On 16 September 1999
Legislative Council Panel on Security
Progress of Year 2000 Compliance Work in Departments and
Related Organization under the purview of
The Security Bureau
Following the meeting of the Panel on 21 July 1999, this paper reports on the Year 2000 (Y2K) contingency plans and their related testing by the five departments under the purview of the Security Bureau (SB), viz. the Hong Kong Police Force, the Fire Services Department, the Immigration Department, the Correctional Services Department and the Government Flying Service.
2. All five departments have completed their Y2K contingency plans in July 1999. For ease of perusal, an executive summary each of these plans is set out in Annex A-1 to E-1 respectively. As the contents of the contingency plans involve detailed operational matters relating to the departments' law enforcement operations, prison security management or arrangements for border-crossing control, full disclosure of the disciplined services departments' contingency plans would not be appropriate.
TESTING AND EXERCISES
3. Details of testing and exercises of the five departments are at Annex A-2 to E-2.
Annexes and Appendixes
|Departments|| Summary of Plan ||Testing/Exercises
|Hong Kong Police||Annex A-1|
with Appendix I
|Fire Services Department||Annex B-1|
With Appendix I
|Immigration Department||Annex C-1||Annex C-2
|Correctional Services Department||Annex D-1|
With Appendix I
|Government Flying Service||Annex E-1||Annex E-2
Commissioner of Police Order on Y2K Contingencies
The Hong Kong Police Force has made considerable arrangements to prepare for any eventualities, which may arise from the Y2K issue.
The Force will utilise normal operating procedures in its day-to-day functions. It is recognised that possible problems caused by the Y2K IT issue could strike at any location in Hong Kong and therefore Major Formation Commanders must refer to their contingency plans for a Y2K failure when drawing up operational orders for the policing of other major events.
The Y2K IT issue may affect any computer system or software and as such all formations within the Force may be affected, either by malfunctioning of equipment or computer systems, or by a lack of power supply/server connection to an external service provider. For this reason the Force will not only be responsible to maintain law and order on the streets, but will also be required to prepare contingency plans for its own information systems to allow everyday work to continue. Major Formation Commanders will identify their own core business functions and will prioritise these functions according to the main mission of ensuring public safety, public service and the maintenance of law and order. This priority list will then be used to formulate contingency plans in the event of a Y2K failure to ensure that a minimum service level is maintained.
A central monitoring unit (enhanced manning of Headquarters Command and Control Centre , PHQ CCC) will be formed by 'A' Department (Police Headquarters Operations Wing) to oversee all Y2K critical dates listed in Appendix I. The level of response at Force level which may be required (to crowd control problems or Y2K IT issues which arise) will be authorised by the Overall Commander, according to the Risk Assessment.
Major Formation Commanders will prepare contingency plans for Y2K related problems which may occur, as identified in the Risk Assessment. These will include:
- resorting to the minimum service level, (public safety, prevention of crime and maintaining law and order), if necessary;
- the use of manual systems (Miscellaneous Report Book and/ Crime Complaint Report or similar) to replace computer technology;
- the use of runners or point-to-point radios to communicate;
- careful management of transport and fuel for vehicles;
- the use of a pre-determined beat conference point system to ensure a chain of command with duties on the ground. To visibly maximise police presence to allay public fears and deal directly with requests/ reports from the public;
- the possibility of operating from a District/Division Control Room (DRC) should there be a loss of service from Regional Command and Control Centres (RCCCs). Use of the fallback telephone system to RCCCs if necessary/working. A list of fallback telephones is available;
- the availability of emergency equipment.
