For Information
June 2015

Legislative Council Panel on Transport
Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways

Revised Estimates of Programme to Complete ("PTC") and Cost to Complete ("CTC") of the Hong Kong Section of Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link

INTRODUCTION

This paper updates Members on MTR Corporation Limited's ("the Corporation") revised estimates of the Programme to Complete ("PTC") and Cost to Complete ("CTC") of the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link project ("the Project") which were submitted to the Government on 30 June 2015.

2. The Project is an express rail link connecting Hong Kong with Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Guangzhou which will become part of the National High-speed Railway Network. Funding for the construction of the Project was approved by the Finance Committee of Legislative Council ("LegCo") on 16 January 2010 in the total amount of HK$66.8175 billion in money-of-the-day ("MOD") prices. Of this amount, a sum of HK$65 billion was allocated by the Government to the Corporation to carry out the construction and commissioning of the Project in accordance with an "Entrustment Agreement for the Construction and Commissioning of the Project" ("Entrustment Agreement") dated 26 January 2010. The remaining HK$1.8175 billion

was retained by Government for project monitoring, Government facilities and other works associated with the Project that are not the responsibility of the Corporation. These funds remain under the control and management of the Government. Construction works started at the end of January 2010, with a target completion date in 2015.

3. Under the Entrustment Agreement, the Corporation acts as a project manager in the design, construction and commissioning of the Project and is obliged (under the Entrustment Agreement) to act in accordance with its management systems and procedures in the areas of, among other things, project management and procurement. 42 major construction contracts[1] together with other minor contracts were awarded to contractors for the delivery of the Project. As the project manager, the Corporation oversees the works undertaken in each contract and closely monitors and controls costs. Whilst the performance of respective contractors varies, the Corporation works diligently with each of them and their supply chain to resolve technical and commercial issues with the objective of identifying solutions which are best for the Project from both a cost and delivery perspective.

4. Pursuant to the Entrustment Agreement, the Corporation has recently completed and submitted revised estimates of the PTC and CTC to the Government. We understand that the Government will take some time to review the submission.

5. With the consent of the Government, the Corporation is providing information on the revised estimates of the PTC and CTC to Members.

[1] Major construction contract refers to an individual contract with a value above HK$50 million.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

6. Pursuant to the latest review, the Project is now estimated to complete in the **third quarter of 2018,** which includes a 6-month contingency period ("Revised PTC"). The CTC is revised to an estimated **HK$85.3 billion** ("Revised CTC") which includes a contingency amount of HK$2.1 billion. It should be emphasized that these are the Corporation's latest estimates based on the best available information to date, with the understanding that certain risks and uncertainties remain outstanding in the Project, including the arrangements for the co-located Customs, Immigration and Quarantine facilities.

7. In order to achieve the Revised PTC and CTC, the approval of Government, as the Project Owner, will be required for the Corporation to continue working and identifying solutions with contractors that are in the best interests of the Project and will help to assure project delivery. It is also critical that the Government, as the Project Owner, approves such solutions and makes available the funds to facilitate Project delivery.

Revised Programme to Complete

8. Since April 2014, when the PTC was last updated, reasonable progress has been made on the Project. Overall, completion was at 68.7% at the end of March 2015 (as compared to 56% at the end of March 2014), whilst excavation of the 26-km railway tunnel was over 90% complete. However, the progress of works, particularly on three contracts (namely 824, 826 and 810A) remains behind schedule. A summary of both the major progress and areas of delay is provided in Annex I.

9. The Project has experienced significant challenges since construction started and under the latest Revised PTC, the major causes of delay are:

a. Unforeseen site conditions, e.g. unfavourable ground conditions, obstructions in the ground and complicated utility diversions;
b. Issues relating to tunnel boring machines (TBMs);
c. Fast-tracked front end and design variations; and
d. Lower than anticipated production rates and labour shortage.

10. In April 2014, the Corporation revised the target for completion of the Project to the end of 2017 ("2017 Schedule").

11. While the Corporation and its contractors have been able to overcome some challenges over the last 12 months, new challenges have arisen as works have moved from one stage to the next, resulting in the revision of the Project completion estimates from the 2017 Schedule to the third quarter of 2018.

