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**Panel on Security**

**Background brief prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat  
for the special meeting on 29 November 2010**

**Results of Study of Matters Raised in the Annual Report  
to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner  
on Interception of Communications and Surveillance**

**Purpose**

This paper summarizes past discussions by the Panel on Security ("the Panel") on the results of study of matters raised in the annual reports to the Chief Executive ("CE") by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance ("the Commissioner").

**Background**

2. Pursuant to section 49 of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Cap. 589) ("ICSO"), the Commissioner shall, for each report period, submit a report to CE. The report is to be submitted within six months after the expiry of the report period. CE shall cause to be laid on the table of the Legislative Council ("LegCo") a copy of the report.

3. In the course of examination of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Bill in 2006, the Administration undertook, inter alia, to report to the Panel the results of the Administration's study of matters raised in the Commissioner's annual report to CE.

**Past discussions of the Panel**

4. Since the commencement of ICSO on 9 August 2006, the Commissioner has submitted three annual reports to CE. The first one covered the period

from 9 August 2006 to 31 December 2006, and the second and the third for the whole year of 2007 and 2008 respectively. The Security Bureau ("SB"), in consultation with the law enforcement agencies ("LEAs") concerned, had studied the matters raised therein and briefed the Panel at five meetings on the results of the Administration's study of matters raised in the three annual reports.

5. The following paragraphs set out the major areas of concern raised by members.

Attitude problem and compliance with the statutory requirements among officers of the law enforcement agencies

6. Noting the Commissioner's comments in his Annual Report 2008 about the attitude of a law enforcement officer, which was described as "arrogant and presumptuous, bordering on recalcitrance", some members expressed grave concern about the overall attitude of law enforcement officers towards the Commissioner's oversight and review functions. They enquired about the measures taken by the Administration and the Independent Commission Against Corruption ("ICAC") to address the attitude problem among law enforcement officers and to ensure their strict compliance with ICSO and full cooperation with the Commissioner.

7. The Administration advised that it noted the Commissioner's comments about the attitude of a law enforcement officer in a reported case involving an irregularity due to system failure in effecting discontinuance resulting in the facilities covered by five prescribed authorizations being disconnected six to 18 minutes after the expiry of the authorizations. Although the way in which the officer responded to the Commissioner's enquiry appeared to be unsatisfactory, it was an isolated incident due possibly to the fact that the officer had not got used to the Commissioner's oversight authority. As a matter of fact, the Commissioner stated in his Annual Report 2008 that the heads of LEAs had provided him with all the assistance he needed, enabling him to perform his review and oversight functions under ICSO.

8. The Administration further advised that with the benefit of more practical experience gained in the implementation of ICSO, LEAs were more readily able to offer useful comments from the operational perspective in response to recommendations and suggestions made by the Commissioner for improving the checking mechanism. Regarding recommendations made by the Commissioner to LEAs, the LEAs concerned had accepted them in full or were actively identifying improvement measures to address the Commissioner's concerns. SB had also amended the Code of Practice ("CoP"), as and where appropriate, to resolve common issues that had implications across LEAs.

9. ICAC assured members that it was committed to ensuring ICAC officers' full compliance with the ICSO requirements in conducting interception and covert surveillance. In tandem with the introduction of a package of improvement measures, a dedicated Compliance Assurance Group had been set up to deal with ICSO-related matters. Although investigations into the cases of irregularities/non-compliance had not revealed any evidence of bad faith on the part of ICAC officers, the ICAC management agreed that officers should have been more vigilant in the implementation of ICSO and in responding to the Commissioner's enquiries or requests. ICAC would continue to render full cooperation and support to the Commissioner to facilitate his performance of the statutory functions under ICSO.

#### Fairness of disciplinary actions taken by ICAC

10. Members noted that in his Annual Report 2008, the Commissioner doubted the fairness and appropriateness of the disciplinary actions taken by ICAC against various offending officers in a reported case, which related to an irregularity concerning the inclusion of a wrong facility number in the application for and the obtaining of a prescribed authorization for interception resulting in the interception for a few days of a facility of a person who was not the subject under investigation. Members were gravely concerned that although the Commissioner had made known to ICAC his analyses of the blameworthiness of each of the officers concerned and doubted the fairness of the disciplinary actions taken by ICAC, ICAC did not consider that there was unfair treatment. Some members queried the propriety of ICAC's decision to uphold its stance, especially when the difference in treatment was considered by the Commissioner as magnifying the culpability of the junior while playing down the mistakes committed by the superior who similarly lacked diligence and vigilance in performing their duties. These members cautioned that the unfair disciplinary actions taken against various offending officers might give the public an impression that such decisions were not entirely impartial, and the fact that ICAC did not pay heed to the views of the Commissioner might affect the community confidence in the work of ICAC.

