

**For information
on 3 May 2016**

Legislative Council Panel on Security

Security Arrangement for Passengers and Baggage at the Hong Kong International Airport

Purpose

This paper briefs Members on the regulatory framework on aviation security in Hong Kong and the security arrangement for passengers and baggage at the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA). It also discusses how the handling of an incident at the HKIA on 27 and 28 March 2016 has not violated the relevant international and local security requirements, which are analysed in detail in the report submitted by the Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK) to the Government on 25 April 2016 (see Annex).

Regulatory Framework

2. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, through the membership of the People's Republic of China in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), is obliged to maintain high aviation security standards in compliance with the aviation security requirements established by ICAO.

3. In Hong Kong, the Aviation Security Ordinance (ASO) (Cap. 494) is the principal legislation on aviation security. The main purpose of the ASO is to prohibit acts which pose a threat to international civil aviation and to give effect to international conventions on aviation security. The Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme (HKASP), drawn up under section 27(1) of the ASO, stipulates security requirements for the protection and safeguarding of airports, aircraft, passengers, crew and the general public against acts of unlawful interference.

4. Under this regulatory framework, the Civil Aviation Department (CAD) is the executive agent responsible for ensuring the implementation of HKASP, under delegated authority from the Secretary for Security, who is the Aviation Security Authority under the ASO. CAD assumes regulatory functions, including vetting individual security programmes developed by airlines and airport operators, and monitoring implementation of the programmes. In fulfilment of the relevant requirements, AAHK, as the

manager of HKIA, has developed the HKIA Airport Security Programme to lay down the airport security procedures and measures in further detail.

5. The Aviation Security Company Limited (AVSECO), as a subsidiary company of AAHK and provider of aviation security services at HKIA, conducts security screening of all departing and transfer passengers as well as their cabin and hold baggage in compliance with the requirements of HKASP and the HKIA Airport Security Programme.

ICAO's Security Requirements for Passengers and Cabin Baggage Screening

6. As far as security screening of passengers and cabin baggage is concerned, which is a focus in the incident on 27 and 28 March 2016, ICAO's requirements are set out in Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation, and ICAO's Aviation Security Manual¹. The key requirements are –

- (a) passengers and their cabin baggage have to be screened prior to boarding an aircraft²; and
- (b) under certain circumstances, screening equipment operators should select baggage for secondary screening, including manual search³. Manual searches of cabin baggage should always be carried out in the presence of the owner of the baggage, and the baggage should be opened preferably by the passenger⁴.

Relevant Security Arrangements for HKIA

7. In compliance with the relevant ICAO requirements and HKASP, a comprehensive and structured security system has been developed by AAHK at HKIA to guard against all types of security threats. The security arrangements for passengers and baggage include –

- (a) screening of all passengers and their cabin baggage are required before entering the Enhanced Security Restricted Area (ESRA) with the aid of metal detectors for passengers and x-ray imaging for cabin baggage. Screening is performed to detect the presence of restricted articles (e.g. firearms, explosives, incendiary devices,

¹ See Attachments D1 and D4 to AAHK's report to the Government at Annex.

² See paragraphs 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 of Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation (Attachment D1 of AAHK's report).

³ See paragraph 11.5.8.4 of ICAO's Aviation Security Manual (Attachment D4 of AAHK's report).

⁴ See paragraph 11.5.9.1 of ICAO's Aviation Security Manual (Attachment D4 of AAHK's report).

etc.). The x-ray technology for screening of cabin baggage as well as the use of archway metal detectors and hand held metal detectors are fully compliant with the standards stipulated under HKASP.

To supplement x-ray screening (for items that cannot be cleared by normal x-ray or physical inspection), explosives trace detection technology is also utilised. The specialised equipment is deployed in accordance with the manufacturer's protocols that align with the guidance material set out under the ICAO Aviation Security Manual. The equipment is certified by international regulatory authorities including the US Transportation Security Administration and the UK Department for Transport;

- (b) passengers and cabin baggage are screened at the designated screening locations at HKIA. Passengers departing from Hong Kong are screened at one of the three Departures Immigration Halls (two in Terminal 1, one in Terminal 2); and
- (c) secondary screening of passengers is conducted to account for all unidentified objects on a passenger that has activated an alarm of the archway metal detector. It may be conducted by hand or by using a hand held metal detector supported by a hand search.

Secondary screening of cabin baggage is conducted if any item of a suspect nature has been detected or an item which cannot be identified and cleared during x-ray examination. Secondary screening of the cabin baggage will normally be conducted by means of hand search. Such search must be conducted in the presence of the passenger. The passenger will be invited to open the baggage in order for its contents to be examined.

8. An elaborate set of security procedures is also in place for handling unattended items found at HKIA, which may pose security risks. These include where appropriate, explosive trace detection testing with dedicated equipment by AVSECO staff. AVSECO has guidelines in place to return the unattended item (cleared of security threat) to its owner or an airline representative. If the item has not been claimed, it will be transferred to AAHK's Lost and Found Office.

The handling of the incident on 27 and 28 March 2016

9. The incident is detailed in AAHK's report. As far as aviation security is concerned, the handling of the incident has not violated the ICAO and local requirements specified above, or compromised aviation security in

any way, in view of the following key actions taken –

- (a) the baggage underwent explosive trace detection test after it was first discovered as an unattended item on the landside;
- (b) the baggage was returned to the airline’s representative after the security threat was cleared and ownership confirmed;
- (c) before entering the ESRA, the baggage underwent the standard x-ray screening which meets the ICAO’s requirements;
- (d) there was no need to conduct a secondary screening (manual search) after the standard x-ray screening. Had there been a need for a manual search, since the ownership of the baggage had been confirmed, the owner would be summoned to the screening area so that the manual search could be conducted in the owner’s presence; and
- (e) the baggage underwent another screening at the boarding gate in compliance with the requirement of the relevant authorities of the destination country of the flight.

10. AAHK’s report devoted a section to discuss how the handling of the incident on 27 and 28 March 2016 has not violated the various requirements laid down by ICAO, HKASP and the HKIA Airport Security Programme⁵.

Response to Allegations made

11. Following the said incident, some allegations have been made to the effect that certain ICAO’s requirements have been breached in the handling of the incident. In particular, it has been asserted that there is an ICAO’s requirement that cabin baggage must be accompanied by its owner throughout the screening process. As analysed in AAHK’s report, there is no such ICAO requirement. Some of the references that have been said to be quoted from ICAO’s documents include:

- (a) “*Check that luggage belongs to the passenger and place it on the inspection table*”: this is in fact extracted from some training materials issued by ICAO for airport security staff. It refers to the procedure for manual search of cabin baggage, instead of the standard x-ray screening;

⁵ See paragraphs 3.8 -3.12 of AAHK’s report to the Government at Annex.

- (b) *“Baggage must be matched with the correct person/owner and positioned on the search table so that the owner can open the bag but not interfere with the conduct of the search”*: this comes from a working paper on training for conducting manual search presented by International Air Transport Association (IATA) at an ICAO working meeting in 2008. Again, it refers to the procedure for manual search of cabin baggage; and
- (c) *“When an item of baggage is separated from its owner through a breakdown of the baggage handling system the baggage should be subjected to additional security controls which could include a combination of manual search, conventional X-ray, explosive detection systems, vapour or trace analysis in respect of suspect items found in the baggage, or the use of a stimulation chamber before being loaded onto an aircraft.”*: this comes from a 2002 version (now outdated) of the Aviation Security Manual published by ICAO. It referred to the handling of unaccompanied hold baggage, i.e. check-in baggage that is not transported on the same aircraft as its owner. The sentence specified the requirement for additional security controls applicable to a check-in baggage separated from its owner through a breakdown of the baggage handling system of an airport. It does not concern cabin baggage.

