

**For Discussion
On 7 July 2025**

Legislative Council Panel on Security

Proposed Amendments to the Prison Rules (Cap. 234A)

PURPOSE

This paper briefs Members on the proposed amendments to the Prison Rules (“PR”) (Cap. 234A).

BACKGROUND

2. According to the Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security and The law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”) has the responsibility to continue to improve the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security steadily so as to continue to prevent, suppress and punish acts and activities endangering national security effectively. Section 25(1) of the Prisons Ordinance (Cap. 234) empowers the Chief Executive in Council to make rules providing for matters including the regulation and government of prisons and hostels. The PR has been in operation for many years. We need to review whether the PR can meet the needs of safeguarding national security and modern correctional institution management.

3. Having reviewed the relevant law enforcement experience in in the past respect of custody of convicted persons in custody (“PICs”) and prisoners awaiting trial (“PATs”), potential national security risks and security threats that may be faced by correctional institutions in the future, and relevant law and practices in other jurisdictions, we propose to improve the extant PR, so as to ensure that we can effectively prevent, suppress and punish acts and activities endangering national security; continue to strengthen the legal basis for correctional officers in discharging their duties; maintain the security, good order and discipline of prisons; and facilitate the rehabilitation of PICs and protect their lawful rights and interests. We also put forward other amendments to strengthen the

enforcement effectiveness of the Correctional Services Department (“CSD”). At the same time, we have reviewed and amended other provisions with a view to making the PR more up-to-date and meeting the needs for the management of correctional institutions.

PROPOSAL

4. In order to achieve the above-mentioned policy intent, we propose to expressly empower CSD to impose restrictions, conditions or prohibitions on relevant arrangements under the respective provisions of the PR having regard to specific purposes and different circumstances, with a view to preventing any person from endangering national security, or posing threat to the security, good order and discipline of the prison, or impeding the rehabilitation of PICs by abusing the PR regime. These specific purposes (“key purposes”) include –

- (i) safeguarding national security;
- (ii) preventing any crime;
- (iii) rehabilitating any PIC;
- (iv) safeguarding any individual’s personal safety; or
- (v) maintaining the security, good order and discipline of the prison.

5. When putting forward the proposals, we have fully taken into account the Basic Law, including its provisions relating to human rights. Article 6(3) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance provides that “the penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.” Persons serving sentences in prisons or other correctional institutions upon conviction of offences should face the consequence of committing crimes, and undergo rehabilitation under CSD’s control. As for PATs, while their treatment in prison must be commensurate with their presumed innocence, they are remanded pending trial in accordance with lawful order and for legitimate reasons (e.g. the risk of jumping bail and absconding, committing a criminal offence, or perverting the course of justice).

6. Based on the above, the rights and freedoms enjoyed by PICs and PATs shall be subject to necessary restrictions in the prison. Needless to say, PICs do not lose all the rights and freedoms protected under the Basic Law due to imprisonment or remand in custody, but the rights and freedoms they enjoy are not the same as those enjoyed by non-PICs. While they enjoy rights and freedoms, they must be subject to restrictions

necessary for the legitimate purposes of safeguarding national security, and maintaining the security, discipline and good order of the prison, etc. Our proposal is based on the above-mentioned basic principles, which are reasonable, necessary and proportionate. We have also formulated appropriate safeguards accordingly to strike a reasonable balance between safeguarding national security, protecting public safety and public order, and protecting individuals' rights and freedoms. The legislative amendment proposal cover the following major areas.

(1) Visiting system for PICs

7. Any imprisonment or custody necessarily imposes restrictions and regulation on communication between PICs and the outside world, including restrictions on visits by certain categories of persons, the number of visitors, the frequency of visits, and the monitoring of visits. In different major jurisdictions, due to security considerations and the need for maintaining the discipline and good order of the prison, communication between PICs and the outside world (including correspondence and visits) generally require the approval of the correctional authority and can only be conducted under specific conditions and circumstances. The existing PR stipulate some basic conditions¹ on the manner of certain visits, but do not expressly provide the statutory purpose of the visiting mechanism. The authority of CSD to approve and refuse visits is also not clear enough.