11. ICAC advised that following the submission of a report to the Commissioner, the Compliance Assurance Group had conducted a full investigation into the incident to determine the appropriate disciplinary actions to be taken. Taking into account a number of matters including the duties and responsibilities of the officers concerned, the nature and extent of contravention and mitigating circumstances, the four officers involved were respectively given either a disciplinary warning or a disciplinary advice. ICAC noted the Commissioner's comments and analyses about the case and appreciated his concerns. In the light of the Commissioner's observations, the ICAC

management had reviewed the disciplinary actions taken, but considered that they were not inappropriate or unfair. This notwithstanding, ICAC had assured the Commissioner that his comments would be taken into consideration in the performance review of each and every officer concerned together with other aspects of their performance.

Protection of information subject to legal professional privilege and privacy of members of the public

12. Members expressed deep concern about how LEAs handled interception products involving information which might be subject to legal professional privilege ("LPP"). Members considered that LEAs should be mindful of the need to protect LPP in carrying out interception or surveillance operations, as failure to observe the requirements of ICSO regarding handling of LPP would have an adverse impact on LEAs' reputation.

13. The Administration advised that section 59(2)(b) of ICSO and paragraphs 124 and 169 of CoP provided adequate safeguards for protected products, including those containing information subject to LPP. ICSO and CoP required that any intercepted product containing information that was subject to LPP should be destroyed as soon as reasonably practicable.

14. Members were also concerned whether LEAs carried out interception in a responsible manner and complied closely with the requirements and spirit of ICSO to ensure that the intrusion into privacy of the subject of the prescribed authorization, albeit a suspected offender, would not be continued unless it was necessary and reasonable.

15. The Administration advised that the checks and balances built into the ICSO regime had struck a balance between protecting privacy and LPP, while allowing LEAs to carry out covert operations for the prevention and detection of serious crimes and protection of public security in warranted circumstances. Whenever an application was made to the relevant authority (panel judge or authorizing officer) for a prescribed authorization, the relevant authority would assess whether the conditions for issue of the prescribed authorization as set out in section 3 of ICSO were met. Applications for renewal of prescribed authorizations were also subject to stringent requirements. As pointed out by the Commissioner in his Annual Report 2006, where the LEA concerned came to the view that circumstances did not warrant the continuation of an operation, it would proactively discontinue the operation and inform the panel judge concerned as soon as practicable. This would help protect the privacy of the individuals concerned.

16. Some members requested expanding the content of the Commissioner's annual report to include the numbers of applications received from and authorizations issued or renewed for respective LEAs, as well as more detailed information on renewal cases.

17. The Administration informed the Panel that it was concerned that the provision of too much information in the Commissioner's annual report might reveal the investigation capability of LEAs, and would be prejudicial to the prevention and detection of crime and the protection of public security. Notwithstanding this concern, the Administration undertook to refer members' request to the Commissioner for consideration.

18. Some members noted from the Commissioner's Annual Report 2007 that some conversations containing LPP information or possible LPP information might touch on matters not directly related to legal advice but useful for crime prevention or detection purposes relating to the offence for which the prescribed authorization was granted or to other offences. They also noted that the Commissioner had raised a query on whether LPP information obtained in this manner could be used for criminal investigation purposes. These members sought clarification on whether information subject to LPP, if obtained, could be used for crime prevention or detection purposes.

19. The Administration advised that it had already made its stance clear to LEAs that any information subject to LPP was to remain privileged notwithstanding that it had been obtained pursuant to a prescribed authorization. As a matter of fact, ICSO required that any telecommunications interception product should not be admissible as evidence in any proceedings before any court and should not be made available to any party to these proceedings. LEAs must fully observe the requirements of ICSO in their handling of LPP matters.

20. A member was of the view that penalty should be introduced for non-compliance with the provisions in ICSO or CoP. He suggested that the Administration should consider making the use of LPP information obtained through interception of telecommunications for any purposes a criminal offence.

