

**Legislative Council Panel on Transport  
Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways**

**Occurrences of Non-stopping of MTR Trains or Door Opening  
Procedures not Properly Followed by MTR Train Captains**

This paper provides information on occurrences of non-stopping of MTR trains or door opening procedures not properly followed by MTR Train Captains for the four-month period between 1 October 2011 and 31 January 2012 as requested by Members of the Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways at its meeting on 13 January 2012.

**Fail-safe design**

2. The MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) is committed to providing a safe, reliable and efficient railway service for the people of Hong Kong. Safety is the absolute top priority in MTR operations.

3. The MTR system is designed to be fail-safe. MTR train doors, platform screen doors (PSDs) and automatic platform gates (APGs) have been designed in such a way that under normal train operations, they cannot be normally opened if the train is in motion or not stopped at the pre-designated stopping position at platforms, such that passengers who board and alight at stations can be safeguarded.

**Training for Train Captains**

4. MTRCL attaches great importance to the training and assessment of Train Captains. Train Captains are properly trained and assessed as competent to operate trains before they are assigned with the duties. Training covers the proper procedures to follow when opening and closing train doors, PSDs or APGs such that passengers can board and alight smoothly at stations.

**Recent occurrences of non-stopping of trains or door opening procedures not properly followed by Train Captains**

5. In the period between 1 October 2011 and 31 January 2012, there were two occurrences of door opening procedures not properly followed by Train Captains for the heavy rail network. For the Light Rail network, the number of occurrences of non-stopping or door opening procedures not

properly followed by Train Captains totalled five. Relevant information is set out in the Annex.

6. Of the occurrences in the heavy rail network, one was attributed to a West Rail Line Train Captain who did not follow the established procedures to ensure the train doors and PSDs were opened as normal, after the train berthed at Long Ping Station, leading to passengers not being able to board and alight. The other occurrence was attributed to an East Rail Line Train Captain who did not ensure that the train was berthed within the platform area of the Mong Kok East Station. He also did not follow the proper procedures to obtain authorisation from the Operations Control Centre, before activating the override switch to open the train doors. In fact, the last car of the train was outside the platform area. Both events were the result of human error.

7. Of the five occurrences on the Light Rail network, all were attributed to Train Captains bypassing a Light Rail stop or failing to open the Light Rail vehicle doors for passengers to board and alight. Human error was attributed to these occurrences.

### **Improvement measures**

8. All concerned Train Captains were temporarily relieved from driving duties and required to attend re-training courses and complete re-qualification before being allowed to resume driving duties. To prevent the reoccurrence of such cases due to human errors, MTRCL has reminded all Train Captains to be vigilant in ensuring they strictly follow the door opening procedures when stopping at MTR stations and Light Rail stops, by issuing reminders and conducting briefings. Notices have also been placed in train cabs to remind Train Captains of the proper door opening and closing procedures.

### **Conclusion**

9. MTRCL attaches great importance to the occurrences of these aforementioned cases, and apologises for the inconvenience caused to passengers.

10. Safety is the absolute top priority in MTR operations. MTRCL is committed to seeking continuous improvements and preventing similar occurrences in future.

**MTR Corporation Limited**  
**February 2012**

**Occurrences of Door Opening Procedures not Properly Followed by MTR Train Captains  
from 1 October 2011 to 31 January 2012 (Heavy Rail)**

Occurrence Date	Occurrence Time	Railway Line / Location	The Case	Findings of Investigation / Remedial Action Taken	Delay (min)
25-Dec-11	2:21 AM	West Rail Line / Long Ping Station	The Train Captain of a Tuen Mun-bound train did not notice that the platform screen doors did not open after the train berthed at Long Ping Station when he opened the train doors. Passengers were not able to board or alight from the train. A platform staff brought the train to stop by pressing the stop switch while the train was departing. The train set back to the platform area for passengers to board and alight as authorised by the Operations Control Centre.	The case was caused by human error. The Train Captain was temporarily relieved from driving duties and was required to attend re-training courses and complete re-qualification before he was allowed to resume driving duties.	4
8-Jan-12	12:32 PM	East Rail Line / Mong Kok East Station	When a Hung Hom-bound train stopped at Mong Kok East Station, the Train Captain opened the train doors by activating an override switch without ensuring that the train had berthed within the platform area. The last compartment of the train was outside the platform area. The Train Captain immediately realised the irregularity and closed the train doors. He informed the Operations Control Centre and obtained authorisation to move the train forward to the correct stopping position before re-opening the doors for passengers to board and alight.	The case was caused by human error. Under normal train operations, if a train is not stopped at the proper stopping position, the train doors cannot be normally opened. In the case, the Train Captain admitted that he did not follow the proper procedure by first obtaining the agreement of the Operations Control Centre before activating an override switch to open the train doors. The concerned Train Captain was temporarily relieved from driving duties and was required to attend re-training courses and re-qualification before he was allowed to resume driving duties.	9

