day 1”便馬上複製更多鎖匙。

**主席：**

對不起，請你清楚說明。你在“statement”內提及鎖匙的問題，但並沒有就由“swipe card”轉用鎖匙的過程提供詳情，只是指出鎖匙不敷使用。據你剛才提出的補充資料，當時情況很倉卒。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

他們在7月4日才通知我們。

**主席：**

在7月4日才通知你們，但機場在7月6日凌晨已開始運作，即你們只得7月5日一天作出安排。



**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

基本上是星期六、星期日兩天。

**主席：**

他在時間那麼緊迫的情況下才告訴你們要轉用鎖匙。當時，你是否已告訴他鎖匙不足夠？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我告訴他20條鎖匙可能不足夠。

**主席：**

他是否答應會在“AOD”給你更多鎖匙？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是，他答應會多給一些鎖匙。

**主席：**

結果，他們在“AOD”當日是否沒有為你們提供鎖匙，是否直至7月7日才提供？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

鎖匙不足的問題除了對工作人員造成不便外，會否影響他們的運作，因為他們可能從未使用鎖匙？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

不。在訓練過程中，“control panel”之下已有鎖匙，工作人員只須使用鎖匙便可“activate”。

**主席：**

工作人員是否知道可能要使用鎖匙？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

工作人員在當日是否沒有出錯？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

沒有出錯。使用鎖匙的程序不會有問題。

**主席：**

當日的運作如何受到影響？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

鎖匙不足及停機坪分配混亂均造成影響。

**主席：**

我現在集中詢問鎖匙不足如何影響當日“airbridges”的運作。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們要等工作人員送交鎖匙。

**主席：**

請問這情況如何影響乘客？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

要等我們用鎖匙來啟動“airbridge”。

**主席：**

“I see. OK”。請你再說停機坪方面的問題所造成的影響。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

你是說如何影響整體落客的情況？

**主席：**

是。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

當日，停機坪的安排經常轉變。舉例而言，我們原本預計飛機會停泊這裏，但後來飛機卻在別處停泊，我們因而需重新調配人手。此外，正如我剛才提及，車速亦有限制。再者，由於飛機延誤，我們在調配人手方面亦有困難。飛機抵港時，我們的工作人員必須在場，把登機橋準備妥當。由於我們不知道飛機何時起飛，因此我們的工作人員必須留守那兒，待飛機起飛時把登機橋推後。因此，飛機的延誤使我們難於調配人手。

**主席：**

李永達議員，你有沒有問題？何承天議員。

**何承天議員：**

主席，委員曾否就“airbridges”的設計提問？

**主席：**

你可以發問。

**何承天議員：**

我首先想問證人，就設計而言，新機場的“airbridges”是否與啟德機場所用的“airbridges”不同？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**何承天議員：**

功能上是否有些分別？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。多種……

**何承天議員：**

很多乘客均認為，他們要在飛機等候很久，待“airbridge”泊近飛機才可下機。是不是有這情況？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們曾就此方面進行測試。我已在“statement”內提供一個“performance standard”，由開始啟動登機橋至橋身泊近飛機為止，大約需要一分鐘，而我們亦有把這個標準告知“AA”。

**何承天議員：**

但實際情況如何？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

實際上，剛才提及的多個因素造成阻礙。

**主席：**

不是，剛才何承天議員說，很多人……

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

事實上，在操作時間方面，我們一直有向“AA”提供我們的“standard”。現在由開始操作至泊近飛機的“standard”時間大約為1分鐘至2分鐘。

**何承天議員：**

在“AOD”當日有沒有記錄需要多少運作時間？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

在操作方面我們需要2至3分鐘。

**何承天議員：**

本委員會的委員曾前往赤鱘角新機場視察情況。當時，機管局人員對我們說，由於經訓練並負責操作“airbridges”的工作人員不足夠，因此負責的公司(據我估計，即你們)未能達到他們所要求的運作時間。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我不同意這點。

**吳靄儀議員：**

“This is not the evidence before this Committee.”

**何承天議員：**

我正詢問有關資料。

**主席：**

他的問題與“AOD”有關。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我不同意這點。我們公司有超過130名人員可以操作登機橋，他們曾受過訓練，並經“AA certified”。

**何承天議員：**

你剛才是否表示這條橋和啟德機場的橋在設計上有所不同？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**何承天議員：**

這個設計會否延長登機橋的操作時間，繼而使乘客需等候較長時間才能落機？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我認為這個設計不會對操作時間造成太大影響，而現在我們的操作時間也只是1分鐘至2分鐘。新舊機場的登機橋在結構上有所不同，例如新機場的登機橋設有空調及“ground power”，但這些分別不會對登機橋的操作造成太大影響。

**何承天議員：**

機管局人員向我們表示，新機場登機橋具有較多調節的功能。請問你對此有何意見？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

就操作方法而言，我認為新機場與啟德機場的登機橋並無大分別。因此，有操作經驗的人員，可在1天內修畢訓練課程。

**何承天議員：**

你可否提供證據，顯示在“AOD”當日，操作登機橋的時間是合乎所要求的標準？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們在首兩天沒有記錄所需時間，但第四天開始我們已能提供數據。

**何承天議員：**

是否第1天沒有記錄時間？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

沒有概括的數據。或許我可以翻查我們“service record”的時間。

**何承天議員：**

你能否向本委員會提供這些數據？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

可以。我盡量回去找找那些數據。

**主席：**

馬逢國議員。

**馬逢國議員：**

我的問題很簡單。請問“AMD”有否向你們解釋為何更改啟動“airbridge”的程序，即由掃“card”改為用鎖匙？

**主席：**

不是“AMD”，是“Airfield Operations”。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

正如我剛才所說，他們認為“swipe card”系統內的反應並不很“stable”。

**馬逢國議員：**

這是否他們提供的理由？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**

我想提出另一個有關“airbridges”的問題。據我們所知，“airbridges”

亦有保安方面的問題，那段路似乎也是一個“security area”，你們的人手有沒有反映這方面的問題影響運作？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

沒有。我們由停機坪通過一條樓梯上去開門，直達那裏。你說的保安地區可能是連接“boarding gate”玻璃門的地方，這在“ramp handling”是……

**主席：**

即沒有阻礙你們。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我們不是從那裏上去。

**主席：**

各位委員是否還有及其他問題詢問鄭先生？若沒有，我們現在休息一會，下一節由11時35分開始。鄭先生，你現在可以退席，如果本委員會需要你再次出席研訊進一步作證，我們會另作通知。此外，有關剛才我們要求你提供的資料，我們秘書會與你聯絡，希望你以書面向我們提交補充資料。謝謝。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

謝謝主席。

**主席：**

11時25分。現在我們到會議室C。

(鄭國雄先生離席)

**[研訊於上午11時35分繼續]**

**第2節研訊**

**主席：**

我現在傳召證人香港航空公司代表協會副主席施禮達先生。



(施禮達先生進入會議室)

**Chairman:**

Mr SILADI, thank you for attending today's hearing. You are summonsed before the Select Committee today to give evidence and to produce papers, books, records and documents related to the Select Committee's scope of inquiry. First of all, the Committee has decided that all witnesses must give evidence on oath. As Chairman of the Select Committee I will administer the oath. You may either take the oath with your hand on the bible or take an affirmation. Please follow the terms of the oath or affirmation, whichever you prefer, in front of you. Please stand.

