

司法及法律事務委員會於2001年4月26日的會議摘錄

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III. 《物業轉易及財產條例》(第219章)第12條下的法庭權力

(立法會 CB(2)1249/00-01(02) , 1342/00-01(07) , 908/00-01(01)及921/00-01(01)-(02)號文件)

18. 委員察悉，此事項上次是在2001年2月20日的會議上討論。在該次會議中，事務委員會考慮了政府當局的建議，即修訂《物業轉易及財產條例》(“財產條例”)賦權法院可命令退還買方所付訂金。政府當局認為：

- (a) 應藉修訂財產條例第12條，引入一條類似英國《1925年產業法令》第49(2)條的條文；以及
- (b) 此等修訂應包括明令禁止在合約中訂定與法例有抵觸的條款。

19. 委員亦察悉，政府當局曾提交另一份文件(立法會CB(2)1249/00-01(02)號文件)，回應大律師公會、律師會及余若薇議員所提出的意見。大律師公會及余若薇議員均認為不應賦予香港法院此項酌情權，而律師會則原則上支持政府當局的建議。

20. 陳景生先生回應主席時表示，大律師公會已於2001年2月向事務委員會提交意見書(之前發出的立法會CB(2)908/00-01(01)號文件)陳述對此事項的最新意見。他概述大律師公會的意見如下：

- (a) 買賣雙方應享有訂約自由，法院不應干預。重要的是合約必須確切。長久以來，香港人慣有的觀念是，訂約的任何一方未有履行合約條款，便會蒙受損失，例如訂金遭沒收等。現時似乎並無充分理據支持物業買賣應有例外。在香港，物業的買賣完成期較之英國等地的為短，合約的確切性更形重要。
- (b) 法院可基於任何理由行使無限酌情權命令退還訂金，加上並無法定指引訂明應如何行使此酌情權，可能會鼓勵買方提出不必要的訴訟。在物業轉易事宜方面有豐富經驗的律師均對此表示關注。
- (c) 在英國要裁定業權並非易事，法院可能因此需要酌情權，但在香港卻無此問題。

隨文附上

21. 余若薇議員曾表示對賦予法院酌情權的建議有保留，她解釋其主要關注事項如下(立法會CB(2)921/00-01(02)號文件：

- (a) WU Wing Kuen一案中買方蒙受損失，無疑甚為不幸，但此案似乎只屬少數個別案例之一。買方可能需要法院行使擬議酌情權的情況甚為罕見。事實上，大部分與破壞合約執行有關的訴訟均非因業權證明而起，物業市場和價格波動才是箇中原因。
- (b) 在通過《土地業權條例草案》後，有關物業業權證明的問題便可解決。
- (c) 從公眾利益的角度來看，擬議酌情權並不可取。正如終審法院法官Lord Hoffmann在Union Eagle一案中指出：

“.....酌情權未有清晰界定，而法院可以‘不合情理’為理由引用此酌情權拒絕執行合約，這本身已足以構成不確切性。儘管法院不大可能會酌情給予免被沒收訂金的濟助，但若法院真有此酌情權，已足以令訴訟淪為談判手段。在現實的商業世界中，這可能導致案件最終判決亦不能完全彌補的不公平情況。”；及

- (d) 買方支付訂金後，物業便受業權留置權所限，即使有另一買家願出更高價格，賣方亦不能把物業售予該買家。若買方提出訴訟，即使成功機會不大，訴訟程序亦可能曠日持久，這對賣方並不公平。

22. 提到余若薇議員所指物業可能受制於訴訟而無法買賣一事，陳景生先生認為，引進簡易程序以處理與物業交易有關的案件可有助解決問題。

23. 余若薇議員又提述律師會的意見書。(立法會CB(2)1342/00-01(07)號文件)律師會在意見書中表示支持政府當局的建議，惟擬議的酌情權必須予以清晰界定。律師會建議以新南威爾斯《1919年物業轉易法令》第55條為藍本作出修訂。可是，余若薇議員指出，新南威爾斯法令第55(2A)條與英國法令第49(2)條相若，措詞含意相當廣泛。她表示或要請律師會澄清這一點。

24. 高級助理法律政策專員表示，政府當局曾試圖探討應否在法例中臚列法院可行使擬議酌情權的具體情況類別，但卻發覺沒收買方訂金有欠公允的情況數之不盡，要將之盡列實不可能。政府當局仍認為可引用英國的法律條文作為財產條例的藍本。

