ISE02/19-20

Subject: constitutional affairs, data breach, personal data, privacy, notification system


Personal data breach trends in Hong Kong

  • Hong Kong is among the first in the region to put in place a personal data protection regime. It enacted PDPO in 1995 and established the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data ("PCPD") in 1996. Over the years, the public focus of privacy protection had largely been on the collection and use of personal data, for example, unauthorized sale and use of personal data by entities holding such data. In recent years, there have been a string of high profile personal data breach cases amid a rising trend of cyber-attacks in Hong Kong.3Legend symbol denoting During 2009-2018, the number of security incidents reported to the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Centre under the Hong Kong Productivity Council has increased by 10 times to 10 081. A third of these incidents were related to malware. During the same period, the number of "technology crimes" such as e-banking fraud and identity theft recorded by the police also increased from 1 500 to 7 800 cases. The focus has therefore increasingly tilted towards data security.4Legend symbol denoting See Wong, Stephen (2018). This was partly reflected in the growing number of personal data breaches received by PCPD under its voluntary notification system.
  • In 2012-2013, there were about 61 data breach notification reports received by PCPD, but the figure has almost doubled within six years to 116 cases in 2017-2018. Not only the number has increased, but also the scale of data breach has grown, as indicated by the number of people affected by such breaches. In 2012-2013, only a total of 17 000 people were affected, whereas 3.86 million people were affected in 2016-2017, mostly due to the case of the loss of computers containing information of about 3.78 million voters (Figure 1).


    Figure 1 - Number of data breaches reported under PCPD's voluntary notification system

    Year Private entities Public entities Total No. of affected
    2012-201329326117 000
    2013-2014225476114 000
    2014-201525426777 000
    2015-20166044104854 000
    2016-20175137883 860 000
    2017-20187937116765 834
    Source: PCPD.

  • In recent years, private entities have also overtaken public bodies and government agencies in voluntarily filing data breach to PCPD. However, public doubts over whether private entities have enough incentives to notify and do so in a timely manner still linger. For instance, a Hong Kong-based airline notified PCPD in October 2018 of a data breach affecting 9.4 million individuals, though the breach had been detected in March 2018. While there is no mandatory notification requirement, PCPD viewed that the airline could have notified after the "suspicious activity" was detected so as to allow the affected to take immediate protection measures.

Existing voluntary notification system

Mandatory data breach notification in Australia

Development of the mandatory notification system

Key designs of the notification system in Australia

Effectiveness and issues of concern of DBNS

  • In the first year of operation from April 2018 to March 2019, OAIC received a total of 1 132 notifications which comprised 964 eligible data breaches and 168 voluntary notifications defined as breaches not deemed eligible data breaches under DBNS. While the business sector had challenged the need for a mandatory notification regime during consultation, the number of reported eligible breach was 712% above the pre-mandatory scheme level and significantly outnumbered the original estimate of 200%, possibly supporting the earlier suggestion that there had been under-reporting of personal data breaches. In the first year, no entity was fined for violating the notification requirements.
  • The mandatory scheme has also helped fill the data gap in overall data breaches in Australia, offering valuable insights into the scale and nature of the problem. For example, it was found that 60% of breaches were caused by malicious attack, 35% by human error and 5% by system fault, with the finance and health sectors being the most affected sectors, though breaches by the former sector were more likely to be due to human error.
  • About 83% of the qualified reported cases affected less than 1 000 people each. However, 25% just affected one individual. Moreover, the most common form of information breached was contact information like email address. Compared to other sensitive information like credit card information, loss of contact information may not result in immediate or financial harm. As such, OAIC recognizes that there are challenges to data controllers to determine if loss of personal information warrants a serious harm. Apart from these, there was also confusion in the year over who should be responsible to notify in multi-party breaches, i.e. entities holding personal information jointly. OAIC later issued a specific guidance to clarify the responsibility of notification and to avoid duplication of notification.20Legend symbol denoting For example, there was a data breach incident of an online recruitment system provider which provides services to many clients from different sectors across the world. The incident has created confusion over whether it should be the provider or its clients to notify local privacy watchdogs and affected individuals. Moreover, the breaching entity was obliged under the UK rules to report its suspected breach earlier than would have been the case in Australia, highlighting the need for a proper response plan in a multi-jurisdictional breach. According to OAIC's suggestion, the entity with the most direct relationship with the individuals affected by the data breach should notify the regulator of the data breach.
  • As to the timeframe of notification, it was found that it took an average of 28.25 days for an entity to notify following a breach detection, which was broadly consistent with the 30 days maximum assessment period allowed. As to compliance cost, OAIC does not hold any figures of it. Yet a global data breach study showed that notification cost accounted for as small as 5% of the total cost of a data breach, and the notification costs in Australia has been on a slightly declining trend between 2010 and 2017.21Legend symbol denoting See Ponemon Institute (2017).
  • Overall speaking, OAIC believed that the mandatory requirements have driven many data controllers to improve their practices such as by development and implementing data breach response plans, improving security and privacy standards, and adopting data minimisation policies to reduce overall exposure. However, since the Privacy Act excludes many small businesses, the overall effectiveness of the system may be discounted. Moreover, the legal sector in Australia has expected that DBNS will accelerate the development of class actions over data breaches, by providing an additional source of evidence for seeking remedies. This may give rise to the need for businesses to increase the related liability insurance.