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I, Mark SILADI, solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

**Chairman:**

Thank you, Mr SILADI. The Select Committee will now deal with papers, records and documents that the witness has produced on 30 November 1998. The Select Committee notes that the witness has already provided the following document: witness statement of Mr Mark SILADI to the Commission of Inquiry on the New Airport.

Mr SILADI, are you now formally producing to the Select Committee the document mentioned above as evidence?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I am, yes.

**Chairman:**

Thank you. I now declare that the document mentioned above is admitted as evidence produced to this Select Committee.

Mr SILADI, may I ask you the first question on behalf of the Committee. Could you turn to your statement to the Commission of Inquiry, which is Paper

no. L1. You have your own copy?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

Could you refer to Paragraph 4, which is the sub-paragraph on fitting-out for airline offices. You have in fact outlined quite a lot of the problems that you faced prior to AOD, experienced by airlines.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

Could you tell us, who were the parties responsible for these problems, or for the resolution of these problems, and what steps you took to try to resolve the problems prior to AOD?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Prior to AOD the AA/BAR consultation group had held meetings. It was generally chaired by Mr Chern HEED as Director of Airport Management Division, or a deputy in his absence, that would tend to be either K S NG or Howard ENG, depending on who was available on that day. I would say the majority of the cases it was Chern HEED.

Airport Management Division would be the Chair of that meeting, while others such as IT, Commercial, Operations, Terminal, Airfield were represented, but Airport Management Division clearly was in control of that meeting from the AA's side. From our side we had a variety of airline representatives including experts in the field of cargo, as well as ground handlers.

It was a forum not only for discussion, but also for problem resolution, and probably for the majority of the time it was on problem resolution. No one really had time to discuss anything that was working well, so we only talked about the problems. As problems, as you can see from the minutes presented, were raised, the various individuals from the different departments of AA would

respond in areas of their expertise, and debate would ensue. On occasion things would be solved, and on occasion they would not, as you can see from the minutes. Could you be more specific I would say?

***Chairman:***

Of course. We have in fact followed the minutes that you provided us with. On this particular aspect it seemed to surface quite late, around about May or June, when you started talking about the problems that had in fact accumulated over fitting-out. If came, I would say, came to a head in a letter which is contained under Paper no. L1-14 dated 12 June 1998, signed by your Chairman, Philip CHEN, and addressed to Dr Henry TOWNSEND. In the letter it says that, "Regrettably, airlines and ground handling companies are still experiencing serious problems with office and lounge fit-outs." Then, "Some of these problems, such as the lack of telecommunication facilities are airport operational readiness issues." Then in the next paragraph:

"Intense efforts have been made between BAR, airlines and the AMD and Commercial Departments of AA. While every understanding of the gravity of these problems seems forthcoming, the necessary action from the Project Department is lacking."

We are talking about 12 June already.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

What has prompted this letter must have been quite of grave concern to the airlines. Can you tell us the state of the situation prior to this, and also after this? Did you actually hear from Dr TOWNSEND in reply? Did you actually have your problems resolved and so on?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I will deal with those in order, if I can, and in terms of time. Yes, it is accurate to say that the letter represented a certain seriousness that had gone beyond the traditional BAR/AA consultation group. In other words, it was the result of the -- I believe it was the BAR/AA group meeting of June. Is it 4

June, the one just prior to that letter? I believe that is 4 June if I am not mistaken.

**Chairman:**

Yes, it was.

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

That meeting particularly highlighted the seriousness of the issues. The minutes of meetings were done by the Airport Authority, BAR did not spend a tremendous amount of time correcting the minutes because there were too many issues. So the minutes are not necessarily reflective in the earliest stages of the gravity of these problems. At the 4 June meeting, the seriousness of some of the problems were raised. One particular problem was telecommunications facilities, which include telephone lines, fax lines, data lines. I stress the importance of data lines, because aircraft operational data flows over the same telephone lines. My aircraft and my operational people will get the flight plan, and the critical flight information through those telecommunications. So it is not simply a phone line.

United Airlines raised at the 4 June meeting essentially that they could not operate on Day 1 if these problems were not resolved. Throughout the meeting we obviously had a great debate about these issues, but Mr HEED essentially said it was beyond his capability to have Project responded effectively. He suggested that the Chairman of BAR should write directly to the Chairman of the Airport Authority. Hence the letter of 12 June.

Individual airlines were in a position in the meetings, particularly up to 4 June, or through the meetings or both, to ask the Airport Authority Project Division to complete certain works, particularly regarding fit-out or telecommunications. Project, if you have noticed, was never represented at the BAR/AA consultation group, although we were trying through it as the proper channel of communication, to influence Project to complete certain items. That influence through that group was not significant or adequate. So Project was not responding to airline requests.

Ultimately, by 4 June we were still in a position that certain things were not done which were AOR issues. So airlines were saying, "we cannot operate if we do not have these problems solved." Mr HEED at that point suggested

Philip CHEN write to Hank TOWNSEND.

The second part of your question, no, we did not receive a response from Mr TOWNSEND on this letter. The last 2 months, in particular, the last month and the first week of July were incredibly difficult months for everyone. It was very difficult to get the Project Division to finish any of the requests on time. Telecommunications were an incredibly critical issue. Yes, we could probably live without air-conditioning on Day 1, but we certainly could not live without telecommunications. In certain instances Virgin Atlantic Airways, of which I am the General Manager, did not receive our telecommunications TDF, which means Telecommunications Distribution Frame, until 2 days prior to the airport operating. Therefore, we had very little time to actually test the systems and to ensure that they were functioning. It was clearly not an ideal situation.

I know that there were 2 or 3 others. HIAS, as a ground handler, was also in the same situation of receiving the telecommunications distribution frames, where all that information must flow through, only until the last 2 or 3 days.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Mr SILADI, if I can just ask you, you seem to be referring to Project not being represented in the consultative meeting. Have you ever requested Project to be represented, or have you ever voiced out your complaint about it?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

We probably had voiced out our complaints at the very beginning, very early on. It was not, however, until June, I believe the 18 June meeting that Project was represented. I think it would be fair to say that airlines were probably not strong enough in making the request earlier on.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

That is the only meeting that Project was represented over the last 6 months prior to AOD?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

To my recollection, at that BAR/AA meeting, and they were represented in other sub-committee meetings.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Why did you accept that sort of situation, apart from Project not being represented, generally about the delay in terms of fitting-out and the various items quoted in your statement? You mentioned 7 items there. The delay actually has been going on for a few months. Since you took up the representative post in September 1997, this situation has been going on until AOD. What action have you taken to deal with it and to solve the problem? In your statement you did mention that you are not entirely happy with the relationship with AA in terms of the way that they are, in your wording, "decentralising to various departments to deal with the airport operation issues", and also in terms of AA adopting different priorities.

