

立法會

Legislative Council

LC Paper No. CB(2)647/17-18

(These minutes have been seen
by the Administration)

Ref : CB2/PL/SE

Panel on Security

Minutes of meeting
held on Tuesday, 5 December 2017, at 2:30 pm
in Conference Room 1 of the Legislative Council Complex

**Members
present**

: Hon CHAN Hak-kan, BBS, JP (Chairman)
Hon James TO Kun-sun (Deputy Chairman)
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP
Hon Starry LEE Wai-king, SBS, JP
Hon CHAN Kin-por, GBS, JP
Dr Hon Priscilla LEUNG Mei-fun, SBS, JP
Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun, JP
Hon Claudia MO
Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun, BBS, JP
Hon Steven HO Chun-yin, BBS
Hon YIU Si-wing, BBS
Hon MA Fung-kwok, SBS, JP
Hon Charles Peter MOK, JP
Hon CHAN Chi-chuen
Hon CHAN Han-pan, JP
Hon Kenneth LEUNG
Hon Alice MAK Mei-kuen, BBS, JP
Hon KWOK Wai-keung, JP
Hon Dennis KWOK Wing-hang
Hon Christopher CHEUNG Wah-fung, SBS, JP
Dr Hon Fernando CHEUNG Chiu-hung
Dr Hon Elizabeth QUAT, BBS, JP
Hon POON Siu-ping, BBS, MH
Hon Alvin YEUNG
Hon CHU Hoi-dick
Hon Jimmy NG Wing-ka, JP
Dr Hon Junius HO Kwan-yiu, JP
Hon LAM Cheuk-ting

Hon Holden CHOW Ho-ding
Hon SHIU Ka-chun
Hon YUNG Hoi-yan
Hon CHAN Chun-ying
Hon CHEUNG Kwok-kwan, JP
Hon HUI Chi-fung
Hon LAU Kwok-fan, MH
Dr Hon CHENG Chung-tai

Member attending : Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki

Members absent : Hon WONG Kwok-kin, SBS, JP
Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming, SBS, JP
Hon LEUNG Che-cheung, SBS, MH, JP
Hon CHUNG Kwok-pan

Public Officers attending : Item IV

The Administration

Mr John LEE Ka-chiu, SBS, PDSM, PMSM, JP
Secretary for Security

Mrs Marion LAI CHAN Chi-kuen, JP
Permanent Secretary for Security

Ms Mimi LEE Mei-mei, JP
Deputy Secretary for Security 1

Mr Andrew TSANG Yue-tung
Principal Assistant Secretary for Security E

Mr CHIU Man-hin
Assistant Secretary for Security E2

Independent Commission Against Corruption

Mr Steven LAM Kin-ming
Assistant Director / Operations 3

Ms Winky HSU Man-wai
Senior Principal Investigator / R Group

Item V

The Administration

Mr Sonny AU Chi-kwong, PDSM, PMSM, JP
Under Secretary for Security

Mr Parson LAM Chun-wah
Principal Assistant Secretary for Security D

Mr CHAN Tin-chee
Assistant Director (Identity Card)
Immigration Department

Mr Benny LEUNG Chin-pang
Senior Systems Manager (Technology Services)
Identity Card
Immigration Department

Mr Tony WONG Chi-kwong
Assistant Government Chief Information Officer
(Industry Development)
Innovation and Technology Bureau

Item VI

The Administration

Ms Manda CHAN Wing-man
Commissioner for Narcotics

Miss Fiona LI Wing-suen
Principal Assistant Secretary for Security
(Narcotics) 2

**Clerk in
attendance**

**: Miss Betty MA
Chief Council Secretary (2) 1**

Staff in attendance : Mr Timothy TSO
Senior Assistant Legal Adviser 1

Mr Raymond LAM
Senior Council Secretary (2) 7

Ms Kiwi NG
Legislative Assistant (2) 1

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I. Confirmation of minutes of previous meeting
(LC Paper No. CB(2)422/17-18)

The minutes of the policy briefing cum meeting held on 3 November 2017 were confirmed.