Y2K Critical Date
|22.8.1999||(may affect GPS system)
|9.9.1999||(fallback date - 9.9.99)
|3.1.2000||(1st working day of new millennium)
|10.1.2000||(1st nine digit date)
|10.10.2000||(1st ten digit date)
|31.12.2000||(366th day of the year)
|1.1.2001||(may be recognised as the alternative new millennium)
Hong Kong Police Force
Tests of all ground level contingency plans at police stations were conducted between 1st - 8th September 1999. A number of Exercises have been conducted at Regional level with other Government Departments and Business Partners.
|31.8.99||Hong Kong Island Y2K Contingency Test||Hong Kong Island Region
|7.9.99||Kowloon East Y2K Exercise||Kowloon East Region
|7.9.99||New Territory North Y2K Contingency Test||New Territory North Region
|9.9.99||Y2K Precautionary Arrangement||Y2K Central Co-ordinating CentreHQCCC Bridge,All Regional HICOMs,ISW Y2K Command Centre,OCTB Control Room,IT Help Desk,Comms Emergency Fault Report Centre,All DRCs
|9.9.99||Exercise 'YOYO'|| HQ CCC, HK Observatory
A programme of future tests is as follows :-
|Date||Type of Test||Units Involved
|4th Sept 1999||Fallback phone tests (completed)||HQCCC& RCCCs
|8th - 9th Sept 1999||Communication & Wellness Checks||EMSC, HQCCC,All RCCCs
|13th - 30th Sept 1999 *||Desk-Top Exercises||EMSC, HQCCC, Other Govt CCCs
|1st - 31st Oct 1999 *||Command Post Exercise||EMSC, HQCCC, All RCCCs
|1st - 30th Nov 1999 *||Territory Exercise||EMSC, All Govt CCCs,HQCCCs, RCCCs, DCRs
|Mid November 1999||Force-wide Exercise||HQCCC, RCCCs,DCRs
|Dec 1999 ||Roll-over Preparedness||All
(* Exact dates yet to be agreed with ITBB)
FSD Service-wide Y2K Contingency Plan
With a view to minimizing the risk of Y2K-induced failures that would affect the delivering of emergency services to the community, Fire Services Department established a Working Group in early 1998 to look into the Y2K problems existing in the department. The Working Group had conducted a risk assessment to identify the possible causes for disruption of fire and ambulance services, secured access to necessary resources and drawn up action plans for responding to any Y2K-induced disruption. A Service-wide Contingency Plan had been drawn up to cater for different Y2K-induced scenarios so as to minimize their effects.
The risk assessment for the possible outbreak of Y2K disruption has been classified into two categories, namely risks from INTERNAL factors and EXTERNAL factors. In regard to the investigation on INTERNAL factors, it was focused on the possibility of system breakdown of FSD equipment due to Y2K-induced failures. Major concerns were the critical systems installed in the Fire Services Communications Centre (FSCC), such as Computerized Mobilizing System, Vehicle Availability System and Trunked Radio System, etc. which facilitate processes in call-taking, despatching/mobilisation of appliances and radio communication between FSCC and fire appliances/ambulances. Subsequent to the identification of internal factors described above, all mission-critical computer and embedded systems were put under status verification and those found not compliant had been rectified. This was followed by a test conducted by an independent third party to ensure their reliability before end of June 1999. In addition, contingency measures were formulated to cater for any computer failures due to Y2K problem. Detailed procedures have been laid down which are to be carried out upon the system failure of FSCC equipment. Alternative means of communication, despatching and mobilisation were prepared, and are ready to be put into effect at any time.
In addition to the aforesaid critical systems, the risks involving non-critical systems such as administrative personal computers have also been assessed. The failure of the non-critical system may cause various degree of inconvenience due to data corruption or system crash but will not directly affect the Department's primary functions in providing emergency services. The administrative computer users were advised to make frequent back-ups of data files in particular before the critical dates and seek technical assistance from the IT-proficient members of the Department should a need arise.