25. 高級助理法律政策專員證實，新南威爾斯法令第55(2A)條與英國法令第49(2)條內容一樣。

26. 李柱銘議員表示，香港的情況與英國及澳洲的情況有相同但亦有相異之處。英國和澳洲訂有類似法例，顯示此類法例或有其用處。李議員提述余若薇議員所引述Lord Hoffmann的意見時表示，在其他存有不確切成分及法院可按情況酌情給予免被沒收訂金濟助的案件中，Lord Hoffmann所關注的事項同樣適用。他認為，容許法院可靈活地按其判斷作出最能彰顯公義的行動，是有其值得考慮之處。

27. 李柱銘議員又表示，在香港，完成物業交易買賣所需時間不多，這或可作為支持賦予法院酌情權以確保買賣雙方能得享公義的理據。

28. 劉健儀議員表示，為保障合約不受侵犯，法院命令發還買方已付訂金的酌情權應受規限，規定法院不得在買方明顯違反合約時行使此權力。

29. 劉漢銓議員表示，考慮到所有情況，他認為並無逼切需要作出擬議修訂。他表示，類似WU Wing Kuen一案般的不幸情況十分罕見。他又認為，賦予法院擬議的酌情權會引起不必要的訴訟。

30. 何俊仁議員表示，他曾遇見多宗因業權不明確而引起的糾紛，連律師本身也難以向客戶提供明確適當的法律意見。他表示，他最關注的，是法例須訂得更清晰，以協助交易所涉各方。對於法院可在其認為合乎公義的情況下行使酌情權，給予免被沒收訂金的濟助，他表示，是項權力並非罕有，事實上，其他法例也有賦予相若的酌情權。何議員表示，社會上分別有合理意見支持或反對政府當局的建議，他仍未決定如何就此事取態。

31. 李柱銘議員認為，各界就相關事項意見紛紜，故政府當局實有必要提出更多理據支持其建議。

32. 主席表示，她對是否有需要實施政府當局建議的法例修訂持保留態度。她表示，最終政府當局須考慮

經辦人／部門

各界不同意見，自行決定是否提出修訂建議。若有需要，
事務委員會繼續討論此一事項。

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LC Paper No. CB(2)908/00-01(01)

**HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION'S COMMENTS ON
THE PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A STATUTORY
DISCRETIONARY POWER TO ORDER RETURN OF DEPOSITS TO
PURCHASERS IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES**

The case for the need of such power

1. It is understood that on a few occasions, Godfrey J. had lamented openly in his judgments that there was no power on the part of the Courts in Hong Kong to give relief to the purchaser to order the refund of the deposit to him (see e.g. **Wu Wing Kuen v Leung Kwai Lin** [1999] 4 HKC565 at 576E). In many of these hard cases, the purchaser thought that the title offered to him by the vendor was not a good title, and therefore refused to complete. On the other hand the vendor insisted that the title offered was good and would seek to forfeit the deposit when the purchaser failed to complete on the date of completion. The parties thus litigated. If it turned out that the Court considered that the title offered was in fact good, the inevitable result was that the purchaser would lose the deposit.

2. It is thought that this situation is harsh on the purchaser particularly in the context of the current conveyancing practice in Hong Kong. In most of the cases for sale of land in Hong Kong, the date for completion would not be long. In the cases of sale of completed domestic flats, it would usually be a period of one month to 6 weeks from the time of the contract only. Even in cases where there is a long completion period, the usual practice of the mortgagee banks of the vendors is that they would not release the title deeds to the purchasers' solicitors until about a month before the contractual completion date. Hence by the time when the parties had crystallized their position over the requisitions, there would be very little time left before completion for their differences to be determined by the Court. In practice, it is hardly possible to have the matter resolved by a vendor and purchaser's summons before the contractual date for completion without any extension of time agreed to by the parties. This is particularly so in the context of the Hong Kong Rules of Supreme Court which do not make any provision for the