Concluding remarks

  • Personal data breach as a result of cyber-attack, system failure or human error has given rise to grave public concern over data security and brought challenges to organizations holding a vast amount of personal information. Hence, it has become an international trend to mandate notification of personal data breach so that the affected individuals can promptly take mitigation measures. It could also prompt data controllers to rethink their personal data management regime. In Hong Kong, the Government is examining the introduction of a mandatory notification mechanism to help strengthen the protection of personal data.
  • Australia implemented the mandatory notification regime in 2018 in light of growing incidents of personal data breach under the voluntary notification scheme. Its model is seen to be of a higher threshold of notification and more flexible notification timeframe. Despite that, there was a marked increase in notifications, which has offered valuable insights into the contemporary data breach problems. Yet, the review of the first year of operation indicates that there remain concerns and challenges about the assessment of a notifiable data breach, the responsibility for notification, and the overall scheme coverage.


Prepared by CHEUNG Chi-fai
Research Office
Information Services Division
Legislative Council Secretariat
20 November 2019


Endnotes:

1. In the United States, the state of California was the first to implement such system in 2003. At present, all 50 states have enacted similar mandatory requirements. The Australian notification system came in force in February 2018 while the Canada's in November 2018. The United Kingdom also applies the General Personal Data Regulation ("GPDR") of the European Union ("EU") which has come into force since May 2018. Singapore is also moving towards mandatory notification while New Zealand is also expected to pass a bill in 2019 for the system.

2.See Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau (2019).

3.During 2009-2018, the number of security incidents reported to the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Centre under the Hong Kong Productivity Council has increased by 10 times to 10 081. A third of these incidents were related to malware. During the same period, the number of "technology crimes" such as e-banking fraud and identity theft recorded by the police also increased from 1 500 to 7 800 cases.

4.See Wong, Stephen (2018).

5.Some entities including public bodies had been notifying PCPD of data breaches before the PDPO review in 2009. In 2010, PCPD reinforced the arrangement by issuing a guidance note and a template for notification. See PCPD (2010).

6.During the public consultation of the review, a majority of views supported a voluntary system for the following reasons: (a) a mandatory system was still at infant stage of development internationally at that time; (b) a mandatory approach may lead to over-notification and hence, notification fatigue; and (c) the lack of international standard on notification system may make multinational firms difficult to comply with. To take the lead, the Government has since 2008 required its departments to report breaches to PCPD "as soon as possible" and to affected individuals "as far as practicable".

7.See Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau (2019).

8.The public sector agencies of states and territories in Australia are regulated by the respective local privacy laws. The Privacy Act also does not cover public universities and schools, and political parties as well.

9.The provisions of the Privacy Act were extended to cover the private sector in 2000. At that time, small businesses were excluded in order to gain widespread acceptance from the private sector, and to avoid additional compliance burdens on them. However, small businesses are still required to collect and retain customer, financial and transaction records under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006. See Australian Law Reform Commission (2008).

10.The federal government began to consult the public about a mandatory system in 2012, and conducted a targeted consultation in 2013 on the detailed legislative model.

11.The number of voluntarily notified breaches went up from 44 in 2008-2009 to 107 in 2015-2016.

12.In one case, a major retailer in Australia only notified its customers and OAIC in 2014 about a data breach involving two million customers' personal data and credit card information stolen by hackers in 2011.