The scope of the investigation on EXTERNAL factors was considerably wider. It aided to cover, as extensively as possible, all consequences resulting from the Y2K-induced disruptions of public utilities, transportation systems and communication networks, which are likely to affect the normal operations of FSD. Notwithstanding that these service providers have made their effort to ensure their systems are Y2K compliant, there is a possibility that something may have been overlooked. As such, it was considered that there was a need to draw up contingency plans to deal with possible interruptions to services such as suspension of water supplies, failure of public switched telephone networks and sudden upsurge of incident calls such as 'shut-in-lift' owing to power supply failure, etc.
In the light of information provided by ITBB, the department has identified a number of critical dates for activation of the Service-wide Contingency Plan. An alert classification system has been devised to indicate the severity of the situation. In addition, two levels of response, namely "Service Stand-by" and "Service Stand-to", which will constitute two distinctive states of readiness during the contingency plan activation periods will be implemented according to the prevailing situation. "Service Stand-by" is the initial state being put into effect upon the plan activation when additional resources will be held in readiness. If the situation deteriorated, "Service Stand-to" may be put into effect and further resources will be made available for operation. In this connection, all personnel have been appropriately advised. An 'FSD Y2K Emergency Command Post' will be set up during "Service Stand-to" period, which will be headed by the Chief Fire Officer (Headquarters). The Command Post is responsible for overseeing, co-ordinating and directing the implementation of the Service's response in the event of Y2K-induced disruptions requiring the full activation of the Service-wide Y2K Contingency Plan.
To ensure that the Contingency Plan is workable, it is essential that all personnel in the Fire Services Department are familiar with the Plan. In this respect, a Command Training Officer has been assigned in each Command to oversee the training and to evaluate the practicality and effectiveness of the Plan. The adequacy and effectiveness of the plan would be tested on a regular basis. At least three Service-wide exercises shall be held before September 1999. Revisions of the Plan will be made in the light of experiences gained during the exercises.
Details of Fire Services Department
Service-wide Y2K Contingency Plan
Part I - Introduction
Part II - Risk Assessment
Part III - Contingency Plans for Internal Systems Failure
- Possible Risks if Internal Systems Fail
- Computerised Mobilizing System in FSCC
- Telephone System
- Trumked Radio System
- Other Sub-systems of FSCC
- Public Switched Telephone Network and Private Automatic Branch -Exchange
- Appliances and Equipment
- Non-critical Systems
- Possible Risks if External Systems Fail
- Water Pumping System
- Public Switch Telephone Network
- Traffic Controlling Devices
- Mechanically Driven Equipment
- Automatic Fire Alarms System
- Power Supply
- Crises involving Aircraft
- Crises in Hospitals
Part IV - Contingency Plans for External System Failure
- Fire Services Communications Centre (FSCC)
- Maintaining communication with Police
- Maintaining Communication with Fire Station/Ambulance Depots
- Maintaining communication with other Departments/Utilities
- Appliances and Equipment
- Fire appliances with embedded electronic devices
- Diving equipment
- Fireboat and maritime equipment
- Airport Fire Contingency
- Equipment for Daya Bay Nuclear Plan Contingency Plan
Part V - Deployment of Resources
Part VI - Contingency Measures for Non-Critical Systems
- Deficiency of water supplies
- Breakdown of public telephone network
- Traffic congestion due to traffic control device failures
- Automatic Fire Alarms failure
- Upsurge of Calls for assistance
- Power failure
- Crises involving aircraft
- Crises in Hospital
- Special Risk Areas / Potential Hazardous Installations
- Millennium Celebrations
Part VII - Contingency Alert Classifications and Corresponding Actions
- Administrative Personal Computers
Part VIII - Definition of Response Levels and Activation Details
- Four levels of alert with four levels of corresponding actions
Part IX - Training and Exercises
- Criteria for the activation of Plan
- Critical dates requiring the activation of Plan
- The formation of FSD Y2K Emergency Command Post
Fire Services Department
|Date of test||Type of test||Units and party involved||Objective of exercise and result
|12.7.1999||Table top exercise||
- Mobilization and Communication (MC) staff of Fire Services Communication Centre (FSCC).
