# Views of the Governance of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority

Stephen Y. L. Cheung Professor (Chair) of Finance Department of Economics and Finance City University of Hong Kong

2 June 2003

# Content

- Central Bank Independence
- HKMA's Governance Structure
- Alternative Governance Structure
- Future Development

# Central Bank Independence

- Definition and Rationale
- Central Bank and the Markets
- Central Bank Independence and Creditability
- Central Bank Independence and Accountability

# HKMA

- Monetary Stability
- Banking Stability
- Financial Infrastructure

# HKMA – Advisory Committees

- EF Advisory Committee
  - Subcommittee on Currency Board
- Banking Advisory Committee
- DTC Advisory Committee

- EF Advisory Committee
- de facto management board
- Replace by the Board of Director

- Board of Directors
  - CE and Deputy CE of the HKMA
  - FS as ex-official
  - Independent members

#### Board of Directors


#### Functions

- Review HKMA's performance in relation to its objectives and strategies
- Monitor the extent to which the objectives set in relation to HKMA's financial management have been met

8

- Review the internal financial control of HKMA
- Determine the remuneration package of senior executives of HKMA

- Board of Directors
  - Two Sub-committees should be formed only by independent members on sensitive matters



- Audit Subcommittee
  - Internal financial controls
  - Financial management
  - Risk management
- Remuneration Subcommittee
  - Review HKMA's performance
  - Determine remuneration and pension of senior management

#### Cautions

- Independent members should be 'real' independent – creditability of the Board
- Independent members should be nominated by the Board and appointed by the CE
- Fixed term
- Transparent

# Future Development

- 'Empire' building?
- Super-regulator?
  - Similar to the UK
- Future monetary policy?

# The End

Thank You!