Commissioner's power and authority to listen to interception product and the need for legislative amendments

21. A member suggested that consideration should be given to engaging officers or organizations independent from any LEAs, such as the Office of the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance, to be responsible for listening to interception products. In his view, this measure would serve as a safeguard against LEAs since staff members of the

Commissioner's Office would screen out any suspected LPP information before passing it to the investigators for their retention. The Administration advised that it would consider the suggestion when conducting the comprehensive review of ICSO.

22. Members were also concerned about the queries regarding the legitimacy or propriety of the Commissioner's listening to interception products including those that contained, or might contain, LPP information, which had been lawfully obtained by LEAs, for the purposes of performing his functions under ICSO. Noting that the Commissioner had made a recommendation to the Administration for amending ICSO to give express power and authority to the Commissioner to listen to interception products held by LEAs, members asked whether the Administration was prepared to do so.

23. The Administration admitted that there was an absence of express and unambiguous provisions in ICSO empowering the Commissioner to listen to interception products. It was also doubtful whether section 53(1)(a) regarding the power of the Commissioner to require any person to provide information for the purpose of performing his functions under ICSO could be construed as having the effect of empowering the Commissioner to listen to interception products. With the existence of legal uncertainty, the Commissioner considered that the safest way was to amend ICSO to allow the Commissioner and the staff designated by him to conduct the checking. The Administration would carefully consider the recommendations raised in the Commissioner's annual reports, including the one in connection with the Commissioner's authority to listen to interception products which required legislative amendments for implementation, during the comprehensive review of ICSO. The Administration noted that the Commissioner would cease listening to the recordings before it took any final decision on the matter. Nevertheless, LEAs would continue to preserve the recorded products containing LPP information or possible LPP information and other related materials for the purposes of the Commissioner's inquiry or performance of his oversight functions under ICSO.

#### Differences in the interpretation of provisions in the legislation

24. Members were concerned that LEAs and panel judges held different interpretations on a number of provisions in ICSO, such as the power of panel judge to revoke an authorization that had been granted, to impose additional conditions when confirming an emergency authorization and to revoke a device retrieval warrant. Some members queried whether LEAs were challenging the rule of law, the power of panel judges and the views of the Commissioner. They took the view that if LEAs questioned the power of the panel judge to revoke the prescribed authorization, LEAs should seek remedy from the court, such as to quash the panel judge's decision of revocation or his refusal to allow

the continuance of the prescribed authorization or to seek for a declaration of a proper interpretation of the statutory provision.

25. The Administration advised that although the annual reports had revealed that there was occasional disagreement between LEAs and the Commissioner on the interpretation of certain provisions of ICSO, there was no question of LEAs being disrespectful to panel judges or the Commissioner. In the LPP case referred to in the Commissioner's Annual Report 2007, the LEA concerned had accepted the panel judge's view and discontinued the covert operation as soon as reasonably practicable.

26. The Administration further advised that LEAs had adopted pragmatic measures to address the Commissioner's concerns and resolve the differences in views between them regarding the power of panel judge to revoke an authorization. SB had amended CoP where appropriate to address the issues identified in the annual reports. As some of the Commissioner's recommendations arose from different interpretations of certain provisions in ICSO, the Administration would consider those recommendations in detail when it conducted the comprehensive review of ICSO after the Commissioner's Annual Report 2008 was available. The review would provide an opportunity for the Administration to identify further legislative improvements to ICSO.

27. The Administration stressed that notwithstanding the possible need to refine ICSO when the Administration next reviewed the legislation, the issues raised by the Commissioner in his annual reports had either been dealt with by pragmatic solutions, such as revision of the CoP, or did not have any substantial impact on the operation of the existing regime.

#### Political monitoring

28. Some members were concerned whether law enforcement officers would carry out interception of communications for political monitoring under the name of crime investigation. They suggested that the Commissioner should consider disclosing in his annual report any political monitoring identified.

29. The Administration stressed that law enforcement officers had always conducted interception and covert surveillance operations strictly in accordance with the law and only for the purpose of prevention or detection of crime or protection of public security. There was no question of covert operations under ICSO being conducted for political monitoring. The Administration reiterated that the scope of information to be included in the annual report was a matter for the Commissioner. Nevertheless, it would convey the views of members to the Commissioner.

## **Review of ICSO**

30. The Administration briefed the Panel on the scope of its comprehensive review on ICSO at the Panel meeting held on 6 July 2010.

### Protection of information subject to legal professional privilege and proactive monitoring of interception products and related records

31. Members asked whether the Administration would, in considering the Commissioner's recommendations to amend ICSO, solicit views from LEAs and the Department of Justice. The Administration advised that it had formed an interdepartmental working group ("the Working Group") to conduct a comprehensive review of ICSO. In undertaking the review, it would take into account the recommendations of the Commissioner, the views of panel judges and the operational experience of LEAs.

