

**立法會**  
**Legislative Council**

LC Paper No. CB(2)1452/10-11  
(These minutes have been seen  
by the Administration)

Ref : CB2/PL/SE

**Panel on Security**

**Minutes of meeting**  
**held on Thursday, 10 February 2011, at 2:30 pm**  
**in Conference Room A of the Legislative Council Building**

- Members present** :
- Hon James TO Kun-sun (Chairman)
  - Hon LAU Kong-wah, JP (Deputy Chairman)
  - Hon Albert HO Chun-yan
  - Dr Hon Margaret NG
  - Hon CHEUNG Man-kwong
  - Dr Hon Philip WONG Yu-hong, GBS
  - Hon WONG Yung-kan, SBS, JP
  - Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing, JP
  - Hon Timothy FOK Tsun-ting, GBS, JP
  - Hon Audrey EU Yuet-mee, SC, JP
  - Hon Andrew LEUNG Kwan-yuen, GBS, JP
  - Hon CHIM Pui-chung
  - Dr Hon LAM Tai-fai, BBS, JP
  - Hon CHAN Hak-kan
  - Hon IP Kwok-him, GBS, JP
  - Dr Hon PAN Pey-chyou
  - Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun
  - Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung
  - Hon WONG Yuk-man
- Members absent** :
- Hon Abraham SHEK Lai-him, SBS, JP
  - Hon Cyd HO Sau-lan
  - Hon WONG Kwok-kin, BBS

**Public Officers : Item IV**  
**attending**

Independent Commission Against Corruption

Ms Rebecca LI Bo-lan, IDS  
Director of Investigation (Private Sector)

Mrs WONG CHEUK Wai-kuen  
Assistant Director (Administration)

Mr Ricky TSUI Yin-fung  
Principal Investigator

Item V

The Administration

Mr LAI Tung-kwok, SBS, IDSM, JP  
Under Secretary for Security

Miss Shirley YUNG Pui-man  
Deputy Secretary for Security

Mr CHAN Chor-kam, FSDSM  
Deputy Director of Fire Services

Mr WONG Sai-chuen, FSMSM  
Chief Fire Officer (Hong Kong)  
Fire Services Department

Mr Charles CHOW Chi-ping  
Project Director (2)  
Architectural Services Department

**Clerk in : Mr Raymond LAM**  
**attendance : Chief Council Secretary (2) 1**

**Staff in : Ms Connie FUNG**  
**attendance : Senior Assistant Legal Adviser 1**

Miss Josephine SO  
Senior Council Secretary (2) 1

Mr Ian CHOW  
Council Secretary (2) 1

Miss Lulu YEUNG  
Clerical Assistant (2) 1

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**I. Confirmation of minutes of previous meeting**  
(LC Paper No. CB(2)904/10-11)

The minutes of the meeting held on 4 January 2011 were confirmed.

**II. Information papers issued since the last meeting**  
(LC Paper No. CB(2)741/10-11(01))

2. Members noted that a letter dated 3 January 2011 from Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, addressed to the Chief Executive and copied to the Panel, regarding the entry of certain persons to attend the funeral of Mr SZETO Wah had been issued since the last meeting.

**III. Date of next meeting and items for discussion**  
(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)938/10-11(01) to (02) and  
CB(2)968/10-11(01))

3. Members agreed to discuss the item "Replacement of two mobile x-ray vehicle scanning systems of the Customs and Excise Department" proposed by the Administration at the next regular meeting to be held on Tuesday, 1 March 2011, at 2:30 pm.

4. The Chairman advised that Hon WONG Kwok-hing had suggested in a letter dated 31 January 2011 to discuss the outbound travel alert for Hong Kong travellers. Members agreed that the item "Outbound travel alert for Hong Kong travellers" be discussed at the Panel meeting on 1 March 2011.