8. There were cases in the past where the visiting mechanism was abused by some people using “humanitarian relief” as a pretext to visit for influencing PICs with soft tactics, in an attempt to incite their resistance against CSD’s supervision, arouse their hatred of the Central and the HKSAR Governments, or even turn them into potential risks against national security and public safety when they return to society, which are difficult to guard against. The Court of Final Appeal case has pointed out that visits to PICs must be consistent with the statutory purpose of visiting such PICs, be conducted with legitimate reasons and in good faith, and

¹ Under Rule 48 of the PR (general provisions as to visits), CSD shall allow relatives and friends of convicted PICs to visit them in prison in the manner prescribed by that rule. The relevant prescribed manner includes a prisoner shall be visited in the presence of an officer of CSD; a prisoner shall be allowed to be visited twice a month and no more than three persons shall be allowed at one time, etc. In addition, under Rule 203 of the PR (rule as to visitors), every PATs shall, subject to the order of CSD, be permitted to be visited by one visitor, or if circumstances permit, by two at the same time, for a quarter of an hour on any week day, during such hour as may from time to time be appointed; CSD may, in special cases, permit the visit to be prolonged, and allow more than two visitors to visit such PAT at one time.

must not have improper motives².

9. We note that other jurisdictions (e.g. the United Kingdom (“UK”), the United States (“US”), Canada, Australia and New Zealand) have put in place statutory provisions empowering the authorities to prohibit a person from visiting PICs having regard to factors such as national security and prison security, or to impose necessary restrictions and conditions. In addition, while the relevant legislation of some jurisdictions (e.g. New Zealand, New South Wales and Western Australia of Australia) allows religious personnel to conduct visits or activities in prisons, there are also provisions empowering the correctional authorities to impose restrictions and conditions on such visits or activities in order to maintain the security, good order and discipline of the prison.

10. To enhance prison security and management and to effectively guard against national security risks, we propose to amend and rationalise the general provisions on visits in the PR (including Rules 48 and 203) to clearly reflect the legislative intent that no PIC shall receive visits from persons not authorised by the Commissioner of Correctional Services (“the Commissioner”), except as otherwise provided in the PR³; and to clearly stipulate that the statutory purposes of visits are to facilitate the rehabilitation⁴ of PICs or to prepare them for reintegration into society, enabling PICs to maintain connections with his or her family or with society, or providing mental or material support to the PICs. CSD has the power to refuse any visits not in compliance with the statutory purposes. At the same time, we propose that CSD may, for “key purposes”, impose restrictions or conditions on a particular visit or to prohibit such a visit, so as to ensure that the visiting system is effectively regulated.

11. Likewise, to enhance prison security and management, and to effectively prevent national security risks, supplementary provisions to the PR are proposed with regard to the visits by chaplains, to expressly empower CSD to consider under particular circumstances whether there is a need to, for “key purposes”, impose restrictions or conditions on access to PICs by a particular chaplain or on the religious activities conducted by that chaplain, or a prohibition on the access or activities conducted by that chaplain. It is noteworthy that this proposal does not aim to hinder PICs in exercising their religious freedom or attending religious services, and

² *HKSAR v Wan Thomas* [2018] HKCFA 15.

³ Examples include visits by police officers (Rule 49), visits by officers of the Court (Rule 50), visits by legal adviser (Rule 52), etc.

⁴ This item does not apply to PATs who have not been convicted.

will definitely not affect PICs to be visited by, or to receive religious counselling or attend religious services conducted by other chaplains or religious organisations allowed to enter the correctional institution. Therefore, under the arrangements of the proposed amendments, PICs' religious freedom will continue to be fully protected.