- Operational fire staff from South Division of Kowloon Command.
- Operational ambulance staff from Hong Kong Region of Ambulance Command
|The objectives of the exercise are :-
- to test the practicability of the Service-wide Y2K Contingency Plan (the Plan) ;
- to practice manual mobilising procedures by FSCC staff when the Computerised Mobilizing System is down ;
- to practise Trunk Radio System(TRS) in 'Failsoft' mode operation by FSCC and operational staff ;
- to evaluate the capability of TRS radio system operating in 'Failsoft' mode in handling major incidents.The exercise was conducted smoothly and the objectives were achieved. The result was considered satisfactory.
- MC staff from FSCC.
- Operational fire staff from West & Marine Division of Hong Kong Command, South Division of Kowloon Command and South Division of NT Command.
- Operational ambulance staff from Hong Kong Region of Ambulance Command.
|The objectives of the exercise are :-
In order to warrant adequate opportunity to practise/evaluate various contingency arrangements, the exercise scale has been developed by stages and the sequence are listed at Annex I-5.
- to test the practicability of the Plan ;
- to assess the operational readiness and responsiveness of individual Command upon the implementation of the Plan ;
- to evaluate members' knowledge and conversance of the Plan.
The irregularities observed during the exercise, such as radio discipline, were addressed. This exercise is to test 'C' Watch members of Fire Commands about their conversance of the Plan. The exercise was conducted satisfactory.
In order to warrant adequate opportunity to practise/evaluate various contingency arrangements, exercise scale was developed by stages as per the following sequences: -
|1||Computerized Mobilizing System (CMS) was down||Service Standby||Manual mobilizing operation implemented
|2||Trunked Radio System (TRS) was down Service Standby||All radio communication switched to fail-soft mode for operation
|3||Large influx of localised CFATS calls and shut-in lift calls throughout the territory||Service Stand-to||Call detailed were prepared by SDO(MC) and passed to operational DCs concerned during the exercise
|4||Request for mass transfer of patients from one hospital to other hospitals||Service Stand-to||Ground mobilizing of ambulance. Ambulance shortfalls were made up on a token basis.
|5||Public Switched Telephone System (PSTN) was down ||Service Stand-to||TS Fallback System activated and respective Command Training Officer of Operational and Ambulance Commands arranged running callers to simulated emergency calls at stations level
Executive Summary of Year 2000 Business Continuity Plan
The Year 2000 Business Continuity Plan of Immigration Department aims to minimise the impact on the operations due to Y2K-induced system failures. It contains eight chapters:
|II||Priority of Business Operations / Services
|VII||Contingency Procedures for Administrative Computer Systems
|VIII||Contingency Procedures for Other Systems
2. Possible risks to business continuity caused by Y2K-induced failures of internal systems or external systems are identified. Chapter I focuses on risk assessment. The Department's business operations / services are prioritized at Chapter II. Passenger clearance at control points tops the list of priorities.
3. In order to be able to react swiftly to any Y2K-induced failures, the escalation procedures are formulated and documented at Chapter III. There will be two committees:
- The Year 2000 Emergency Response Centre (Y2KERC) will monitor the roll-over and tackle problem with low level impact on business and services; and
- The Year 2000 Emergency Command Centre (Y2KECC) will take over the command in case of major problems and make decision on contingent management issues.
4. Chapter IV - VI highlight the preparation work for the Y2K roll-over. Actions to be taken are summarised as below:
- To cancel leave and set up a reinforcement team to ensure availability of adequate backup manpower;
- To establish special teams within business units for execution of contingency arrangements;
- To make available transport facilities;
- To stock up essential supplies items;
- To secure support from vendors, ITSD and EMSD;
- To make preparation for production and distribution of hardcopies of historical records for checking;
- To make ready back-up equipment for use;
- To adjust the timing for non-critical system back-up and running of batch jobs;
- To reduce non-essential business activities;
- To prepare for the setting up of Y2KERC and Y2KECC; and
- To arrange checking of all systems/equipment soon after the roll-over to Year 2000.
