

立法會
Legislative Council

LC Paper No. CB(1) 551/99-00
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by the Administration)

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LegCo Panel on Environmental Affairs

Minutes of special meeting
held on Thursday, 28 October 1999, at 8:30 am
in Conference Room A of the Legislative Council Building

- Members present** : Hon Christine LOH (Chairman)
Hon HUI Cheung-ching (Deputy Chairman)
Ir Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai, JP
Hon Martin LEE Chu-ming, SC, JP
Prof Hon NG Ching-fai
Hon Ronald ARCULLI, JP
Hon CHEUNG Man-kwong
Hon CHAN Wing-chan
Dr Hon LEONG Che-hung, JP
Hon Mrs Sophie LEUNG LAU Yau-fun, JP
Hon WONG Yung-kan
Hon LAU Kong-wah
Hon Mrs Miriam LAU Kin-ye, JP
Hon CHOY So-yuk
Hon LAW Chi-kwong, JP
- Non-Panel members attending** : Hon NG Leung-sing
Hon Mrs Selina CHOW LIANG Shuk-ye, JP
- Members absent** : Hon Margaret NG
Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing, JP
Hon Andrew CHENG Kar-foo

**Public officers
attending : For item I**

Mr Wilson FUNG
Principal Assistant Secretary for Planning,
Environment and Lands (Planning)

For item II

Mr Kim SALKELD
Deputy Secretary for Planning,
Environment and Lands (Environment)

Mrs Philomena LEUNG
Principal Assistant Secretary (Environment)
Planning, Environment and Lands Bureau

Mr Rob LAW
Director of Environmental Protection

Mr John Collier
Director of Drainage Services

Mr Benny Y K WONG
Assistant Director (Waste & Water)
Environmental Protection Department

Mr Raymond CHEUNG
Assistant Director (Sewage Services)
Drainage Services Department

Item III

Mr Kim SALKELD
Deputy Secretary for Planning,
Environment and Lands (Environment)

Mr Raymond W F HO
Chief Assistant Secretary for Works
(Information Technology)

Mr David T W WONG
Principal Environmental Protection Officer
(Corporate Services)
Environmental Protection Department

Mr Andy C KING
Ag Principal Environmental Protection Officer
(Facilities Development)
Environmental Protection Department

Clerk in attendance : Miss Odelia LEUNG, Chief Assistant Secretary (1)1

Staff in attendance : Mrs Mary TANG, Senior Assistant Secretary (1)2

I Protection of the Harbour (Amendment) Bill 1999
(LegCo Brief on the Bill issued under PELB(CR)L/M81/98)

The Chairman said that it was her original intention to introduce a Member's Bill to amend the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance (the Ordinance). She subsequently revised the Member's Bill and agreed with the Administration that the proposed amendments should be pursued as a Government Bill.

2. At the invitation of the Chairman, the Principal Assistant Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands (Planning) (PAS/PEL) explained that the main provisions of the Bill sought to replace all references to "central harbour" in the Ordinance with "harbour" and to repeal Schedule 1 which set out the boundaries of the central harbour. The legal effect of the proposed amendments was to apply the definition of "harbour" in the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) to the Ordinance. In effect, the scope of application of the Ordinance to the harbour area would be extended, as set out in the site plan at Annex C to the LegCo Brief.

3. Responding to Mr Martin LEE, PAS/PEL said that the Administration did not intend at this stage to further extend the scope of application of the Ordinance to the entire harbour area of Hong Kong but agreed in principle to consider such need at a later stage. The proposed Bill would address the public concern about the importance of preserving and protecting the harbour. Its aims were in line with the "Visions and Goals for the Harbour" put forward by the Town Planning Board recently. Environmental Impact Assessment had to be conducted on all reclamation projects within the harbour area.

4. Mr WONG Yung-kan expressed support for the extension of the protected areas, in particular, to areas near marine parks. He considered it necessary to protect the entire Hong Kong waters and fishery resources. PAS/PEL said that the Bill was but one of the legislation to protect the harbour. Other legislation such as the Marine Parks Ordinance served the same purpose. The Deputy Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands (DS/PEL) added that there were two aspects to the protection of the harbour, namely the

landscape value of the hills coming down to the sea and the sea as a recreation and fishing resort. Apart from designating country parks and marine parks, the Administration had developed an artificial reef programme which would provide protection for marine parks and actively develop fish stock. Consultation was underway on the artificial reef programme.