12. Since the release of AAHK’s report, there have also been suggestions that HKASP contained a provision (paragraph 6.2.10) requiring passengers and their cabin baggage to simultaneously go through security screening. Members are invited to note that paragraphs 6.2.8 to 6.2.11 of HKASP stipulate the requirements on secondary screening. Paragraph 6.2.10 in fact refers to the requirement that the secondary screening of cabin baggage must be conducted by AVESCO staff in the presence of the owner of the baggage. This requirement specific to secondary screening is fully consistent with the ICAO requirement (see paragraph 6 above) and with the HKIA Airport Security Programme which was developed based on HKASP.

Conclusion

13. A key issue arising from the incident on 27 and 28 March 2016 is whether the return of a lost item to its owner in the ESRA by a member of the airport staff violates any international aviation security standards or local requirements. The answer is in the negative. This notwithstanding, AAHK has stated in its report that AAHK would, together with other stakeholders, review and fine tune the existing handling procedures for lost and found items. The Government agrees with this work direction.

14. The Government has always attached great importance to security at HKIA. The Government and the airport community will continue to uphold high aviation security standards at HKIA in full compliance with relevant security requirements under ICAO.

**Security Bureau
Civil Aviation Department
Airport Authority Hong Kong
Aviation Security Company Limited**

April 2016



REPORT

Handling of Unattended Baggage subsequently confirmed to belong to a Departing Passenger at HKIA on 27 and 28 March 2016

1. Introduction

- 1.1 This report covers the handling of a piece of unattended baggage that was subsequently confirmed to belong to a departing passenger at HKIA. The event lasted from 2342 hrs on 27 March to 0023 hrs on 28 March. While the Airport Authority (AAHK) was in attendance at scene during the latter half of the event, the main parties handling the case were Aviation Security Company Limited (AVSECO) and Cathay Pacific Airways.
- 1.2 The report also addresses concerns raised in the media regarding security being compromised during the event. Specifically, the report will address the allegation that the manner in which AVSECO and Cathay Pacific Airways resolved the matter resulted in security requirements being disregarded.

2. The Event

- 2.1 On 27 March at 2348 hrs an AVSECO security supervisor detected an unattended bag of standard cabin baggage size located in the landside area close to Check-in Aisle B. In accordance with established AVSECO procedures (please refer to Attachment B, Annex A), AVSECO reported the case to the Integrated Airport Centre (AVSECO desk) and proceeded to carry out the stipulated security check for unattended baggage found (explosive trace detection). Subsequently, the result of the check confirmed no indication of explosive trace; allowing the bag to be treated as lost property. In accordance with

- standard operating procedures to handle lost property, AVSECO notified AAHK at 0003 hrs.
- 2.2 During resolution of the aforementioned security check, at 2359 hrs, staff from Cathay Pacific Airways check-in approached AVSECO staff at scene and informed AVSECO that the bag might belong to a Cathay departing passenger (Miss Leung CY), departing on Flight CX872, scheduled departure time 0030 hrs. Also present at the scene at similar time was a female wearing a face mask, claiming to be the mother of the passenger (subsequently recognised as Mrs. Leung).
- 2.3 Prior to discovery of the unattended bag, at 2342 hrs Miss Leung CY had approached AVSECO staff at Level 7 Departures Immigration Hall South to report that she had left a bag behind. She told AVSECO that the bag might have been left behind at the security screening point. Acting upon this information, AVSECO searched the security screening areas at both Departures Immigration Hall North and South. As the bag was physically located on the landside, near to check- in aisle B it was not discovered during this search. At 2347 hrs Miss Leung CY left the Departures Immigration Hall South to seek assistance from the airline on the airside. Miss Leung CY contacted staff from Cathay Pacific Airways at the Cathay Pacific Airways airside lounge known as the Cabin. She gave a description of the bag to the lounge staff who passed the information via telephone conversation to Cathay Pacific Airways staff at the landside scene with AVSECO and Mrs. Leung.
- 2.4 To verify the ownership of the bag, and with the information relayed from Miss Leung CY via the staff of Cathay Pacific Airways, AVSECO inspected the bag in the presence of Cathay Pacific Airways. The given description of the bag and the items inside (a notebook computer and some medication), confirmed the bag belonged to Miss Leung CY. At 0013 hrs, upon completion of these checks AVSECO released the bag to Cathay Pacific Airways, in accordance with procedures for handling

found property. Moments later Cathay Pacific Airways handed the bag for safe keeping to Mrs. Leung.

- 2.5 From CCTV records¹ it is apparent that discussion ensued between Mrs. Leung, and the handling staff of both Cathay Pacific Airways and AVSECO. As stated in the AVSECO report (attached at Attachment B), Mrs. Leung requested that Cathay Pacific Airways deliver the bag to her daughter on the airside. AAHK duty staff arrived at scene at 0015 hrs. A staff member from Cathay Pacific Airways asked the AAHK staff whether AAHK would deliver the bag airside and hand it over to Miss Leung CY. AAHK declined this request as AVSECO had already cleared the bag and ownership of the bag was confirmed as belonging to a Cathay Pacific Airways passenger. It was therefore more appropriate for Cathay Pacific Airways to handle. Cathay Pacific Airways staff then asked an AVSECO manager now on scene as to whether it would be possible for Cathay Pacific Airways to deliver the bag airside to Miss Leung CY at the boarding gate. AVSECO confirmed that there was no objection for Cathay Pacific Airways to convey the bag airside, as the normal security controls for aviation security purposes (x-ray screening) would apply.
- 2.6 At 0018 hrs, the Cathay Pacific Airways staff presented the bag for x-ray screening at the Departures Immigration Hall North. The staff member concerned was in possession of the necessary Airport Permit. Upon completion of x-ray examination of the bag and security screening of the Cathay Pacific Airways staff, the latter proceeded to boarding gate 3 to hand over the bag to Miss Leung CY. This was done at 0023 hrs. At the boarding gate AVSECO physically examined the bag in accordance with US Transportation Security Administration security requirements. These require boarding gate checks to prevent the carriage by passengers of liquids aerosols and gels on US bound flights.

¹ CCTV records will not be released for security reasons.

- 2.7 A sequence of events prepared by AAHK and based on CCTV timings capture is at Attachment A1. A timeline of events prepared by AAHK duty staff subsequent to the event is at Attachment A2. Supporting reports prepared by AVSECO and Cathay Pacific Airways are at Attachments B and C respectively.
- 2.8 The report by Cathay Pacific Airways refers to "approval" being sought from AVSECO to convey Miss Leung CY's bag airside. Provided the airline complies with aviation security requirements and presents the item for x-ray screening by AVSECO, there is no specific restriction to prevent the airlines at HKIA from conveying to airside from landside an item belonging to one of its passengers, for the purposes of returning the property to the passenger. (Please also refer to comment at 3.7 below).

3. Implications for Airport Security

- 3.1 Based on International Civil Aviation Organization international standards and recommended practices, the Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme (HKASP) allocates responsibilities to various stakeholders. AAHK, being the airport manager of HKIA, is responsible for establishing and implementing measures to protect the enhanced security restricted area through security screening of persons, their baggage and items carried for entry into the enhanced security restricted area at HKIA in accordance with the requirements of the HKASP.
- 3.2 In fulfilling the above requirements, AAHK has established procedures and measures including access controls for passengers, crew and airport staff seeking to enter the Airport Restricted Area (ARA). In addition, measures to screen passengers, crew and airport staff entering the enhanced security restricted area as well as baggage and

articles carried into this area have also been established. These measures are to detect and prevent the movement of restricted articles into the enhanced security restricted area.