5. The contingency plans for the administrative computer systems and other systems are at Chapter VII - VIII. For Administrative Computer Systems, the contingency arrangements will in general cater for the following scenarios:
- Failure of the host computer system
Computer transactions which require host interaction cannot be performed. However, computer processing under the 'Standalone' mode at LAN level will continue to maintain service. Depending on the specific system design of the different systems, varying degree of level of service can be provided. With regard to the Immigration Control Automation System (ICAS) supporting operations at the control points, passenger clearance can basically be continued without interruption.
- Failure of the LAN system
All computer processes will be suspended. Under such circumstances, manual processing will be adopted.
For other systems, on encountering of system or equipment failures, substitutes will be used if available. Manual procedures to supplement the operation will also be adopted to ensure continuation of service.
Testing/Exercises of Immigration Department Business Continuity Plan
- Testing of the plan was performed between 2 August to 15 August 1999.
- Desktop talk-through exercises were conducted.
- The plan was tested internally and all business units within the department had participated.
- Detailed contingency procedures for our major systems have been in place for a long time and our staff are familiar with their application. We have nevertheless made use of the tests to further reinforce their readiness and awareness on the issue.
- Further testing of the plan will be conducted again in December 1999.
Aim of the Plan
Year 2000 Contingency Plan of the Correctional Services Department
This contingency plan was published in mid July 1999 for distribution to all heads of divisions and institutions and respective Headquarter Emergency Coordinators to deal with all possible Y2K-induced failures. As the priority of the Department is to ensure safe and secure custody of the prisoners and inmates in case of major disasters or emergencies, the Y2K contingency plan of the Department mainly concentrates on the following major functions under the programme area of prison management :
|1||Maintenance of Security & Order
|2||Provision of Basic Necessities & Reasonable and Safe Living Environment
|3||Provision of Medical Services
|4||Engagement of Prisoners in Useful Work
Key Systems/Elements Covered
2. The following key systems/elements in support of the above functions were covered in the Contingency Plan :
|Internal Systems/Elements||External Systems/Elements
|1. Locking Systems||1. Electricity Supply
|2. Alarm and Call Bell Systems||2. Telecommunication Networks
|3. Security and Monitoring Systems||3. Water Supply
|4. Trunk Radio Communication Systems||4. Fuel and Gas Supplies
|5. Catering Systems||5. Food and Ration Supplies
|6. Critical Medical Equipment||6. Public Transport
|7. Critical Medical Supplies||7. Public Hospital Services
|8. Computer Systems
- Penal Records Information System
- Manufacturing Management Control System
- HRM System (formerly known as Personnel Information Management System)
|9. Workshop Machines
|10. Contingency Power Supply Systems
3. The Y2K issue has little impact on the locking systems in prisons as we do not have any computer-controlled locking system currently. There are only a few electric locks in penal institutions which can all be switched to manual operation. Other security and monitoring systems with computer component, such as CCTV, have been included in the list of mission-critical embedded systems which have all been rectified and confirmed Y2K ready.
4. Provision of sufficient stock of emergency rations and medicine, the staff deployment and standby arrangements, emergency contact persons and telephone numbers have also been covered in the Contingency Plan.
5. All critical computer system and mission-critical embedded systems of the Department has been rectified by June 1999 and are now Y2K ready. Among the three critical computer systems, the Penal Records Information System has the greatest impact on penal operations. However, failure of this System will only affect the operational efficiency of institutions in areas of new admission and discharge of inmates/prisoners, court attendance, inmates/prisoner's earnings & properties, canteen purchase and visits, but not security of the prisons. Manual systems are in place and the staff adequately trained in operating in the manual mode. Sufficient backup and restoration plans have been devised to minimise the loss of data in case of system failure.