The two priorities that you mentioned are: service which was going to be paid for, and the second one, which is very important, the necessary facilities were not dealt with speedily, but put off until after airport opening. Why would you accept that sort of situation lingering on for that long period of time? What action have you taken?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

There are two questions there, I think, if I am not mistaken. Why would I accept that, and what did we do about it? The BAR/AA consultation group was the primary avenue of communication on issues relating to the opening of the airport. So we were clearly trying to work within the normal procedures and channels of communication. It did not say that every airline spoke through BAR to the Airport Authority. Individual airlines obviously spoke to the various divisions of the Airport Authority about their own undertakings and their own issues. The BAR group tended to represent those issues and areas that were of community concern that, in essence, affected everyone.

I think if you read through the minutes you also see a pattern which was that we were informed by the Airport Authority that certain things would happen next month, next month. I can go through several of these, even the ones preceding -- if you would like I can raise some examples. What we were hearing on many occasions, certainly not on all occasions, but on many occasions in regards to many issues was, "Yes, this would be solved." I recall one incident where we

were told it would be done in August 1997 ...

**Chairman:**

Can you cite just one example to assist members?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

To assist members if I can say, under the 19 March 1997 consultation group there was a statement by Brian REID of the Airport Authority ...

**Chairman:**

Sorry. The title of the paper?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

19 March 1997. Sorry, I am not using the same nomenclature ...

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Paper no. L1-1.

**Chairman:**

Paper no. L1-1, which paragraph?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

Under 3.5, Transportation Sub-group. The last paragraph in that sub-heading, which reads:

"When the GTC Building (the ground transportation building) is suitable for a visit, a tour will be arranged for steering group members. It is expected to be some time in August 1997."

The Ground Transportation Centre was not completed until about 2 weeks before the airport opened. I use this as an illustration. There are more. When you ask why we did not do anything, what actions did we not take? We invested some faith in this group, we invested some faith that the airline community and the Airport Authority were working together to accomplish the task of opening

the airport. Aside from the retailers and the consumers, we are the largest group of users at the airport. We have to invest some faith in this system. We have to work very diligently and accept that the Airport Authority has as much expertise as we do in this endeavour. There are other examples of that. The 12 June letter from the Chairman of BAR to the Chairman of the Airport Authority as representative of the intense frustration ...

***Chairman:***

The Chief Executive Officer.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

The Chief Executive Officer of the Airport Authority. It is only representative of the 8 months of negotiation that I had personally gone through to achieve resolution of some of the problems. Essentially, when we got to the 4 June meeting of the BAR/AA we were told by Airport Management Division, essentially, that we cannot solve these problems for you, please have your Chairman write to the Chief Executive Officer. I guess at that point our faith had reached its limits.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

My question was, Mr SILADI, you are working over a long period of time where you started with faith and with representation from AA and promises not being kept. Why would it require such a long time until 12 June, being prompted by AMD at the consultative meeting, that the Chairman of BAR wrote to Dr Henry TOWNSEND, but in your letter you also expressed that, "I am sure you will agree that this will be too late to solve some of these critical issues." The whole matter had been left aside until a very late date for bringing up to the level of Chief Executive Officer of AA. Why have you not thought about bringing the whole matter to the Board of Governors, or the Board of Directors of AA, or to a higher level?

By the time you raised the issues it was probably too late, even your chairman, in his letter, pointed out that some of the issues were not going to be resolved. What caused you to have such faith in the AA group? Because in your statement you have given us an impression that there were a lot of disappointments and frustration in your operation with the group.



**Chairman:**

Why was it left so late?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I think we have to go back to the break point here. Up until January something in 1998 we were told the airport would be opened in April. In January we were then told it would be opened in July, which allowed us approximately 3 months more, I am not sure how much more time specifically. But certainly, once again, more time we had to complete the airport opening. Again, BAR/AA consultation group was one avenue of communication. It is not to say that individual airlines were not going above that group to make representations to individuals higher up in either the Airport Authority, the Government, etc. BAR met with Economic Services Bureau's Stephen IP at one point on airport departure tax issues. I do not recall the exact date of that meeting. There was a whole panoply of meetings and communication going on between individual companies and the Airport Authority as well, undoubtedly, with Legislative Councillors and with others. That was not my place to represent the community at those individual meetings or on an individual level. In hindsight, yes, we did not scream loud enough.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Do you have some record of evidence of those sorts of other avenues or channels whereby this sort of frustration has been voiced?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I would imagine other airlines would have records of that, I personally do not. For Virgin Atlantic Airways, I do not recall any either off the top of my head.

**Chairman:**

We were actually told by Mr Raymond LAI, Director of Commercial, that quite a number of complaint letters have actually been directed to the AA from various companies, not from BAR, regarding tenants' fitting-out problems that they faced, all through May. As soon as the site was handed over to quite a lot of these companies, problems cropped up, so they wanted resolution. Also, they

were paying the Project Division for certain services to be delivered, but were not getting them. Your company is not among one of those companies which have written?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I think Virgin Atlantic had written some letters very late, towards the end of June, to Project Division on certain issues basically saying that we could not open our lounge.

***Chairman:***

There has been no exchange of information amongst your members in BAR that various people have actually written to AA?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

BAR was sometimes copied these letter and sometimes not. Airlines were under incredible pressure. I will point out the Airport Authority had one task before them, they had to build one new airport. Airlines had to operate at one existing airport as well as commence operations at a new airport. This placed a lot of strain on companies here. There was no lack of willingness or frustration in the community. There was, I would suggest, an incredible lack of time to express that willingness or frustration perhaps in a documented, detailed way.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Is there any occasion whereby you have voiced out your frustration to any of the AA members, Board members, or any Government officials regarding the April opening date or the July opening date, that it is not going to be successful because of these sorts of problems?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

If I recall, we had one letter here from the Joint Council Tourism Industry, JCTI, which BAR is a representative. The letter went to the Chief Executive. Was that in here? I do not recall.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

I do not think so.

**Chairman:**

Can you supply us with that?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I can.

**Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Do you remember the rough timing of that letter?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I do not recall. It would be difficult.

**Chairman:**

You can supply us with that afterwards.

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I believe it was perhaps 1 or 2 months before the letter to Hank TOWNSEND.

**Chairman:**

That is fine. It was prior to AOD, was it?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

Yes, absolutely.

**Chairman:**

If we could have that.

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

There were certainly discussions about your very specific question here; how do we go about influencing or making our concerns or the depth of our concerns understood, appreciated and acted upon? The response or the tactics that we sought to employ were to continue with the BAR/AA consultation group. I am sure any analysis of the media will bear this out. We chose not to go to the media, we chose not to use the press releases and press statements. That was a conscious decision on the part of BAR. We chose to work cooperatively with the Airport Authority in this endeavour. We only have one airport after 6 July, we did not have a choice. I jokingly used to say, "Thank you very much, I'll stay at Kai Tak."

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Did you consider contingency plans?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

At Virgin Atlantic my contingency plan was to fly to Macau.

***Chairman:***

Are you serious?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I am completely serious.

***Chairman:***

Please elaborate, Mr SILADI.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

At Virgin Atlantic we understood that our telecommunications were relatively undeveloped in the very last weeks of operation, we ensured that Macau was designated as an alternate airport anyways in our normal flight operations manual. We could in fact put down at Macau if CLK was not ready.

