# Select Committee to Inquire into the Background of and Reasons for the Delay of the Construction of the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link

**Written Statement of Dr. Philco WONG Nai-keung**

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I. **Introduction**

1. This Statement is prepared in response to the invitation by the above-captioned Select Committee to me and to Mr. Mark Gowan Lomas ("Mr. Lomas") to attend a hearing and to submit a Statement.

2. This Statement contains information relevant to the Select Committee’s major areas of study. It has been prepared with the assistance of, and includes information provided by, various members of the Corporation’s management team involved in the XRL project during the relevant period.

3. I am employed by the Corporation as Projects Director. I joined the Corporation in November 2011 as General Manager for the Shatin to Central Link ("SCL") project, before becoming Projects Director – Designate in August 2014. I became Projects Director on 28 October 2014 following the retirement of Mr. Chew Tai Chong from that position.

4. As Projects Director I am responsible to the Chief Executive Officer, the Executive Committee and the Board of the Corporation for delivery of the XRL project and the Corporation’s other railway projects.

5. My appointment as Projects Director in October 2014 came several months after the Corporation’s announcement in April 2014 of the delay in the XRL project’s target completion date. I was not personally involved in the management of the XRL project prior to that time.

6. Mr. Lomas is employed by the Corporation as Project Manager – Technical Support within the Project Engineering Department.

7. Mr. Lomas joined the Corporation in July 2011. From April 2013 to August 2015, he was Project Manager – XRL Terminus (Controls) reporting to the General Manager – XRL Terminus. In that position,
he was responsible for co-ordinating a number of different project management functions relating to the construction of the West Kowloon Terminus (“WKT”), including construction, interface and risk management.

II. Background of and reasons for the delay of the construction of the Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (“XRL”) (“the project delay”), as announced by the Government and MTR Corporation Limited (“the Corporation”) in April 2014

(a) Scope and implementation schedule of the construction of the XRL (“the project”)

8. I refer to the contents of the written statement of the Corporation’s Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Lincoln Leong Kwok-kuen (“Mr. Leong”), in particular the information Mr. Leong has provided to the Select Committee concerning the scope and implementation schedule of the project at paragraphs 5 to 36 of his statement.

9. As explained in Mr. Leong’s statement, the Corporation has been entrusted with the design and management of the construction of the XRL, subject to monitoring and verification by the Government, in accordance with two Entrustment Agreements dated 24 November 2008 (“the 1st Entrustment Agreement”) and 26 January 2010 (“the 2nd Entrustment Agreement”) respectively.

10. In so far as XRL construction activities are concerned, the Corporation’s role is that of a project manager, with responsibility to co-ordinate and oversee the work of a number of third party contractors working on various sections of the railway and its terminus. The responsibilities for actual construction of the project are with the appointed third party contractors, according to the terms and specifications of their respective construction contracts.
11. An alignment plan for the XRL and an aerial view of the location of
the WKT are contained at Annex 1 of Mr. Leong’s statement.

(b) Reasons for the project delay

12. As has been explained in Mr. Leong’s statement, the project is a
large and very complex one, requiring the co-ordination of numerous
contractors working on adjacent sites and during different project
phases. Events leading to programme delays and costs impacts are
not uncommon in such significant projects.

13. It was agreed accordingly between the Government and the
Corporation in drawing up the 2nd Entrustment Agreement that the
project programme was capable of adjustment, with the Corporation
agreeing to use its best endeavours to complete, or procure the
completion of, the project within the estimated timetable and to
minimise the effect of any delay.

14. The reasons for delay to the project are summarised at paragraphs 37
to 67 of Mr. Leong’s statement.

15. An account of the causes of delay as at April 2014 to individual
sections of the project by reference to the relevant construction
contracts is also contained in the Corporation’s report to the
Legislative Council submitted on 2 May 2014 (CB(1)(1345/13-
14(01) including the Annexes thereto (“the 2 May 2014 Report”).