Headquarters Emergency Coordinating Team
6. To coordinate emergency responses in case of Y2K-induced crisis, an Emergency Coordinating Team is formed at headquarters level. It comprises all Division Heads whose distribution of businesses are as follows :
|Civil Secretary ||-|| CSD Y2K Coordinator for overall liaison with central coordinating bodies
|AC(Operations)||-||commander for crisis affecting penal operations
|AC(I&MS)||-||adviser on internal security matters
|AC(Personnel)||-||commander for crisis affecting Headquarters operations and adviser on staff deployment
|AC(Rehabilitation)||-||adviser of crisis affecting the welfare and psychology of inmates/prisoners
7. The Team will operate at the Headquarters in Wanchai Tower. The Commissioner of Correctional Services, assisted by the Deputy Commissioner, is the overall command authority. The Division Heads will be assisted by respective Headquarters Emergency Coordinators in devising detailed plan and instructions and providing assistance to penal institutions and operational units for handling all Y2K problems in different key areas during the preparation, trigger off and rectification stages. Staff of the Computer Services Unit will be on duty during the high risk dates of Category A. Duty rosters for other standby and on-call staff of institutions and operational units have been devised to provide speedy reinforcement in case of emergencies.
8. The Plan is subject to refinement in the light of the operational experience in the interim before the actual roll over to Year 2000.
Report on Testing of the Y2K Contingency Plan
of the Correctional Services Department
Testing of the Contingency Plan of the Department was completed in August 1999. The testing at institutions mainly took the mixed form of table top exercises and live tests in order to avoid the risk of causing unnecessary unrest among the prisoners by conducting drilling exercises. During the period from 3 August 1999 to 31 August 1999, all penal institutions have conducted testing on the essential systems/elements covered in the Contingency Plan. The results indicated that sufficient backup resources and proper procedures are in place to tackle any emergency situations. (Please refer to Appendix I for the result of the test items). The staff working in institutions have also been briefed of the local contingency plans by the institutional management.
2. For the critical computer systems, Y2K simulation tests for the Penal Records Information System (PRIS) and Manufacturing Management Control System (MMCS) were carried out on 25 April 1999 and 15 May 1999 respectively. The results indicate that the two Systems are Y2K ready.
3. In addition, regular disaster recovery drill is held jointly by ITSD and CSD for the full data in PRIS. The last such exercise was held on 18 October 1998. Rehearsal of backup data recovery for MMCS had been conducted successfully in August 1999. The next test is scheduled for 4 September 1999. Backup data recovery for the HRM System was also tested successfully for several times in July and August 1999.
4. All PRIS data are kept in the IBM mainframe computer of ITSD at 15/F, Wanchai Tower with a mirror site of data backup in Tsuen Wan for emergency disaster recovery. To further guard against data loss, one PC will be set up at ITSD for downloading PRIS key data on 31 December 1999. The backup data will be transferred to the Computer Services Unit of the Department for connecting with our Headquarters LAN on that date. The backup tapes for MMCS are stored off-site in Stanley Prison whereas those for the HRMS are stored in a fire-proof container in the server room of the Computer Services Unit.
5. All servers in the Headquarters and institutions are connected with Uninterrupted Power Supplies (UPS). All these UPS systems have been tested and found to be in proper working order.
6. To provide necessary resources for tackling Y2K problems, additional notebook computers have been reserved for emergency use, such as for data retrieval and checking. During the Category B high risk date on 9 September 1999, two officers were arranged to standby at the computer Services Unit. All staff of the Computer Services Unit (except clerical staff) will be on duty during the Category A high risk dates. Apart from them, relevant ITSD staff will also be on duty on 31 December 1999 and 29 February 2000. The contractor of MMCS has agreed to deploy one IT staff to the Computer Services Unit to standby on the Category A high risk dates.