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**IV. Proposal on the implementation of a New Generation Information System for the Operations Department of Independent Commission Against Corruption**  
(LC Paper No. CB(2)882/10-11(01))

5. Director of Investigation (Private Sector), Independent Commission Against Corruption ("DI(PS)/ICAC") briefed members on the proposal of the Independent Commission Against Corruption ("ICAC") to replace the existing Operations Department Information System ("OP SIS") by a new generation OP SIS with a view to enhancing the information technology ("IT") capability of ICAC to support investigation management of its Operations Department, details of which were set out in the paper provided by ICAC.

6. Noting that ICAC had, in the past 10 years, developed six separate administrative IT systems which operated in parallel and independent of the existing OP SIS to support various operational requirements, the Chairman sought more information on the systems.

7. DI(PS)/ICAC advised that the six separate and independent administrative IT systems were built at different times, which included -

- (a) Case Property Recording System;
- (b) Barcode Exhibit Tracking System;
- (c) Barcode File Management System;
- (d) Financial Investigation Team (Bank Enquiry) System;
- (e) S.13 Authorization Management System; and
- (f) Video/Audio Interview Record Management System.

DI(PS)/ICAC said that ICAC proposed to replace the existing OP SIS by implementing a new generation OP SIS and consolidating the above administrative IT systems, with a view to providing integrated and enhanced system facilities.

8. Mr IP Kwok-him and Dr PAN Pey-chyou expressed concern on whether the new generation OP SIS had sufficient security protection against unauthorized access to or retrieval of data/information stored in the system.

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9. DI(PS)/ICAC responded that the new system would be equipped with enhanced security. To ensure system security, ICAC had developed a separate, secure and closed network for OPSIS, which was used for investigation management and was only accessible by authorized officers in the Operations Department. ICAC had stringent control over data security and system security with necessary access control, audit trail and encryption features implemented in the existing OPSIS. The new generation OPSIS would be further equipped with enhanced information security features. For example, authentication using ICAC warrant card/staff card would be imposed to restrict access to selected functions where appropriate. More advanced firewall would be implemented for safeguarding the new OPSIS from unauthorized access. Furthermore, risk assessments of the new OPSIS would be conducted in order to ensure that appropriate measures were in place regarding authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation of the access to and use of information as well as the protection of personal data from unauthorized or accidental access, processing, erasure or other use.

10. DI(PS)/ICAC assured members that there was no question of data leakage from OPSIS, as all data and information stored in the system could not be downloaded to portable electronic storage devices.

11. In response to Mr IP Kwok-him's enquiry on whether the new OPSIS could detect and report immediately attempts of unauthorized access to and use of information, DI(PS)/ICAC replied that the new system would be equipped with more advanced firewall and the overall system security would be enhanced. Apart from the measures mentioned for proper use, storage and transmission of all relevant data, printed documents containing data generated from OPSIS would show the information sources for identification purposes.

12. Mr IP Kwok-him noted that the annual recurrent expenditure of the proposed system for hardware and software maintenance, on-going system support and maintenance as well as acquisition of consumables was estimated to be \$8,978,000 in a full year from 2017-2018 onwards, while the maintenance cost of the existing OPSIS was \$6,838,000 per annum. He asked about the reason for the increase in maintenance cost of the proposed system by around \$2 million over the existing OPSIS.

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13. DI(PS)/ICAC explained that the new OPSIS would be based on a new design of system architecture and the latest technologies to support the development of customized application components covering the entire investigation cycle as well as enhancing the IT capability to support investigation management. Modern tools for data analysis and enhanced search technology would be provided. The new OPSIS would also incorporate core functions and features of the six separate administrative IT systems with enhanced security and service availability. An increase in cost estimate was therefore necessary to maintain the new OPSIS in good conditions.

14. The Chairman queried why the existing OPSIS and the other six separate administrative IT systems were not inter-connected.