13.A government report released in 2014 also suggested a link between increasing identify theft and data breaches, while it was reported by IDCARE, an Australian organization providing identity and cyber security support services, that personal data had been found put on sale in illicit online marketplaces. It was also estimated that at least a third of compromised records were further misused.

14.For example, the threshold of notification (to individuals) in California does not require "harm" to be triggered as a result of the data breach, but the notification requirement generally applies to unencrypted electronic data only. The EU threshold is broader that it includes risks of harm to individual rights and freedoms.

15.There are also exceptions to notify certain breaches even though the three conditions are met. These include whether a notification may prejudice law enforcement matters or violate "secrecy provisions" under other legislation.

16.The initial draft of the bill for consultation had used the threshold of "real risk of serious harm". Yet the term was regarded as vague by the business sector. It was then replaced by "likely to result in serious harm", a term that the authorities believed would be of higher threshold and could avoid narrow interpretation that could lead to notification fatigue and create resources issues for the regulator.

17.This timeframe is less stringent than EU's requirement to notify the supervisory authority after having become aware of the breach within 72 hours.

18.This is different from the EU requirement that notification to the supervisory authority is required when the breach is likely to result in a risk to rights and freedoms, but notification to individuals is required only if such risk of harm is considered high.

19.This is contrasted to EU, where the privacy authority can impose an administrative fine of up to €10 million (HK92.5 million) or 2% of the annual turnover of a company for failing to notify.

20.For example, there was a data breach incident of an online recruitment system provider which provides services to many clients from different sectors across the world. The incident has created confusion over whether it should be the provider or its clients to notify local privacy watchdogs and affected individuals. Moreover, the breaching entity was obliged under the UK rules to report its suspected breach earlier than would have been the case in Australia, highlighting the need for a proper response plan in a multi-jurisdictional breach.

21.See Ponemon Institute (2017).


References:

Australia

1.Attorney-General's Department. (2014) Identity crime and misuse in Australia Key findings from the National Identity Crime and Misuse Measurement Framework Pilot.

2.Attorney-General's Department. (2016) Serious Data Breach Notification.

3.Australian Law Reform Commission. (2008) For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice.

4.IDCARE. (2016) Submission to the Serious Data Breach Notification Consultation.

5.Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. (2019a) Notifiable Data Breach (NDB) Scheme.

6.Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. (2019b) Website.

7.Parliament of Australia. (2013) Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security inquiry report.

8.Ponemon Institute. (2017) Cost of Data Breach Study: Australia.

9.Norton Rose Fulbright. (2017) The end of a long road - Mandatory data breach notification becomes law.


Hong Kong

10.Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau. (2019) Motion on "Keeping up with Technological Development and Enhancing the Protection of People's Privacy" at the Legislative Council meeting of 22 May 2019 Progress Report.

11.GovHK. (2018) LCQ2: Enhancing information security and the protection for privacy of personal data.

12.GovHK. (2019) Government notes PCPD report on Cathay Pacific data breach incident.

13.Minutes of Meeting of the Panel on Constitutional Affairs. (2019) 18 March. LC Paper No. CB(2)1703/18-19.

14.PCPD. (2010) Media statement: Privacy Commissioner Publishes Guidance Note on Data Breach Handling and the Giving of Breach Notifications.

15.PCPD. (2019) Data Breach Incident Investigation Report: Cathay Pacific Airways Limited and Hong Kong Dragon Airlines Limited.

16.Report of the Bills Committee on Personal Data (Privacy) (Amendment) Bill 2011 of the Legislative Council. (2012) 30 May. LC Paper No. CB(2)2197/11-12.

17.Wong, Stephen. (2018) Grooving Privacy Evolution with Law Reform and Data Ethics.


Others

18.California Legislative Information. (2019) Civil Code Section 1798.29.

19.EU GDPR.orgn. (2019) Website.

20.ICO. (2019) GDPR One year on.

21.Lexology. (2018) Dutch Authority fines Uber for violation data breach regulation.



Essentials are compiled for Members and Committees of the Legislative Council. They are not legal or other professional advice and shall not be relied on as such. Essentials are subject to copyright owned by The Legislative Council Commission (The Commission). The Commission permits accurate reproduction of Essentials for non-commercial use in a manner not adversely affecting the Legislative Council, provided that acknowledgement is made stating the Research Office of the Legislative Council Secretariat as the source and one copy of the reproduction is sent to the Legislative Council Library. The paper number of this issue of Essentials is ISE02/19-20.