use of the expedited form of originating summons for vendor and purchaser's summons. The consequence is that unless the parties agreed to the abridgement of time, there is no hope that a vendor and purchaser's summons could be heard and determined within a month. In a rising market, the vendor has every incentive to seek to forfeit the deposit and to refuse to agree to any extension of time for completion or any abridgement of time in litigation. The reason is obvious – there would be very little down side risk on the part of the vendor in taking such course. If the purchaser should succeed in a case where there is no defect in title, in a rising market, the likely result would be that the purchaser would want specific performance, and the vendor would only be liable to assign the property to the purchaser on specific performance. The damages which the purchaser could get in addition to specific performance would be the loss due to the delay in completion which is usually the rental value of the property between the original completion date and the date of the eventual assignment in pursuance of the Court's order for specific performance. Against that, the purchaser would have to give credit for the interest on the balance of the purchaser price during this same period. In a case where there is a defect in title, the purchase may still elect to complete in a rising market if the defect is curable. Even in the case where the defect is such that it is not curable and the purchaser has elected to rescind, the only consequence to the vendor is the refund of the deposit received by him together with interest and cost. If on the other hand the vendor should succeed, then the vendor would be able to get the benefit of the forfeiture of the deposit, (if that does not exceed 10% of the price) and meanwhile, the vendor would also get the benefit of the increase in value of the property in the rising market.

3. It is thought that in such cases, where the deposit forfeited appears to be a windfall for the vendor, there should be power on the part of the Court to order the refund of the deposit, leaving the vendor to prove his actual loss and to recover his actual loss from the purchaser.

The case against the provision of such power

4. In a falling market such as the position since October 1997, the trend

is the reverse. It was the case of the speculator purchasers who tried every means of getting out of the contractual obligation. The existence of the power of the Court to order the repayment of the deposit would certainly give them hope to litigate on any flimsy ground. If the Court is given a general discretion to order the refund of the deposit, then if the purchaser should ask for the exercise of such power, the case could not be disposed of by a summary process and it is almost inevitable that the action must be tried before the Court could decide whether such discretionary power should be exercised. This was what happened in **Universal Corp. v Five Ways Properties Ltd.** [1979] 1 All E.R. 552, where the Court held that the matter should go to trial even though it was a plain case that the purchaser failed to complete because of his own financial reasons.

5. As it is now increasingly common that people would use limited companies to acquire properties, the down side risk for purchasers to embark on unmeritorious litigation in practical term would be limited to his own cost only. Questions of liability for damages and costs payable to the other side were wholly academic, although in the case of costs, it would be possible for the vendor, faced with a corporate purchaser without any real assets, to ask for security for cost.

6. Indeed the inducement of the hope that the Court could grant a refund of the deposit would be there even though the market was not a falling market.

The legislative provision in Hong Kong & England

7. In England, when 1925 legislation made provisions for the speedy determination of dispute by vendor and purchaser's summons, there are express provisions for the Court to order the return of the deposit. Section 49 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides :

“49. (1) A vendor or purchaser of any interest in land, or their representatives respectively, may apply in a summary way to the court, in respect of any question

arising out of or connected with the contract (not being a question affecting the existence or validity of the contract), and the court may make such order upon the application as to the court may appear just, and may order how the by whom all or any of the costs of and incident to the application are to be borne and paid.

(2) *Where the court refuses to grant specific performance of a contract, or in an action for the return of a deposit, the court may, if it thinks fit, order the repayment of any deposit.*

(3) This section applies to a contract for the sale or exchange of any interest of land.”

8. In Hong Kong, section 12 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance makes provisions for the vendor and purchaser's summons procedure. However, as has been pointed out earlier, there is nothing in section 12 to indicate that the matter could be decided in a summary way and there is nothing in the Rules of Supreme Court to enable the expedited procedure to be used for the determination of questions raised in the vendor and purchaser's summons. Furthermore, while there is little doubt that section 12 of the CPO is modeled on section 49 of the LPA, there is a deliberate omission of the power to order the refund of the deposit provided in section 49(2) of the LPA. It must therefore be thought by the previous legislature that there ought not to be such power on the part of the Courts in Hong Kong.

9. It is notable that in England, the authorities established that :

(a) such power is exercisable for the return of the whole deposit but not part (**James Macara Ltd. v Barclay** [1944] 1 All E.R. 31).

- (b) The exercise of such power is not confined to cases where the vendor's conduct was unconscionable but "was exercisable on wider grounds, including a general consideration of the conduct of the parties, the gravity of the matters in question and also the amount at stake." (**Schindler v Pigault** (1975) 119 SJ 273).
- (c) It is not necessary that the conduct of the vendor should be open to criticism in some way. The power was designed to do justice between the parties, and the word "justice" was to be used in a wide sense, indicating that the repayment must be ordered in any circumstances which make this the fairest course between the 2 parties (**Universal Corporation v Five Ways Properties Ltd.** [1979] 1 All E.R. 552).
- (d) Repayment had been ordered in cases where the vendor managed to resell at a profit leaving the vendor to prove and claim the actual loss. (**Dimsdale Development (South East) Ltd. v De Haan** (1983) 47 P & CR 1).
- (e) Repayment was declined in a case of sale of commercial property where the Court took the view that the purchaser was an experienced property dealer and was well aware of the function of the deposit (**Safehaven Investments Inc. v Springbok Ltd.** (1995) 71 P & CR 59).
- (f) It is probable that it is possible to contract out of the power under section 49(2) (see the view of the editors of **Emmet on Title para 7.028**).