12. There are 2 main factors: i) extra time needed for the complex construction of the West Kowloon Terminus (WKT) Station Entrance Building (SEB), which now represents the critical path for Project completion; and ii) a 6-month contingency period to take account of known risks and uncertainties.

Revised Cost to Complete

13. At the start of construction in 2010, the estimate of the CTC was $65 billion. Based on the latest revised PTC, the Revised CTC is estimated at $85.3 billion. This amount includes a Revised Total Project

Cost of $83.2 billion and a contingency of $2.1 billion.

14. The higher Revised Total Project Cost of $83.2 billion is due to three main factors:

a. Programme Extension – The extended duration of the construction programme brings higher associated costs such as labour, project management, site running costs and insurance and has also resulted in the need to instruct delay recovery and programme protection measures. In addition, the extended programme has resulted in the need to re-sequence related construction works, which also leads to higher costs ;
b. Changes/Unaccounted Items - Additional costs incurred in relation to changes in work scope or methodologies, many of which have resulted from unforeseen events; and
c. Additional Project Costs - Continuous and significant increases in underlying costs, particularly labour and material costs, since construction began.

15. In July 2014, the Corporation provided a revised interim Project cost estimate of $71.52 billion. The Revised CTC estimate of $85.3 billion is the result of a review of the Project cost, taking into account both historical events since the Project commenced construction and future events up to the revised PTC target completion of third quarter 2018. The difference between these estimates is due predominately to the following factors:

a. Further programme extension – additional overhead and associated costs;
b. Changes since/unaccounted items in the previous interim estimate – changes and variations to works;

c. Additional Project Costs - enhanced visibility and a fuller understanding of higher underlying costs; and
d. Contingency - providing costs certainty.

DETAILS ON REVISED PROGRAMME TO COMPLETE (PTC)

16. The original target completion date of the Project was 2015. In April 2014, the Corporation announced that the target for completion of the Project had to be revised to the 2017 Schedule, due to the continuing construction challenges experienced which included, but were are not limited to, the following:

a. Unforeseen site conditions, e.g. unfavourable ground conditions, obstructions in the ground and complicated utility diversions;
b. Issues relating to tunnel boring machines (TBMs);
c. Fast-tracked front end and design variations; and
d. Lower than anticipated production rates and labour shortage.

17. The above causes of delay have been verified by the Independent Experts appointed in July 2014 by the Independent Board Committee formed by the Board of the Corporation to review the Project.

18. Since the 2017 Schedule was announced in April 2014, the Corporation, together with its contractors and other working partners, has worked diligently to tackle the continuing and new challenges on the Project. While some of these challenges have been overcome, many of the abovementioned difficulties continue. Some examples are set out in paragraphs 19 to 25 below.

Unforeseen Site Conditions

19. The unexpectedly high water ingress in the tunnel section between Ngau Tam Mei and Tai Kong Po (Contract 824), particularly from June to Oct in 2014, although improved, has led to an accumulated delay of over two months against the 2017 Schedule at the time of

breakthrough in March 2015.

20. At the cross-boundary tunnel section (Contract 826), while the two TBMs have moved safely past the high-risk marble zone in Mai Po, the process took longer than expected under the 2017 Schedule. Difficulties continue on this cross-boundary tunnel section as the heavy clay content in the alluvial subsoil, encountered more recently, is impacting progress and a two-month delay is expected to be incurred which will consume all the float in this critical activity.

Issues Relating to TBMs

21. In Contract 826, the delays due to the difficult ground conditions highlighted above were made worse by the inconsistent performance of the TBMs, with the need to carry out frequent maintenance. As an example, there were two major stoppages of the TBM in the southbound tunnel last year. As a result, about four months were needed to fix the cutter head and another month to repair a major component.

Lower than Anticipated Production Rates and Labour Shortage

22. Productivity at various sections of the tunnels and WKT continue to be below the levels assumed in the 2017 Schedule due to the acute labour shortage and limited work fronts.

23. The industry-wide shortage of labour in Hong Kong has had a significant and continuing impact on the Project. Although constraints on work fronts may have affected production rates somewhat, the acute labour shortage remains a major contributor to the low production rates especially with the tight labour supply in important trades including bar-bending and fixing, concreting and electrical fitting. Indeed, the labour supply situation has seen no improvement in any trade.

