

立法會

Legislative Council

LC Paper No. CB(2)532/14-15
(These minutes have been seen
by the Administration)

Ref : CB2/PL/SE

Panel on Security

Minutes of meeting
held on Tuesday, 2 December 2014, at 2:30 pm
in Conference Room 1 of the Legislative Council Complex

Members present : Hon IP Kwok-him, GBS, JP (Chairman)
Hon James TO Kun-sun
Hon CHAN Kam-lam, SBS, JP
Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing, JP
Hon Cyd HO Sau-lan, JP
Dr Hon LAM Tai-fai, SBS, JP
Hon CHAN Kin-por, BBS, JP
Dr Hon Priscilla LEUNG Mei-fun, SBS, JP
Hon WONG Kwok-kin, SBS
Hon Alan LEONG Kah-kit, SC
Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung
Hon WONG Yuk-man
Hon Claudia MO
Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun, BBS, JP
Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming
Hon YIU Si-wing
Hon MA Fung-kwok, SBS, JP
Hon Charles Peter MOK, JP
Hon CHAN Chi-chuen
Dr Hon Kenneth CHAN Ka-lok
Hon LEUNG Che-cheung, BBS, MH, JP
Hon Kenneth LEUNG
Hon KWOK Wai-keung
Hon Christopher CHEUNG Wah-fung, SBS, JP
Dr Hon Fernando CHEUNG Chiu-hung
Dr Hon Elizabeth QUAT, JP
Dr Hon CHIANG Lai-wan, JP
Hon CHUNG Kwok-pan
Hon Christopher CHUNG Shu-kun, BBS, MH, JP

Members absent : Hon NG Leung-sing, SBS, JP (Deputy Chairman)
Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun, JP
Hon Dennis KWOK

Public Officers attending : Item IV

The Administration

Mr LAI Tung-kwok, SBS, IDSM, JP
Secretary for Security

Mr Joshua LAW Chi-kong, JP
Permanent Secretary for Security

Ms Mimi LEE Mei-mei, JP
Deputy Secretary for Security 1

Mrs Millie NG KIANG Mei-nei
Principal Assistant Secretary for Security E

Ms Alice YEUNG Lai-shan
Assistant Secretary for Security E2

Mr Godfrey KAN Ka-fai
Senior Assistant Solicitor General
Department of Justice

Independent Commission Against Corruption

Mr Steven LAM Kin-ming
Assistant Director / Operations 3

Ms Winky HSU Man-wai
Senior Principal Investigator / R Group

Item V

The Administration

Miss Shirley YUNG Pui-man
Deputy Secretary for Security 2

Miss Amy YEUNG Wai-sum
Assistant Secretary (Emergency Support Unit) 3

Mr HO Wing-yiu
Chief Electrical and Mechanical Engineer
(Electricity Legislation)
Electrical & Mechanical Services Department

Mr LEE Siu-keung
Senior Physicist, Radiation Health Unit
Department of Health

Dr Raymond HO
Principal Medical Officer (Risk Management)
Food and Environmental Hygiene Department

Dr Allen CHAN
Senior Veterinary Officer (Veterinary Public Health)
Food and Environmental Hygiene Department

Mr TSUI Kit-chi,
Assistant Director of Hong Kong Observatory
(Radiation Monitoring and Assessment)

Mr CHAN Kin-man
Chief Waterworks Chemist
Water Supplies Department

Clerk in attendance : Miss Betty MA
Chief Council Secretary (2) 1

Staff in attendance : Mr Bonny LOO
Assistant Legal Adviser 3

Mr Raymond LAM
Senior Council Secretary (2) 7

Ms Mina CHAN
Council Secretary (2) 1

Miss Lulu YEUNG
Clerical Assistant (2) 1

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I. Confirmation of minutes of previous meeting
(LC Paper No. CB(2)355/14-15)

The minutes of the meeting held on 4 November 2014 were confirmed.