- 3.3 At HKIA passenger hold baggage (i.e. check-in baggage) is screened after acceptance by the airline at check-in. The screening system is built into the HKIA baggage handling system, such that every item is security screened and cleared prior to being loaded on board an aircraft. The model that HKIA has adopted to screen hold baggage is widely used in other international airports. In the event that a hold bag cannot be cleared by screening technology, it will need to be physically inspected. In such cases AVSECO will notify the airline concerned and then convey the bag to the relevant aircraft. At the boarding gate, the airline will identify the owner of the bag. The airline will then escort the passenger concerned downstairs to the AVSECO search vehicle, where the owner's bag will be physically searched. The passenger will open the bag. AVSECO will then physically inspect the bag and its contents. Any restricted article will be removed and will not be allowed to be carried on board the aircraft. Once cleared AVSECO will release the bag for carriage as hold baggage on the aircraft.
- 3.4 Hold baggage is not allowed to be loaded on board an aircraft in the event that the owner of the bag fails to fly on the aircraft for any reason. For instance, should a passenger fail to arrive at the boarding gate, or arrive at the boarding gate too late to board (a "no show" passenger), the airline is required to remove that passenger's hold baggage from the aircraft hold. This process (known as baggage reconciliation) ensures a positive check is undertaken before flight departure that any bag belonging to a no show passenger is removed from the aircraft.
- 3.5 Passengers and cabin baggage are screened at the designated screening locations at HKIA. Originating passengers are screened at one of the 3 Departures Immigration Halls (2 in Terminal 1, 1 in

Terminal 2). Transfer passengers are screened at any one of the 9 transfer security points located at HKIA. Ordinarily passengers will convey their respective cabin baggage through the security screening channel. It is possible however for other parties to convey items belonging to passengers through security controls for the purposes of returning such items to the owners. Please refer to the examples under paragraphs 3.6 and 3.7 below. The purposes of security screening of passengers and their cabin baggage is to detect and prevent the carriage of restricted articles past the security check point. In the event that a restricted article is present, (or suspected to be present) in a passenger's cabin baggage AVSECO will carry out a secondary search of the bag. AVSECO will request the passenger to open the bag. AVSECO will then physically inspect the bag and its contents. Any restricted article discovered will be removed for disposal. Any item detected possession of which is illegal under Hong Kong law, will be handled by the Hong Kong Police Force.

- 3.6 AAHK has established procedures that cover the handling of lost and found property. Lost and found property handling allows AAHK staff and the relevant contractor, subject to availability of manpower, to provide courtesy delivery of found property to its established owner. These procedures also include taking the found property into the ARA (airside) if the passenger is airside. For the period March 2015 to March 2016 some 517 courtesy deliveries of items were recorded. Items including travel documents, bags, wallets, clothing and electronic items were taken from the landside and after the required security screening, into the ARA (airside) and returned to their owners.
- 3.7 As stated previously, provided that the airline complies with airport security screening requirements (x-ray screening of the item) there is no specific restriction to prevent airlines at HKIA from providing a similar courtesy delivery of passenger found property to their

respective passengers airside. Whether the airlines choose to provide such service depends on their own discretion.

3.8 In the following paragraphs, the security requirements set out under ICAO documentation, the HKASP and the HKIA Airport Security Programme (HKIA ASP) which may be considered relevant to the current case are summarised with comments offered in respect of the relevant security implication. Extracts of the relevant documents are at Attachment D.

3.9 Screening of Passengers and Cabin Baggage

- ICAO Annex 17, Standards 4.4 & 4.5 (Attachment D1)
- HKASP Part 6, paragraphs 6.2.6 to 6.2.12 (Attachment D2)
- HKIA ASP Part 8 (6.1 – 6.12) (Attachment D3)

Requirement : All items of cabin baggage shall be security screened, generally by means of x-ray technology. In circumstances where x-ray screening is not applicable, AVSECO shall conduct physical search on the item concerned, and where necessary supplement by trace detection technology.

Comments: The bag in question had undergone explosive trace detection when it was handled as an unattended bag and was considered "cleared". When the bag was carried airside by a Cathay Pacific Airways staff, it was screened through x-ray screening as required and was once again cleared.

3.10 Secondary Search of Cabin Baggage

- ICAO Document 8973, Aviation Security Manual paras 11.5.8 & 11.5.9 (Manual searches of cabin baggage) (Attachment D4)
- HKASP Part 6, paragraphs 6.2.8 to 6.2.10 (Attachment D2)
- HKIA ASP Part 8 (6.7) (Attachment D3)

Requirement: A reasoned secondary search of the cabin baggage shall be conducted if there is a suspicion and the search shall be conducted in the presence of the passenger.

Comments: The requirement for the passenger to be present applies when the bag appears suspicious and a secondary search is necessary. In this case, there was no requirement for a secondary search and the presence of the passenger was therefore not required. Some commentary to date has asserted this requirement (for the passenger to be present) applies in respect of all x-ray screening, which is not the case.

3.11 Staff Screening

- HKASP Part 6, paragraph 6.2.4 (Attachment D5)
- HKIA ASP Part 8 (8) (Attachment D6)

Requirement: The screening of airport staff and their belongings shall be screened in the same manner as that applies to passengers and their cabin baggage.

Comments: The Cathay Pacific Airways staff and the bag carried were subject to the same manner of screening as that respectively applying to passengers and cabin baggage.

3.12 Unattended Baggage and Articles Handling

- HKIA ASP Part 11(12) (Attachment D7)

Requirement: If an unattended bag appears suspicious, precautionary measures will need to be taken by AVSECO staff or the Police including the use of a trace detection unit to test the item for trace of explosives. If the result is negative, this will normally be sufficient to enable the bag to be 'cleared' and treated as found property.

Comments: Having cleared the bag (through explosives trace detection and inspection) and confirmed that it was the property of a Cathay Pacific Airways passenger, AVSECO released it to Cathay Pacific Airways staff.

4. Conclusion & Way Forward

4.1 AAHK is satisfied that at no time during the event was aviation security compromised. The bag underwent the required security clearance while being treated as an unattended baggage. It was physically examined to confirm ownership. At the screening point the Cathay Pacific Airways staff and the bag underwent the required security screening and both were cleared.

4.2 It is recognized that appropriate handling of lost and found properties is essential in promoting customer service at HKIA without compromising safety and security. Together with other stakeholders, AAHK will review and fine tune the existing handling procedures for lost and found items, and promulgate specifically to the airlines any change of the arrangements whereby properties may be returned to their owner inside the ARA (airside).

Airport Authority Hong Kong

April 2016

- Attachment A – AAHK Sequence of Events & Duty Staff Report
- Attachment B – AVSECO report
- Attachment C – Cathay Pacific Airways report
- Attachment D1 – ICAO Annex 17, Standards 4.4 & 4.5
- Attachment D2 – Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme paragraphs 6.2.6 to 6.2.12
- Attachment D3 – Hong Kong International Airport: Airport Security Programme, Part 8 paragraphs 6.1. to 6.12

- Attachment D4 – ICAO Document 8973 Aviation Security Manual paragraph 11.5.8 & 11.5.9
- Attachment D5 – Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme paragraph 6.2.4
- Attachment D6 – Hong Kong International Airport: Airport Security Programme, Part 8, paragraph 8
- Attachment D7 – Hong Kong International Airport: Airport Security Programme, Part 11, paragraph 12

Sequence of the Event, 27-28 March 2016, based on CCTV timestamps

Compiled by Airport Authority

2319 hrs	The passenger (Miss Leung) was at the boarding pass checkpoint, Level 7 South DIH. Her bag was left behind on a trolley near the end of Aisle B.
2320 hrs	The passenger was at the security screening checkpoint, Level 7 South DIH.
2342 hrs	The passenger returned to Level 7 South DIH and approached an ImmD officer. She was assisted by Immigration. The passenger approached AVSECO screening checkpoint and requested AVSECO to assist.
2347 hrs	The passenger returned to Immigration, as the left bag could not be located.
2348 hrs	The passenger left the Immigration area. Around the same time, an unattended bag on a trolley was spotted by AVSECO. The AVSECO personnel moved the unattended bag on trolley to the side.
2358 hrs	CX staff was on phone, in search of the lost bag (near the end of Aisle B).
0002 hrs	The CX staff met with a woman (passenger's mother) and proceeded from the end of Aisle B to the lost bag
0013 hrs	The bag was being checked by AVSECO for reclaim by CX staff
0015 hrs	AA duty staff arrived at scene and was in conversation with CX staff (as to delivery of the bag)
0016 hrs	Passenger's mother moved to Level 7 North DIH with the bag
0018 hrs	CX staff carried the bag into Level 7 North DIH
0019 hrs	The CX staff rushed the bag into airside
0025 hrs	The passenger boarded at Gate 3, with the bag returned