16. In commenting on the reasons for the project delay at paragraph 1.30
of the First Report by the Corporation’s Independent Board
Committee (“IBC”) on the Express Rail Link Project published in
July 2014 (“the 1st IBC Report”), the IBC stated that they had:

“…not seen any evidence to suggest that in its day-to-day work the
[XRL project team] has not followed the systems and procedures
established in accordance with the requirements of the [2nd]
Entrustment Agreement and vetted by Government and the
independent M&V Consultant appointed by Government.”
17. I trust it will be helpful to the Select Committee to provide further information concerning the background and reasons for the project delay in my Statement.

WKT

18. At paragraph 2.6 of the Second Report by the IBC on the Express Rail Link Project published in October 2014 (“the 2nd IBC Report”), it is noted that:

“WKT is the largest excavated underground [high-speed rail] station in the world. In the view of the Independent Experts, it is the most complicated and challenging contract to construct in the Project.”

19. Paragraphs 10 to 13 of Mr. Leong’s statement provide a general description of the WKT construction element of the project.

20. The terminus building will house 15 platforms serving both long and short-haul high-speed rail services, passenger departure and arrival halls and a ticketing hall. The main public area of the terminus will include a large atrium with a steel-framed glazed roof structure.

21. There are associated works including an underground reconstruction of Austin Road West and Lin Cheung Road to create a traffic-free piazza on the southern side of the terminus building.

22. The principal civil engineering construction contracts relating to WKT and the appointed contractors are as follows.

Contract 810A – WKT Station (North) - Leighton / Gammon Joint Venture

23. Contract 810A is by far the largest and most complex WKT construction contract. The contract works include:
(a) excavation of the northern section of WKT,
(b) construction of the northern portion of the WKT structure and an up ramp to Road D1 (known as ‘Wui Man Road’),
(c) the Station Entrance Building,
(d) two subways to Austin and Kowloon stations and associated modifications at the connections,
(e) Lin Cheung Road, Wui Man Road and associated works including noise barriers,
(f) Lin Cheung Road Underpass,
(g) Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Works for the Lin Cheung Road / Austin Road West Underpass system,
(h) footbridges and an associated pedestrian link,
(i) diversion of utilities and laying of water mains, drains and sewers, and
(j) other miscellaneous works including landscaping and all Architectural Builder’s Works and Finishes works.

Contract 810B – WKT Station (South) - Laing O’Rourke / Hsin Chong / Paul Y. Joint Venture

24. The original Contract 810B works included:

(a) excavation of the southern section of the WKT station box and initial excavation within the main station north terminus area,
(b) construction of the southern section of the WKT structure, and
(c) the Austin Road West underpass and a noise mitigation deck.

25. Significant additional work has been instructed relating to interface works with adjoining third party facilities.

Contract 811A – WKT Approach Tunnel (North) - Bachy Soletanche / Laing O’Rourke Joint Venture

26. The Contract 811A works include:
(a) construction of a 302 metre long cut-and-cover tunnel linking the Contract 820 works (to the north) with the Contract 811B works (to the south),
(b) a temporary Tunnel Boring Machine retrieval shaft,
(c) the Mongkok West Ventilation Building, and
(d) demolition of existing road bridges and provision of two replacement bridges.

Contract 811B – WKT Approach Tunnel (South) - Gammon / Leighton Joint Venture

27. The Contract 811B works include:

(a) construction of a 600 metre long cut-and-cover tunnel,
(b) three new footbridges,
(c) a public transport interchange, and
(d) the West Kowloon Plant Building.

Delay events at WKT

28. Construction of WKT has faced significant challenges and delays since the commencement of works. The site lies within an area of reclaimed land bounded by Kowloon Station on the western side, Austin Station on the eastern side and Victoria Harbour to the south. The particular location and geology of the site has added to the complicated nature of the engineering challenges posed.

29. As noted by the Corporation at paragraph 20 of the 2 May 2014 Report, Contract 810A was one of three project contracts facing delays (the others being tunnel Contracts 823A and 826) which as at April 2014 were considered critical in terms of completion of the project overall.

30. Before construction commenced, site investigation work was carried out at the WKT site at various stages from 2008. Information from over 600 drill holes was obtained and samples were collected at an
average spacing of 14.4 metres, consistent with Government guidelines and representing a closer spacing than the industry norm.