II. Information papers issued since the last meeting
(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)360/14-15(01) and CB(2)366/14-15(01) to (05))

2. Members noted that the following papers had been issued since the last meeting -

- (a) letter dated 26 November 2014 from Mr James TO suggesting the Panel to discuss issues relating to the Police's clearance operations at Mong Kok on 25 and 26 November 2014 and the Clerk's reply dated 28 November 2014;
- (b) letter dated 27 November 2014 from Ms Claudia MO suggesting the Panel to discuss issues relating to the Police's clearance operations at Mong Kok and the Clerk's reply dated 28 November 2014; and
- (c) letter dated 27 November 2014 from Dr Fernando CHEUNG suggesting the Panel to discuss issues relating to the Police's clearance operations at Mong Kok and the Clerk's reply dated 28 November 2014.

3. Mr James TO, Ms Emily LAU, Ms Cyd HO, Mr Alan LEONG, Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung, Ms Claudia MO, Mr CHAN Chi-chuen, Mr Kenneth LEUNG and Dr Fernando CHEUNG considered that a special meeting should be held as soon as possible to discuss the Police's use of force in handling recent public assemblies related to Occupy Central ("the Movement") in Mong Kok. Mr TO and Mr LEONG expressed concern that there were allegations about police officers chasing after demonstrators to hit them with batons in recent public assemblies. Mr CHAN said that there were also allegations about police officers hitting some passer-bys with batons in recent public assemblies. Dr CHEUNG considered that both demonstrators and police officers had resorted to violence in recent public assemblies. He expressed concern that further escalation of violence might eventually result in casualties. Mr WONG Yuk-man disagreed with the view that demonstrators had

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resorted to violence in recent public assemblies in Mong Kok. He considered that it was the police officers who had resorted to violence. Ms MO considered that a special meeting should be held to discuss the issue before Christmas. Ms HO considered that a special meeting should be held within the current week to discuss the issue.

4. Mr CHAN Kam-lam, Mr YIU Si-wing, Mr LEUNG Che-cheung, Mr KWOK Wai-keung and Dr CHIANG Lai-wan took the view that the issue should be discussed in the context of the Police's overall handling of the Movement after the latter had come to an end. Mr YIU and Dr CHIANG expressed concern that many demonstrators had resorted to violence in recent public assemblies. There were also news footages showing some demonstrators assaulting off-duty police officers at recent public assemblies. Mr CHAN and Mr LEUNG said that violence exhibited by demonstrators had escalated after the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism called for besieging the Central Government Offices. Mr CHAN and Mr KWOK considered that Members in support of the Movement should urge the organizers to terminate the Movement.

5. The Chairman said that there had been many discussions and debates on the issues concerned at many Council meetings in the current legislative session. The Panel had also discussed the Police's handling of public assemblies at a recent special meeting on 27 October 2014. He considered it more appropriate to discuss the Police's overall handling of the Movement after the latter had come to an end. As members had divergent views on the issue, he would further consider the views expressed by members before determining the timing for discussion of the issue.

6. Mr Kenneth LEUNG said that he intended to write to the Chairman suggesting the formation of a subcommittee under the Panel to review the Police's guidelines and procedures on the use of force as well as facilitating media reporting work at public assemblies.

III. Date of next meeting and items for discussion
(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)357/14-15(01) and (02))

Regular meeting on 6 January 2015

7. Members agreed that the following items would be discussed at the next regular meeting on 6 January 2015 at 2:30 pm -

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- (a) The next generation smart identity card system; and
- (b) Latest situation of the operation of control points.

Special meeting in January 2015

8. The Chairman informed members that a special meeting would tentatively be scheduled for 27 January 2015 from 12:30 pm to 2:00 pm to receive a briefing by the Commissioner of Police on the crime situation in 2014. Mr James TO, Ms Cyd HO and Ms Claudia MO considered that the special meeting should be held at a regular meeting time slot. Mr WONG Kwok-kin and Dr CHIANG Lai-wan suggested that the majority views of members on the timing for holding the special meeting be sought after the meeting. The Chairman said that he would further consider the timing for holding the special meeting.