15. Principal Investigator, ICAC ("PI/ICAC") responded that the existing OPSIS and the other six separate and independent administrative IT systems were built at different times to support various operational requirements. The six independent administrative IT systems were developed internally as resource saving initiatives to achieve efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The data structure of the existing OPSIS and the six independent administrative IT systems were not designed to handle multi-dimensional enquiries. Their different architectures, application components and input interface had led to data being stored in different formats in the systems, resulting in difficulties for subsequent data processing, retrieval and analysis. The outdated architecture and design had imposed constraints on data interoperability and administration among the existing OPSIS and the six separate administrative IT systems.

16. Notwithstanding the above explanation, the Chairman considered it unreasonable for ICAC to have built six independent administrative IT systems without considering the "connectivity" and "interoperability" between the existing OPSIS and the six IT systems.

17. PI/ICAC explained that the existing OPSIS was developed in 1998 and launched in 2000 based on the technology prevailing at that time. As the design of the existing OPSIS was not based on a modular and componentized architecture, there were technical limitations in planning for subsequent system enhancements or changes after its commissioning. To meet the changing operational needs, six separate and independent administrative IT systems were built after taking into account various factors including cost-effectiveness, technical feasibility and resource implications.

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18. DI(PS)/ICAC and PI/ICAC said that to prepare for the move to the new Headquarters building at Java Road, North Point and to meet its long-term business needs, ICAC had commissioned a consultancy study in 2004 to map out its IT strategic development plan. In recommending a two-phased IT development plan for ICAC, the consultant suggested that the existing OPSIS should be replaced by a new generation OPSIS in Phase Two, so as to better support the Operations Department in carrying out the functions of complaint receiving, case management, court case management, investigation case closure, and statistical compilation and reporting. Against this background, a feasibility study was conducted on ICAC's business needs and technical options available for upgrading the OPSIS. It was the plan of ICAC to redevelop OPSIS with a view to enhancing its support to the entire investigation and case management process.

ICAC

19. The Chairman and Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung requested ICAC to provide the Panel with a copy of the consultancy study conducted in 2004.

20. In response to the Chairman's enquiry about the constraints of the existing OPSIS and the six independent administrative IT systems, and how they could be addressed through the proposed new system, PI/ICAC explained in detail the anticipated benefits of the new generation OPSIS as outlined in paragraph 6 of ICAC's paper. He highlighted the improved case data correlation and analysis capabilities as well as the enhanced searching efficiency of the new system.

ICAC

21. Mr WONG Yuk-man considered the information provided in ICAC's paper inadequate for members to comprehend the constraints of and hence the need to replace the existing OPSIS. He requested ICAC to provide more detailed information about the proposed system, including a full description of the key expenditure items referred to in paragraphs 7 and 9 of ICAC's paper. Mr WONG was also of the view that ICAC should ensure value for money in replacing the existing OPSIS. Given the rapid changes and advancement in technology, the design of the new generation OPSIS should possess the capability and flexibility to cope with further enhancements and changes should such needs arise in the future. His view was echoed by the Chairman.

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22. The Chairman noted that according to ICAC's estimate, the implementation of the new OPSIS would also bring about a one-off cost avoidance of \$35,681,000 which would be required for integrating the existing OPSIS and the six separate administrative IT systems, procuring additional hardware as well as implementing the outstanding application backlog if the existing OPSIS was not replaced. He expressed reservations about the accuracy of the estimate and questioned whether there was a pressing need to redevelop and consolidate the systems.

23. In response to the Chairman's enquiry as to whether the new OPSIS would interoperate with the IT system designed for managing intelligence derived from interception products, DI(PS)/ICAC advised that OPSIS was the information system of the Operations Department for case management and was independent of the IT system for the handling of interception products obtained pursuant to the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Cap. 589) ("ICSO"). The latter system was a confidential and separate system, and its use was restricted to designated officers.

24. The Chairman queried ICAC's overall work effectiveness and efficiency, when its IT systems did not support data sharing, correlation and analysis given that they did not interoperate with one another.

25. Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung held the view that the IT system, developed by ICAC specifically for the handling of intelligence derived from interception products should be a stand-alone system in order to prevent unauthorized access or improper use.