31. During the site investigation process, access was not available before site possession to certain areas such as Jordan Road, the public transport interchange between Austin and Kowloon stations and the central portion of the City Golf Club ("CGC") which was a golf driving range. In particular, before taking possession of CGC, investigation at the site was only possible at the perimeter and car parking areas of the driving range.

32. Significant delay events at WKT as at April 2014 included the following.

*Diaphragm wall*

33. Foundation works for WKT were carried out under four advanced works contracts, as follows:

- Contract 803A – WKT Diaphragm Wall (Site A)
- Contract 803B – WKT Piles (Site A - North)
- Contract 803C – WKT Piles (Site A - South)
- Contract 803D – WKT Diaphragm Wall and Piles (WKCD)

‘Site A’ refers essentially to the main terminus area.

34. The construction of the diaphragm wall under Contracts 803A and 803D was one of the first major WKT works to be undertaken, with the diaphragm wall further north constructed as part of civil works Contracts 811A and 811B. The diaphragm wall was required to be constructed deep into the ground around the WKT site to prevent ground settlement outside the site, provide groundwater cut-off and ensure the safety and stability of surrounding facilities and buildings.

35. Completion of the diaphragm wall under Contract 811B was delayed for about a year because of unfavourable ground conditions
including uncharted large boulders, corestones, uneven bedrock and the presence of underground utilities.

36. Further, the 811B contractor needed to divert Jordan Road northwards to complete the diaphragm wall panels below the original road alignment and join them to those constructed by the 803A contractor. This could not be done until the diaphragm wall panels to the north of Jordan Road were completed. These particular works were delayed owing to unfavourable ground conditions.

37. To mitigate the effect of the delay, the Corporation instructed the 811B contractor initially to divert Jordan Road southwards, as discussed at paragraphs 78 to 79 of Mr. Leong’s statement.

38. After the subsequent northwards diversion of Jordan Road in 2012, the works were again delayed by unfavourable ground conditions and the presence of utilities under the original Jordan Road alignment.

North top-down area

39. A particularly challenging area of the WKT works has involved the north top-down area of the site, interfacing with the Contract 811B works, where the 15 tracks originating from the terminus merge towards the two running tunnels for the high-speed railway lines.

40. In particular, a slab at the B1 level of the site required completion to act as a strut between the completed diaphragm walls, preventing undue ground settlement, before excavation could continue below this level.

41. Owing to the interdependency of works and the complexity of interfaces between adjacent contracts, the significant delays to the 811B works (in particular caused by the prolonged construction of the diaphragm wall as discussed above) caused delays to the 810A contractor accessing the site to construct the north top-down part of the terminus building. In particular Works Area 13.61, an area of
approximately 1,740 square metres under Jordan Road, was not handed over to the 810A contractor until November 2013.

42. The B1 slab located at the former Jordan Road was fully completed from east to west in April 2014. In combination with the completed diaphragm wall, adequate support to the surrounding infrastructure was then in place to allow excavation below B1 level in the north top-down area.

Utility diversions

43. The maintenance and diversion of complex underground utilities at the WKT site has proved to be very challenging and time-consuming.

44. Although public utilities (including power cables, lighting cables, telecommunications cables, water and gas pipes, storm and drainage services) were known to exist and were charted to an extent, the configuration, spread, alignment and slack within the utilities and the locations of the utilities joints, as well as the interrelationship between the various services, could not be properly identified until possession of the site was taken for construction. The term “spread” refers to the manner in which a number of cables are bundled together, and the term “slack” refers to the extent to which cables can be moved out of the way of construction works.

45. A wide range of utilities were located beneath Jordan Road in particular. The precise location of these utilities was not known before possession of the site. The utilities had to be diverted in parallel with the diversion of Jordan Road to enable the Corporation to construct the diaphragm walls required at the site. In many cases, there was limited room to divert the utilities, which had to be handled with extreme care to ensure that services to nearby buildings were not disrupted.
**Delays to Contract 810A**

46. In addition to the delays to Contract 810A caused by delayed access to the site, Contract 810A has experienced further substantial delays to the planned programme and sequence of the works. Those delays have resulted from, among other things:

(a) unfavourable ground conditions,
(b) design changes and design development issues,
(c) unexpected movement of the western diaphragm wall,
(d) shortage of skilled labour and frontline supervision, and
(e) inability to achieve planned production rates.