II. Information papers issued since the last meeting
(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)251/17-18(01), CB(2)404/17-18(01) and CB(2)444/17-18(01))

2. Members noted that the following papers had been issued since the last meeting:

- (a) joint letter dated 31 October 2017 from Mr LEUNG Che-cheung, Dr Elizabeth QUAT and Dr CHIANG Lai-wan;
- (b) Administration's response to issues raised in a letter dated 4 October 2017 from Mr Holden CHOW; and
- (c) letter dated 30 November 2017 from Dr CHENG Chung-tai.

III. Date of next meeting and items for discussion
(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)424/17-18(01) and (02))

Regular meeting in January 2018

3. Members agreed that the following items would be discussed at the next regular meeting on 9 January 2018 at 2:30 pm:

- (a) Fire Safety Improvement Works Subsidy Scheme;
- (b) Exercise on the Daya Bay Contingency Plan; and

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- (c) Government Flying Service Kai Tak Division.

IV. Results of study of matters raised in the Annual Report 2016 to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance

(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)424/17-18(03) to (04) and Annual Report 2016 to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance)

4. Members noted a Summary of the Annual Report 2016 ("the Annual Report") to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance ("the Commissioner") prepared by the Secretariat of the Commissioner, which was tabled at the meeting.

(Post-meeting note: The Summary tabled at the meeting was circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(2)478/17-18(01) on 7 December 2017.)

5. The Chairman informed Members that the Commissioner, who had been invited to attend the meeting, had replied that it was not appropriate for him to attend. The Commissioner had, in line with his past practice and the practice of former Commissioners, held a briefing on the Annual Report in the morning of 5 December 2017, which had been attended by two Legislative Council ("LegCo") Members, the media and members of the public.

6. Members noted an updated background brief entitled "Results of Study of Matters Raised in the Annual Report to the Chief Executive by the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance" prepared by the LegCo Secretariat.

7. Secretary for Security ("S for S") briefed Members on the results of the Administration's study of matters raised in the Annual Report, which were set out in the paper to the Panel.

Compliance with legislation and recommendations of the Commissioner

8. Mr NG Wing-ka said that he was pleased to note that there was no case of wrong or unauthorized interception of communications or abuse of surveillance devices in 2016. Noting that the Commissioner had

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made recommendations to law enforcement agencies ("LEAs") on matters relating to operations under the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (Cap. 589) ("ICSO"), he sought information on the specific recommendations of the Commissioner and the actions taken by LEAs in response to such recommendations, especially in relation to matters relating to legal professional privilege ("LPP").

9. S for S responded that the Commissioner had pointed out at the briefing in the morning of 5 December 2017 that there was no finding that any of the cases of irregularities/incidents was due to deliberate disregard of the statutory provisions, the Code of Practice ("CoP") or the control of surveillance devices. There was also no sign of abuse of surveillance devices for any unauthorized purposes during the report period. Noting that there were occasions when officers were not careful enough in dealing with documents relating to operations under ICSO nor vigilant enough in discharging ICSO-related duties, the Commissioner had said that LEA officers should stay alert and exercise care in different stages of operations under ICSO. The Commissioner's recommendations as set out in the Report had all been accepted by LEAs. The Commissioner had also set out in the Report the details of his review of 46 new LPP cases on which LEAs submitted notifications in accordance with CoP.

10. Mr YIU Si-wing asked whether there had been any unauthorized use of or loss of covert surveillance devices. He also asked whether the management of such devices were regularly reviewed.

11. S for S responded that according to the Report, there was no sign of abuse of surveillance device for any unauthorized purposes in 2016. There was only a report from an LEA that a surveillance device and its associated accessories were reported lost after they were withdrawn for use in a training exercise. LEAs had established and put under constant review a control mechanism to keep track of surveillance devices with the use of a computerized device management system and QR Codes to facilitate the issue and return of surveillance devices.

12. Ms Claudia MO expressed concern about the possibility of LEAs carrying out interception of communications or covert surveillance not according to ICSO. S for S responded that any such operation, if carried out, would be in contravention of ICSO.

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13. Ms Claudia MO expressed concern about the possibility of LEAs carrying out interception of communications or covert surveillance for political purposes. S for S responded that the Commissioner had stated at the briefing on 5 December 2017 that he had not identified any interception of communications or covert surveillance carried out for such purposes. The Commissioner had also stated that applications of such a nature, if any, would not be approved by panel judges.