Airport Authority

Sequence of Events

Incident on 27/28 March, 2016 regarding
Lost and Found Cabin Baggage of Miss Leung Chung Yan

0003	T1 Operation Officer (OO) in IAC received a call from AVSECO in IAC stating that an unattended bag had been found near L7 South Pre-Immigration. OO took note of it.
0005	T1 OO in IAC received another call from AVSECO in IAC stating that AA could collect an unattended bag which had passed ion scan. OO asked T1 OO to attend to the case.
0007	OO received a call from CX requesting AA to attend to and to release the found bag immediately because the case involved the Chief Executive's daughter. OO replied that our duty staff had been dispatched to the scene.
0010	OO called AVSECO in IAC and asked if the owner had shown up and which CCTV camera could be used to view the scene. AVSECO replied he didn't know. OO located the scene with CCTV and found that CX staff and AVSECO staff were at the scene.
0014	OO called AVSECO in IAC and asked if AA's presence was required as handover of the bag was in progress. AVSECO replied that AA's presence was not necessary.
0015	When the two OOs arrived, a male CX staff and AVSECO staff were at the scene. They noticed that AVSECO Assistant Manager (AM) was trying to explain the procedure of handling such a case to Mrs. Leung and why they couldn't take the bag to airside. The CX staff at the scene told OO that the owner of the bag had been identified in airside and asked if AA would deliver the bag to its owner at the boarding gate. OO declined CX's request to take the bag to its owner at the boarding gate and stated that it was the airline's responsibility.
0016	Mrs. Leung appeared upset. She said she couldn't understand why no one could help her deliver the bag to its owner at the boarding gate as she knew the owner of the bag and there was no forbidden item inside the bag. Then, Mrs. Leung started to walk to L7 North Pre-Immigration stating that she would take the bag to the boarding gate herself. AVSECO staff tried to stop Mrs. Leung but Mrs. Leung kept walking to L7 North Pre-Immigration.

0018	When the two OOs followed Mrs. Leung, CX staff and AVSECO staff to L7 North Pre-Immigration, they noticed that a CX staff was carrying the bag into airside via the staff channel.
0018	After security screening was carried out on the bag, the CX staff ran to the boarding gate with the bag.
0019	Mrs. Leung expressed her dissatisfaction over the procedure and the handling of this case to AA, AVSECO and CX.
0025	Miss Leung boarded her flight at Gate 3.
0041	AA duty staff left the scene.
0053	Mrs. Leung and the other parties left the scene.
	-End-

Prepared by:

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Report

Aviation Security Concerns Arising from the handling of an Unattended Bag

INTRODUCTION

Commencing 7th April 2016 (Thursday), considerable media attention has been given to a case of unattended bag handled jointly by staff of Cathay Pacific Airways (CX), Aviation Security Company (AVSECO) and the Airport Authority (AA) around midnight of 27th March 2016. Concerns mainly surround whether any unusual privilege had been granted to the passenger in this case and whether aviation security was compromised.

2. This report outlines the sequence of events as known to AVSECO. All facts have been carefully examined, and it is concluded that all related handling of the matter was appropriate and in accordance with laid down policy and procedures and aviation security was properly safeguarded.

INCIDENT

3. The bag in question belonged to a departure passenger for flight CX872 (STD : 0030 hours) on 28th March 2016 for San Francisco. (*Note : The passenger is now known as Miss LEUNG.*) She entered the Airport Restricted Area (ARA) through Departures Immigration Hall (DIH) at Level 7 South around 2320 hours on 27th March 2016 and underwent the required boarding pass check and security screening.

Loss of Cabin Bag

4. At about 2342 hours on 27th March 2016, Miss LEUNG returned from the airside to Level 7 South DIH and enquired if her lost bag could be found in the screening hall. (*Note : AVSECO staff were unaware of any special identity of the*

passenger at that time. Requests for assistance of this nature are not uncommon and AVSECO staff exercise their best judgment to help the passengers as a customer service measure.)

5. On the request of Miss LEUNG, AVSECO screening staff searched for the lost bag in the DIH at Level 7 South and later checked the DIH at Level 7 North (in case the passenger's memory was confused as to where she had undergone security screening.) Diligent efforts did not result in finding the bag. AA Lost and Found Office was also called with no fruitful results. AVSECO screening staff advised Miss LEUNG to seek further assistance from airline staff, and Miss LEUNG left at about 2347 hours.

Location of Unattended Cabin Bag

6. At about 2348 hours, an AVSECO access control security supervisor (SS) noticed an unattended bag at the end of Aisle B of the Check-in counters (landside). The SS followed the standing handling protocol to take control of the bag and asked a security officer (SO) to conduct an Explosive Trace Detection test. The test was completed in about 10 minutes and confirmed there was no presence of explosives. AA Lost and Found Office was informed and two AA staff attended scene at about 0015 hours on 28th March 2016.

7. In the process of the explosive trace detection test, three CX staff turned up. They were able to identify the bag as one belonging to a CX passenger by the name tag attached to the bag. A moment later, the mother of the passenger concerned also arrived. *(Note : The lady is now known as Mrs LEUNG.)* They requested to reclaim the property on behalf of the passenger. *(Note : This is allowed if assessed to be safe by AA staff or an AVSECO supervisor.)* The AVSECO supervisor opened the bag in the presence of CX staff and Mrs LEUNG confirmed that the computer and medication inside belonged to the passenger. The bag was released to CX staff according to the laid down procedures. The Action Card governing handling of found property is attached at Annex A.

8. As time did not allow the passenger to return to the landside to take over the bag, Mrs LEUNG requested CX staff to have the bag delivered to the passenger. CX staff enquired AVSECO if CX could take the bag to the passenger in the restricted area. AVSECO confirmed that AVSECO had finished all screening process of the unattended bag and that there was no objection to allowing CX to bring it to the

passenger. At about 0018 hours on 28th March 2016, a CX staff took the bag to the airside through the passenger screening channel, Level 7 North DIH. He went through all necessary permit check and security screening before proceeding to the flight to return the bag to the passenger.

9. At about 0024 hours on 28th March 2016, the passenger presented her bags, including the bag in question and a handbag, to AVSECO staff outside Boarding Gate No. 3 for "Liquid Aerosol Gel" (LAG) check in compliance with US regulations. No irregularities were found.

10. Annex B shows the chronological sequence of events.

CONCLUSION

11. Based on all information elicited and the review of related aviation security provisions, the conclusions are as follows:

- (a) All handling of the bag was in accordance with laid down procedures and reasonable judgment was exercised in the prevalent circumstances.
- (b) The passenger was not granted any unusual privilege. The passenger under the circumstances was provided with assistance/service by the airline to reclaim and return the lost bag.
- (c) The aviation security was properly safeguarded throughout the event. The bag concerned was "cleared" through various security procedures, including explosive trace detection test, x-ray screening and compliance with required US security checks. Hence, at no time were there any violations of overall aviation security requirements.