5. The Chairman said that after the introduction of the Bill into the Council, members might wish to decide on the need to form a Bills Committee.

II Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme (SSDS) (LC Paper Nos. CB(1)201/99-00(01) and (02))

Engineering feasibility of deep tunnelling works

6. The Director of Drainage Services (DDS) reported the progress of the tunnelling works by referring to paragraph 6 of the information paper (LC Paper No. CB(1)201/99-00(01)). He said that tunnelling works were now over 61% complete. Tunnel C (Tseung Kwan O to Kwun Tong) would shortly be completed. He invited members of the Panel to attend the break-through ceremony on 9 November 1999. Tunnel D (Kwun Tong to To Kwa Wan) had experienced mechanical failure. The drive shaft of the tunnel boring machine had been replaced and the works had resumed. Tunnel E also had some mechanical problems and as a result, the progress had been less than expected.

7. Mr LAU Kong-wah expressed concern about the repeated delay in completion of the tunnelling works, in particular Tunnels D and E. He questioned whether detailed geological investigations had been done before commencement of the works. DDS advised that the progress of works at Tunnels D and E was slower because the tunnel boring machine was doing excavating and lining work at the same time. The machine used was bought by the original contractor. The failure of the main shaft of the machine was an unusual occurrence. The mechanical problem in Tunnel E was unexpected. DDS stressed that prior to the original tendering of Stage I of SSDS, extensive geological investigations had been undertaken. Over \$200 million were spent in drilling bore holes along the alignment of the tunnel system. However, as these bore holes were widely spaced, it would still be difficult to judge the actual ground conditions until pilot holes were actually drilled through them.

8. Responding to Mr LAU Kong-wah's enquiry about the resistance of deep tunnels to earthquakes, DDS said that the advice from geologists was that tunnels were far safer than surface structures in the event of an earthquake. The Assistant Director/Sewage Services, Drainage Services Department (ADDS) added that the tunnels built were within bed rock and should have less damage compared with surface structures in the event of an earthquake. However, the impact of earthquake on deep tunnels had not been comprehensively evaluated.

9. Mr LAU Kong-wah further enquired about the service life of the tunnels and the way of maintenance. DDS advised that the tunnels were designed for longevity. They were built through solid rock and would be lined with concrete. They would be filled with sewage when in operation. Whilst the tunnels could be emptied and inspected, it would take quite some time before this could be done. Investigation had been underway on the use of devices for inspection which did not require the emptying of the tunnels.

10. Referring to the unforeseeable ground conditions and the mechanical breakdown in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the paper, Mr Martin LEE pointed out that these difficulties should have been anticipated from the beginning. DDS said that the tunnels were built through hard rock in which faults were common. At least 30 geological faults were identified and quite a few of these faults had been successfully negotiated. The tunnelling works at Tunnel F was now about 200 metres away from the Tolo Fault, which was one of the worst cases of fault. Caution was needed to prevent the rocks from collapsing. The time to negotiate the faults was difficult to estimate. DDS further advised that the machine failure was not due to the change in rock type. It appeared to be associated with the wear and tear of the machine which was far greater than anticipated. Time was needed to re-install the spare parts.

Problem of site settlement

11. Members were gravely concerned about the report of settlement in urban areas allegedly owing to the implementation of SSDS. DDS said that a cautious drilling approach was used under built-up areas. There had been no incidents of buildings affected by settlement. There had been some settlement in Chai Wan, but this was limited to seawalls and roads around the Typhoon Shelter. Since the settlement in Chai Wan occurred, the contractors had been more cautious.

12. Responding to the Chairman, DDS said that the settlement in Chai Wan had been reported at the Panel meeting on 4 May 1999. The settlement in other areas was not included in the information paper for this meeting because the reported settlement in Chai Wan was the only settlement that was directly attributable to the tunnelling works.

13. Professor NG Ching-fai enquired whether the review to be conducted was in any way connected to the problem of settlement in some urban areas. DDS said that the site settlement problem at Chai Wan was due to the excavation works performed under the Typhoon Shelter. The site settlement problem had been resolved after grouting was applied to stop the flow of water.