(Post-meeting note: With the concurrence of the Chairman, the special meeting was subsequently scheduled for 27 January 2015 from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm.)

IV. Results of study of matters raised in the Annual Report 2013 to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance

(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)342/14-15(01) and CB(2)357/14-15(03))

9. Members noted a Summary of the Annual Report 2013 ("the Annual Report") to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance ("the Commissioner") prepared by the Secretariat of the Commissioner, which was tabled at the meeting.

(Post-meeting note: The Summary tabled at the meeting was circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(2)387/14-15 on 3 December 2014.)

10. The Chairman informed members that the Commissioner, who had been invited to attend the meeting, had replied that it was not appropriate for him to attend. The Commissioner had, in line with his past practice and the practice of the former Commissioner, held a briefing on the Annual Report in the morning of 2 December 2014, which had been attended by a Legislative Council ("LegCo") Member, the media and members of the public.

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11. Secretary for Security ("S for S") briefed members on the results of the Administration's study of matters raised in the Annual Report, details of which were set out in the Administration's paper. He informed members that after consulting Members on the proposed legislative amendments to the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Cap. 589) ("ICSO"), the Administration had been drafting the relevant legislative amendments and intended to introduce the relevant bill into LegCo by the end of the current year or early next year.

12. Members noted the updated background brief entitled "Results of Study of Matters Raised in the Annual Report to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance" prepared by the LegCo Secretariat.

Cases of non-compliance or omission in 2013

13. Mr WONG Yuk-man noted from the annual reports submitted by the Commissioner over the years that non-compliance and omissions had been found with law enforcement officers in each year. He expressed particular concern about Report 5 in Chapter 6 of the Annual Report that the applicant concerned had failed to make an assessment of the likelihood of information subject to legal professional privilege ("LPP") or journalistic material being involved in the application for a prescribed authorization. S for S pointed out that law enforcement agencies ("LEAs") had taken follow-up actions in accordance with the Commissioner's advice and recommendations in the cases concerned.

14. Mr KWOK Wai-keung expressed concern about Report 4 in Chapter 6 of the Annual Report in which there was an omission of a subject's alias in the affirmation in support of an application for a Type 1 surveillance operation. He asked whether the Administration had adopted measures to prevent the recurrence of such omission in future. S for S responded that the omission was an inadvertent one which occurred during the transfer of the case concerned from one investigating team to another. The officers of the LEA concerned had been reminded to be more vigilant in handling ICSO-related documentation and to avoid transferring cases involving ICSO operations between investigating teams as far as practicable. The relevant guidance notes had also been revised to alert officers of LEAs to include any relevant alias of the subject in an application.

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15. Dr Elizabeth QUAT expressed concern about Report 2 in Chapter 6 of the Annual Report where interception continued for 22 minutes after a panel judge had revoked the prescribed authorization upon considering the information provided by the LEA concerned. While noting that there was an unavoidable time gap between the time of revocation of a prescribed authorization and the time of physical disconnection of the interception facility, she asked whether LEAs had adopted measures to shorten such a time gap.

16. Mr CHAN Chi-chuen asked whether any malpractice had been identified with law enforcement officers in the case concerned and whether measures were adopted by LEAs to address the time gap.

17. S for S responded that when making an application for a prescribed authorization, an LEA applicant was obliged to state his assessment of the likelihood of obtaining information subject to LPP. If there was subsequently any material change of circumstances including the likelihood of obtaining information subject to LPP, the LEA applicant had to promptly notify the panel judge. In the event that the prescribed authorization was revoked, an unavoidable time gap would arise between the time of revocation of the prescribed authorization by the panel judge and the time of physical disconnection of the interception facility. In this regard, the former Commissioner had recommended that ICSO should be amended to address the issue and the Administration would propose relevant amendments to ICSO. In the interim, administrative measures had been adopted by LEAs to address the issue as far as possible. LEAs would not listen to any interception products obtained during such a time gap.