AVSECO
20th April 2016



行動指引：對於發現獨處行李 / 物件的處理程序

1.0 主旨：當發現獨處行李 / 物件時，按既定程序處理，確保機場安全及有效地處理獨處行李 / 失物。

2.0 當接獲有關訊息，指揮室當值控制員應該：


1. 記錄所有接獲的詳細資料，確定發現物件的正確位置及攝取該物件的詳細資料，並派隊員到現場作出初步評估及處理。
2. 通知 IAC，並要求聯絡機管局(AA)派員到場作進一步處理。
3. 知會當值助理經理、高級保安主任/保安主任及附近保安隊長到場。
4. 安排進行炸藥探測器 (IONSCAN) 測試，將探測結果轉告 IAC。
5. 如有需要，要求 IAC 將該物件有關資料轉告有關航空公司。
6. 將詳細資料記錄在事件記錄冊(Incident Book)內。

2.1 當接獲有關訊息，到達現場之保安人員應該注意下列事項並依照下列流程表處理：

1. 所有移動獨處行李/物件的工作均由 AA 或其指派職員負責。
2. 在禁區內發現的獨處行李/物件由 PSD 負責炸藥探測器 (IONSCAN) 測試，而非禁區內發現的則由 TAD 負責。
3. 所有非禁區內發現的獨處行李/物件均送往二號客運大樓的寄存行李處作 X-RAY 檢查。當寄存行李處停止運作時，則送往 L3 中央貨物檢查區作 X-RAY 檢查，而禁區內發現的則由 PSD 負責。
4. 在非禁區發現的獨處行李/物件，保安人員需要在十五分鐘內到達到場處理。如在禁區內發現，則需五分鐘內到達現場。
5. 如獨處行李/物件是由乘客或職員交來，保安人員必須詢問該人仕資料。如對方願意提供，把該人仕資料，例如姓名、國籍、職員公司名稱、聯絡電話，並即時記錄在個人記事簿內。
6. 在處理期間，乘客或航空公司代表到場認領該物件，初步評估無可疑後可在 AA 或其指派職員，或一名保安隊長或以上級別人員面前核對物主身份，確保無誤後將物件即場交回物主或航空公司代表。如有可疑，可用人手檢查而無需花時間將物件帶往保安檢查點進行 X-RAY 檢查。
7. 如進行爆炸品測試期間有物主前來認領該物件，在場保安人員應向物主解釋為可需要進行測試，並向其詢問下列問題。
 - 1) 該物件是否代人攜帶
 - 2) 該物品是否曾經無人看管
 - 3) 是否有不屬於物主的東西在內
 - 4) 物主的職業
 - 5) 物主曾否接觸過爆炸品或化學品：例如肥田料。
8. 在場保安人員將處理過程不斷向 Command Post 匯報。
9. 將事件始末詳情記錄在個人記事簿及崗位記事冊內。



2.2 當發現獨處行李/物件,在接獲上級指令時,在場保安人員應該根據下列程序處理:





2.3 當發現獨處行李／物件內有違禁物品時，保安人員應該：

1. 報告 Command Post、IAC 及通知上級到場處理。
2. 即時封鎖現場及經 IAC 要求警方到場處理。
3. 如懷疑是土製炸彈 IED 時，切勿觸動該物件直到軍火專家到場，並在現場協助警方疏導人群。
4. 將事件詳情始末記錄在個人記事簿及崗位記事冊內，以作記錄。

3.0 發現失物件時，當值保安人員應該：

1. 立即通知 Command Post 及 IAC 有關事件，向對方索取資料，並填妥 拾獲失物資料單據 的第一部份。(AC-OPS I-TAD-App.58)
2. 如拾獲人士拒絕提供個人資料，只需在 拾獲失物資料單據 第二部份備註欄填上拾獲人士拒絕提供資料便可。
3. 將失物連同 拾獲失物資料單據 放入膠袋內，然後封密。
4. 要求拾獲人士在膠袋封口上簽署。
5. 等待上級到場協助處理。
6. 等待 AA 或其代表到場拆封膠袋及在現場點收，然後填妥第二部份，交回 TAD Command Post 記錄
7. 處理失物的膠袋均編印有獨立號碼及受到管制，一切使用或報銷須記錄在個人記事冊，並通知上級及向 Command Post 報告。
8. 當值 Command Post 人員須將有關失物及接收失物職員資料記錄在“發現失物登記簿”內。

3.1 發現〈機場禁區證〉的處理程序：

1. 將證件資料通知 IAC，等待 IAC 回覆禁區證的狀況，例如使用中、已報失或失效。
2. 如屬使用中的禁區證，須向 IAC 查詢當時有否職員向 IAC 報失。盡快安排交回 Permit Office。但當 Permit office 辦公時間已過，應把禁區證暫時保管在 Command Post 內。
3. 如屬已報失 / 失效禁區證，則直接交回 Permit Office。但當 Permit office 辦公時間已過，則把禁區證暫時保管在 Command Post 內。
4. 如持證人向本部門通知報失禁區證尋回，須通知持證人到警局辦理尋回手續。
5. IAC 証實證件資料無誤；經 DSM 決定，將證件直接交回證件持有人。

Approved By: T.P. LEE

M/TAD

07.2.2012



機場保安有限公司

AVIATION SECURITY COMPANY LIMITED

1 Cheong Yip Road, Hong Kong International Airport, Lantau, Hong Kong

Ref : IB 1477/16
 Incident : Unattended Bag
 Date : 2016-03-27 to 28

Sequence of Event

Approximate Timing	Occurrence
23:20	Miss LEUNG entered the Airport Restricted Area (ARA) through Level 7 South Screening Hall (L7S), and underwent boarding pass check and security screening.
23:42	Miss LEUNG returned to the L7S screening hall from the airside and enquired if she had left her bag in the screening hall. AVSECO assisted by searching L7S and L7 North (L7N) Screening Halls and called AA Lost and Found Property Office, with negative result. AVSECO advised Miss LEUNG to seek assistance from the airline.
23:47	Miss LEUNG left the L7S screening hall and proceeded to the departure gate.
23:48	An AVSECO supervisor (SS) noticed an unattended bag (a black trolley case of standard cabin bag size) near check-in counter aisle B. SS reported to AVSECO Integrated Airport Centre (IAC). He did not locate the owner in the vicinity. It was handled in accordance with laid down procedures.
23:55	SO performed an explosive trace detection test, which required a few minutes to complete.
23:58	A CX airlines staff attended and identified the bag as one belonging to a CX passenger (Miss LEUNG). A moment later, two other CX staff arrived with a female (Mrs LEUNG) who claimed to be the mother of the passenger. AVSECO staff advised them that the screening process was in progress and no interference of the bag was allowed.
00:05	Explosive trace detection test completed with negative result. IAC was updated. IAC informed AA Lost and Found Office. Airline staff were in discussion with Mrs LEUNG outside cordon area.

Annex B

(P.2)

00:12	Airline staff requested to verify the contents of the bag in order to identify the owner. AVSECO staff opened the bag in the presence of CX staff and Mrs. LEUNG and the contents were confirmed to be the belongings of the passenger. The bag was released to CX staff for onward handling.
00:13	Mrs LEUNG requested CX for the bag to be taken to the passenger.
00:15:05	2 AA staff attended and assisted in the handling of the bag.
00:15:44	AVSECO AM attended the incident.
00:15:54	AVSECO AM approached Mrs. LEUNG and CX staff and asked about the situation. Mrs. LEUNG informed AVSECO AM that no one could assist her to send the trolley bag to her daughter. CX male staff enquired if CX could take the bag to the passenger in the airside. AVSECO AM confirmed that AVSECO had finished all the screening process of the "unattended bag" and that she had no objection to allowing him to bring the trolley bag to his passenger.
00:16:21	Mrs. LEUNG took the trolley bag and walked to L7N Departure Hall. All involved parties including AVSCEO, CX and AA followed.
00:16:44	AVSECO AM telephoned DSM and updated him on the progress of the handling of the unattended bag. DSM agreed that AVSECO had no objection to allowing the airline to reclaim the trolley bag for their own passenger after AVSECO duties had completed all the screening process and cleared the bag.
00:18:28	Upon arrival at L7N Staff Entrance, the CX staff took the trolley bag from Mrs LEUNG.
00:18:49	The CX staff took the trolley bag and passed through the screening at L7N screening channel. No irregularities were found during security screening.
00:24	Miss LEUNG presented her cabin bags to AVSECO staff (ASD) outside Boarding Gate No. 3 for open bag check prior to boarding. No irregularities were found.
00:19 – 00:53	Mrs. LEUNG discussed with the 2 CX female staff about the baggage handling procedures. AVSECO AM explained to Mrs. LEUNG that it was not appropriate for AVSECO to take the trolley bag to her daughter in this case, as the trolley bag was reclaimed by the airline. Mrs LEUNG left at 00:53.