Completion date and cost estimates

14. Responding to the Chairman about the proposed completion date for SSDS Stage I, DDS said that the original completion date was mid 1997 and the expected

completion date now was mid 2001, representing a four-year delay. He would be greatly disappointed if the estimate proved wrong. He stressed that the main delay was due to the forfeiture of the contracts by the original contractors.

15. Mrs Selina CHOW considered it totally unacceptable that the Government put all the blame on mechanical and other failures for the delay. She said that since the Government had chosen the deep tunnelling method, it had to deliver the project quickly in the public interest. It had to resolve the problems by itself and to account for the delay in terms of time and costs. The public had the right to know what had caused the problem, who should be held responsible and how much more resources were needed. She stressed that as an accountable government, it would have to admit mistakes, accept responsibility and learn from experience. DDS said that the Administration would be able to do better with the experience gained. It would perform more ground investigations, apply new techniques such as long hole coring, specify tunnelling equipment more precisely instead of relying on contractors on the choice of machinery used, include risk sharing in the terms of contract and review the system of the lowest tender. He also said that it might be more effective to use completely new tunnel boring machines instead of refurbished machines but this would put back tunnel excavation start by about 12 months. He informed members that the Singaporean Government was now undertaking the construction of a system of deep tunnels for its sewage system using design-and-built contracts and the Administration would be watching the project with interest. DS/PEL added that the Administration had all along been transparent about what was going on. He assured members that the tunnels would be completed as quickly and cost-effectively as possible without compromising safety.

16. Professor NG Ching-fai said that from the outset, the Administration had been forewarned about the non-viability of the SSDS project but it had insisted on proceeding with it. All along the Administration had been assuring the public that the difficulties encountered were surmountable. He stressed that the Administration need to be honest about the difficulties it was facing.

17. DDS responded that the Administration had been learning a lot from Stage 1 of the project. With hindsight, the Administration should have clearer specifications on the types of tunnel boring machines. With the experience gained, there would be greater degree of certainty in dealing with tunnelling works. The delays were either contractual or mechanical and could be adequately explained. The progress being achieved for the remaining tunnels was reasonable.

18. Dr LEONG Che-hung said that with the new technology of drilling pilot boring holes along the length of the tunnel, the Administration should be able to provide a more accurate estimate of the time and resources needed to complete Stage 1. DDS said that the new technology of drilling an exploratory hole of about 780 metres long had been used in Tunnel F. Unfortunately, the drill was stuck in the Tolo Channel Fault and efforts to drill through the fault was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, full information had

been obtained on the rock conditions of the tunnel yet to be bored between the fault and Stonecutters Island.

Admin 19. As regards the estimates on the costs for the delay, DDS said that as the arbitration was going on with the original contractors, it was difficult to estimate the costs now. With the information available at hand, the Administration was hopeful that tunnelling works could be completed within the funding approved for the project. In response to members, the Administration would provide an estimate on the additional costs incurred as a result of the delay in due course.

The re-convening of the International Review Panel

20. Miss CHOY So-yuk said that the lesson learnt was too expensive. The Provisional Legislative Council had approved extra funding of \$2 billion for the project. It was about time that a review should be made, not only on the way forward but also on the treatment level and the technology used in Stage I since its impact on site settlement and the general environment was of much concern to the public.

21. DS/PEL said that he remained confident that Stage I could be completed but the issue was how long it would take to complete the project. The original estimate was made before the tunnelling works started. There had been considerable delays due to forfeiture of contracts, geological faults and machinery breakdowns. He stressed that the SSDS was an immensely complex engineering operation. The Administration was prepared to review the situation and to look into possible alternatives. When the review was made in 1994/95, the IRP had endorsed the deep tunnelling method. Stage I dealt with the collection and treatment of 70% of the sewage generated in Kowloon. It would not make sense to stop the Stage I works at this stage. There might be a need to review Stages II, III and IV for any other possible alternatives, but these alternatives would still involve a complex engineering system of collection and treatment of sewage.