**Occurrences of Non-stopping of MTR Trains or Door Opening Procedures not Properly Followed by MTR Train Captains  
from 1 October 2011 to 31 January 2012 (Light Rail)**

Occurrence Date	Occurrence Time	Railway Line / Location	The Case	Findings of Investigation / Remedial Action Taken	Delay (min)
2-Dec-11	5:49 AM	Sam Shing Stop	The Train Captain of a Light Rail vehicle on Route 505 forgot to open the train doors for passengers to board and alight after the vehicle had stopped at Sam Shing Stop Platform 3. The Train Captain later departed from the Stop, realised the irregularity and notified the Operations Control Centre. He was authorised to go back to the platform to allow boarding and alighting of passengers.	The case was the result of human error. The Train Captain was temporarily relieved from driving duties and was required to attend re-training courses and complete re-qualification before he was allowed to resume driving duties.	1
22-Dec-11	6:04 AM	Tuen Mun Ferry Pier Stop	The Train Captain of a Light Rail vehicle on Route 615P forgot to open the train doors for passengers to board and alight after the vehicle stopped at Tuen Mun Ferry Pier Stop. When the vehicle started to move off, the Train Captain realised the irregularity and stopped the vehicle. The vehicle was stopped at a position where the last pair of doors remained in the platform area. The Train Captain then notified the Operations Control Centre and with the assistance of other Light Rail staff, the last pair of doors was opened for passengers to board and alight.	The case was the result of human error. The Train Captain was temporarily relieved from driving duties and was required to attend re-training courses and complete re-qualification before he was allowed to resume driving duties.	1

**Occurrences of Non-stopping of MTR Trains or Door Opening Procedures not Properly Followed by MTR Train Captains  
from 1 October 2011 to 31 January 2012 (Light Rail)**

Occurrence Date	Occurrence Time	Railway Line / Location	The Case	Findings of Investigation / Remedial Action Taken	Delay (min)
1-Jan-12	7:53 AM	Tuen Mun Hospital Stop	The Train Captain of a Tuen Mun Ferry Pier-bound Light Rail vehicle on Route 610 forgot to stop the vehicle for platform duty at Tuen Mun Hospital Stop. After the vehicle passed the platform area, the Train Captain realised the irregularity, stopped the vehicle, and notified the Operations Control Centre. He was authorised to proceed to the next stop at Affluence where platform duty was conducted. As a result, 8 passengers alighted at Affluence Stop and took a Light Rail vehicle travelling in the opposite direction to go back to Tuen Mun Hospital Stop.	The case was the result of human error. The Train Captain was temporarily relieved from driving duties and was required to attend re-training courses and complete re-qualification before he was allowed to resume driving duties.	8
14-Jan-12	11:10 PM	Tsing Wun Stop	The Train Captain of a Tuen Mun Ferry Pier-bound Light Rail vehicle on Route 610 forgot to open the train doors after the vehicle stopped at Tsing Wun Stop. He took the vehicle to the next stop at Tsing Shan Tsuen where platform duty was conducted. As a result, 2 passengers alighted at Tsing Shan Tsuen Stop and took a Light Rail vehicle travelling in the opposite direction to go back to Tsing Wun Stop.	The case was the result of human error. The Train Captain was temporarily relieved from driving duties and was required to attend re-training courses and complete re-qualification before he was allowed to resume driving duties.	3

**Occurrences of Non-stopping of MTR Trains or Door Opening Procedures not Properly Followed by MTR Train Captains  
from 1 October 2011 to 31 January 2012 (Light Rail)**

Occurrence Date	Occurrence Time	Railway Line / Location	The Case	Findings of Investigation / Remedial Action Taken	Delay (min)
18-Jan-12	8:09 PM	Tsing Wun Stop	The Train Captain of a Tuen Mun Ferry Pier-bound Light Rail vehicle on Route 615 forgot to stop the vehicle at Tsing Wun Stop for platform duty. The Train Captain realised the irregularity after the vehicle had passed the platform area. He immediately stopped the vehicle, notified the Operations Control Centre which authorised him to proceed to the next stop at Tsing Shan Tsuen where platform duty was conducted. When the vehicle arrived at Tsing Shan Tsuen Stop, no passenger alighted to travel in the opposite direction.	The case was the result of human error. The Train Captain was temporarily relieved from driving duties and was required to attend re-training courses and complete re-qualification before he was allowed to resume driving duties.	2