26. In response, DI(PS)/ICAC advised that ICAC had, in accordance with the requirements laid down in ICSO, put in place a stringent system for handling interception products. Information and intelligence derived from interception of communications were not shared or exchanged with OPSIS which was used by frontline investigating officers for case management purpose.

27. The Chairman said that despite ICAC's explanation, it was difficult for members to visualize how the operational needs of ICAC could not be met without a new generation OPSIS. He requested ICAC to arrange a demonstration, before submitting the funding proposal to the Finance Committee, to facilitate members' understanding of the limitations of the existing OPSIS in supporting the investigation process and case management of its Operations Department.

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*(Post-meeting note: With the concurrence of the Chairman, the demonstration was scheduled for Tuesday, 15 March 2011, from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm, at the Headquarters of ICAC.)*

**V. Redevelopment plan for the Fire Services Training School**  
(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)938/10-11(03) and (04))

28. Under Secretary for Security ("US for S") briefed members on the Administration's proposal to redevelop the Fire Services Training School ("FSTS") at Pak Shing Kok in Tseung Kwan O, details of which were set out in the Administration's paper. Chief Fire Officer (Hong Kong) of the Fire Services Department briefed members on the redevelopment plan with the aid of powerpoint presentation.

*(Post-meeting note: The softcopy of the powerpoint presentation materials was issued to members vide LC Paper No. CB(2)1008/10-11(01) on 11 February 2011.)*

29. Dr LAM Tai-fai noted that it would take some years before the new FSTS came into operation. He asked how the Fire Services Department ("FSD") could meet the latest training needs and equip frontline staff with advanced firefighting and rescue techniques.

30. US for S and Deputy Director of Fire Services ("DDFS") responded that FSD had kept on upgrading the training facilities at the existing FSTS in Pat Heung over the years. Currently, training for new recruits was being conducted at the existing FSTS in Pat Heung, while refresher and advanced training courses for serving firefighters were being conducted at the West Kowloon Rescue Training Centre.

31. Dr LAM Tai-fai asked about the criteria under which the 13 proposed simulators were selected for the proposed FSTS.

32. DDFS responded that the 13 proposed simulators were commonly used in training by advanced fire brigades around the world, including those in Singapore, United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, and Guangdong Province. These simulators would enable the trainees to be trained in realistic settings of fire or other emergency scenarios which would be encountered by frontline personnel.

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33. Noting the provision of an earthquake simulator in the public education centre and an oil tank simulator in the proposed FSTS, Dr LAM Tai-fai queried the rationale for choosing such installations, given that oil tank emergencies and earthquakes rarely happened in Hong Kong. His view was shared by Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung.

34. DDFS advised that oil tank fires, although rarely happened, might result in very serious consequences. As there was no oil tank simulator at the existing FSTS, special arrangements had to be made with oil companies for conducting fire drills at oil depots. The Administration proposed to install simulators of oil tanks that were similar to those currently in use in Tsing Yi and the Hong Kong International Airport. DDFS emphasized that FSD had a responsibility to educate the public on fire prevention and emergency preparedness in natural disasters. Although the chance of a significant earthquake happening in Hong Kong was small, there had been a number of locally felt earth tremors since 1979. It would be beneficial for Hong Kong residents to acquire relevant knowledge.

35. Regarding the public education centre, Mr CHAN Hak-kan asked if there was adequate space and manpower to support its operation at the proposed FSTS.

36. DDFS responded that the Sai Kung District Council proposed to set up a public education centre at the proposed FSTS. Similar facilities are commonly found in overseas countries and cities in the Mainland. The space required for the public education centre would not be large. FSD would consider recruiting part-time or voluntary staff to man the public education centre.

37. Mr CHAN Hak-kan considered the 13 simulators to be installed at the proposed FSTS inadequate. Referring to the new cruise terminal at the former Kai Tak Runway, Mr CHAN asked if the ship fire simulator and water rescue facility would contain simulated internal environment of cruise vessels. Dr LAM Tai-fai and Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung suggested that a flood simulator should be installed at the proposed FSTS since there had been casualties caused by flooding in Hong Kong.