22. The Director of Environmental Protection (DEP) said that the totality of the problems encountered, which ranged from mechanical failure, forfeiture of contracts and unforeseen ground conditions, had led to doubts about the credibility of the scheme and the Administration's ability to accurately estimate the cost and time to complete the scheme. The Administration need to demonstrate that it had a sound knowledge base to go forward for the remaining stages, hence the need for a review. The two main purposes of the review were -

- (a) to make use of additional specialist services of the experts on tunnelling to review the experience encountered in Stage I and to see what lessons in terms of time and cost management could be learnt for implementing Stages II, III and IV; and
- (b) to compare the planned Stages II, III and IV with the cost, programme, and environmental benefits of other possible alternatives.

23. DEP further said that the Administration would provide the Panel with information on the practicable alternatives based on distributed systems for the remaining stages of SSDS. It would also be inviting interested parties to put forward their views on possible alternatives. The IRP would meet the Advisory Council on the Environment and the Panel if members so wished. All of the information gathered would be put to the IRP for review. The whole process would be conducted in an open and transparent manner. If it was concluded upon the review that some alternatives to the existing planned stages were considered practicable, the Administration would look at these alternatives at a much greater depth with a view to pursuing the matter. DEP added that the review process would take about nine months to complete and would cost about \$5 million.

24. To minimise delay in completion of the project, DEP said that the Administration considered that there were advantages in re-appointing the three previous members of IRP who were involved in the 1994/95 review of SSDS. He stressed that these experts who came from China, Denmark and the United States were of the highest international status. They all had a sound reputation and had no vested interest in the project. They had a complete understanding of the background of the project. In addition to the three members, the Administration intended to appoint an internationally renowned tunnelling expert whose role would be to review the engineering feasibility of deep tunnels for subsequent stages of SSDS. To bring in local perspective, a member of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers would be invited to join the IRP. The Administration considered that with the benefit of the review by IRP, it would be in a better position to decide the most cost effective way to proceed with SSDS in terms of environmental protection, costs and programme.

25. Mrs Sophie LEUNG said that she would welcome a review of the project because in this way the situation could be looked at from a new angle. She considered it necessary to involve the community and to provide a forum for the collection of public views at an early stage of the review. DEP said in response that the Administration would be inviting green groups to contribute their ideas at an early stage of the review. He would be personally overseeing the review process.

26. Mr LAU Kong-wah disagreed to conduct a review at this stage. He considered that the review of the next stages should best be done after the completion of Stage I in 2001.

27. DEP said that if the review was conducted upon completion of Stage I in 2001, the provision of adequate sewage treatment would be further postponed for two years. The deterioration in water quality was a problem which had to be addressed urgently. The SSDS was meant to be an integral scheme. Stage I dealt with the collection of effluent from Kowloon to Stonecutters Island Sewage Treatment Plant for treatment. The effluent would then be discharged after chemical treatment via a short outfall to the eastern harbour. This was however not a satisfactory long term arrangement. Stage II

comprised the construction of collection tunnels on the Hong Kong Island and a tunnel from Hong Kong Island to the Stonecutters Island Sewage Treatment Plant, the upgrading of treatment system to include disinfecting and the construction of a longer tunnel that would discharge treated sewage outside the harbour area. If the plans to collect and treat effluent from Hong Kong Island were delayed, there would be serious impact on the quality of water in Hong Kong.

28. Mr Martin LEE supported that the review should be sped up. He said that given the possibility of abandoning the deep tunnelling method for transporting sewage altogether, the further continuation of Stage I would only constrain the review by IRP. He suggested that, where necessary, the works in Stage I should be stopped. This would be better than taking the risk of spending more money on a method which might later be discarded. He asked whether the previous experts were tunnelling experts and if the Administration would consider inviting experts in alternative methods to take part in the review.

29. Miss CHOY So-yuk agreed with Mr Martin LEE that the IRP should be tasked to review the overall strategy and explore the alternative to tunnelling works. By appointing the three previous members of IRP who had endorsed the tunnelling method in 1994/95, the Administration would be seen to be pre-empting other strategies to dispose of sewage. She suggested that the composition of the review panel should be expanded to enhance its representation.

30. Professor NG Ching-fai also agreed that the review should be conducted as soon as possible and in an objective manner. He said that there might be a need to revise the Stage I strategy if it was ultimately decided that the tunnelling method should not be the way forward.

31. Mrs Selina CHOW echoed the view that the review panel should start from a clean slate and should not be hampered by a previous decision. She however queried the objectivity of the review if the majority of members of the review panel were involved in the earlier review in 1994/95 which had endorsed the tunnelling works for Stage 1.