Our aircraft arrives from London in the late afternoon. We knew that the airport was scheduled to open at 6 o'clock in the morning, if there were problems in the morning they would generally tend to build up during the course of the day, and that we could potentially be landing at a time where those problems became potentially so great that it would make this alternative a better solution than to actually land at CLK.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

So your airline makes formal arrangements to make sure that contingency plan can back you up in case of anything going wrong?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes. We discussed it.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Did you discuss this with other airlines, or are you aware of any other airlines ...

***Chairman:***

I am sorry, I really would rather leave that line of questioning to later, on contingency plans. Can we finish all the questions on fitting-out first. Do you have any more on fitting-out, Mr Ambrose CHEUNG, if not I will move to Mr Edward HO.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

First, if we can look at Paper no. L1-12, which we referred to a little bit earlier, the meeting on 4 June, Paragraph 3.14, "Fit-out issues." Have you got that, Mr SILADI?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes, I do.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Since we are talking about fitting-out, what I would like to do is to clarify with Mr SILADI the meaning of "fit-out"? What does it comprise of? Say, for instance, AA after they have finished the building, the building shell, do they just give the airlines a shell of the room and you have to put in all the finishes yourself? What are we talking about?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Generally speaking, yes. We would receive a shell. There would be concrete floors, no ceiling, there would be usually no fire services, the sprinkler systems, because those would come later, although those would be provided at a cost by the Airport Authority. In essence, the Airport Authority brought services to the wall of your tenancy, electricity, telecommunications, chilled water for air-con.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

So you would need time to fit-out the space?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

What was the time that the airlines required generally to fit-out the space, as told to AA?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I do not recall the specifics, there was a fit-out programme designed which gave certain number of weeks for certain articles.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

1 month, 2 months, 6 weeks?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Average 2 to 6 months. A VIP lounge, for example ...

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Put VIPs aside for a second, they are not that important.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I beg to differ with the honourable counsellor, the VIPs provide a large part of the revenue of the airlines and therefore are completely entitled to their facilities, much like the Government VIP suite.

***Chairman:***

I think we are trying to establish the essential time that is required and whether you had the time, whether you took it up at the time when it was physically possible to actually do this, whether it was handed to you late?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

If you could go over that systematically. How much time do you think on average you would need, apart from the VIP, I know that takes a much longer time, but without a VIP lounge airlines can still operate, right?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

What I am trying to find out is the typical operation or AOD.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I would only be guessing at this, I certainly could not represent the 50 somewhat airlines specifically on this question. It would take, I would suggest,

about 10 weeks at a minimum for that to happen, 10 weeks to 12 weeks.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

2 months.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes, 2 to 3 months.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Is this an agreed period between you and the Airport Authority, that they would give you 2 months before AOD?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

It would depend upon the time when you signed your lease. Once you signed your lease and paid your deposits you would then have the tenancy.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

When were these leases signed?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I believe most were around April.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

So they were more than 2 months before AOD, were they?

***Chairman:***

You should have had the 10 or 12 weeks required in other words?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***



Again, it would be entirely difficult for me to answer this specifically. I can only answer generally and I would answer generally, no, there was not enough time for fit-out.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

First I have to ascertain from you, the airlines first have to sign the lease, right?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

They have to sign the lease, they have to submit the plans. I think that 10 to 12 weeks I am describing is the actual period of building. There is a period where you need to supply all your plans, etc., on detailed electrical wirings, fire services, telecommunications ...

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

To AA.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

To AA, and you must have them approved. That would probably take another 2 to 4 months.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

So in total you are talking about 6 months, right?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I am talking about a period longer than was available to us.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

One thing you have not answered me yet and that is, when did the airlines sign the lease?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

They all signed their leases on different days, I have no knowledge.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

No, I mean if they sign it one month before AOD certainly it would not be AA's fault that they could not deliver everything to you within 6 months, or whatever.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I would agree with that statement. You would need to talk to individual airlines to determine when they signed their leases and the ramifications on the fit-out programme.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

So you cannot answer that question. Coming back to this meeting, according to the minutes of this meeting, a lot of concern was raised on outstanding issues. These are not normal fit-out work, actually, these are telecommunications, chilled water supply, air-conditioning, everything else.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I do not see those as abnormal fit-out work.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

These are the utilities that they would have to supply to the airline offices certainly, as you say, up to the perimeter of the wall or whatever. You take it from there.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Not all of them. Sprinklers, no. You cannot do fit-out without having your sprinklers installed.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

On the other hand, you cannot fit-out until you have got AA's approval as

far as your modification of your sprinkler locations, and certainly you cannot do that without signing a lease with AA, so on and so forth, right?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

In your opinion, was there any delay on the part of airlines signing the leases, giving their drawings to AA and so on which resulted in having ...

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I was aware there were perhaps 3 or 4 smaller airlines that were delaying on their leases. The small to medium to large airlines, I would generally say that there were not delays on the part of the airlines.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Mr SILADI, so all these other issues covered here in this meeting, telecommunications, chilled water supply, air-conditioning, whether the airlines have signed the leases or not, these are required anyhow, right?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes, they are.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

They have to be provided to the room even though certain airlines might have signed a lease late, so they cannot get on with the fitting-out, but they would assume that once they start, or once they complete, these will be all connected up.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Those will be available. So these concerns are really on the main building services?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes. You had to sign a lease officially. A lot of things were being done simultaneously. Airlines and the Airport Authority could not simply just say, we will not progress. Certainly as Virgin Atlantic we submitted our plans months in advance of actually signing the lease.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

The other question I would like to ask, because it is mentioned here about certain things that cannot be done until the OP. Some of the work cannot be done before occupation permits. We know occupation permit was issued just a few days before AOD; so did that account for the fact that most of these works could not have been done?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No. The majority of these works were undertaken without the occupational permit.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

This should have been done before occupation permit, right?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I am not a legal expert on what can be done and what cannot be done without the occupational permit. All I know is that most of these works, again, were undertaken simultaneously without the occupational permit being signed. Enoch LAM, EL, the gentleman here was far more ...

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

What I am still trying to clarify in my mind is, what happens outside the airline offices are the utilities, bringing the water supply, the air-conditioning and everything up to the airline offices, or whatever?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Right.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

That has to be completed before occupation permit, otherwise -- if you did not have the fire service sprinkler system you could not get the OP anyhow.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Right.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

There are certain things within the airline offices that the airline themselves have to do. This is not done by the AA's contractor, is it, the fit-out?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Certain things had to be done by AA contractors, for example, fire services, sprinklers.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Anyway, those works could not have been done before OP, because they would not have been in the approved plans.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Plans were submitted for the whole building on fire service well in advance of the OP being ...

***Chairman:***

Which particular service are you referring to, Mr Edward HO? We were looking at Paragraph 3.14.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Sprinklers.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Sprinklers were one of the larger problems.

***Chairman:***

Where does it say that it has to be done after OP has been issued?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Paragraph 3.14.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes.

"He realised that modification works could only be carried out once the occupation permit for the PTB was obtained."