7. To forewarn all PC users of possible effects of Y2K problem, a circular has been issued to request them to back up the data in their PCs before the high risk dates.
Testing of the CSD Y2K Contingency Plan
by Institution/operational units
|1. Manual operation of electric locks||Checked in order.
|2. Availability and functioning of loudhailer||Available and found in proper working condition.
|3. Availability and functioning of radio handsets ||Available and found in proper working condition.
|4. Functioning of PA Systems||Checked in order.
| 5. Practice of Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation||The medical and nursing staff are conversant with the proper techniques.
|6. Availability of medical stock||Essential drugs sufficient for one month's use are being kept by the dispensaries of institutional hospitals.
|7. Availability and functioning of manual workshop tools ||Available and in proper working condition.
|8.Functioning of emergency power generators||Found in proper working condition.
|9. Availability and functioning of emergency lamps||Found adequate and in proper working condition.
|10. Availability of adequate Emergency Communication Officers (ECOs) with valid driving licences||Adequate institutional staff with valid driving licences are available for deployment.
|11. Availability and functioning of fire fighting equipment||Available and tested in good condition.
|12. Availability of proper storage space for LPG and kerosene||Proper storage space reserved.
|13. Availability of proper storage space for food and ration supplies||Proper storage space reserved. The contract food supplier has confirmed its Y2K readiness. Arrangements have been made with the contractor to provide non-standard emergency ration of distill water and biscuits for 3 days' consumption during the high risk dates.
|14. Briefing/instruction for staff||Completed by all institutions.
|15. Practice of manual calculation of inmate discharge dates and procedural guide for manual bring up of inmate discharge ||The manual calculations by institutional staff were verified to be correct and practice of manual record keeping tried out and found in order.
|16. Practice of manual calculation of inmate earnings and canteen purchase ||The manual calculations by institutional staff were verified to be correct.
- The test items are not exclusive to the above list. Depending on the local situations and scale of staff and inmates/prisoners involved, individual institutions have made additional tests, such as practice of water rationing, manual takeover of inmates' locations, work assignments and visits.
- Other contingency measures, such as holiday routine (with non-essential activities removed), arrangement for staff to report for duty during suspension of public transport (same as that for Typhoon Routine), were not specifically covered in the tests conducted in August 1999 as they have been proved successful and adequate on previous occasions.
GFS Operation Continuity Plan
The GFS systems have been evaluated and rectified for Y2K readiness in June 1999. An Operation Continuity Plan (OCP) is formulated to ensure our core activities will be operational if Y2K-related failures in the following systems do occur :-
1. Communication systems in GFS operations control centre
2. Aircraft navigation systems
3. Integrated aviation software computer system
4. Headquarter plant and equipment
5. Power supply
Should these Y2K-related problems happen, GFS flying service could be maintained by using alternate systems, equipment or procedures to enable the continuity of our operation.
GFS will closely monitor all critical dates and the OCP task force will supervise the rollover to year 2000. The GFS Air Command Control Centre will work as the Y2K emergency command center during Y2K emergency situations. All sections will prepare adequate manpower and arrange standby staff for the critical dates. All aircraft will be made serviceable prior to the rollover and there will be no aircraft maintenance scheduled on that period. An emergency contact list has been prepared that the required assistance could be sought during emergency situations.
Government Flying Services
|Date of tests||Systems||Type of tests||Parties involved||Results
|21.6.1999||S70 helicopter||Simulation||GFS|| Satisfactory
|4.6.1999||J41 aeroplane||Simulation||GFS|| Satisfactory
|25.6.1999 & |
|Communication system||Desk top exercise/ simulation||GFS/FSD/H KP||Satisfactory
|10.7.1999||Power supply||Simulation||GFS/EMSD ||Satisfactory
|11.6.1999||Engineering maintenance systems||Desktop exercise||GFS||Satisfactory
|30.6.1999||Building management system||Simulation/ desk top ||GFS/EMSD||Satisfactory