32. Members considered that there was a need to strike a balance between protecting privacy and LPP, while allowing LEAs to carry out interception of communications and covert surveillance operations for the prevention or detection of serious crimes and the protection of public security. They considered that the Administration should bear this principle in mind in conducting the comprehensive review of ICSO.

33. The Administration advised that interception of communications and covert surveillance operations were critical to the capability of LEAs in combating crime and protecting public security. The Administration recognized the need to strike a balance between combating serious crimes and protecting the privacy of individuals. Stringent safeguards were provided under ICSO at all stages of the covert operations, from the initial application to the execution of the authorization, and throughout the entire oversight process. Regarding the review of ICSO, as a number of the issues involved the panel judges, the Working Group would consult the panel judges. In conducting the review, the Administration would strive to improve the operation of the ICSO regime without compromising the privacy of individuals and the effectiveness of LEAs in combating serious crimes. The Working Group would take into account the comments of members, panel judges and the Commissioner in formulating the recommendations.

34. Some members expressed concern about the Commissioner's proposal to amend ICSO to allow him or his designated officers to check interception products, which might increase the risk of disclosure or leakage of confidential information.



35. The Administration informed the Panel that it was fully aware of the privacy concern. The materials obtained by interception of communications and covert surveillance might contain sensitive personal information about the targets and other innocent persons. Improper use or disclosure of such materials would result in a serious invasion of their privacy. ICSO therefore strictly regulated the handling of such materials by LEAs. ICSO expressly required heads of LEAs to make arrangements to ensure that the extent to which such materials were disclosed, the extent to which they were copied and the number of copies made were kept to the minimum that was necessary; that all practicable steps were taken to make sure that such materials were protected against unauthorized or accidental access, processing or erasure; and that such materials were destroyed as soon as their retention was not necessary for the relevant purpose of the authorization.

36. As regards the proposal to amend ICSO to enable the panel judges and the Commissioner to access the interception products, the Administration advised that it fully respected the need to facilitate the performance of the panel judges' and the Commissioner's functions under ICSO, but the public must be assured that the proposed arrangements would not add intrusion into their privacy, infringe their right to confidential legal advice or increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure or unintended leakage. It would consult panel judges and the Commissioner on the detailed proposals.

37. Members opined that during the process of reviewing and considering legislative amendments to ICSO, the Administration should consult the public widely on the proposed amendments. The Administration advised that it was still in the process of reviewing the entire ICSO. It assured members that in considering whether legislative amendments to ICSO were required, it would take into account the views of relevant parties, including the Commissioner, the panel judges, members and LEAs, as well as the views of the two legal professional bodies where appropriate.

#### Review of panel judge's determination

38. Regarding the Administration's proposal to establish a mechanism for the review of a panel judge's determination of an application for the issue of a judge's authorization, members enquired about the rationale and the implementation details for the proposal. The Administration informed the Panel that ICSO did not provide for any mechanism for an LEA to apply to a panel judge for a review of the latter's determination. In 2008, the numbers of interception authorizations issued and applications for the issue of interception authorizations refused were 801 and 13 respectively. It planned to explore the option of establishing a statutory review mechanism under which a panel judge might, upon application by an LEA, review his own determination. This

arrangement would enable LEAs to have an opportunity to explain to the panel judges their grounds for making the applications in person and to provide further information about their applications where necessary. The preliminary thinking of the Administration was to provide a mechanism that could set the review process in motion within a short period of time.

#### Review of the intelligence management system of LEAs

39. A member pointed out that in examining the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Bill, members of the Bills Committee had expressed concern over LEAs' intelligence management system, and there was a view that sufficient safeguards should be put in place to prevent possible abuse of retention and use of intelligence derived from interception of communications and covert surveillance activities. As a member of the Bills Committee, he had requested the Administration to consider establishing a mechanism for the keeping and destruction of intelligence derived from such activities, and to review the existing intelligence management system of LEAs. He asked about the progress of the review of the intelligence management system of LEAs.