24. As an example, in the tunnel section between Ngau Tam Mei and Tai Kong Po (Contract 824), productivity for the tunnel lining works remains challenging due to the complex logistics and sequential activities, the unexpectedly high water ingress mentioned above and the shortage of labour. Overall, the tunnel lining works are lagging behind the 2017 Schedule by 7 months, consuming all the float in this critical activity.

25. Similarly, concrete production in WKT was still below the 2017 Schedule by 12% as at March 2015. Other than constraints on work fronts on site, the shortage of concreting resources in the last twelve months has been the main reason behind the low productivity. The float allowed in the 2017 Schedule for this activity has been used up and concreting works in WKT are now one month behind schedule.

Station Entrance Building (SEB)

26. Over the last 12 months, new construction challenges have arisen, the greatest of which is the complexity in the fabrication of the WKT SEB (Contract 810A). This has now become the key issue on the critical path to Project completion.

27. As reported to the Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways under the LegCo Panel on Transport ("RSC") in May 2015 (LegCo paper: CB(4)954/14-15(07)), the steelwork fabrication for the SEB is highly complicated and serious delays have been experienced. In order to increase the pace of production of the temporary steelwork, additional off site fabrication yards and resources have been arranged. As at the end of March 2015, erection of the temporary and permanent steel members of the SEB structure was 45% and 16% complete. This is behind the planned progress of 93% and 35% respectively under the 2017 Schedule.

28. Due to the delay in steel structure erection, the Corporation's recent assessment, with input from the relevant WKT contractors, shows that the programme is currently experiencing a delay of about two months. This has used up all the programme contingency provided in the 2017 Schedule for construction of the SEB. In addition, after extensive discussions with contractors, construction works for the SEB glass and aluminium cladding wall (External Wall System (EWS)) are being re-sequenced to optimize the interaction of the construction activities between the EWS and the permanent steel and concrete structure of the SEB. As a result, the contractors have provided a new timetable for the overall SEB works which will extend the forecast completion date by three months. The two-month delay in steel structure erection mentioned earlier in this paragraph already put the SEB on the critical path for Project delivery, using up all the float available in the 2017 Schedule. The additional three months required for the re-sequencing of EWS works is extending the critical path, pushing overall Project delivery into 2018. However, it is noted that this programme does not include any float to accommodate risks and future unforeseen events.

Programme to Complete

29. The Corporation has undertaken a detailed risk analysis of the latest programme. Given that it has no time contingency and, in light of the continuing and possible future construction challenges, (particularly relating to the erection and construction of the SEB and the cross-boundary tunnel section), as well as the length of time remaining between now and the target completion, the Corporation considers that it is prudent to include some contingency time. This approach is consistent with the recommendation made by the Independent Experts appointed by the Corporation's Independent Board Committee to provide greater certainty over achievement of the target completion date.

30. The Corporation has therefore notified Government that the target PTC for the Project should be revised to the third quarter of 2018 as shown in the chart below.



XRL Programme to Complete

DETAILS ON REVISED COST TO COMPLETE (CTC)

31. Following the detailed review and revision of the PTC, the Corporation has conducted a complete review of the estimated CTC of the Project. The latest Revised CTC estimate is HK$85.3 billion (in MOD prices). This comprises a contingency amount of HK$2.1 billion and a Revised Total Project Cost of HK$83.2 billion derived from a "bottom up" estimate.

32. The increase in costs from the original Project estimate of HK$65 billion to the HK$85.3 billion can be broken down into four main categories:

a. Programme Extension;
b. Changes / Unaccounted Items;
c. Additional Project Costs; and
d. Contingency.

Programme Extension

33. As a result of the revised PTC, pursuant to which the target completion of the Project has been deferred from 2015 to the third quarter of 2018, additional overhead and associated costs such as for the labour, plant and machinery which are required to manage the construction works and maintain and operate the various project sites will be incurred. The extended programme has also resulted in the need to instruct delay recovery and programme protection measures. Furthermore, the extended programme brings with it additional project management and insurance costs.

34. In addition, as a result of access constraints for finishing-and-fit-out contractors at certain sites, works will be carried out in a re-sequenced and fragmented manner; site activities may also be compressed. This may mean higher costs due to lower levels of productivity on some occasions and higher levels of overtime working on others.