32. Ir Dr Raymond HO was of the view that Stage I should be completed since a lot of resources had already been spent. He welcomed the Administration's decision to invite a member of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers to join the IRP. While he had no doubt about the engineering feasibility of tunnelling works, he was concerned about whether the treatment should be by way of a centralised system or a distributed system. He hoped that the review could be completed in three to six months' time.

33. In response to members' comments, DEP made the following points -
(a) The three previous members of IRP were not tunnelling experts but were experts in the field of sewage treatment. They were of the highest international repute and their integrity was beyond question. Their curriculum vitae could be made available for members' reference. It was

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inconceivable that they should be accused of working for the Government to reconfirm what the Government wanted;

- (b) The original IRP was set up at a time when there was considerable concern about the way the Government was intending to go forward with SSDS. Consultants had been employed to look at all sorts of sewage treatment schemes. As a result, a scheme which was similar to the present scheme was proposed. The IRP was formed to review the work of the consultants to see if the proposed scheme was sound. Members of the IRP had endorsed the scheme proposed and had recommended some changes to the method of treatment;
- (c) The appointment of a tunnelling expert to IRP would augment the engineering experience which the original members did not have. The tunnelling expert would be expected to draw experience from Stage I. The intention of adding another local expert was to bring in local perspective to the issue. The expert would be familiar with sewage treatment processes;
- (d) To allay members' concern, the Administration would consider reviewing the composition of IRP. It would also involve green groups in the review process;
- (e) There was no intention on the part of the Administration to confine the scope of the review to what was originally intended. The review would be on the whole strategy and would see if the present approach was the correct way forward. The review panel would be expected to look into the possible alternatives. If the review panel had found alternatives that were practicable, the Administration would consider implementing these alternatives; and
- (f) Part of Stage I of the project was already operating and dealing with 25% of the effluent and some of the tunnels had been completed. In terms of costs and environmental impact, it would not make sense to suspend the works of Stage I.

34. Mrs Selina CHOW opined that the appointment of a review panel to review a strategy which was already in operation was putting the cart before the horse. Previous efforts in Stage I would have been wasted if the review panel subsequently decided that an alternative strategy should be adopted. She queried the appointment of the three members of IRP who were not tunnelling experts in the first place. She also questioned whether adequate research had been undertaken before committing to the deep tunnelling strategy which had been plagued with technical difficulties. She said that the Administration would need to determine the scope of the review before deciding as to who should be appointed to the review panel.

35. Mr Martin LEE shared Mrs Selina CHOW's concern. He said that he was surprised that the original three members of IRP were not tunnelling experts. He supported the convening of the review panel but stressed that it must review the strategy

afresh. Therefore, the Administration should not pre-empt the suspension of Stage I tunnelling works. If the original tunnelling strategy turned out to be a wrong decision, further resources should not be put into it.

36. Mrs Sophie LEUNG also agreed that the panel should not be constrained by the tunnelling strategy in Stage I. She said that new sewage technologies had been introduced over the years and the review panel might make use of the opportunity to review possible alternatives. She reiterated that there should be more community involvement in the review.

37. Dr LEONG Che-hung sought clarification on whether the review panel would work under the constraint that tunnelling works for Stage I would be completed anyway.

38. DEP said that the tunnelling strategy was not committed to Stages II, III and IV. At the moment, the Administration intended to complete Stage I tunnelling works. The effluent from the Hong Kong Island and the disposal of treated effluent from Stage I had yet to be dealt with under Stages II, III and IV. Through the IRP, the Administration would examine the most effective strategy in terms of cost, programme, and the environment for the remaining stages. DEP assured members that the Administration would not commit to appointing members to the IRP without the approval from LegCo.

39. Members considered it necessary to further discuss the subject of review and agreed to hold another meeting on 25 November 1999 at 10:45 am to continue discussion.

II Progress of Year 2000 compliance exercise relating to the environment (LC Paper No. CB(1)201/99-00(02) and (03))

40. At the invitation of the Chairman, the Chief Assistant Secretary for Works Information Technology (CAS/W) briefed members on the contingency arrangements for the waste disposal system by highlighting the salient points of the information paper at LC Paper No. CB(1)201/99-00(03). He said that there were no specific contingency arrangements for the Y2K compliance programme because contingency arrangements were all along a part of the operational requirements of the waste disposal system which had been fully tested.