***Chairman:***

I took it to mean that modification work -- I mean the basic, all the building services, this, that and the other, particularly fire prevention and so on, equipment, would have to be installed.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Chairman, I realise Mr SILADI may not be an expert. I think I am more expert than him, I am an architect. The thing is this, if you look at this room here, if this room is a tenant room rather than in this case Legco, but a tenant, then when the occupation permit was issued then it would show this room as being a room with some sprinklers. But after this fitting-out, you have this translation booth over there, whatever over there, and the seating and all that, and the ceiling design, the sprinklers have to be changed, this is the modification we are talking about. So that can only be done after the occupation permit. The point I am trying to make is, whether there was any agreement between BAR or the airlines with AA about the amount of time you were given after the

occupation permit so that the fitting-out could be done, so that the modification of sprinkler could be done, and everything would be ready by AOD.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

It was not based upon the occupational permit date. Modifications were taking place from very early on.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Provided that ...

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Plans were submitted.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Provided plans were submitted in time, that was incorporated in the general building plans approved by the Buildings Department. I do not think we are getting anywhere.

***Chairman:***

You are getting very technical.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

If I can just say, I do not think that airlines used the awarding of the occupational permit as a milestone for their fit-out in any sense, quite honestly. We wanted the OP there so we could operate on AOD. But people were desperately trying to get their works done.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Maybe we will not get an answer here this morning. I was trying to find out whether the delay in the OP actually delayed fitting-out, hence the problem at AOD.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I do not think so, really.

**Chairman:**

Can I look at this paragraph that you drew our attention to. Telecommunications, chilled water supply, air-conditioning, sprinkler installation. Yes, only sprinkler installation might be connected to the fire services inspection, but all these others, communications systems, for example, these things are not related to the OP, sprinkler system aside.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Air-conditioning is, because the room has to be air-conditioned before you can get OP. Normally, you would just have a standard run of ducts or whatever so that you can get the air changers and so on. Once you start fitting-out you have to finish that, otherwise you ...

**Chairman:**

The airlines do not need to wait for OP before they start fitting-out.

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

Exactly.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

There are so many airlines, there could be some who have already submitted plans in advance to AA, so AA incorporate them in the general building plans and they would get this thing finished before OP.

**Chairman:**

It is becoming very technical. What we want to establish is whether the airline offices got what they required for fitting-out at the point which they thought they could rely on to get those sites ready with these services to start fitting-out.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**



Also the problem is, there is another side of the story, which is, AA complained that some of the tenants were late in giving them the plans and applying for telephones or whatever.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I will be happy to respond to that. A vast majority of tenants were waiting for the AA, not the other way around. The vast majority, 90 per cent majority. There may have been 10 per cent, the smaller players, e.g. Cambodian Airways who did not have significant operations at the airport may have been late. I was aware of this.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Would there be anywhere a written document to show that?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

You would have to speak to individual airlines. I could bring in a pile of papers about this high.

***Chairman:***

On that point, could you clarify that in fact AA was actually aware of that, but not Project in AA. They could be aware of that, but certainly, Commercial, AMD, from the record ...

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Commercial and AMD were very much aware of the problem.

***Chairman:***

They were aware of the problem. Project, were they aware of the problem?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

They would have been aware through the individual airline's representatives

speaking to the Authority's representatives on these individual problems, yes.

**Chairman:**

That you were actually waiting for them?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

Because they told us that they were waiting for you. It is something that we would very much like to know, I think it is the crux of Mr Edward HO's question: who is waiting for whom? You are telling us in fact most of the airlines anyway, perhaps not 100 per cent, but most of the airlines were waiting for AA?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

For these services which have been quoted here.

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

For a variety of these services, it would depend on each airline how far progressed they were in their planning. We had things that were delayed at Virgin Atlantic 3 weeks, 4 weeks, a month. Particularly, and I think it came out in the minutes, the sprinkler systems. Because if those were delayed, we did not do it, I do not think, in the strict sense that you did. They put in a rudimentary one, then applied for modifications after the OP. That was not happening. What was happening was, we were submitting our plans, and the contractor providing sprinkler services was going from tenancy to tenancy to provide those services based on the approved plans by the Airport Authority. However, there were not enough, the contractor could not provide those services, so then you got a delay, you cannot put your ceiling in without your sprinklers being fitted.

**Chairman:**

That is the AA's contractor, right?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

That is the AA's contractor. There was one contractor.

**Chairman:**

Were there agreed dates to work with?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

Yes. Every airline would have a project plan. It was approved. There was a process, there was a very specific process for fit-out.

**Chairman:**

Would we be able to see one of those plans?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I am sure we can provide one, yes.

**Chairman:**

The actual dates on which things are delivered. I think what we want is perhaps some illustration as to what you agree on and what eventually happened.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

We want an example where the airline has been delayed. If there is no problem we do not want to see that. If there is one airline which has been delayed because of the AA, we want to see chronologically how that happened.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Mr SILADI, you mentioned that there were overall problems on the fitting-out because it is really incomplete fit-out of the airline offices. You quote examples of telecommunication lines, air-conditioning, sprinklers and fire systems. Were you under the impression that the sprinkler fire system was really what AA is trying to complete, because without which you would not get the occupation permit for the purpose of your occupation of the airline offices?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes. They were clearly very concerned about the sprinkler system. They understood it to be one of the core elements for the occupation.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Were you under the impression that basically that is the only thing that they are trying to deliver to you and then the rest of the other problems can be left until after AOD?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No, I did not get that impression. In particular, telecommunications, they were very clearly aware that airlines could not operate without telecommunications facilities. If anything was suffering, it was the air-conditioning. That was determined, we can live without it for a little while. This was not mentioned by them. They certainly wanted to have everything done. It was not a lack of theoretical willingness on their part, I think they were overwhelmed by the size of the project and their ability for the contractors to provide those services on the dates that they were requested by airlines. I think you need an illustrative example of that. If we can provide that to you, I will. I do that as Virgin.

***Chairman:***

It would be helpful to give us some illustrations on the various problems. For example, the telecommunications. If you have an agreed schedule with them, OK, they were supposed to have all the things done say 2 weeks before, or something like that, allowing you reasonable time for testing and so on, and in the end you had 2 days. That is the sort of documentary evidence that we would like to see. Something that you agreed on previously but they were not able to deliver in the end. Anything else on fit-out?

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

One witness in the Justice Woo's Commission has given evidence that some pre-AOD activities, for example, the Miss Hong Kong competition, and also the ceremony on 2 July actually had some impact on the works in progress. I want to know whether that actually had any impact on the fitting-out works of the company?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

The simple answer to that is yes. In particular, I think in the last month, as you can tell from the minutes of the last 2 meetings we had, we were all very desperate. So losing a day or two, or even 8 hours was fairly critical at that point. The security sweep also, I think it was 11 and 12 June, there was an exchange in one of the minutes. I do not recall off the top of my head, but there was an exchange in here that indicated the difficulties. The President of the US and the President of the People's Republic of China's visit also condensed the time dramatically. So, yes, it did have an impact.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Mr SILADI, can you quantify the amount of time actually lost because of these kinds of activities?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I think in the original schedule for the VIP visits we were losing something like 30 per cent of the time that was left for us before the airport opening. If it was 30 June -- I would have to go back to ...