Changes / Unaccounted Items

35. The Revised Total Project Cost reflects a number of unaccounted items and changes or variations to work scope and methodologies due to unforeseen events. For example, at the WKT site,

there have been changes in the sequence of works and variations in the design to facilitate the excavation of rock in the Jordan Road area.

Additional Project Costs

36. Changes in the underlying cost of labour and materials over the construction period for the Project are a major contributor to the Additional Project Costs.

37. The industry-wide shortage of labour in Hong Kong and lower productivity has been further amplified by the volume of construction work currently being undertaken in Hong Kong and its direct impact on supply chain pricing levels.

38. At the time the original Project cost estimate of HK$65 billion was set, Government's forecast of the trend rate of change in the prices of public sector building and construction output for the period from 2009-2013 was 2% per annum and it was 3% per annum for the period from 2014 onwards. However, Government data shows that the cost escalation rate has been much higher for each year since 2009, i.e. 3.1% in 2009, 2.9% in 2010, 5.9% in 2011, 6.8% in 2012, 5.1% in 2013 and 4.9% in 2014.

39. Looking at publicly-available indexes, the Building Works Tender Price Index (BWTPI) of Architectural Services Department shows an increase of 53.84% between 2009 and 2014. Similarly, in the private sector, the David Landgon & Seah's (DLS) Tender Price Index (TPI) and Rider Levett Bucknall's (RLB) Tender Price Index (TPI) show increases of 48.23% and 48.64% over the same period.

Construction Tender Price Index (TPI)	Q4 2009 (1)	Q4 2014 (2)	Period % (3) = (2)/(1)
Architectural Services Department Building Works TPI	1,107	1,703	53.84%
David Landgon & Seah TPI	1,273	1,887	48.23%
Rider Levett Bucknall TPI	1,655	2,460	48.64%

40. This is also in line with the increase of 48.04% and 58.56% composite labour wages for civil engineering and building works during the period from late 2009 to early 2015.

Cost of Labour Index	Index (April 2003 = 100)		
	Dec 2009	Feb 2015	Period %
Composite labour wages for civil engineering contracts	94.5	139.9	48.04%
Composite labour wages for building contracts	86.4	137.0	58.56%

Source: Census and Statistics Department

41. For certain categories of labour, upon which major railway projects rely heavily, the increase in the same period from 2009 to 2015 is substantially higher. For example, according to data published by the Census and Statistics Department, the increase in the average daily wage of a concretor, bar bender and fixer, welder and carpenter (formwork) is 96.84%, 67.76%, 61.11%, and 87.72% respectively (see Annex II).

42. In certain areas, it is not uncommon to see wage levels for some trades well above the published average daily rates. For example, contractor wage rates for plant operators, jumbo drill operators and electrical fitters are up to 90% above the daily average wage published by the Census and Statistics Department.

43. As works move towards installation and finishing, the demand will grow for more specialised technicians and skilled labour, such as electrical and mechanical experts, which are in short supply in Hong Kong. The pressure on labour supply is, therefore, expected to further intensify.

44. Following further visibility and analysis of detailed particulars as construction works progress towards a more advanced stage, further allowances for historical and future delay events have been included to reflect these higher underlying costs which contractors and their supply chain are experiencing.

45. The revised estimate of the CTC also takes account of delays and related costs incurred by contractors which, under the terms of the respective contracts, are the responsibility of the Project Owner, such as unforeseen ground conditions.

46. In managing these challenges, the Corporation will continue to control costs in accordance with its procedures and will process and examine contractors' requests for additional funds in a detailed and prudent manner, requiring contractors to provide sufficient justification and information to fully substantiate their submissions.

Contingency

47. The contingency amount of HK$2.1 billion is designed to provide additional cost certainty in light of continuing challenges and risks. It takes into account, amongst other factors, further costs which may arise as a result of past or future risk events. This approach is consistent with the recommendation made by the Independent Experts.

July 2014 Interim Cost Estimate Compared to
June 2015 Revised CTC

48. As referred to above, in July 2014, the Corporation provided a revised interim estimate of the CTC for the Project of HK$71.52 billion. Since that time, the Corporation has conducted a review of the total Project cost, taking into consideration the following factors:

a. Further programme extension;
b. Changes since/unaccounted items in the previous 2014 interim estimate;
c. Enhanced visibility and a fuller understanding of higher underlying project costs; and
d. Contingency.