Annex B
(P.3)

00:51	AVSECO DSM attended the scene to understand the incident.
01:01	AVSECO DSM continued to discuss the incident with CX staff and exchanged business cards.



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 Cathay Pacific City, 8 Scenic Road
 Lantau, Hong Kong
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CONFIDENTIAL

Page 1/2

Date: 19 April 2016

To: The Airport Authority Hong Kong

Report on Left Behind Baggage of Pax LEUNG/CHUNG YAN MS. CX872/HKGSFO/28MAR2016

Set out below (in chronological order) are the events which took place in relation to the above subject matter as recorded in our eARS report, the Duty ASM log, the MOD log book and the interview notes with the concerned staff.

Schedule departure time of CX872/28Mar was 0030 from Gate 3.

27 Mar 2016 / 2357LT

The passenger, Ms. Leung, approached the supervisor at the CX lounge (The Cabin) and told the lounge supervisor that her hand carry bag was left at the entrance of the south hall security check point. She further told the lounge supervisor that she realised she had left her bag after going through the X-ray screening point and had informed Avesco staff about her left bag and requested to retrieve it and, after 20 minutes of discussion with Avesco staff, her request to retrieve the bag was rejected. She said that Avesco staff had told her to seek help from airline staff at which point she sought assistance from the airline staff at The Cabin.

The lounge supervisor explained to the passenger that the procedures to retrieve her bag would be to cancel her departure, go back to arrival hall through immigration and back to the landside to collect her bag. The passenger said she must get on the flight to catch up with an exam.

27 Mar 2016 / 2359LT

The CX landside supervisor received a call from the lounge supervisor at The Cabin about the soft black hand carry bag left behind by the passenger. The landside supervisor went to the south hall security check point and noticed that one black hand carry bag with a name tag CY Leung was held by an Avesco staff.

28 Mar 2016 / 0005LT

The passenger's mother, Mrs. Leung, arrived at the south hall security check point and confirmed that the bag belonged to her daughter. Avesco staff explained to Mrs. Leung that the bag could only be released by Avesco until upon the arrival of AA staff. The CX landside supervisor also explained to Mrs. Leung that the bag was under the control of Avesco, and Avesco would not allow the airline or Mrs. Leung to claim the bag before AA Lost and Found staff arrived.¹ At this time, no AA staff had arrived.

In the meantime, the lounge supervisor assigned a customer service officer ("CSO") to accompany the passenger to the south immigration exit near the Disney shop to wait.

¹ This is in accordance to Airport Authority Terminal 1 Circular T1D/013/11 - any found property at the Hong Kong International Airport shall not be removed from the place until IAC's duty staff or AA's Lost & Found office staff has attended to record and take over the item.

28 Mar 2016 / 0009LT

AA staff still had not arrived on site. Avesco Assistant Manager arrived on site and Mrs. Leung explained that her daughter must be on board with the bag. Discussion took place between Avesco staff who were present. After a positive match of the description and content of the hand carry bag was conducted by Avesco staff, Avesco staff released the bag to Mrs. Leung. Mrs. Leung claimed that there was no one to assist her to take the bag to the boarding gate and ran with the bag to the north immigration entrance as the south side gate was closed. CX and Avesco staff followed Mrs Leung to the to the north hall immigration entrance.

28 Mar 2016 / 0012

Avesco Assistant Manager tried to obtain approval from the Avesco Duty Manager to allow CX staff to take the bag to the passenger at the boarding gate. In the meantime, the CSO accompanied the passenger to the boarding gate. While waiting at the boarding gate, the passenger passed her mobile phone to the CSO and it was the passenger's father, Mr. Leung, on the line asking for an update of the situation. The CSO informed Mr. Leung of the progress.

28 Mar 2016 / 0015

Avesco Assistant Manager verbally confirmed to another CX landside supervisor on site that CX is permitted to bring the bag through security on the passenger's behalf, who then took the bag through north immigration to the boarding gate where the bag was handed over to the passenger at 0023. At the same time, the Avesco Assistant Manager and Avesco Duty Manager gave copies of their name cards to the first CX landside supervisor as a record of Avesco's approval for the airline to take the bag to the passenger at the boarding gate.

28 Mar 2016 / 0024

Passenger boarded the flight together with the bag.

Mrs. Leung, the Assistant Manager and Duty Manager of Avesco, an AA staff and the CX landside supervisor continued to wait at landside at the north hall immigration entrance.

At the landside in between conversation, Avesco continued to explain to Mrs. Leung that the passenger must identify the baggage herself.

Mrs. Leung was appreciative of CX's efforts but she raised concerns about why flexibility could not be extended to get the luggage through security checkpoint on her behalf in the first place. CX landside supervisor apologised and explained to her that due to security protocol, airlines cannot bring any items on behalf of passengers.

Key Facts

1. The passenger approached CX for assistance 33 minutes before the scheduled flight departure time. CX staff explained the proper procedures were to cancel departure and return to landside to retrieve her bag.
2. When CX staff arrived at the site of the hand carry bag as advised by the passenger, the bag was already in custody of Avesco.
3. Upon approval granted by Avesco, CX staff was permitted to bring the bag through the security channel and deliver it to the passenger at the boarding gate.

**International Standards
and Recommended Practices**



**Annex 17
to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation**

Security

**Safeguarding International Civil Aviation
Against Acts of Unlawful Interference**

This edition incorporates all amendments adopted by the Council prior to 18 November 2010 and supersedes, on 1 July 2011, all previous editions of Annex 17.

For information regarding the applicability of the Standards and Recommended Practices, see Foreword.

Ninth Edition
March 2011

International Civil Aviation Organization

Attachment D1 - ICAO Annex 17 Standards 4.4 to 4.5

4.4 Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage

- 4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating passengers of commercial air transport operations and their cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft departing from a security restricted area.
- 4.4.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer passengers of commercial air transport operations and their cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft, unless it has established a validation process and continuously implements procedures, in collaboration with the other Contracting State where appropriate, to ensure that such passengers and their cabin baggage have been screened to an appropriate level at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized interference from the point of screening at the originating airport to the departing aircraft at the transfer airport.

Note.— Guidance material on this issue can be found in the Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 — Restricted).

- 4.4.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that passengers and their cabin baggage which have been screened are protected from unauthorized interference from the point of screening until they board their aircraft. If mixing or contact does take place, the passengers concerned and their cabin baggage shall be re-screened before boarding an aircraft.
- 4.4.4 Each Contracting State shall establish at an airport measures for transit operations to protect transit passengers' cabin baggage from unauthorized interference and protect the integrity of the security of the airport of transit.
- 4.4.5 **Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should ensure that practices are established at airports and on board aircraft to assist in the identification and resolution of suspicious activity that may pose a threat to civil aviation.*

4.5 Measures relating to hold baggage

- 4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage is screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations departing from a security restricted area.
- 4.5.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that all hold baggage to be carried on a commercial aircraft is protected from unauthorized interference from the point it is screened or accepted into the care of the carrier, whichever is earlier, until departure of the aircraft on which it is to be carried. If the integrity of hold baggage is jeopardized, the hold baggage shall be re-screened before being placed on board an aircraft.
- 4.5.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators do not transport the baggage of persons who are not on board the aircraft unless that baggage is identified as unaccompanied and subjected to appropriate screening.
- 4.5.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer hold baggage is screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations, unless it has established a validation process and continuously implements procedures, in collaboration with the other Contracting State where appropriate, to ensure that such hold baggage has been screened at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized interference from the originating airport to the departing aircraft at the transfer airport.