38. DDFS responded that the ship fire simulator and swift water simulator would simulate common emergency scenarios that happened in a ship. It would comprise various installations such as an engine room, a control room, a cargo compartment and a boiler room. These

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installations would prepare trainees technically and psychologically for firefighting and rescue duties on board a ship. The swift water simulator could also demonstrate to the public the possible rescue measures during flooding.

39. Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung suggested that railways, tunnels, ferries, flyovers, landslides and nuclear hazard simulators should be installed to educate the public how to react in emergency situations.

40. DDFS advised that railway and tunnel simulators would be installed at the new FSTS.

41. Noting that additional ambulance training facilities would be provided at the proposed FSTS, Mr CHAN Hak-kan asked about the future use of the existing Ambulance Command Training School in Ma On Shan.

42. DDFS responded that the proposed FSTS would provide basic training to newly recruited ambulancemen. The existing Ambulance Command Training School in Ma On Shan, which could only accommodate four classes of trainees at one time, would be used to provide ambulance refresher training courses for serving personnel.

43. Dr LAM Tai-fai and Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung asked about the breakdown of the estimated project cost of \$3.4 billion for the proposed FSTS.

44. Project Director (2), the Architectural Services Department explained that the initial estimated project cost was \$2.4 billion in September 2009 at time of completion of the feasibility study. The unit construction cost was approximately \$19,000 per square metre, which was comparable to that for the new fire station at Aberdeen. As the Tender Price Index had risen by 12.4% between September 2009 and September 2010, the proposed FSTS's estimated project cost had reached \$3.4 billion in money-of-the-day prices. The Administration expected that the prices of construction materials and wages of construction workers would continue to rise between now and the second half of 2011 when the tendering exercise commenced.

45. Ms Emily LAU expressed concern that the existing FSTS was commissioned in 1968 and had been in use for over 40 years. She asked when the Administration saw a need to redevelop the existing FSTS and started the site search. She advised the Administration to provide cost

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breakdown of each facility at the proposed FSTS for seeking funding approval.

46. US for S and DDFS responded that FSD had been upgrading training facilities at the existing FSTS in the past decade to cope with the need for introducing advanced firefighting and rescue techniques. FSD had originally considered in-situ development but later found the proposal technically not feasible. In searching for a site for the proposed redevelopment, the Administration took into account the size required and the need for the proposed FSTS to be located away from residential areas. Right after a suitable site was identified in 2007, the Administration had quickly completed the technical feasibility study and consulted the Sai Kung District Council in 2008.

47. The Chairman considered the cost for the proposed FSTS too high. He requested the Administration to reconsider if the facilities at the proposed FSTS were all essential. He said that it would sometimes be more effective for training to be conducted in real settings, such as at an oil tank. He asked whether FSD would consider constructing a multi-purpose training facility which could simulate different fire scenarios to save cost. Noting from the Administration's paper that several lecture rooms and stores would be installed at different facilities, he asked about the need for the construction of such rooms and stores in all these facilities.

48. DDFS responded that although some training sessions were currently conducted in real oil tanks or at underground railway stations, they were subject to limitation. For instance, no fire could be set at such facilities for training purpose. In addition, training at train stations could only be conducted outside service hours, and the trains could not be lifted up for training purpose. He informed members that a burn house with different types of simulators would be constructed at the proposed FSTS to simulate different indoor fire scenarios. Having regard to the fact that simulators of ship, aircraft, and oil tank fires would take up substantial space, multi-storied simulators were technically not possible. DDFS emphasized that all rooms and stores at different facilities of the proposed FSTS were essential.

49. The Chairman requested the Administration to reconsider its proposal and revert back.

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50. The meeting ended at 4:32 pm.

Council Business Division 2  
Legislative Council Secretariat  
11 April 2011