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Would the fitting-out works stop altogether, for example, 1 or 2 days before the actual arrival of President CLINTON and also Chairman JIANG Zemin? For example, a security check, that sort of thing?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Certainly President CLINTON and Chairman JIANG Zemin's visit had an

impact on the Passenger Terminal Building because of the security that was necessary for both of those visits.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Did they have to ask you to stop your works to check the area that involved your company and other airline companies for security checking?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I do not recall the specific nature of the security checks on that particular instance. I would assume those checks were undertaken, because that was the nature of closing down the Passenger Terminal Building. I was not physically present in the building on those days myself. Certainly for the security sweep on 11 and 12 June, if I recall the proper dates, obviously we had to have a representative there and the security sweep was undertaken in the presence of each airline's representative.

***Chairman:***

We need to move on.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Mr SILADI, before CAD issued the Aerodrome Licence, did they consult the BAR or AOC?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

We were not consulted directly, no. I would have assumed they would have consulted the Airport Authority.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Did you expect that they would come to you for any comments?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No, I did not have an expectation of that.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

You raise a number of concerns with the CEO of AA; did he respond to you afterwards in any form?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I did not personally receive any response, and Philip did not receive a response to the letter.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Not in letter, let alone physical forms?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Just now you talked about contingency plans, you were thinking Macau as the alternative.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

That was for Virgin Atlantic. I was representing Virgin in that statement.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

I see. If there were contingency plans to be discussed or prepared, would it be AOC or BAR?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

It would probably be AOC primarily. But we did not speak of contingency planning at the BAR level. Individual airlines would probably deal with AOC members for that.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

There was no coordinated effort or operational plans?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I do not know if I can answer that question specifically. I can say that there was contingency planning in an overall sense. Overall contingency planning was not raised at the BAR/AA consultation group.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Why was it not raised?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Good question. I am not sure I have an answer for that. I think probably the relative lack of alarm on the part of the Airport Authority left us or gave us the impression that it was not necessary.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

You think it was their responsibility, not your responsibility to think of preparation of contingency plans?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

You probably need to speak to the AOC. Each airline would undoubtedly have its own contingency plan.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Do you think that these plans would have to be passed on to the CAD for their agreement?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Individual airlines would always deal with CAD directly on their own contingency planning. However, that may or may not take a written form. I am not sure. For example, if I had an internal discussion as Virgin Atlantic amongst my colleagues to operate to Macau I would not be required by CAD to let them know this. That would be a decision that I could take as a commercial



organisation on the day.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

On contingency plan. Our attention at this point is not so much whether you decide to fly to Macau in case of some sort of last resort, an absolute impossible sort of scenario, but talking about services in the airport meeting with some difficulties, particularly as you well know the collapse of FIDS on that day; what I have noticed from the minutes of BAR is that there seems to be a rather lack of interest in the systems of information and display. You mentioned AODB from time to time, but there does not seem to be a great sense of urgency in following up the development of that service. Have I got the right impression, or does the minutes reflect that impression, and is that true?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I am sure you have gone through the different systems in some detail. FIDS was certainly the critical information system that was going to provide a variety of information to the airlines for operation as well as the Airport Authority for its operation. AODB was a rather large database that provides users with various things. FIDS, I think the minutes reflect a rather -- we were not alarmed because the Airport Authority was not alarmed. So we had trials, we had obviously many meetings, we talked about FIDS, the airlines were aware that there were issues with FIDS, that they were not working perfectly. But I would say that the impression that we got was that the problems, any problems that arose would be fixed in time. We had some confidence that it would be operational.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam Chairman, perhaps I ought to be more concrete. If Mr SILADI would turn to Paper no. L1-12, a minute of 4 June, Volume XII. Do you have that, Mr SILADI?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes, I do.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

That are minutes of 4 June. You see Paragraph 3.28, "CUTE/FIDS interface." Then: "It was agreed that this item be deleted from the agenda." If you look at Paragraph 3.4, you have an item of AODB. Perhaps I should separate my questions. Why was CUTE/FIDS interface deleted from the agenda? Who suggested this deletion?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I do not recall who suggested it. I would think that it was deleted because it would have been dealt with at the AOC level because it was certainly an operational area.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Right.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

More operational area and much more technical.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Did not you people want to know how FIDS was going on and whether it was going to be a reliable service?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Absolutely. I do not think the minutes reflect that we did not think it was reliable, do they?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

No, I mean were you not interested to find out whether ...

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes, obviously we would be interested. I do not understand the question. If it is that we were interested, yes, of course, we were interested.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Why was the item deleted?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

CUTE/FIDS interface is one particular aspect of the systems and a very technical one. The people in the room might not necessarily have the expertise to deal with it.

***Chairman:***

I think that that is just one aspect of FIDS.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

It is one part of -- it is how 2 systems talk to each other.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

I understand that part. If you look at Paragraph 3.4, same set of minutes, AODB. 3.4 is about AODB, is it not?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

It seems that you were talking about a briefing as late as 4 June.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

If you look at the history of the AODB through the minutes, I think you would find that AODB provides a tremendous amount of information, ability to exchange information with the Airport Authority, CAD, etc. The primary objection to the AODB, if you go back in the minutes, was that the Airport Authority wanted a tremendous amount of money for us to use this system.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

I was going to ask you that.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

The airlines basically completely balked at it and said: We are not going to pay for this system. We did it manually at Kai Tak to provide certain information, and they were saying: Now we have a wonderful new system for you, however, it will cost you X amount. I do not recall the figure. Essentially, the BAR and the AOC rejected wholly the charges.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Just halting there, Mr SILADI, I think it may be useful to look at Paper no. L1-6, that is your minutes of 18 September 1997, Paragraph 2.8.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

It is not "possibly" due, these minutes do not reflect my statement in its entirety. My statement was, the overwhelming lack of interest was due to the incredibly high cost of subscription.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

When it was first suggested to members of your group, the reaction was it was very expensive and there was not a great deal of interest?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

The value of the system was not relative to the cost.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Moving forward in the set of minutes, so I am right, there was not a great interest in AODB?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Primarily due to the cost.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

It is right that there was not much of an interest?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I think there was an interest on the part of the airlines for the functionality of the system. However, again, I stress, you always have to relate the functionality to the relative cost of that functionality. If I can have one person sitting there and filling out forms for \$10,000, I am certainly not going to pay \$90,000 to have it done through the AODB.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

If we move to Paragraph L1-11, that is a meeting on 8 May. In Paragraph 1 there was a correction of the minutes, a comment on minutes of the last meeting: "AOC expressed that the functions of AODB are not clear to the airlines." You confirm that?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I think they were not clear of the AODB functionality -- the Airport Authority did provide the airlines with information on AODB and a specification of AODB describing its functions. I think because of the lack of interest due to cost, which was demonstrated back in September 1997, AODB was shelved, as you can see, for a very long period of time. Quite honestly, I think everyone just said: We are not going to need this. We are not going to pay for it, therefore, we will not have it. So we did not. I think, essentially, people put it on the back burner. It came up again and then people said: Well, we are not clear of the functions because it had been shelved for so long.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

On the same page, Paragraph 2.3, AODB are at that meeting. EL -- let me see, who was he?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Enoch LAM.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

It reads:

"EL opined that a further briefing is required to explain the IT part of AODB as airlines are still confused with its functionalities and structures. AN further sought for urgent clarifications of AODB in CLK environment. HR promised to arrange for a briefing but request AOC summarise the aspects they would like to be covered in the requested briefing to be conducted in the next AOC meeting on 28 May 1998."