14. Referring to paragraph 4.13 of the Report, Ms YUNG Hoi-yan asked how the sealed envelopes containing LPP information or suspected LPP information would be kept and dealt with. S for S responded that panel judges or the Commissioner would decide when and how such information would be disposed of.

Adequacy of existing legislation

15. Mr CHAN Chun-ying asked whether the existing definition of "communication" in ICSO was adequate. S for S responded that according to LEAs, the existing statutory definition of "communication" was adequate for discharging their law enforcement duties and no amendments thereto would be necessary.

16. Dr Elizabeth QUAT said that she was pleased to note from the Report that there was no case of wrong or unauthorized interception of communications in 2016. She asked whether communication through social media was covered under ICSO.

17. The Deputy Chairman said that a balance should be struck between interception of communications and covert surveillance under ICSO and the protection of privacy. There was a need to review the definition of "interception" or "telecommunications system" under ICSO having regard to the proliferation of use of social media and instant message applications among members of the public.

18. S for S responded that the issue had been thoroughly discussed by the Bills Committee on Interception of Communications and Surveillance (Amendment) Bill 2015. The current definitions in ICSO were effective and there was no need for a review. He stressed that for applications for prescribed authorizations approved by panel judges, LEAs were required to report to panel judges any subsequent material change in circumstances which involved LPP or journalistic material. Compliance by LEAs with the relevant requirements under ICSO was monitored by the

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Commissioner. A balance had been struck between maintaining effectiveness of law enforcement and the protection of privacy.

19. Mr LAM Cheuk-ting said that interception of communications and surveillance were effective tools for the detection of serious crime and protection of public safety. He expressed concern that in order to avoid making mistakes, LEAs were reluctant to submit surveillance applications, thus resulting in a substantial drop in the number of applications for Type 1 and Type 2 surveillance from 136 (of which two were rejected) and 126 in 2007 to 23 and seven in 2016 respectively, representing a drop of about 82% and 94% respectively. He considered that LEAs should be encouraged to apply for prescribed authorizations under ICSO whenever there was such a need.

20. Dr Elizabeth QUAT asked whether existing requirements under ICSO were too stringent on law enforcement officers.

21. Mr CHAN Chun-ying asked about the number of persons arrested as a result of or further to interception of communications or covert surveillance carried out pursuant to prescribed authorizations. He also asked whether the Administration had assessed the effectiveness of surveillance devices.

22. S for S responded that the crime trend varied from one year to another. There was no apparent evidence indicating that the drop in the number of applications for Type 1 and Type 2 surveillance arose from reluctance on the part of LEAs to submit surveillance applications. He pointed out that the number of persons arrested as a result of or further to interception of communications or covert surveillance had remained at the level of about 200 in the past five years. Law enforcement officers newly appointed to perform relevant duties were provided with induction training. Training packages had also been developed to enhance the knowledge of law enforcement officers about the requirements in ICSO and enable them to handle ICSO-related matters in a proper and prudent manner.

23. S for S added that from the commencement of ICSO in 2006 to 2016, about 16 000 prescribed authorizations had been issued to LEAs and about 3 500 persons had been arrested as a result of or further to interception of communications or covert surveillance carried out pursuant to prescribed authorizations. This indicated that interception and covert surveillance operations had effectively facilitated law enforcement work.

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Compensation for unauthorized interception of communications or covert surveillance

24. Mr CHEUNG Kwok-kwan asked whether the Apology Ordinance (Cap. 631), which had just come into operation, was applicable to cases of unauthorized interception of communications or covert surveillance.

25. S for S responded that ICSO had provided for a person to apply in writing to the Commissioner for an examination, if he suspected that he was the subject of an interception of communications or covert surveillance operation. If the Commissioner, after an examination, determined that the suspected interception of communications or covert surveillance had been carried out by an LEA without the authority of a prescribed authorization, he would notify the applicant concerned, provided that it would not be prejudicial to the prevention or detection of crime or the protection of public security, and initiate the procedure for awarding payment of compensation to the applicant by the Administration. According to the Report, 15 applications for examinations had been received in 2016 and the Commissioner had found all 15 cases not in the applicants' favour.