Evaluation

10. It is a matter of public policy as to whether the Court should interfere with the contractual arrangement between the parties. The power to be given to the Court to order the repayment of deposit is only relevant in cases where the purchaser is in breach of the contract so that under the terms of the contract or as a matter of implied terms or under the common law, the vendor is entitled to forfeit the deposit paid by the purchaser. In the case of the contract being terminated as a result of the vendor's breach, there is no need to have any legislative provision to enable the Court to order the repayment of the deposit, because under the existing law, the purchaser would be entitled to the repayment of the deposit. Likewise in cases where the contract was terminated without the fault of either party, e.g. in the case of frustration of contract, there is again no necessity in making any legislative provision to enable the Court to order the repayment of the deposit. Thus any power provided by legislation to enable the Court to order the repayment of the deposit should be viewed as an interference with the parties' freedom of contract. It is a matter of public policy as to whether this should be done.

11. The traditional view of the law is that the Court should not interfere with the bargain freely entered into between the parties, and the contractual rights of the parties are to be respected. It is never the duty or function of the Court to rewrite the terms of the contract between the parties. Thus it is settled law that the Court would not imply a term into any contract between the parties simply because it is reasonable to do so, because if this is done, the Court is re-writing the contract of the parties.

12. As it has been pointed out above, during the years when there was a rapid rise in the property prices in Hong Kong, there were certainly many hard cases

where because of some errors of the judgment on the part of the purchasers' solicitors in advising on the merit of the title to the property, many purchasers lost their deposits through no fault of their own. In those years, the temptation of having a quick profit was great for the vendors. Many vendors were induced to take a very hard line in standing on their contractual rights.

13. One possible reason for there being a legislative provision in England to enable the Court to order the repayment of the deposit was that the question of title to property in England was often thought to be a difficult one. Indeed, the common belief is that there is nothing as a perfect title in unregistered land in England. Thus it may be thought that it is necessary to provide the Court with the power to order the repayment of the deposit in suitable cases.

14. By contrast, the title to land in Hong Kong is relatively simple. Cases of real difficulties of title problem seldom arise.

15. As it has been pointed out above, in the case of a falling market, cases of oppression by vendor hardly occur. Thus the need of such legislative provision is less urgent today than say 3 years ago. Furthermore, in the light of the probable law reform in introducing registered title, the number of hard cases of loss of deposit because of some doubtful title problems should be ruled out when registered title is introduced.

16. The Court has always the power to set aside a transaction entered into as a result of an unconscionable bargain. There is really no need to have the proposed legislative provision for the protection of the weak.

17. It has to be pointed out that the law is that the Court will view a contractual provision for the forfeiture of a deposit in excess of the conventional sum of 10% of the price as *prima facie* a penalty. The consequence is that since the Court will not allow the imposition of a penalty, the whole amount of the "deposit" would be ordered to be repaid leaving the vendor to recover from the purchaser his actual loss (see **Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd. v Dojap Investments**

[1993] AC 573). [N.B. this is the prevailing view of the law, however there was some doubt expressed by Cheung J. as to whether the Court would have any power to order the repayment to the purchaser of anything in excess of the 10% in the event that the Court should take the view that the forfeiture of the whole deposit would amount to a penalty (see **Green Park Properties Ltd. v Dorku Ltd.** [2000] 2 HKLRD 400, 428)]. In the light of this, the prevailing practice is that the contracts of sale of land would usually only provide for either 10% deposit or if the deposit is to be more than 10%, then the right to forfeit (without showing any loss) is to be limited to only 10% of the price. Thus in practical terms, the lack of power on the part of the Court to order the repayment of the deposit in cases where the purchaser is at fault would really mean that the purchaser would suffer the “unjustified” loss of 10% of the price only. Of course, the law would allow the innocent vendor to show and recover all his actual loss regardless of the amount and in the case of the falling market in the past 2 years, the vendor’s loss could be as much as some 60% of the price of the property. In many instances, the deposit paid could hardly be sufficient to cover the actual loss. In these cases, it is difficult to see why the Court should order the repayment of the deposit even assuming that it has the power to do so.