Note.— Guidance material on this issue can be found in the Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 — Restricted).

4.5.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators transport only items of hold baggage which have been individually identified as accompanied or unaccompanied, screened to the appropriate standard and accepted for carriage on that flight by the air carrier. All such baggage should be recorded as meeting these criteria and authorized for carriage on that flight.

4.5.6 **Recommendation.**— *Each Contracting State should establish procedures to deal with unidentified baggage in accordance with a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities.*

4th edition
January 2008

Copy No. _____

◆

Hong Kong Aviation Security Programme

◆

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Attachment D2 – HKASP Part 6, paragraphs 6.2.6 to 6.2.12

Screening of Passengers and Cabin Baggage

- 6.2.6 The airport manager shall ensure that a passenger, authorized in accordance with section 6.1.11 (d) to (g) above to enter or remain in an airport restricted area, and his cabin baggage are screened to a standard sufficient reasonably to detect a restricted article, before the passenger or cabin baggage is permitted access to an area set aside for processing embarking passengers and crew within an enhanced security restricted area. Any security equipment used in such screening shall conform to the appropriate standards and requirements stipulated in Part 8 of this Programme and any screening staff shall conform to the appropriate standards and requirements stipulated in Part 9 in this Programme.
- 6.2.7 The screening of a passenger and his cabin baggage shall be with the consent of the passenger, which normally is tacit since access to the enhanced security restricted area shall be conditional on the passenger undergoing such screening. A refusal on the part of a passenger to undergo the screening will normally be suspicious and the Police should be alerted. (Nothing in this section prejudices the authority of police officers to conduct searches in accordance with powers provided in legislation.) Such refusal shall also result in the passenger being refused entry to the enhanced security restricted area or in the case of a transfer/transit passenger, being refused entry into the airside departure lounge (and thus denied boarding of the flight).
- 6.2.8 A reasoned secondary screening shall be conducted to account for all unidentified objects on a passenger that has set off a security equipment alarm (usually an archway metal detector). This secondary screening may either be typically by hand or it may be conducted using a hand held metal detector supported by a hand search. A reasoned secondary screening shall also be conducted of a passenger's cabin baggage, where any items of a suspect nature have been detected during x-ray examination. This secondary screening shall be conducted by hand and may be supported by a trace detection system to examine those items which are difficult to be search by hand.
- 6.2.9 A reasoned secondary screening of a passenger and his cabin baggage shall also be conducted if, in the judgment of the screener, the passenger displays undue nervousness or arrogance or who appears to evade screening, conceal an item or in any other way suggests that he may have a restricted article.
- 6.2.10 All screening of cabin baggage shall be conducted in the presence of the passenger.
- 6.2.11 In addition to any reasoned secondary screening described in sections 6.2.8 and 6.2.9, the Aviation Security Authority may prescribe a percentage of random secondary screening of passengers and their cabin baggage corresponding to the prevalent threat level. This random secondary screening shall be conducted by hand. The percentage threshold may be set in relation to threat level and may be adjusted commensurate with any change in the threat.
- 6.2.12 The airport manager shall provide for the continuous recording, via closed circuit television, of the passenger and cabin baggage screening process and the screening areas, with the video tapes being retained for a period of at least 31 days.



**HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMME**

CONTROLLED COPY No.

Attachment D3 – HKIA Part 8 (6.1-6.12)

6 Screening Procedures – Passengers & Cabin Baggage

- 6.1 The screening of passengers and cabin baggage shall take place in the appropriate departure passenger or transfer passenger screening facility provided by the Airport Authority.
- 6.2 All items of cabin baggage shall be security screened, generally by means of x-ray technology. Passengers shall be required to remove waist pouches and other accessories that may conceal a restricted article and these shall also be x-ray screened. The x-ray machines used in the screening of cabin baggage are all 'film safe'. In circumstances where x-ray screening is not applicable, AVSECO shall conduct physical search on the item concerned, and where necessary supplemented by trace detection technology.
- 6.3 Plastic trays will be made available for passengers to insert small items and / or foodstuffs that require x-ray screening. Passengers will be encouraged to divest themselves of metallic objects that might alarm the archway metal detectors. Such items will be either x-ray screened or physically inspected by the security staff.
- 6.4 The passenger will be directed to proceed through the archway metal detector. Security staff shall pay particular attention to ensure that there is appropriate separation between passengers using the archway metal detector. Passengers shall be required to walk through at a normal pace. Running or jumping through the archway will not be permitted.
- 6.5 A reasoned secondary search of the passenger shall be conducted if:
- (a) the passenger alarms the archway metal detector; or
 - (b) in the judgement of the screener, the passenger displays undue nervousness, or arrogance or who appears to evade screening, conceal an item or in any other way suggests that he may have a restricted item.

The secondary search may either be typically by hand or it may be conducted using a hand held metal detector supported by a hand search. The search shall be thorough enough to account for all metallic and unidentified objects on the person.

- 6.6 If a hand search is to be performed then the searcher shall be of the same sex as the passenger. Secondary searches of passengers (including any hand search) are also conducted under this programme with the consent of the passenger undergoing such search. Such consent is normally tacit since access to the Enhanced Security Restricted Area is conditional on the passenger undergoing such screening. A refusal on the part of a passenger to undergo a secondary search will normally be suspicious and the Police will be alerted to the scene for investigation.
- 6.7 A reasoned secondary search of the cabin baggage shall be conducted if:
- (a) a suspect item or an item which cannot be identified and cleared by x-ray examination, is observed by the operator; or
 - (b) in the judgement of the screener, the passenger displays undue nervousness, or arrogance or who appears to evade screening, conceal an item or in any other way suggests that he may have a restricted item.

The search shall be conducted in the presence of the passenger. The passenger shall be invited to open the bag in order for its contents to be physically inspected. Further x-ray images may be taken of the bag from a different angle or of items within the bag.

- 6.8 Items that cannot be cleared by normal x-ray or physical inspection may be further screened using trace detection equipment. In the event that the trace detection equipment registers an alarm, AVSECO Duty Security Manager shall collate the detection result with the circumstance and determine whether assistance from the Airport Duty Manager and the Police is warranted.
- 6.9 Suspect Device Isolation Unit (SDIU) is provided at each screening point for temporary storage of unclear / unresolved items found during screening. AVSECO Duty Security Manager shall make decision whether to store the unclear / unresolved item in the SDIU.
- 6.10 The Aviation Security Authority may prescribe a percentage of random secondary searches of passengers and their cabin baggage, which are required to be undertaken in addition to any reasoned secondary searches described above. Such secondary searches may include both hand search as well as search by use of hand held metal detector. The percentage threshold may be set in relation to a threat level and may be adjusted commensurate with any change in the threat.
- 6.11 Private search cubicles will be provided in each of the departure search halls in case a passenger requests that a search be carried out discretely. Similar arrangements can be made at the transfer screening channels.
- 6.12 In the event of departing passengers at the Terminal 1, who have been security screened but before departure Immigration clearance, request returning to landside for personal reasons, they may leave the screening hall under the supervision of AVSECO through the designated exit.

**Doc 8973/9
RESTRICTED**



Aviation Security Manual

**Approved by the Secretary General
and published under his authority**

Ninth Edition — 2014

International Civil Aviation Organization

Attachment D4 – ICAO Document 8973, Aviation Security Manual paras

11.5.8 & 11.5.9

11.5.8 Screening of cabin baggage

11.5.8.1 The cabin baggage of all departing passengers should be screened using one or more of the following techniques:

- a) manual search of the content of each bag and item carried. Screeners should be particularly alert for suspicious signs, such as inconsistent weight;
- b) conventional X-ray;
- c) explosives trace detectors;
- d) liquid explosives detection systems (LEDS); and
- e) other appropriate technology and equipment.