That is very close. So as late as the end of May airlines were still quite confused about the functions or functionalities of AODB.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Enoch LAM, EL here, was certainly expressing a general sentiment. I think specifically what we were trying to ascertain was, were there parts of AODB, because it is a very large system with several different functionalities, we were trying to ascertain whether there were certain parts of the system that we could use that would be useful as opposed to saying we want the whole thing, let us take 3 parts of what you are providing as opposed to 10 parts. I think we were trying to ascertain more specifically what functions could be used.

One of the functions that is provided through AODB tends to mimic what FIDS provides. I believe in the 18 June meeting I said FIDS to the airline offices was expensive. FIDS in the general terminal a passenger sees, he does not pay for that, but if I want it in my office, I pay for it. It was much higher than Kai Tak's previous charges, installation as well as monthly charges.

Again, the issue came up, if AODB can provide some of these services that duplicate what FIDS is providing, should we not be looking at a way to amortize costs by using one system? It was an attempt by airlines, and the Airport Authority I might add, to understand what the systems were doing and how to provide information to people. The third point being, at a cost effective manner.

***Chairman:***

What were you leading to?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Exactly. Without saying who is to blame for the time being, would you

agree that it was because it was even so late in the day that airlines were not even clear about functionalities, would that also mean that you were not in a position to know how well FIDS was progressing, the system, the whole system set-up was progressing, how reliable it was up to that point?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

AODB and FIDS can operate independently. FIDS is not dependent on AODB to my understanding. Therefore, it was not considered imperative to have AODB. But we were attempting to try and find some functionality out of it. The second part of your question, I do not think we were made well enough aware of the problems with FIDS. We understood there were problems and our understanding was that the problems would be fixed, whatever problems there were, that it would be operational on AOD.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Presumably you all knew that it was of central importance to you?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Absolutely.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Did you do something to find out how well it was going, whether it was going to be reliable?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

We participated, obviously the airlines participated, in all the trials.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Did those trials enable you to find out how reliable FIDS was?

***Chairman:***

I think Mr SILADI answered the question earlier, he said he was relying on

AA, the confidence level of AA on FIDS, the airlines. Whatever AA was actually telling them.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

We did not go into the meetings thinking they were lying to us. We went into the meetings in the spirit of trying to open up the airport. If there was a lack of alarm, I call it an escalation procedure. I believe that there was a failure in the escalation procedure of the AA in understanding the nature of the problems of FIDS. I am not a technical expert. It is the role of management, particularly in an operationally imperative business such as airlines, to understand the impact up as you escalate it. If you believe this has an impact you must escalate that. Your sense of alarm must in fact increase. We never had a sense of alarm from the Airport Authority regarding FIDS.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Be that as it may, were you aware of an overall contingency plan should FIDS fail, should the information system somehow fail?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

We have heard about on AOD actually whiteboards were used and an emergency centre was set up and so on. Before AOD did you know that should anything happen there would be an emergency centre?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I was not personally aware of it. That may have occurred at the AOC level more on an operational basis.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

BAR was not informed?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***



We did not discuss a contingency plan of that nature, no.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

So the whiteboard system, the first that you knew, of it being used, or about to be used, was on AOD, was it?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

6 July, yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

A point on security. Towards the end of your statement, Mr SILADI, you mentioned that the airlines would prefer a single service provider, more than one service provider, but in the end there was only one. You were saying in your statement that the organisation for this service was a bit rushed and disorganised; could you tell us a bit more about it, how did it affect the airlines?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

It affected the airlines in 2 ways. Because of the very late creation or strategy being brought down from Security Bureau in November 1997, we have to remember we only had 4 months, in November we were still talking about an April operating date. We thought it was very optimistic of AVSECO, the new company, Security Bureau and the Airport Authority to be able to put in place an effective security system in that short period of time. I then spoke with Norman SHANKS, who was the security. I am not sure of his exact title at the Airport Authority, security director or coordinator, or something like that. He told me in a meeting prior to November that he believed 6 months would be the appropriate length of time, although they could compress certain aspects of it.

The strains it placed upon the airlines were twofold. Because there was only a single service provider, the security at Kai Tak could potentially suffer because the people who were working for Secure Air were now placed in a position of uncertainty on their jobs because they were not automatically given a job at AVSECO, in the very early stages. I think that position changed over time. We had a concern that Kai Tak, the degradation of security at Kai Tak was a very real problem for us because people may say: I do not have a job, I

am leaving. And Kai Tak could be placed in jeopardy. We had many conversations with Security Bureau about this.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

How did it actually affect the AOD, I think that is the main question, focus on that please?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

There were a tremendous amount of problems with security passes, the processing and the issuing of the passes. On occasions I personally was wearing 3 different types of passes on my chest to get through various parts of the airport. I think there was a lack of clarity on the issuance of security passes for contractors and airline personnel.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Did you foresee this problem before AOD?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Before AOD, yes. We talked about it in many forms including BAR/AA. We suggested in the early stage that the Airport Authority accept the Kai Tak pass, to be automatically used at the new airport. That was rejected. Given the short period of time, we had to look for very time efficient solutions to these problems.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Did you raise a concern, but the situation or the problem still arose on AOD?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes. It was very difficult. The other aspect was in issuing the passes, I am not sure if the regulation or the ordinance has changed, we needed to require more reference checking. Anyone issued with airside passes was vetted by Customs, I believe, and the police. That was considered, I believe, at Kai Tak acceptable. At the new airport the new regulations required that the airlines

provided background checks as well. We were asked to provide background checks on our own employees.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Can you elaborate a little bit on your statement that, "The organisation or security system at the new airport has been rushed and somewhat disorganised." Can you elaborate on this? How disorganised was it?

***Chairman:***

Did it mainly relate to the pass system, or is there anything else apart from that?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

There is much more apart from that. I think there are several aspects, one of which is the passes, we have talked about. Then there is the scope of services. Because we have one single service provider there was great debate over what the single service provider was, what type of services they were going to give to the airlines. That debate delayed the proper organisation of the services at the airport. Things such as the -- which is still unresolved quite frankly -- provision of escorting high value cargo from the cargo terminal to the aircraft. We believe this is a commercial function, say diamonds or gold or something valuable, but because the Airport Authority said this one provider must do it, we objected to that, because certain airlines and/or individuals shipping the cargo wanted to escort their own high value cargo. New procedures had to be developed to accommodate this disagreement.

The other thing I would suggest is that we were not convinced that the new security provider could in fact have enough adequate staff, therefore, if they did not have adequate staff, standards of security might slip.

***Hon LEE Wing-tat:***

Mr SILADI, can you give us some information on the first day of running? Before AOD they did not have sufficient staff, inexperienced actually, and it becomes a problem on opening.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I think the problems on opening related more to the control of flow through the terminal building, because the access control system was not completed. Also, because of the signage, people could not move around the terminal. People were going through fire doors to and from airside and landside, not on AOD, but beforehand. I think by AOD it is fair to say that it was generally in a state that was acceptable to the airlines, albeit a bit disorganised. I do not think the aviation security or airport security was compromised.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Can I go back on one question on the contingency?