41. Dr LEONG Che-hung enquired about the monitoring mechanism over the operation of the Chemical Waste Treatment Centre (CWTC) which was managed by private companies and the emergency arrangements for dealing with spillage of chemicals. He also questioned if the present practice of storing collected chemical waste arisings in containers was a satisfactory arrangement. The Chairman sought information on the co-ordination of emergency response plan amongst different government departments such as Fire Services Department, Police Department and Home Affairs

Department in the event of spillage of chemicals, particularly in industrial areas where chemical factories were centred.

42. CAS/W said that chemical waste arisings had all along been stored in containers during the annual maintenance shutdown of the CWTC incinerator. He added that there were established procedures in dealing with chemical spillage and no specific arrangements were made with regards to chemical spillage during the millennium rollover.

43. As regards the environmental pollution incidents arising from Y2K induced disruption in private sector business, the Principal Environmental Protection Officer /Corporate Services (PEPO/CS) advised that industrial plants were subject to licensing controls under various environmental ordinances. Early in the year, EPD had approached the major industrial plants directly to seek information on their Y2K status. Some 750 chemical waste producers including 35 licensed treatment plants for chemical waste which might employ computerized control systems in handling and processing their chemical waste were targeted. Advisory letters were issued to these businesses to draw their attention to possible environmental impacts arising from Y2K induced disruption of their operation. Follow-up site visits were made by EPD control staff under their routine surveillance programme. Most of the chemical waste producers had completed their Y2K rectification work. Surveillance would continue in respect of those non-critical chemical waste producers which had not completed their Y2K work. On the whole, EPD was satisfied with the progress of Y2K compliance.

44. To address members' concern about the possibility of occurrence of environmental pollution incidents arising from Y2K induced disruptions, PEPO/CS advised that during the millennium rollover, additional staff would be deployed on duty at the Environmental Protection Department's (EPD) Y2K Command Centre as well as major waste facilities. In addition, there would be an emergency communication system to facilitate communication in the event of pollution incidents. EPD would be working closely with the Y2K Environment-Sector Co-ordinating Centre and other concerned departments and bureaux in carrying out a series of command post exercises and drills. It would be taking part in a territory wide exercise in November 1999. The Acting Principal Environmental Protection Officer/Facilities Development (PEPO/FD) added that arrangements had been made to process as much of the collected chemical waste as possible to increase its buffering capacity for coping with any surge of chemical waste in early 2000. If necessary, additional storage could be provided for. As an added precaution, the CWTC incinerator would be shutdown during the millennium rollover.

45. Responding to Dr LEONG's further enquiry about the duration of the shutdown period for annual maintenance and the storage capacity of CWTC, PEPO/FD informed that the shutdown period for annual maintenance was about seven to ten days while the storage capacity was more than seven days. In anticipation of the shutdown, the CWTC would collect the waste in advance.

46. Mr Martin LEE enquired if the Administration was able to provide assurance about its Y2K compliance only after the completion of the external audit exercise by mid-November 1999. CAS/W said in response that the service providers were international contractors who had substantial experience in waste management and disposal operations. They had independently checked their systems for Y2K compliance. Nevertheless, the Administration could not entirely rely on the statements made and it would carry out an external audit on the Y2K compliance programme as an additional check and balance. Hence, it would be unlikely that the major facility systems in EPD would be seriously affected by the millennium rollover. Members would be informed about the outcome of the external audit exercise by mid-November 1999.

47. Responding to Mr Martin LEE's further enquiry about what other contingency plans were in place in the event that all facilities became inoperable, including a breakdown in telecommunication system, CAS/W said that arrangements were in place for government drivers to remain on stand-by duty during the millennium rollover to assist in communication work should this be necessary.

48. Noting that a territory wide Y2K compliance exercise would be conducted in November 1999, the Chairman requested that the information on the outcome of the exercise should be made available to the Panel. CAS/W said that the exercise was under the command of the Secretary for Information Technology and Broadcasting who would be responsible for the dissemination of information. He added that chemical spillage was one of the scenarios which had been tested and would be further tested in the territory wide exercise to be carried out in November 1999.

III Any other business

49. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 10:45 am.

Legislative Council Secretariat

7 December 1999