**Delays to Contract 810B**

47. A number of design changes were incorporated to facilitate developments in the design of the West Kowloon Cultural District. Unfavourable ground conditions also affected progress. These factors caused a substantial knock-on delay to the Contract 810A works.

48. The design of temporary works at the interface of Contract 810B had to wait for input from the 810A contractor in order to accommodate the different levels of soil resulting from the different approaches planned for excavation and construction sequencing.

49. Higher than predicted movements in diaphragm wall panels in the 810A works area delayed Contract 810A and also delayed excavation in the northern core area by the 810B contractor.

**Delays to Contract 811A**

50. Major challenges to the Contract 811A works included exposing and underpinning the operating West Rail Line, formation of a 30 metre deep cofferdam with only a 5 metre clearance to the China Light and Power Lai Cheung Road Substation and working with limited headroom near existing over-bridges.
51. The 811A contractor has encountered numerous uncharted obstructions, mainly remnants from earlier abandoned and unrecorded construction activity. The contractor has been required to adopt alternative designs and modified construction practices as a result.

**Tunnels and ancillary facilities**

52. As well as the construction of WKT, the project involves the construction of around 25km of underground tunnels (and ancillary facilities) from WKT to the boundary with the Mainland of China. Cut-and-cover, drill and blast and TBM tunnelling methods are used.

53. As noted at paragraph 2.22 of the 1st IBC Report:

> “The tunnel engineering required for the Project is unprecedented in Hong Kong...Each contract area has raised very different logistical, engineering and geological challenges, not least the challenge of driving what are often deep tunnels with only very limited surface access.”

54. As noted at paragraph 4.108 of the 1st IBC Report, all eight of the major tunnel contracts for the project (Contracts 820, 821, 822, 823A, 823B, 824, 825 and 826) have been affected by a number of delay events.

55. All of the major tunnel contracts were affected by unfavourable ground conditions, including higher than anticipated rock head levels, presence of cobbles and boulders, high water inflows and underground obstructions.

56. In addition, a significant shortfall in skilled labour and frontline supervision has caused, or contributed to, production rates falling short of programme plans across many of the contracts.
57. I discuss below particular significant causes of delay to the two tunnel contracts, Contract 823A and 826, which as described above were considered critical at the time of the announcement in April 2014 of the delay to the project opening date.

Contract 823A

58. Contract 823A (the Yuen Long tunnel section between Tse Uk Tsuen and Tai Kong Po) requires the construction of two sections of twin bored tunnels with cross passages, to the north and south of stabling sidings and an emergency rescue siding being constructed at Shek Kong under Contract 823B.

59. The works are located at the site of the former Choi Yuen Tsuen. Initial access to the Contract 823A site (and to the adjacent Contract 823B site) was delayed due to objections over resumption of the relevant land. This also restricted the amount of site investigation that could be performed before Contract 823A was tendered.

60. Higher than originally anticipated rock head levels were encountered by the contractor. As a result, the contractor was required to carry out modified temporary works design and construction works to the access shaft for the tunnels. Air and slurry leakages, and a sinkhole, were also encountered. The contractor has also faced restrictions on working hours (to between 7am to 7pm each day) in the south tunnels.

61. The contract originally contemplated the use of only one Tunnel Boring Machine (“TBM”). It became necessary to use a second TBM to mitigate the delays which had occurred, and this was procured accordingly.

62. Even with a second TBM deployed, further delays were encountered. The performance of the two TBMs was variable and the mixed ground conditions encountered resulted in the need for frequent maintenance, repair and replacement of components. Site constraints
also affected the rate at which spoil could be removed from the tunnel.

63. Further, on the night of 30 March 2014, a black rainstorm led to the flooding of a section of cut-and-cover tunnel in the adjacent Contract 823B. Flood water from this section flowed into the substantially bored Contract 823A tunnel, submerging and causing severe damage to the TBM at the north down-track tunnel. More than 2,000 (mostly electrical and electronic) components in the TBM required replacement. While it was originally anticipated that the damaged TBM would be able to resume full operation after repair and testing in December 2014, the contractor was able to borrow the parts from the second TBM that had just completed a drive and was being repositioned. As such, the damaged TBM was able to resume operation in July 2014, several months earlier than planned.