18. Dr CHIANG Lai-wan sought information on the percentage of applications for interception that had been refused by panel judges. S for S responded that seven applications for interception had been refused by panel judges in 2013.

Empowering the Commissioner and his staff to listen to interception products

19. Mr WONG Yuk-man expressed concern that legislative amendments had not yet been introduced to implement the recommendation of expressly empowering the Commissioner and his staff to listen to interception products. He expressed concern about the Administration's progress of work since July 2013 in the drafting and introduction of legislative amendments to ICSO.

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20. Dr Elizabeth QUAT noted with concern the Commissioner's comments in the Annual Report that before the introduction of legislative amendments empowering the Commissioner and his staff to listen to interception products, no finding could be made as to whether there were any communications subject to LPP other than those reported.

21. S for S responded that law drafting in relation to the proposed amendments to ICSO, which included amendments empowering the Commissioner to listen to interception products, had been completed. Subject to some internal procedures within the Administration, the Administration intended to introduce the relevant legislative amendments into LegCo in December 2014 or early 2015.

Interception by parties other than LEAs

22. Dr CHIANG Lai-wan asked whether there was protection under ICSO of a person's communication from interception by parties other than LEAs. S for S responded that ICSO provided a statutory framework for the regulation of interception and surveillance by four designated LEAs in the detection of serious crime and protection of public security. Compliance of the four designated LEAs with the relevant requirements of ICSO was monitored by the Commissioner.

Statistics on cases involving serious crime and those involving public security

23. Mr James TO pointed out that there was no breakdown in the statistics provided in the Annual Report between cases involving serious crime and those involving public security. Given the lack of such a breakdown in the Annual Report and the absence of a definition of "public security" in ICSO, he expressed concern about the possibility of interception for political monitoring.

24. Mr LEUNG Kwok-hung expressed concern that if a low threshold was adopted for the interpretation of "public security" in ICSO, interception might be carried out for political monitoring.

25. S for S responded that there was no question of interception for political monitoring. Under ICSO, a prescribed authorization had to be granted by a panel judge in fulfilment of the objectives of the operation as prescribed under section 3 of ICSO. He reiterated that the compliance of LEAs with ICSO was monitored by the Commissioner.

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26. Ms Cyd HO expressed concern about the recent refusal by the Mainland immigration authorities of some Hong Kong residents from entering the Mainland. She queried whether a list of persons to be refused entry into the Mainland had been compiled by the Administration after carrying out interception and surveillance in Hong Kong.

27. S for S responded that entry into the Mainland was a matter for the Mainland authorities, and that the Administration was not aware of any list of persons to be refused entry into the Mainland. He considered it inappropriate to interfere with the immigration decisions of the Mainland authorities.

28. Dr LAM Tai-fai asked whether LEAs had carried out interception or surveillance on organizers of the Movement. S for S stressed that all applications for prescribed authorization had to be submitted in written form and approved by panel judges. Section 3 of ICSO defined the conditions for the issue, renewal or continuance of a prescribed authorization. Compliance with ICSO was monitored by the Commissioner.

Possibility of abuse of power by LEAs when carrying out interception or surveillance

29. Ms Claudia MO expressed concern about the possibility of abuse of power by LEAs when carrying out interception or surveillance under ICSO. S for S responded that interception and surveillance by the four designated LEAs were regulated by ICSO. When making an application for a prescribed authorization, a LEA applicant had to submit with his application an affidavit or written statement on his assessment of the likelihood of involvement of LPP to a panel judge. Whenever there were subsequent changes which might affect the assessment, the LEA concerned had to submit an REP-11 report to the panel judge, who would then determine whether the prescribed authorization should continue and if so, whether any additional conditions needed to be imposed. The compliance of LEAs with ICSO was further monitored by the Commissioner. He stressed that the Administration had full confidence in the existing ICSO regime.