V. New Smart Hong Kong Identity Card
(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)424/17-18(05) and (06))

26. Under Secretary for Security ("US for S") briefed Members on the new form of smart Hong Kong identity ("ID") card and the territory-wide smart ID card replacement exercise, as detailed in the paper provided by the Administration. With the aid of powerpoint presentation, Assistant Director (Identity Card), Immigration Department ("AD of Imm (IC)") provided further elaborations on the security features of the new smart ID card and the territory-wide smart ID card replacement exercise.

27. Members noted a background brief entitled "New smart Hong Kong identity card" prepared by the LegCo Secretariat.

Security of the new smart identity card

28. Ms Claudia MO said that while she had no objection in principle to the introduction of the new smart ID card, she was concerned about the possibility of theft of new smart ID cards or cardholders deliberately

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reporting loss of card and arranging the card for sale on the black market. She also expressed concern about the possibility of alteration of the photo in a new smart ID card and theft of information stored in the chip of a new smart ID card.

29. US for S responded that some 13 million smart ID cards of the current generation had been issued between 2003 and 2017 and only about 3 000 forged smart ID cards had been seized during the same period. The new smart ID card would incorporate sophisticated security features and strong protection against photo substitution and counterfeiting.

30. Dr Elizabeth QUAT asked whether it would be possible for someone with a suitable device to read information stored in the chip of a new smart ID card from a short distance without being noticed by the cardholder.

31. US for S responded that the proposed new smart ID card would adopt a bi-level encryption mechanism. To enable access to information in a new smart ID card, it would be necessary to physically place the smart ID card on top of an authorized optical card reader to initiate the authentication process. To access data stored in the chip of a new smart ID card, further mutual authentication between the chip and the card reader would be required.

Design and durability of the new smart identity card

32. Mr Holden CHOW said that some members of the public were of the view that the new smart ID card resembled a Home Visit Permit. He asked whether it was easy to distinguish between the two cards.

33. Mr SHIU Ka-chun expressed concern that it was easy for a cardholder to mix up the two cards, which looked very similar.

34. US for S responded that the new smart ID card differed from a Home Visit Permit in that the former featured the use of bauhinia as the main theme of the background of the card, the inclusion of a portrait of a second smaller photo of the cardholder by the patent security feature of "Stereo Laser Image" and a see-through window with the ID card number printed therein.

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35. Mr CHAN Chi-chuen queried why the design of the new smart ID card was very similar to that of a Home Visit Permit. He asked about factors considered in the design of the new smart ID card. US for S responded that the new smart ID card had been designed mainly on the basis of security considerations. Design work for the new smart ID card had been commissioned to a European contractor.

36. Dr Elizabeth QUAT said that some members of the public were of the view that the emblem of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China ("HKSAR") on the back of the new smart ID card should be enlarged to make it more legible. US for S responded that the emblem of HKSAR on the back of the new smart ID card would be of similar size as that on the existing smart ID card. Given the need for incorporation of a chip and various security features on the new smart ID card, there was no room for further enlarging the emblem on the back of the new smart ID card.

37. Mr CHAN Chun-ying said that the chip of an existing smart ID card was more durable than the card itself, which was made of plastic, and asked about the durability of the new smart ID card. US for S responded that the new smart ID cards would have a serviceable life expectancy of 15 years.

Territory-wide identity card replacement exercise

38. Referring to paragraph 10 of the Administration's paper, Mr Holden CHOW enquired about the timetable for provision of on-site smart ID card replacement service for elderly persons and persons with disabilities ("PWDs") residing in residential care homes ("RCHs") and the number of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") involved.

39. Mr POON Siu-ping asked whether additional manpower would be required for the provision of such on-site service. Noting that about 8.8 million smart ID cards would be replaced in the upcoming smart ID card replacement exercise while the last card replacement exercise involved the replacement of about 6.8 million smart ID cards, Mr POON also asked whether more manpower would be needed for the upcoming smart ID card replacement exercise.

40. AD of Imm (IC) responded that on-site smart ID card replacement service was expected to commence in the first quarter of 2019. Officers of the Immigration Department ("ImmD") would visit RCHs registered

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with the Social Welfare Department under relevant laws to provide PWDs and elderly persons residing therein with the choice of having their smart ID cards replaced on-site. ImmD would ensure the availability of sufficient manpower for the upcoming card replacement exercise, including the on-site smart ID card replacement service at RCHs.