49. Firstly, in regards to programme, the revised PTC has been extended by nine months to the third quarter of 2018 from the end of 2017.

50. Secondly, the Revised CTC estimate also includes some costs that were unaccounted for during the previous July 2014 update, including costs associated with changes in major station facilities and station layout at WKT, as well as items of operating equipment.

51. Thirdly, with construction works having progressed to the 70% mark and more detailed data now being available to allow for better analysis and assessment, the Corporation has enhanced visibility and a fuller understanding of the higher underlying costs being experienced by contractors and their supply chain. Further allowances for historical and future delay events have therefore been included. This additional information has also allowed the Corporation to better assess

responsibility for historic and future delay events and to work with the contractors on a best-for-Project basis with the objective of assuring Project delivery.

52. Lastly, a contingency amount of HK$2.1 billion has been included to provide additional cost certainty in light of continuing challenges risks. This is an international industry practice recommended by the Independent Experts.

CONCLUSION

53. Pursuant to the Entrustment Agreement, the Corporation is responsible for carrying out or procuring the carrying out of the agreed activities for the planning, design, construction, testing and commissioning of the Project.

54. The Corporation has submitted a revised PTC and CTC to the Government on 30 June 2015 in accordance with the provisions of the Entrustment Agreement.

55. The Corporation will be cooperating fully to provide additional information as requested to assist the Government in its assessment of the revised PTC and CTC.

56. The Corporation will continue to closely monitor and control costs while ensuring the successful delivery of this important rail infrastructure for Hong Kong in accordance with the revised programme for the Project.

MTR Corporation Limited
June 2015

Annex I –

Summary of Overall Progress of the Construction Works

I. Major Progress of the Project since April 2014

Mei Lai Road to Hoi Ting Road tunnel section (Contract 820)

- All tunnel construction between Mei Lai Road (Mei Foo) and Hoi Ting Road (West Kowloon) (Contract 820) was completed with the last section at the Hoi Ting Road retrieval shaft being cast in March 2015;

Tse Uk Tsuen to Shek Yam Tunnel section (Contract 822)

- Track laying was completed and related works are now in progress;

Tai Kong Po to Tsat Sing Kong Tunnel section (Contract 823A)

- The damaged TBM resumed excavation work in early July 2014, six months earlier than the expected schedule;
- Both TBMs of Contract 823A commenced excavation of the northbound tunnel in October and November 2014 respectively. With the experience gained from the previous southbound tunnel drives, the two TBMs, enhanced and re-assembled, commenced their northbound tunnelling works with improved rates of progress;

Shek Kong Stabling Sidings (SSS) and Emergency Rescue Siding (ERS) (Contract 823B)

- Structural works for all 14 buildings at the SSS have been completed and electrical and mechanical (E&M) installation works are in progress;

Ngau Tam Mei to Tai Kong Po Tunnels (Contract 824)

- Breakthrough for the southbound and northbound tunnels were achieved in January 2015 and March 2015 respectively;

Mai Po to Ngau Tam Mei Tunnels (Contract 825)

- Breakthrough for the northbound tunnels was achieved in November 2014, with construction of cross passages between the two running tunnels and walkways along both sides of the tunnel progressed satisfactorily;

Cross-boundary tunnel section (Contract 826)

- Exited the marble zone (which is known to contain cavities) in Mai Po area for the northbound and southbound TBM in December 2014 and March 2015 respectively, the excavation is 58% and 36% completed respectively.

West Kowloon Terminus (Contract 810A)

- The permanent lateral support (diaphragm action) at the basement level B3 in a critical area located in the northern part of WKT was achieved on 20 March 2015. This is a key milestone of the Project, allowing the blasting and remaining excavation works to proceed at full speed;
- The implementation of the full closure of Lin Cheung Road northbound between Austin Road West and Jordan Road on 1 April 2015 will also help to provide greater programme

certainty for the construction of the Lin Cheung Road Underpass.

II. Areas of Delays

Ngau Tam Mei to Tai Kong Po Tunnels (Contract 824)

- Accumulated delay of over seven months for the tunnel lining works.

Cross-boundary tunnel section (Contract 826)

- A two-month delay is expected to incur in tunnel excavation.