18. If, as is the position in England, very broad power is given to the Court to order the repayment of deposit without in any way giving the Court any legislative guidelines as to how the power should be exercised, then there would have the down side effect of introducing an element of uncertainty in sale and purchase of land. Is the law to be that there should be a distinction between the rights of a purchaser in a domestic sale and a commercial sale? Is the law to be that a person with very little means should receive extra protection of an imprudent purchase than someone who could well afford the loss of the deposit?

19. The existence of such power (whether with or without any guidelines for its exercise) would certainly encourage purchasers to litigate for the recovery of the deposit. Generally when the purchaser seeks to recover the deposit, he would at the same time ask for a declaration of a lien on the property for the recovery of the deposit. It is not sure whether a lien is available in cases where the

only ground for the recovery of the deposit is the exercise of such discretionary power on the part of the Court. We are inclined to the view that he would not. However, in practical terms, once the purchaser has decided to litigate, it is unlikely that he would simply be relying on the discretionary power of the Court. It is likely that no matter how flimsy his case is, he would seek to say that there is a contractual ground for which he could recover. In such case, in practical terms, his claim for a lien could not be struck out. This would mean that meanwhile unless a special arrangement is worked out (usually by an arrangement for the amount of the lien claimed to be paid into Court or to be stake-held), the vendor is prevented from reselling his property until the determination of the litigation. In any event, the vendor has very little redress for the loss of use of his money. The vendor's cause of action for an unjustifiable registration of a lien claim against his property is an action on slander on title, which requires the proof of actual malice. In practical terms, it is very difficult to prove actual malice.

20. On the whole, we do not consider that it would be desirable to introduce such power on the part of the Court to order the repayment of the deposit.

Dated this 19th day of February 2001.

**LETTERHEAD OF OFFICE OF AUDREY EU, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
MEMBER**

20th February 2001

Miss Margaret Ng
Chairman
Administration of Justice and Legal Services Panel
Legislative Council
8 Jackson Road
Hong Kong

Dear Madam Chairman,

Re: Paper on proposed amendment to the Conveyancing and
Property Ordinance (Cap.219) to enable a court to order
Repayment of any deposit

I refer to the above proposal which will be discussed at the AJLS Panel meeting today.

I have reservations on the proposal for reasons below.

1. The court already has the power to grant relief against forfeiture of the deposit in cases of fraud, accident, surprise or mistake (see para.5 of the paper). In other words, the court already has the power to return the deposit (or part thereof) in order to do justice in those circumstances.
2. Sometimes, if the transaction falls through because of the fault of the purchaser's solicitor, the purchaser can sue his solicitor for negligence and recover the deposit paid.
3. The injustice has been somewhat mitigated since the English case of **Workers Trust** where the court tries to limit the forfeitable deposit to the conventional sum of 10% of the purchase price. This case has been followed in Hong Kong.
4. Whilst the above points cannot help the unfortunate purchaser in **Wu Wing Kuen** as mentioned in the paper, a decision to give the court a *blanket* discretion to order the return of the deposit should be balanced against the considerations in points 5 to 8 below.
5. I agree with the reasons given in paragraph 25 of the paper against the proposal.
6. In addition, no consideration has been given to the benefit the purchaser gained by paying the deposit or to the detriment suffered by the vendor in receiving this

deposit. The deposit is paid for the commitment from the vendor to hold the property for the purchaser. The property is tied up for the period from the sale and purchase to the time of completion. The vendor cannot sell to another/different purchaser at a higher price. The vendor suffers a loss of opportunity. But, in reality, it is difficult for the vendor to prove this loss of opportunity (that he could have sold at a higher price to some other party). It is difficult to adduce hypothetical evidence and the court often ignores this factor. This factor is also ignored in the paper. Thus it is not quite fair to regard deposits retained by vendor as a "windfall". By the time the dispute arises, the vendor has already given consideration for the receipt of the deposit by holding the property for the purchaser and not being able to sell at a better price.

7. I would also like to emphasize the importance of the certainty of contract. From a selfish point of view, it may be good for lawyers to encourage more uncertainty and thus more litigation. But this is highly undesirable from public interest of view. I commend the following passage from one of our Court of Final Appeal Judges Lord Hoffmann in **Union Eagle** for consideration.