41. Referring to paragraph 11 of the Administration's paper, Mr SHIU Ka-chun asked about the role of NGOs in facilitating smart ID card replacement for elderly persons and PWDs with low mobility who lived in the community. AD of Imm (IC) explained that NGOs might contact the smart ID card replacement centres ("SIDCCs") for special time slots to arrange group visits for such persons to replace their smart ID cards at SIDCCs.

42. Mr CHAN Chun-ying said that with some 8.8 million ID cards to be replaced at nine SIDCCs within a period of 4.25 years, each SIDCC would have to handle the replacement of about 700 ID cards per day and the issue of a large number of new smart ID cards. He considered that the nine SIDCCs should be established at locations convenient to members of the public and the floor area should be sufficiently large.

43. AD of Imm (IC) responded that the nine SIDCCs would be established at locations convenient to members of the public. US for S added that the nine SIDCCs would be opened for longer hours than those of the last ID card replacement exercise. ImmD would adopt facilitation measures in the upcoming card replacement exercise, including:

- (a) the adoption of a "Dual-Track-Parallel-Run" approach in the call-up programme;
- (b) the provision of on-site smart ID card replacement service at RCHs for elderly persons and PWDs; and
- (c) better use of information technology such as allowing form-prefilling on the Internet or through a mobile application, as well as the establishment of self-service registration kiosks and self-service collection kiosks.

44. Mr POON Siu-ping asked whether a person whose existing smart ID card was damaged or lost during his scheduled smart ID card replacement period would be replaced with the current or new generation of smart ID card. AD of Imm(IC) responded that the Commissioner of

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Registration would, by a notice published in the Gazette, specify a date on which the new smart ID card would come into use. After this date, a damaged or lost card would be replaced by the new generation of smart ID card.

45. Mr YIU Si-wing asked whether a cardholder whose existing ID card was lost or damaged would be required to pay the replacement fee, if his card replacement application was submitted when his age group was called up for smart ID card replacement. US for S responded that a cardholder would be required to pay the card replacement fee unless the card damage was due to natural wear and tear.

46. The Deputy Chairman said that a number of Hong Kong permanent residents had emigrated and resided in other countries. Some of these persons were too old for travelling to Hong Kong for smart ID card replacement. He considered that such persons should be allowed to replace their smart ID cards at the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices located at major cities of overseas countries. US for S responded that according to the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap. 177), cardholders who were absent from Hong Kong, such as those residing in the Mainland or overseas, at the time when the respective age group was called up for smart ID card replacement could apply for an ID card within 30 days of their return to Hong Kong, without being regarded as contravening the requirements for persons of the respective age group to replace their ID cards in SIDCCs.

47. Noting that the number of smart ID cards to be replaced in the upcoming smart ID card replacement exercise was around 8.8 million while the number of smart ID cards replaced in the last ID card replacement exercise was around 6.8 million, Dr KWOK Ka-ki asked whether the difference in number was mainly due to Mainland residents coming to settle in Hong Kong under the One-way Permit ("OWP") Scheme. AD of Imm (IC) responded that the number of smart ID cards to be replaced included cards held by Hong Kong residents and permanent residents, including those residing in other places. ImmD did not maintain statistics on the number of smart ID cards issued to Mainland residents coming to settle in Hong Kong with OWPs. Dr KWOK requested the Administration to provide a breakdown by type of cardholders of the 8.8 million smart ID cards to be replaced in the upcoming smart ID card replacement exercise.

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Non-immigration applications of the new smart identity card

48. Mr CHAN Chi-chuen expressed concern that the e-Cert stored in the chip of existing smart ID cards had barely been used. He said that the incorporation of applications which would be of little use to cardholders in new smart ID cards should be avoided in future. Assistant Government Chief Information Officer (Industry Development), Innovation and Technology Bureau ("AGCIO(ID)") responded that access to the e-Cert stored in the chip of a smart ID card, which required the use of personal computer and card reader, did not tie in with the technological advancement as well as changing user preference towards mobile phones and devices. Thus, the Office of the Government Chief Information Officer ("OGCIO") would not provide for the choice for a cardholder to store an e-Cert in the next generation smart ID card. On the other hand, OGCIO would implement the electronic identity initiative, the application of which did not involve smart ID card, to facilitate smart city development.