***Chairman:***

Very quickly.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Mr SILADI, I just want to understand a little bit more about that your airline made a contingency plan to fly to Macau. Is it because of that you have not got an overall contingency plan with AA as earlier on you have told us that there is no such overall contingency plan, you become concerned? What really is your concern? Why are you concerned, and why do you make such contingency plans within your airline?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

All airlines maintain contingency which is called alternate airports. If you are unable to land at an airport, you designate other airports within the area to put your aircraft down at. I think my concern was that the backup of problems would mean that the aircraft would not be able to land at the time when the aircraft was supposed to land. The problems that we would consider would be the baggage system being backed up, which it was to some degree, the lack of space on the apron to park the aircraft potentially, the lack of slots due to continued delays that may have occurred during the day. There are several different aspects that one would consider.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

That is during AOD, but not prior to AOD. Prior to AOD you foresee problems.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

It was discussed prior to AOD amongst myself and my colleagues that if for some reason we were unable to land at CLK where would be the best place?

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

What were the reasons?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

As I said, it could be any reason from a rather simple one to a rather more tragic one, which we did not anticipate.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Are you aware of any other airlines having that sort of same arrangement?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I believe some airlines actually did not operate on Day 1, who made plans earlier on not to.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam Chairman. This is just general, not specific, is it?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

It is general. We always have a contingency plan, there is always a contingency plan if we cannot get into an airport for whatever reason. So a plan exists already.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Did any airline or your airline actually use that contingency plan on AOD?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I think aside from Cathay's whiteboards or Dragon Air's whiteboards, no, I do not believe they fell back to major contingency plans, no.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Mr SILADI mentioned something about baggage; can I ask something about the baggage?

***Chairman:***

Before you go to that, can I ask Mr SILADI, where were you on AOD? Were you actually in the building?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes, I was.

***Chairman:***

Since what time, 6 o'clock in the morning?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No. I was not there that early in the morning, I had been there until about 2 o'clock the night before.

***Chairman:***

Were you there for the 10 o'clock meeting?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No, I was not. I was not at the meeting. I do not recall exactly what time, I arrived before noon, I do not remember.

***Chairman:***

You actually did not take part in that discussion about contingency plan, what they should move on to?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No.

***Chairman:***

You were aware that there was a meeting to deal with that?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

Before then you had not heard what they were going to do to in fact deal with the crisis?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No, I had not.

***Chairman:***

When you arrived you already heard that they were going to adopt a whiteboard and so on?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I was made aware of it, yes, by my station manager.

***Chairman:***

Did you take part in the 4 o'clock meeting?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No, I did not.

**Chairman:**

On the whiteboards that were used, because we obtained verbatim notes of the hearing and Dominic PURVIS. He is AOC, is he?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

Cathay.

**Chairman:**

He in fact said that problems encountered were location of the whiteboards, difficult to read, stress on staff and so on; was this actually discussed either on the day or somewhere near the time amongst members of BAR?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I think we all knew that we would need more resources, so we planned to have available on the day for whatever additional staffing we could bring in. My airlines, for example, brought in 6 or 7 staff from the UK, as did other non-Hong Kong national carriers. People brought in extra human resources. I have to say on AOD I was very much concerned about Virgin Atlantic's flight and less so about the community and the airport operation as a whole. I have a commercial responsibility to make sure my plane arrives and leaves with most of the people on it.

**Chairman:**

What delay were you experiencing?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

Baggage situation primarily.

**Chairman:**

With your airline?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**



And FIDS, we could not get information from FIDS. Parking bays, we were eventually put on an outer bay so we were not able to get a jetway. FIDS, I do not remember if it was the 6th or the 7th, I think it was the second day FIDS was not operating. There were a tremendous amount of PAs which made it extremely confusing for passengers as well, I am sure you have all heard that.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

One of the major problems is with baggage handling on AOD, and there has been evidence given to this Committee saying that on Day 1 with the 10,000 bags processed, and they were basically stacking up on the problem bags area, and on Day 2 there were about 6,000 bags like this. 2 reasons have been given. Firstly, the insufficient training of the airline staff. Secondly, the inefficient problem with the bar code. What are your comments on that?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I am not a baggage handling system expert. I would clearly say that there was a lack of time to train the staff adequately on the system. I think that is certainly a real comment, and one that should be taken with a great deal of weight. The bar code, I was aware that there were problems with reading the bar codes and also with the BSM, which is baggage system messages as well. The bar codes I cannot comment on directly, I am not sure which airlines had the problems. I know certain airlines had difficulties with it, but I cannot remember the specifics. The baggage system messages as well for interline bags were a problem. I think there is an important point in that, there are formats given by IATA for the baggage system messages, but there is not one standard, there is not one format for these messages. There are actually several recommended by IATA. So airlines could in fact have different formats for these messages.

I think we were all aware, everyone was aware of that. Everyone was also aware of the fact the bar codes can be slightly different as well. There is not a one uniform standard that the whole world's airlines use for these things. The systems need to be flexible and accommodating.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

What are the reasons for insufficient training? Who should be responsible for that?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I would say, generally, because of insufficient time. The impact of late fit-out means that your staff cannot be at the airport to receive the training that is required in the various parts of the building.

***Chairman:***

Surely, baggage handling takes place at the desks, right? That really, strictly speaking, should not have relevance to the fitting-out.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

Baggage handling occurs in various parts of the airport, the check-in desk, the baggage sortation area, the lateral, airside and so on. You cannot be expected to take 10 staff out to the airport and make them stand around all day with no place to sit down, no place to eat, no air-conditioning, the security passes would then not be processed etc. There were several problems that related to the fact that staff could not have enough time to work in the environment. The environment was not in a condition conducive to training, generally speaking.

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Can I put to you, Mr SILADI, that one of the comments in a meeting in AOR dealing with this says that the airline staff need to be encouraged to ensure that there are no straps or handles hanging over the sides of the trays. Do you think this is a fair comment?

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

No straps or handles hanging over the sides of the trays?

***Hon Ambroase CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

In the operation of the baggage handling.

***Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:***

I really cannot comment on that.

**Chairman:**

Would the AOC be more in a position to answer the questions relating to direct operational?

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

On baggage handling, yes.

**Chairman:**

Meanwhile, Mr SILADI could probably answer us on the management side, lounges and fitting-out and so on. On operational matters, you seem to have been saying that it is probably more appropriate for us to get the answers from AOC. I think we are going to wrap up very quickly. One question, perhaps you can answer us in writing, we do not need you to answer right now. Probably, it will take you some time, maybe it is too much in detail. The question is; have you got any feedback from pilots as to problems generally encountered, experienced or envisaged by them on AOD, or thereabouts? The opening, anyway. So if you could let us have that in writing, I think that would be very helpful.

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I will put that to the BAR members and respond.

**Chairman:**

It will have to be as soon as possible. Hopefully, within a week.

**Deputy Chairman, The Board of Airline Representatives in Hong Kong:**

I will do my best.

**Chairman:**

Thank you very much. Today's hearing will end here. Mr SILADI, please note that if the Select Committee considers it necessary to order you to

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日

開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜

專責委員會

Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances  
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of  
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok  
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

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give further evidence you must attend further meetings. We might also try and obtain information from you in writing as well. You may be hearing from us as well. You may now withdraw. Thank you very much.

*(The hearing ended at 1:05 pm)*

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