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Statistics on number of persons arrested in 2013

30. Mr Christopher CHEUNG said that since ICSO came into operation some eight years ago, hundreds of persons had been arrested each year as a result of interception or covert surveillance. He queried why the number of persons thus arrested had decreased to 261 in 2013. He asked whether it was due to the availability of more anti-interception and anti-surveillance devices on the market or a decrease in the number of persons who breached the law.

31. S for S responded that the number of persons arrested as a result of interception or covert surveillance carried out pursuant to prescribed authorizations was subject to a number of factors, including the amount of information obtained by interception and surveillance, the number of offenders involved and whether there was sufficient evidence for instituting prosecution in the cases concerned. He stressed that interception and surveillance by LEAs, which had to be carried out in compliance with ICSO, were important to the maintenance of law and order in Hong Kong.

Comparison of statistics about interception and surveillance in Hong Kong with those of other jurisdictions

32. Dr LAM Tai-fai asked how the numbers of applications and arrests relating to interception and surveillance as set out in the Annual Report compared with those of other jurisdictions. S for S responded that although the numbers of applications and arrests relating to interception and surveillance in Hong Kong were much lower than those of the United Kingdom, it was inappropriate to compare the statistics given the different laws and regulatory systems of the two places. He stressed that the Administration had studied the experience of other common law jurisdictions before the enactment of ICSO.

V. Contingency plan for nuclear incidents near Hong Kong
(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)357/14-15(04) and (05))

33. Deputy Secretary for Security 2 ("DS for S2") briefed members on the contingency plan and related measures in the event of nuclear events at nuclear power stations near Hong Kong.

34. Members noted the background brief entitled "Daya Bay Contingency Plan" prepared by the LegCo Secretariat.

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Monitoring of radioactive substances in water

35. Referring to paragraph 16 of the Administration's paper, Mr Kenneth LEUNG sought information on the water treatment process to be adopted to reduce the content of radioactive substances in treated water supply and the volume of water which could be so treated.

36. Chief Waterworks Chemist, Water Supplies Department ("CWC/WSD") explained that drinking water in Hong Kong had undergone stringent treatment processes including coagulation, sedimentation, filtration and disinfection. According to the World Health Organization's Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality published in 2011, coagulation, sedimentation and filtration processes could effectively remove radioactive substances in water. The effectiveness of water treatment process in the removal of radioactive substances was subject to a number of factors, including the type and state of the radionuclide as well as the proportion of adsorption of such radionuclide onto particulates. As regards the impacts on Dongjiang in the event of a serious nuclear accident, he said that the main river course of Dongjiang, from which Dongjiang raw water was supplied, was located more than 50 km to the north of Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station ("DBNPS"). The impact of a nuclear accident at DBNPS on the quality of Dongjiang raw water would be minimal. According to a consultancy study undertaken by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, the impact of radioactive plume arising from a major release at DBNPS on water in the main reservoirs of Hong Kong, which were located about 30 km from DBNPS, would also be unlikely to have contamination level exceeding the control standards.

37. Ms Cyd HO expressed concern about the radiation monitoring system for water in case of a nuclear event at DBNPS. CWC/WSD responded that WSD closely monitored the radioactivity of raw water supply from Dongjiang 24 hours a day through the automated real-time on-line water contamination monitoring systems at Muk Wu Pumping Stations. Drinking water samples were also regularly collected from different parts of the water supply system for radiological analysis. In case of any emergency whereby contamination was detected, WSD would implement appropriate countermeasures including the rejection of water from contaminated sources, abstracting water from non-contaminated or least contaminated sources first as far as practicable, and adjustment of the water treatment process by increasing the dosage of coagulant and prolonging the sedimentation time to reduce the radioactivity level in the treated water supply to ensure that it was safe for consumption.

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Radiation monitoring system for food

38. Ms Cyd HO expressed concern about the radiation monitoring system for food in case of a nuclear event at DBNPS. She asked whether there were sufficient resources for testing the radiation level of imported food at boundary control points.