49. Referring to paragraph 10 of the background brief prepared by the LegCo Secretariat, Mr CHAN Chun-ying sought information on the results of the technical study conducted by OGCIO to review other possible uses of smart ID cards. AGCIO(ID) responded that following a technical study to review other possible uses of smart ID cards, OGCIO had, in response to proposals from the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau and the Food and Health Bureau, proposed to include digital photograph and sex in the card face data compartment in the chip of a new smart ID card.

50. Regarding the non-immigration applications of the new smart ID card, Mr YIU Si-wing asked whether consideration would be given to incorporating various cards and monthly tickets issued by different government departments into the new smart ID card. AGCIO(ID) responded that OGCIO maintained regular contact with other government departments to understand their needs. US for S stressed that before introducing any new non-immigration applications for the new smart ID card, the Administration would consult the relevant Panels and consider the need for introduction of relevant legislative amendments.

51. Referring to paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Administration's paper, Dr KWOK Ka-ki expressed concern about the security of non-immigration applications of a new smart ID card, such as storage of information relating to the cardholder's bank accounts or health records in

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the chip of a smart ID card. AGCIO(ID) responded that information stored in the chip of a smart ID card was encrypted and access to such information required authorization under relevant legislation. He said that only card face data would be stored in the card face data compartment in the chip of a smart ID card, other non-card face information such as those relating to the cardholder's bank accounts or health records, were not stored in the chip of a smart ID card. The relevant non-immigration applications only provided the key for access, which required the consent of the cardholder, to such information.

Other issues

52. Dr Elizabeth QUAT asked whether the holder of a smart ID card would be required to register his new smart ID card for the use of e-Channels. US for S responded that registration for the use of e-Channels was not required for the current and next generation of smart ID cards. AD of Imm(IC) added that registration was currently required only for the use of express e-Channels, but not e-Channels, at boundary control points.

53. Mr CHAN Chi-chuen asked whether different types of e-Channels would be needed for automated immigration clearance with different generations of smart ID cards. US for S responded that existing e-Channels would be suitable for use by both the current and new generations of smart ID cards.

54. Mr SHIU Ka-chun asked whether there would be any change to the replacement fee for damaged or lost ID cards after the new smart ID card was introduced. US for S responded that there was currently no plan to revise the replacement fee for a damaged or lost ID card.

VI. Proposal to turn a supernumerary post of Administrative Officer Staff Grade C in the Narcotics Division into a permanent post

(LC Paper Nos. CB(2)424/17-18(07) and (08))

55. The Chairman drew Members' attention to Rule 83A of the Rules of Procedure concerning the requirement of disclosing personal pecuniary interest.

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56. Commissioner for Narcotics ("C for N") briefed Members on the Administration's proposal to turn a supernumerary post of Administrative Officer Staff Grade C ("AOSGC") in the Narcotics Division into a permanent post.

57. Members noted a background brief entitled "Proposal to turn a supernumerary post of Administrative Officer Staff Grade C in the Narcotics Division into a permanent post" prepared by the LegCo Secretariat.

Hidden drug abuse

58. Dr KWOK Ka-ki expressed concern that the problem of hidden drug abuse had worsened in recent years. He said that the Administration's existing measures to address the problem, help drug treatment and rehabilitation centres ("DTRCs") to obtain licenses, and support persons with drug problems were ineffective.

59. C for N responded that the number of reported drug abusers had decreased in the first half of 2017 by 23% to about 3 900 persons, as compared with the same period in 2016. The Administration was very concerned about the problem of hidden drug abuse. Under the Anti-drug Community Awareness Building Programme ("ACABP") funded by the Beat Drugs Fund ("BDF"), District Fight Crime Committees ("DFCCs") as supported by District Offices in the 18 districts of Hong Kong had been actively promoting awareness of the drug problem, early identification of hidden drug abusers, and early intervention and assistance to people with drug problems among members of the community at the district level. Suitable training was also provided to teachers and school management personnel to facilitate their identification of students who might have drug problems. Various unconventional outreach services were launched by NGOs for identifying hidden drug abusers. In addition, the Drug InfoCentre had organized parental talks from time to time to equip parents with knowledge of drug harms and skills in identifying family members who might have drug problems.