64. The two tunnel boring machines were re-launched (having completed tunnelling works on the south and north down-track tunnels) and commenced tunnelling works for the south and north up-track tunnels (in late October and late November 2014 respectively). The TBM for the south up-track tunnel broke through in August 2015.

Contract 826

65. Contract 826 requires the construction of twin 1.5km long tunnels at the northern part of the Hong Kong section of the XRL running from the boundary between Hong Kong and Shenzhen under the Mai Po marshes to the Mai Po ventilation building.

66. The TBMs for this cross-boundary section started their tunnel drive on the Mainland side. They arrived at the Hong Kong boundary to start working under Contract 826 almost 15 months behind schedule.

67. This delay was difficult to mitigate given the complex geology of the local area, which includes cavities in a 200-metre section of bedrock in a high-risk ‘marble zone’ in the Mai Po area.
68. Detailed information about the exact location and extent of these cavities was not possible to obtain using conventional site investigation methods in view of access constraints, particularly the presence of fish ponds and a wetland preservation area. Accordingly, probing for and filling of cavities by cement-based grout ahead of the TBMs was required and progress was necessarily slow.

69. The up-track TBM broke through to the Mai Po shaft in August 2015. The down-track TBM broke through in November 2015.

(c) Delay recovery measures adopted by the Corporation to catch up with the implementation schedule

70. It is an important part of the Corporation’s role, as project manager and in accordance with its obligations under the 2nd Entrustment Agreement, to use its best endeavours to procure the completion of the project in accordance with the Entrustment Programme (as defined in the 2nd Entrustment Agreement), to work with the relevant contractors and implement appropriate mitigation measures in the event of delay to the project.

71. A variety of delay mitigation and recovery measures (“DRMs”) have been in place since the early stages of the project. At paragraph 5.21 of the 1st IBC Report, it was stated that:

“The IBC has been impressed by the hard work and dedication it has seen demonstrated by the members of the PjT in their endeavours to manage the difficulties and complexities of this Project.”

72. Examples of measures taken as at April 2014 have been given at paragraphs 68 to 81 of Mr. Leong’s statement and in the Corporation’s letter to the Select Committee dated 14 August 2015, including examples in relation to Contracts 810A, 811A, 811B, 823A and 824. Further examples of measures taken are as follows.
**Contract 811B**

73. The variable rock head levels around the perimeter of the diaphragm wall would have required excessive rock excavation based upon the original founding level criteria (whereby the underlying rock has to meet a particular standard of quality to support the diaphragm wall).

74. A revised set of founding level criteria, coupled with modifications to the permanent works design, allowed the level of some of the diaphragm wall panels to be raised. This reduced the amount of rock excavation required with a resulting reduction in time to the panel installation programme.

75. Further, to overcome partially the complicated array of live and abandoned utilities in the Jordan Road area, an extensive utilities hanging scheme was implemented to protect and manage these fixtures and to facilitate removal of obstructions whilst mitigating the delay to construction of the B1 level slab.

**Contract 823B**

76. A supplementary agreement was executed with the contractor including provision for overtime working and increased plant for construction of a diaphragm wall at the relevant site.

**Contract 824**

77. In consultation with the Corporation the contractor has employed various DRM s including:

(a) construction of a temporary additional access shaft to enable continuous spoil removal and allow early commencement of tunnel excavation,

(b) use of formworks systems to expedite progress to lining of the tunnels, and

(c) simplification of the design of the Tai Kong Po plant building.
Contract 825

78. A second TBM was procured and, as a result of worse than anticipated unfavourable ground conditions encountered, cross-passages were relocated.

Contract 826

79. Among numerous other steps taken, the Corporation has reviewed construction and planning methodologies in an effort to reduce activity durations, including:

(a) implementing concurrent construction of cross passages with tunnels,
(b) completing ground treatment works as an alternative to installing a steel bulkhead at the Mai Po reception shaft, and
(c) implementing concurrent tunnel invert and walkway construction.

III. Performance and accountability of the Government and the Corporation relating to the project delay

80. The Projects Division is responsible for planning, design and construction of railway development projects undertaken by the Corporation.