40. The Administration advised that information obtained in the course of a duly authorized interception of communications or covert surveillance operation might be kept as intelligence if it was related to the prevention and detection of crime or the protection of public security, so as to assist LEAs in performing their functions. All law enforcement officers must abide by the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383), the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) and ICSO. In addition, all LEAs had put in place a stringent intelligence management system. With regard to the keeping of intelligence, LEAs would take into account factors such as the need for continued retention and information accuracy in determining whether certain information captured by their intelligence systems should continue to be kept. During the scrutiny of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Bill, the Administration undertook to conduct a comprehensive review of the existing intelligence management system of LEAs in a separate exercise with a view to further strengthening the systems, particularly to enhance the transparency of the policy on the use of such information. The review of LEAs' intelligence management system had already commenced and consultation with LEAs concerned was in progress. The Administration aimed to report to the Panel the outcome of the review in around one year's time.

#### Possibility of expanding the scope of the review

41. Members asked whether the Administration would consider expanding the scope of the present review on ICSO to cover the following issues -

- (a) to consider expanding the definition of intercepting act and covert surveillance, with a view to enhancing the protection for Hong Kong residents' right to freedom and privacy of communications;
- (b) to consider introducing legislative amendments to ICSO so as to make it applicable also to personnel of the Central People's Government ("CPG") agencies in Hong Kong;
- (c) to re-examine the appropriateness of setting up a panel judges system and conferring non-judicial powers on panel judges to issue or grant prescribed authorizations for interception or covert surveillance;
- (d) to consider involving other relevant parties, such as the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, in the process of granting authorization since views from third parties, particularly from human rights and privacy perspectives, would be relevant to the panel judge's determination of the authorization;
- (e) to consider introducing penalty provisions to guard against law enforcement officers' non-compliance with ICSO or CoP, and to consider making the use of privileged information obtained through interception of telecommunications for any purposes a criminal offence;
- (f) to consider instituting a mechanism whereby LEAs, panel judges and the Commissioner could seek declarations from the court if they held different interpretations on any provisions in ICSO; and
- (g) to consider establishing a mechanism for the keeping and destruction of intelligence derived from interception of communications and covert surveillance activities.

42. The Administration advised that -

- (a) ICSO was enacted after thorough deliberations in the Legislative Council. During the Committee stage of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Bill, it had provided detailed explanation regarding the definitions of intercepting act and covert surveillance, as well as the need to appoint panel judges to consider applications for authorizations;

- (b) ICSO was intended to provide for a stringent regulatory regime for the interception of communications and the use of surveillance devices by public officers, in particular to ensure that LEAs respected the privacy and other rights of the public while combating crimes and protecting public security;
- (c) there was currently no specific legislation regulating the use of video surveillance and telephone tapping by non-public officers, including organizations such as news agencies or the CPG agencies in Hong Kong;
- (d) the report on "Privacy: Regulating the Interception of Communications" released by the Law Reform Commission ("LRC") in 1996 recommended that it should be an offence for a person to intentionally intercept or interfere with communications in the course of their transmission, other than where authorized by a warrant. Separately, in its report on "Privacy: The Regulation of Covert Surveillance" released in 2006, LRC recommended the creation of two new criminal offences to prohibit the obtaining of personal information through trespass on private premises or by means of a surveillance device. While the conduct of interception of communications and the use of surveillance devices by public officers was regulated by ICSO, the Administration was of the view that it should not draw any conclusion lightly that the conduct of non-public officers in this respect should be regulated. As a matter of fact, the two LRC reports were highly controversial. When they were published, the Hong Kong media sector and journalists expressed worry that the recommendations might compromise press freedom. In view of the wide public concern over the issue, the Administration would not accept the recommendations lightly. In determining the way forward, the Administration would consider carefully how press freedom and privacy could be maintained at the same time. At the present stage, the Administration did not have any plan to introduce legislation to implement the LRC recommendations;
- (e) it should be noted that if any public officer had committed an act in contravention of the provisions in ICSO or CoP, he would be subject to disciplinary action under the disciplinary mechanism of the department concerned. Any public officer who had intentionally conducted interception of communications or covert surveillance without lawful authority was liable to be prosecuted for the common law offence of misconduct in public office;

- (f) during the monitoring process, the Commissioner and LEAs had identified a few cases of non-compliance with the relevant requirements of ICSO. Some of them involved technical errors and some were due to individual officers' failure to thoroughly understand or be familiar with the requirements. The Commissioner had indicated in his annual reports to CE that he was satisfied with the overall performance of LEAs and their officers in their compliance with the requirements of ICSO, and that he had not found any wilful or deliberate flouting of such requirements;
- (g) the Commissioner had also pointed out in his Annual Report 2008 that the panel judges were vigilant and strict in their consideration of applications by LEAs for interception and surveillance, and he had not found a single case in 2008 in which he entertained any doubt as to the propriety of their determination, be it a grant of a prescribed authorization or a refusal; and
- (h) as regards the controls over intelligence obtained through interception or covert surveillance, LEAs would take into account various factors, including the need for continued retention and information accuracy, in determining whether certain information captured by their intelligence systems should continue to be kept. Intelligence generated from such information would be destroyed when their retention was no longer required.