11.5.8.2 All screening technology equipment should be used in accordance with the concept of operation provided by the manufacturer or the supplier.

11.5.8.3 Any item or bag that activates an equipment's alarm, or cannot be cleared by the normal screening process, should be referred for manual searches or be subjected to an alternate method of screening. Any item or bag which cannot be satisfactorily cleared after completing the entire screening process, including a manual search, should be denied entry into security restricted areas.

11.5.8.4 Screening equipment operators should always select baggage for secondary screening when:

- a) the screening equipment used generates an alarm that cannot otherwise be resolved;
- b) the screened baggage appears to contain a prohibited article, or an article for which its transport is restricted due to national regulation and therefore warrants further inspection;
- c) the operator cannot confirm that the screened baggage does not contain any prohibited article; or
- d) the screened baggage generates oblique, opaque or complicated images (when such images are available).

11.5.8.5 A proportion of cabin baggage should be subjected to secondary screening using the principles of randomness and unpredictability, insofar as this is practicable. The screening methods to be applied may include manual search, other screening technology equipment (e.g. ETD), or a combination thereof. The proportion of cabin baggage to be subjected to these measures should be based on a risk assessment carried out by the relevant authorities. A greater proportion may be applicable to specific flights considered to be under an increased threat.

11.5.9 Manual searches of cabin baggage

11.5.9.1 Manual searches of passenger cabin baggage should always be carried out in the presence of the owner of the baggage and should be carried out as follows:

- a) the baggage should be opened, preferably by the passenger, and examined to ensure that there is no false bottom. A straight edge gauge-rule, rod or other device may be used to establish whether there is a significant discrepancy in external and internal measurements;
- b) particular attention should be paid to the lining, trim, seams, rims, studs, zip fasteners, locks, hinges, wheels and handles to identify signs of tampering or repair that may indicate the concealment of a restricted article;

- c) the contents of the baggage should be removed layer by layer, with each layer being examined until the baggage is empty. The empty baggage should then be lifted by hand and assessed for balance and empty weight. If there is any suspicion that the baggage is not of uniform weight or not of a weight consistent with being empty, the baggage itself should be examined for concealment of restricted items and, if necessary, should be screened by X-ray equipment;
- d) electrical items, such as razors, calculators, radios, clocks, cameras and personal stereos including their accessories, should be examined to ensure that they have not been tampered with, are of the expected weight, are balanced and have no additional batteries. If necessary, an item should be screened by X-ray equipment to ensure that it has no additional power source or that there is no organic material within what should be an inorganic shell;
- e) articles such as vacuum flasks, books, umbrellas and crutches should be examined in sufficient depth, by X-ray equipment if necessary, to establish their bona fides;
- f) attention should be given to the contents of containers and bottles capable of holding volatile or flammable liquids. Liquids should be rejected when there are grounds for suspecting that they could lead to unruly or disruptive behaviour. Special attention should be given to liquids, aerosols, gels, creams, etc. as these could contain explosive or dangerous substances. Even in small quantities, such substances are potentially lethal because of the possibility that a team of perpetrators may combine their contents to construct an IED. Guidance on security controls for screening LAGs can be found in Appendix 22;
- g) searchers should look for greasy stains and small holes in the exterior of the baggage and for the smell of almonds, nail polish, glue, perfume or other masking vapours, which might indicate the presence of explosives; and
- h) the baggage should be closed and fastened on completion of the search, and held until the person presenting it has also been searched.

11.5.9.2 Screening officers should wear protective gloves when carrying out manual searches, and ensure that the owner of the baggage does not interfere with the search process, using assertive but courteous verbal commands if necessary.

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The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Attachment D5 – HKASP Part 6 paragraph 6.2.4

Screening of Persons, Articles and Vehicles

6.2.4 The airport manager shall ensure that a person, article or vehicle that is authorized in accordance with section 6.1.11 (a) and (b), to enter an airport restricted area, is screened to a standard sufficient reasonably to detect a restricted article, before the person, article or vehicle is permitted access to an enhanced security restricted area. Any security equipment used in such screening shall conform to the appropriate standards and requirements stipulated in Part 8 of this Programme and any screening staff shall conform to the appropriate standards and requirements stipulated in Part 9 of this Programme.



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Attachment D6 – HKIA ASP Part 8 (8)

8 Screening Procedures – Staff & Vehicles

- 8.1 Airport staff (i.e., Airport Restricted Area permit holders and their escortees (if any)) are required to be screened to a standard sufficient reasonably to detect a restricted article before accessing into the Enhanced Security Restricted Area. The screening of airport staff and their belongings shall be in the same manner as that applies to passengers and their cabin baggage as prescribed in Section 6.
- 8.2 During normal airport operations there is no exemption from security screening requirements for government officers from Police, Customs & Excise Department, Immigration Department and Fire Services Department whether such officers are in uniform or in plain clothes. Similarly, there is no exemption for officers from the Independent Commission Against Corruption. Those officers carrying firearms (Police, C&E and ICAC) whether overtly or covertly are also subject to security screening but with the following provisos.
- (1) They need not divest themselves of the firearms, ammunition and related equipment.
 - (2) They are required to walk through the Archway Metal Detector located at the screening point.
 - (3) Secondary search conducted by AVSECO shall not encompass the firearms, ammunition and related equipment.
- 8.3 Under emergency conditions officers from Police, Customs & Excise Department, Immigration Department and Fire Services Department are exempt from screening requirements at entry points to the Enhanced Security Restricted Area.
- 8.4 Airport Staff / permit holders on board vehicles or otherwise entering through one of the designated airfield perimeter gates or mid-field security screening points will be screened through the screening channel located at the gatehouse. Drivers will normally be screened beside their vehicle (using a hand held metal detector).
- 8.5 Vehicles shall be visually inspected. With the exception of vehicles operating under a 'sealed vehicle' protocol, all goods inside the vehicle will need to be removed and screened using an x-ray machine inside the gatehouse, unless (at the discretion of the gatehouse security supervisor) they can be visually checked and cleared inside the vehicle. Airport Organizations should therefore endeavour to keep the interiors of their vehicles clear of paraphernalia, so that the screening process can be expedited.



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Attachment D7 – HKIA ASP Part 11 (12)

12 Suspicious and Suspect Items

- 12.1 Under normal circumstances where generally there is a low security risk to the airport and civil aviation operations, an unattended bag within the Passenger Terminal Building will not normally in itself create sufficient grounds for considering it to be 'Suspect'. However, the Airport Authority (and AVSECO) shall actively discourage members of the public from leaving their belongings unattended.
- 12.2 However, during periods of elevated threat or if the circumstances in which a bag or article has been left unattended appear suspicious, then precautionary measures will need to be taken by AVSECO staff or the Police. This will entail:
- Making enquiries with other staff and passengers in the vicinity to establish ownership of the object and to account for its presence.
 - Visually inspecting the object for suspicious signs (e.g., threat notices, protruding wires, leaking chemicals or noise emissions, etc.), as well as checking for labels or luggage tags, which might identify the owner. **No attempt should be made to move or otherwise interfere with the object.**
 - If the owner can be identified, consideration may be given to making a PA announcement requesting the owner to retrieve the item.
 - If the owner cannot be identified and located and other enquiries in the vicinity have not been able to 'clear' the item, then AVSECO may use a trace detection unit to test the external surfaces of the item (without disturbing it) for traces of explosives. If the result indicates a 'Positive' trace of explosives then the item will be deemed to be 'Suspect' and the Police may declare a 'Major Security Incident'. If the trace detection test produces a 'Negative' result for traces of explosives then this will normally be sufficient to enable the bag to be 'cleared' and treated either as found property
 - However, during periods of elevated threat, such items may warrant additional precautions.
- 12.3 AVSECO is responsible for conducting trace detection on any suspicious baggage once alerted to the scene.