39. Principal Medical Officer (Risk Management), Food and Environmental Hygiene Department ("PMO/FEHD") said that in case of such a nuclear event, radiation monitoring would be carried out by the Mainland authorities of food supplied from areas within a 50 km radius of the nuclear power station concerned to ensure compliance with the standards developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission ("CODEX"). In Hong Kong, radiation monitoring would also be carried out at boundary control points as well as on the retail level for food, livestock and poultry imported from the Mainland.

Radiation monitoring and related work of the Hong Kong Observatory ("HKO")

40. Mr Kenneth LEUNG asked whether the Administration had assessed the impact of dispersion of plume on the health of members of the public in the event of an accident of Level 7 of the International Nuclear Event Scale ("INES") drawn up by the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"). He also asked whether the Administration had educated members of the public on the protective measures to be adopted when there was an INES Level 7 nuclear accident at DBNPS.

41. Assistant Director of Hong Kong Observatory (Radiation Monitoring and Assessment) ("AD/HKO") responded that HKO had used its Accident Consequence Assessment System to assess the possible impact of an INES Level 7 nuclear accident at two new nuclear power stations in Guangdong Province, namely the Yangjiang Nuclear Power Station and the Taishan Nuclear Power Station. It was found that the possibility of the need to take full-scale countermeasures in Hong Kong against the impact of radioactive plume arising from a nuclear accident at the two nuclear power stations would be very low. In the area of public education, HKO had sought to enhance the knowledge of members of the public in radiation through dissemination of relevant information at its website, organizing talks and visits, its Open Day, etc.

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Notification of nuclear events at nuclear power stations in Guangdong Province

42. Mr YIU Si-wing noted from paragraph 8 of the Administration's paper that if an emergency incident or accident occurred at a nuclear power station in Guangdong Province, the DBNPS operator would notify the Prevention and Emergency Administrative Commission Office of Guangdong Province for Nuclear Accident of Civil Nuclear Facility ("PEACO/GD"), which would notify the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government ("HKSARG"). He asked whether the Administration had looked into the notification mechanism between the operators of DBNPS as well as other nuclear power stations in Guangdong Province and PEACO/GD. He also asked whether the Administration had drawn up measures to avoid public panic in the event of a nuclear accident at a nuclear power station in Guangdong Province.

43. DS for S2 responded that according to the relevant Mainland regulations, nuclear power stations in Guangdong were required to report emergencies and nuclear events of INES Level 2 or above to the relevant emergency office and regulatory bodies, including PEACO/GD and the National Nuclear Safety Administration, which had a number of personnel stationed on-site at the nuclear power stations to monitor station safety and operation. PEACO/GD would notify HKSARG in accordance with the agreed arrangement. In the event of an "Off-site Emergency", PEACO/GD would immediately notify HKSARG. Over the years, such notification mechanism had been working effectively. PEACO/GD had agreed to extend the mechanism to cover all other nuclear power stations in Guangdong Province. The management companies of DBNPS and other power stations in Guangdong Province had also agreed to notify HKSARG of nuclear incidents below INES Level 2 at the facilities under their management.

44. DS for S2 informed members that the Administration had, after the Fukushima accident in 2011, revised the Daya Bay Contingency Plan ("DBCP"), to include, among others, the early dissemination of latest information about the situation of the nuclear power station concerned. Although the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was located at a long distance from Hong Kong, the Administration had disseminated information on the latest situation and the contingency measures taken by the Administration through its website and press briefings for a period of time after the accident.

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[To allow sufficient time for discussion, the Chairman advised that the meeting would be extended to 4:45 pm.]

Monitoring in Hong Kong of radiation arising from nuclear events at nuclear power stations near Hong Kong

45. Dr Fernando CHEUNG considered that the Administration should not rely solely on the notification of nuclear events by the Mainland authorities. He asked whether there were adequate equipment and mechanism in Hong Kong for detecting any increase in the radiation level arising from nuclear accidents at nuclear power stations near Hong Kong.