43. Members enquired about the reasons for not legislating against interception of communications and covert surveillance activities carried out by organizations such as the CPG agencies in Hong Kong, and not providing express provisions in ICSO to guard against public officers' non-compliance. These members considered that if LEAs and panel judges had different interpretations on any provisions in ICSO, they should seek judicial interpretation from the court.

44. The Administration advised that -

- (a) existing legislation afforded some protection from interference with private communications by non-public officers. For example, section 24 of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap. 106) provided that it was an offence for any person who had official duties in connection with a telecommunications service to willfully destroy, alter, intercept or detain any message intended for delivery, or to disclose any message to any person other than the person to whom the message was addressed; and section 27 stipulated that a

person who damaged, removed or interfered with any telecommunications installation with intent to intercept or discover the contents of a message was guilty of an offence. Under both sections, a person convicted of the relevant offence was liable on summary conviction to a fine of \$20,000 and to imprisonment for two years. Furthermore, there were provisions in the Post Office Ordinance (Cap. 98) and the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance safeguarding the privacy of individuals in relation to postal packets and personal data; and

- (b) as regards the difference in interpretation between panel judges and LEAs, it was noteworthy that steps had been taken by SB and LEAs to address the issue. Regarding recommendations made by the Commissioner to LEAs, the LEAs concerned had accepted them in full and identified improvement measures to address the Commissioner's concerns. For those recommendations which had implications across LEAs, SB had implemented them as far as practicable and amended CoP where appropriate if the recommendations did not require legislative amendments. Regarding the remaining recommendations, including the one in connection with the Commissioner's authority to listen to interception products which required legislative amendments for implementation, the Administration would study them in detail in the comprehensive review of ICSO.

### **Relevant papers**

45. Members may wish to refer to the following minutes of meetings and papers for details of the discussions -

#### Minutes

- (a) minutes of the meeting of the Panel on Security on 6 November 2007 (LC Paper No. CB(2)707/07-08);
- (b) minutes of the special meeting of the Panel on Security on 6 December 2007 (LC Paper No. CB(2)1496/07-08);
- (c) minutes of the special meeting of the Panel on Security on 16 February 2009 (LC Paper No. CB(2)1208/08-09);
- (d) minutes of the meeting of the Panel on Security on 3 March 2009 (LC Paper No. CB(2)1420/08-09);

- (e) minutes of the special meeting of the Panel on Security on 7 December 2009 (LC Paper No. CB(2)1778/09-10);
- (f) minutes of the meeting of the Panel on Security on 6 July 2010 (LC Paper No. CB(2)2252/09-10);

Papers

- (g) Administration's paper entitled "Results of study of matters raised in the Annual Report 2006 to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance" (LC Paper No. CB(2)181/07-08(03));
- (h) Administration's responses to issues raised at the Panel meeting held on 6 November 2007 (LC Paper No. CB(2)462/07-08(01));
- (i) Administration's paper entitled "Results of study of matters raised in the Annual Report 2007 to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance" (LC Paper No. CB(2)808/08-09(01));
- (j) Information paper provided by Independent Commission Against Corruption in response to issues raised in Chapter 5 of the Annual Report 2007 to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance for the special meeting on 16 February 2009 (LC Paper No. CB(2)889/08-09(01));
- (k) Information paper provided by Independent Commission Against Corruption in response to issues raised by members at the special meeting on 16 February 2009 (LC Paper No. CB(2)990/08-09(01));
- (l) Administration's paper entitled "Results of study of matters raised in the Annual Report 2008 to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance" (LC Paper No. CB(2)396/09-10(01));
- (m) Information paper prepared by the Independent Commission Against Corruption in response to issues raised in the Annual Report 2008 to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance (LC Paper No. CB(2)467/09-10(01)); and

- (n) Administration's paper entitled "Review of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance" (LC Paper No. CB(2)1948/09-10(01)).

46. The above minutes of meetings and papers are available on the website of LegCo (<http://www.legco.gov.hk>).

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