"The boundaries of the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against contractual penalties and forfeitures are in some places imprecise. But their Lordships do not think that it is necessary in this case to draw them more exactly because they agree with Litton VP that the facts lie well beyond the reach of the doctrine. The notion that the court's jurisdiction to grant relief is "unlimited and unfettered" (per Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [1973] AC 691, 726) was rejected as a 'beguiling heresy' by the House of Lords in The Scaptrade (Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. AB v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 AC 694, 700). It is worth pausing to notice why it continues to beguile and why it is a heresy. It has the obvious merit of allowing the court to impose what it considers to be a fair solution in the individual case. The principle that equity will restrain the enforcement of legal rights when it would be unconscionable to insist upon them has an attractive breadth. But the reasons why the courts have rejected such generalizations are founded not merely upon authority (see Lord Radcliffe in Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. v. Bridge [1962] AC 600, 626) but also upon practical considerations of business. These are, in summary, that in many forms of transaction it is of great importance that if something happens for which the contract has made express provision, the parties should know with certainty that the terms of the contract will be enforced. The existence of an undefined discretion to refuse to enforce the contract on the ground that this would be 'unconscionable' is sufficient to create uncertainty. Even if it is most unlikely that a discretion to grant relief will be exercised, its mere existence enables litigation to be employed as a negotiating tactic. The realities of commercial life are that this may cause injustice which cannot be fully compensated by the ultimate decision in the

case."

8. It is easy to include a provision giving the court the power to do justice in individual cases. But in real life, justice to one party can also do injustice to the other party. There are often practical difficulties in doing justice in situations relating to the sale and purchase of land. For example when should justice be measured? At the time of the breach, or at the time of judgment? Please note that cases once started may take 2 - 3 years to come to judgment. Meanwhile the property market may have undergone several ups and downs. The situation can be complicated by the vendor having or not having sold the property for all sorts of personal or commercial reasons. What was thought to be a "windfall" at some stage may not be a "windfall" at another stage depending on whether the vendor may or may not have sold or on the unpredictable movement of the market. There is also the vexed question: to what extend should the court look into the motives of the party in determining injustice? At the moment, the court does not look into motives. But the situation may not be so clear if the court is given a blanket discretion to do justice. For example in **Union Eagle**, the purchaser's solicitors was 10 minutes late in tendering the cheque. Clearly the vendor suffered no loss, but since time was of the essence (an express term of such contracts) the court refused to grant relief. Does the proposal mean that in future, if the vendor's motive is to take advantage of a rising market, he should return the deposit? And what if the market has dropped but the vendor did not want to sell to this purchaser for some other reason? Should the court look into the merits of such reasons? There is also the question of uncertainty. How much delay will be acceptable - 10 minutes, 1 day, 2 days? If the purchaser is merely being late, why is the offer of interest not sufficient? If the vendor refuses to accept late tender coupled with interest payment, will it be considered "just" or "unjust" for the vendor to retain the forfeited deposit?

The above are just some considerations for caution. Since the whole law may well be changed with the passage of the Land Titles Bill, it may well be advisable to leave this area of the law alone. I note that the Law Society has found this to be a difficult matter as the advantages may be outweighed by the disadvantages.

The administration wishes to follow equivalent provisions in England and Australia. I would caution that the Hong Kong property market is very different from England or Australia. It may be better for Hong Kong to have a more restrictive provision where the considerations for the exercise of discretion to do justice are clearly specified.

Yours sincerely,



Audrey Eu

Letterhead of LAW SOCIETY OF HONG KONG

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BY FAX (25099055) AND BY POST

Mrs. Percy Ma
Clerk to Panel
Legislative Council
Legislative Council Building
8 Jackson Road
Central, Hong Kong

Dear Mrs. Ma,

LegCo Panel on Administration of Justice and Legal Services Meeting on 26 April 2001

I refer to your letter dated 4 April 2001.

On Item III of the Tentative Agenda relating to the proposed amendments to the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap. 219), the Society's Property Committee has considered the Administration's response. The Committee reiterates its previous stance to support in principle the Administration's proposal to confer a discretionary power on the court to return the deposit to a purchaser subject to further review of the detailed provisions and subject to the proposed discretionary power being narrowly defined and drafted. The Committee would prefer to have Section 12 amended along the lines of the Australian legislation i.e. Section 55 of New South Wales Conveyancing Act 1919.

The Society will not send any representative to attend the LegCo Panel's discussion on the issue.

Yours sincerely,

Patrick Moss
Secretary General