46. AD/HKO responded that in view of the construction of new nuclear power stations in Yangjiang and Taishan, which were located to the west of Hong Kong, HKO had set up two additional real-time radiation monitoring stations, one at Chek Lap Kok in the western part of Hong Kong and the other at Cape D'Aguiar in the southern part of Hong Kong, thus increasing the number of radiation monitoring stations in Hong Kong to 12. HKO's radiation monitoring system could promptly measure whether there was an increase in the ambient gamma radiation level of Hong Kong and indicate the areas affected. Ambient gamma radiation data were made available to the public on a real-time basis at the website of HKO. Equipment for emergency radiation monitoring had been installed at four additional fire stations located in the western part of Hong Kong.

47. PMO/FEHD said that in response to the Fukushima nuclear event, the Administration had been carrying out radiation testing on food imported from Japan. Of some 220 000 samples tested so far, three vegetable samples had been detected to have radioactivity levels exceeding the guideline levels of CODEX and such results had been announced immediately. Around 60 food samples including mainly tea leaves had been detected to have low radioactivity levels not exceeding the guidelines levels of CODEX. All the results of radiation tests on food samples had been uploaded onto the website of the Centre for Food Safety.

Criteria for activation of DBCP

48. Dr Fernando CHEUNG sought information on the circumstances under which DBCP would be activated and the relevant emergency measures relating to food and water supply.

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49. AD/HKO responded that HKO monitored the ambient gamma radiation level with its Radiation Monitoring Network on a real time round-the-clock basis. An alarm at the HKO Headquarters would be triggered once a significant increase in the ambient radiation level was detected at any one of the monitoring stations. In case HKO's initial assessment indicated that the increase was not caused by natural events, HKO would notify the Security Bureau and enquire with the relevant Mainland authorities as necessary.

50. Noting that principal countermeasures would be taken under DBCP for areas within a range of 20 km from a nuclear power station at which there was a serious nuclear accident, Dr Kenneth CHAN expressed concern on whether any flexibility would be applied to such a 20 km radius. He considered that as many Hong Kong residents were working and residing on the Mainland, the Administration should provide those residents with information on the contingency measures to be taken in case of a nuclear event on the Mainland and any necessary assistance.

51. DS for S2 said that the People's Republic of China was a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and was obliged to notify IAEA of any accident with possible offsite consequences. All nuclear power stations were required to draw up their own contingency plans and comply with the requirements regarding the reporting of irregularities and nuclear events to the relevant Mainland authorities. She added that information about DBCP had been uploaded onto the relevant website. The Administration would provide assistance to Hong Kong residents who encountered difficulties outside the territory of Hong Kong.

Safety record of DBNPS

52. Noting that the Guangdong Nuclear Power Station ("GNPS") and the Lingao Nuclear Power Station ("LNPS") had been in operation for about 20 and 12 years respectively, Dr LAM Tai-fai expressed concern about the possible ageing of facilities in the two nuclear power stations. Referring to paragraph 8 of the Administration's paper, he sought information on the number of nuclear events that had occurred in Mainland nuclear stations in the past and the emergency situations involved.

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53. DS for S2 said that there were six and 25 operational events at GNPS and LNPS respectively in the past five years. All these operational events were classified as INES Level 0 or Level 1 events, which had no impact on nuclear safety, the health of nuclear power station personnel and public environment. She said that the classification of emergency situations in paragraph 8 of the Administration's paper followed the four-category system of IAEA for classifying nuclear emergencies according to the radiological consequences of the emergency.

54. Dr LAM Tai-fai sought information on the INES Level and the classification of emergency situation which would pose a threat to the environment. DS for S2 responded that nuclear events above INES Level 3 were regarded as "accidents" which represented various degrees of radiological impact on people and the environment. She said that there had not been any operational events which involved radioactive release outside nuclear power plants at GNPS or LNPS.

55. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 4:43 pm.

Council Business Division 2
Legislative Council Secretariat
2 January 2015