81. As explained in Mr. Leong’s statement at paragraphs 90 and 91, the 2nd Entrustment Agreement requires the Corporation to act in accordance with its project management systems and procedures. These systems and procedures are set out in the Corporation’s Project Integrated Management System (“PIMS”) and Procurement & Contracts Procedures documents, which cover all relevant project delivery areas.

82. As explained in Mr. Leong’s statement at paragraphs 92 to 99, the PIMS has been in use by the Corporation for over 20 years. It has
been regularly reviewed, internally and externally, and updated during that time to ensure its continued effectiveness as a project management system.

83. In particular, the Government’s Monitoring and Verification Consultant, Jacobs (China) Limited, performed over 250 audits relating to the Corporation’s project management systems and procedures between January 2010 and April 2014. Jacobs reported no significant deficiencies other than to make certain observations including opportunities for improvement (mainly related to near miss reporting) and updating of contractor submissions in method statements, in relation to which improvement actions were taken.

IV. Whether the Government and the Corporation have deliberately covered up the project delay

(a) Reporting within the Corporation

84. Annex 3 of Mr. Leong’s statement sets out the overall flow of reporting on progress on the project from section or department manager level up to the Corporation’s Board. The Corporation’s internal reporting systems are consistent between the various construction projects being undertaken by the Corporation, whether they are the Corporation’s own new or extension railway projects, or projects being managed on behalf of the Government.

(b) Reporting between the Corporation and the Government

85. With a view to ensuring timely and transparent reporting of information in respect of project progress and cost, a detailed reporting and monitoring system was established in accordance with the provisions of the 2nd Entrustment Agreement between the Corporation, the Government and its appointed monitoring and verification consultants through various progress and costs reports and meetings. These reports and meetings are described in detail in Mr. Leong’s statement at paragraphs 137 to 152.
86. At paragraph 1.37 of the 1st IBC Report it is noted that:

“Delays against the project programme have been reported on a timely basis and accurately to Government in accordance with the terms of the Entrustment Agreement. The IBC does not find any attempt by the PjT or the Corporation to cover-up or hide the delays being experienced in the various project contracts. However, Government was often assured by the Corporation that delays in the project could be recovered to achieve opening in 2015.”

87. At paragraph 5.40 of the 1st IBC Report it is also noted that:

“The Corporation was at all times transparent and accurate in its reporting of the progress of the Project both against the Project programme and budget.”

88. Detailed accounts of the events and communications which took place between the Corporation and the Government in the months leading up to the announcement of the delay in April 2014 have been given by the Corporation in:

(a) Paragraph 52 of the 2 May 2014 Report, and
(b) Part IV of the 1st IBC Report.

89. As a result of the issues which came to the attention of the Corporation’s senior management in April 2014, the Corporation immediately acknowledged that enhancements were required to the way in which project progress was reported within the Corporation and to the Government.

90. The findings and recommendations made by the IBC in this regard are described in Mr. Leong’s statement at paragraphs 122 to 125. The enhancements made by the Corporation in consequence are described in Mr. Leong’s statement at paragraphs 166 to 183.
91. I would like to state that at no time before or since taking up the role of Projects Director have I been aware of any intention on the part of the Corporation or any of its employees at any time to withhold or ‘cover up’ relevant information concerning delay to the project from the Government, the Legislative Council or the public.

(c) Reporting to the Railway Subcommittee

92. Paragraphs 159 to 163 of Mr. Leong’s statement describe the reporting arrangements between the Government and the Corporation to the Subcommittee on Matters Relating to Railways under the Panel on Transport of the Legislative Council ("RSC"). These arrangements were also enhanced following the announcement made by the Corporation in April 2014 concerning the revised project programme.

93. I have attended meetings of the RSC on 24 November 2014 (matter not discussed), 2 January 2015, 6 March 2015, 19 May 2015 and 3 July 2015 to update the RSC on progress of the project.

Dr. Philco Wong Nai-keung
Projects Director, MTR Corporation Limited
17 November 2015

*This Statement has been prepared in English and Chinese language versions. In the event of any inconsistency between them, the English language version shall prevail.*

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