West Kowloon Terminus (Contract 810A)

- Concrete production in WKT is still below the 2017 Schedule by 12% as at March 2015. Much of the float allowed in the 2017 Schedule for this activity has been used up and the concreting works in WKT is now one month behind schedule.
- The forecast completion date of the SEB will be push back five months.

Annex II –

Average daily wages of workers engaged in Public Sector Construction Projects as reported by main contractors

Trade	**9/2009 ($/day)**	**2/2010 ($/day)**	**2/2011 ($/day)**	**2/2012 ($/day)**	**2/2013 ($/day)**	**2/2014 ($/day)**	**2/2015 ($/day)**
Concretor	941.3	937.0	923.2	1,078.2	1,346.8	1,509.0	1,871.7
Bricklayer	856.0	921.3	843.2	894.7	946.5	958.4	1,209.1
Drainlayer	864.1	859.8	897.4	982.9	1,149.5	1,158.2	1,409.6
Mason	845.0	853.2	832.6	919.3	1,011.8	1,207.7	1,261.0
Bar bender and fixer	1,115.1	1,118.3	1,188.0	1,288.2	1,484.4	1,621.5	1,870.7
Metal worker	822.5	803.9	831.4	854.0	928.4	978.4	1,098.1
General welder	811.0	817.3	854.6	925.9	1,052.5	1,234.1	1,306.6
Structural steel erector	902.5	973.9	1,025.7	1,151.3	1,324.8	1,419.0	1,500.0
Structural steel welder	783.2	910.1	894.4	1,048.8	1,297.3	1,448.4	1,427.3
Rigger/metal formwork erector	782.4	815.7	840.4	942.3	1,111.0	1,451.8	1,481.6
Carpenter (formwork)	1,003.5	1,004.1	1,012.3	1,131.2	1,392.6	1,595.5	1,883.8
Joiner	842.8	861.1	885.8	896.5	964.1	938.9	1,062.4
Plumber	848.4	849.9	871.8	903.2	970.8	971.0	1,142.7
Construction plant mechanic	723.8	755.8	788.7	909.7	1,042.8	1,105.9	1,136.8
Plant & equipment operator (load shifting)	736.3	738.5	750.2	803.1	897.5	948.2	1,061.5
Truck driver	586.8	594.6	615.7	670.1	725.4	752.4	791.9
Rock-breaking driller	787.3	792.3	786.0	841.9	1,135.1	1,484.1	1,480.5
Asphalter (road construction)	709.5	690.8	691.0	745.3	743.8	801.6	872.2
Bamboo scaffolder	1,030.7	1,044.7	1,089.9	1,139.3	1,296.6	1,487.0	1,640.5
Diver	1,678.4	1,623.7	1,745.6	1,792.5	1,964.7	2,224.7	2,185.4
Plasterer	854.6	861.4	884.2	955.3	1,071.3	1,046.1	1,260.5
Glazier	835.3	839.4	906.3	923.7	1,072.1	917.1	1,405.6
Painter and decorator	771.1	772.8	785.6	806.3	882.2	852.2	996.8
Leveller	696.8	721.4	773.8	846.6	1,040.0	1,143.8	1,367.4
Marble worker	914.3	961.6	841.7	797.9	1,245.1	1,020.8	1,175.2
Electrical fitter (incl. electrician)	713.8	700.4	701.6	735.4	783.5	844.6	935.8
Mechanical fitter	658.8	628.1	609.4	643.8	729.3	741.1	801.3
Refrigeration/air-conditioning/ventilation mechanic	592.9	599.2	696.1	609.3	694.2	703.9	794.5
Fire services mechanic	731.3	706.9	769.6	698.7	783.7	842.1	1,137.3
Lift and escalator mechanic	757.5	648.1	711.4	603.2	659.0	665.7	738.1
Building services maintenance mechanic	696.8	678.5	632.2	674.2	828.4	686.5	708.0
Cable jointer (power)	700.0	400.0	851.3	989.8	1,266.7	1,010.0	1,010.0
General workers and labourers	566.4	577.7	605.1	619.1	701.2	753.0	867.4

Source: "Average daily wages of workers engaged in Public Sector Construction Projects as reported by main contractors" from Census and Statistics Department