60. Mr SHIU Ka-chun said that the Administration's zero-tolerance approach towards drug abuse had resulted in more hidden drug abuse. Consideration should be given to adopting a harm-reduction approach in addressing the hidden drug abuse problem. C for N responded that the Administration adopted a multi-modality approach in facilitating the

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provision of drug treatment and rehabilitation ("T&R") services to drug abusers with individual needs. NGOs had indeed applied various new T&R measures in helping drug abusers quit drugs, including sports therapy, art therapy, family support and occupational therapy. As regards harm reduction, the existing outpatient methadone treatment programme had been administered by the Department of Health to help heroin abusers in a harm-reduction approach. The Administration would keep in view the development of harm-reduction measures in other places as well as their adaptability and acceptability in Hong Kong.

61. Dr Elizabeth QUAT expressed support for the Administration's proposal. She expressed concern about the trend of increasing hidden drug abuse and said that the conventional channels of disseminating anti-drug information might not be adequate in addressing the problem. She said that many anti-drug projects launched by NGOs had been effective but discontinued due to lack of resources. She considered that more resources and support should be provided to NGOs for launching such projects on an ongoing basis.

62. C for N responded that the Administration was addressing the problem of hidden drug abuse through strengthening publicity and education, including utilizing popular social media platforms and other online forums in addition to the conventional channels. NGOs had attempted many innovative means such as online outreaching and making use of mobile apps. As support from family members was important to enabling early help-seeking, NGOs had also conducted home visits to families concerned to offer assistance. The Administration also encouraged cross-sector collaboration, especially between social services and medical services, to facilitate early intervention and provision of T&R services to drug abusers. BDF had been providing funding support to worthwhile projects.

Drug abuse by pregnant women

63. Mr SHIU Ka-chun said that he was formerly a DFCC member and noted that many of the anti-drug activities organized by DFCCs were carnival events and singing contests. He added that more should be done by the Administration to address the problem of drug abuse by pregnant women.

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64. C for N responded that activities under ACABP were tailored to needs at the district level. Not confined to carnival events, such activities covered diverse categories and natures with different target audience including anti-drug seminars, exhibitions and workshops. Besides, NGOs had made substantial efforts to draw up various T&R programmes. In the 2015 and 2016 Regular Funding Schemes ("RFS") of BDF, funding support had been provided for more than 60 T&R programmes proposed by NGOs. For drug-abusing pregnant women, she said that T&R services were provided by existing DTRCs and community-based counselling centres. In the 2017 RFS of BDF, many NGOs had made funding applications for anti-drug projects with drug-abusing pregnant women/mothers as the target service recipients. The Administration supported these applications.

Healthy School Programme with a Drug Testing Component

65. Mr SHIU Ka-chun queried the effectiveness of the Healthy School Programme with a Drug Testing Component ("HSP(DT)").

66. C for N responded that an independent evaluation research conducted on HSP(DT) in the 2015/16 school year had affirmed its effectiveness as an anti-drug preventive education initiative. With the implementation of HSP(DT), the number of reported drug abusers aged below 21 had indicated a decreased trend. The Administration would continue to explore other initiatives to broaden the dissemination of anti-drug messages to secondary schools.

Drug treatment and rehabilitation centres operating on certificates of exemption

67. Referring to paragraph 12 of the Administration's paper, Mr Holden CHOW expressed concern that 12 out of 38 DTRCs had yet to be licensed under the Drug Dependent Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Centres (Licensing) Ordinance (Cap. 566) and were operating on certificates of exemption. He asked whether the Administration had any plan to address the problem.

68. C for N responded that funding support for DTRCs to carry out upgrading or reprovisioning projects was provided through the BDF Special Funding Scheme ("SFS"). Following a review of SFS in 2016, the maximum funding for each project had been increased from \$50 million to \$67 million to respond to practical needs. In fact, the

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12 DTRCs concerned were at various stages of taking forward their projects. The Administration was confident that with the support of SFS and other assistance provided by the proposed AOSGC post, the 12 DTRCs would gradually be able to obtain licenses.

69. The Chairman concluded that members had no objection in principle to the Administration's submission of its proposal to the Establishment Subcommittee.

70. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 4:55 pm.

Council Business Division 2
Legislative Council Secretariat
9 January 2018