(2) Applications may be made to the Court for restricting (i) a PIC's connection with a particular legal representative; and (ii) visits to a PAT/appellant by a particular registered medical practitioner for the purposes of defence/appeal having regard to specific circumstances endangering national security

12. Rule 52 of the PR stipulates that reasonable facility shall be allowed for the legal adviser of a PIC who is a party to legal proceedings, civil or criminal, to interview the PIC with reference to those proceedings in the sight but not in the hearing of an officer of CSD. The legal adviser may be accompanied by his clerk or interpreter, or if authorised by the legal adviser, the clerk or interpreter may interview the PIC alone. A past incident in which a PIC handed over unauthorised articles to his legal adviser to take away from the prison during a legal visit has aroused public concern about the risk of abuse of the legal visit system under the PR.

13. We do believe that the vast majority of legal practitioners uphold professionalism, and that they would not assist their clients in abusing the legal visit system. Nonetheless, if a particular PIC abuses the system to exchange information with external sources and other members of his/her syndicate related to his/her case through this channel, with a view to attempting to pervert the course of justice, commit acts threatening personal safety and even engage in other acts endangering national security, it might lead to irreversible consequences. Therefore, under the premise that PICs are entitled to the rights to confidential legal advice and choice of lawyers as fully protected by the Basic Law, it is necessary to empower CSD to adopt additional measures to effectively prevent any risks arising from the abuse of the legal visit system.

14. With reference to the relevant measures⁵ in the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, we propose to amend the PR to empower a

⁵ Section 79 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance provides that a police officer may make an ex parte application to a magistrate to restrict an arrested person from consulting a particular legal representative or representatives while in police detention, in view of circumstances endangering national security.

magistrate to issue a warrant under specific circumstances, on the application by a CSD officer, authorising CSD to impose restrictions on the PIC (including PAT), to the effect that during the period specified in the warrant, no form of connection (including interviews and letters) between the PIC and a particular specified legal representative (including solicitors, barristers or persons assisting solicitors or barristers) or any other legal representatives of the relevant law firm is allowed. However, the PIC may consult any other legal representatives of his/her choice. A magistrate may issue a warrant only if the magistrate has reasonable grounds to believe that the following specific circumstances exist –

- (a) the PIC's connection with the relevant legal representative will endanger national security or cause bodily harm to any person;
- (b) the PIC has benefited from the relevant offence, and his or her connection with the relevant legal representative will hinder the recovery of the benefit unless a warrant is issued by a magistrate; or
- (c) the PIC's connection with the relevant legal representative will pervert or obstruct the course of justice unless a warrant is issued by the said magistrate.

15. Procedural safeguards will be established under the proposed mechanism to give due regard to PICs' right to confidential legal advice and choice of lawyers in accordance with the law, including the stipulation that after the issue of a warrant, if a CSD officer no longer has the reasonable grounds to believe that the relevant specified circumstances continue to exist, CSD shall immediately cease to impose the above restrictions on the PIC concerned. Besides, the PIC concerned may make an application to a magistrate for revoking or varying the issued warrant.

16. The above proposed mechanism empowers CSD to restrict a PIC's connection with a particular legal representative in accordance with the warrant issued by a magistrate in view of specified circumstances endangering national security, etc., thereby better safeguarding national security and interests of justice. Since the proposed mechanism allows PICs to consult another legal representative of their choice, they are still entitled to the right to confidential legal advice and choice of lawyers, and the courts will ensure the legal proceedings be conducted for a fair trial for PICs. There are stringent procedures for the exercise of such restriction measures, which require the authorisation of a magistrate. In contrast, the

legislation of some jurisdictions (e.g. the US, New Zealand and New South Wales of Australia) allows correctional authorities to restrict PICs' access to individual legal representatives on security grounds without the need for judicial authorisation.

17. On the other hand, all correctional institutions have on-premises hospitals, which are staffed by qualified medical staff. In collaboration with Medical Officers ("MOs") seconded from the Department of Health ("DH"), 24-hour basic medical services are provided. If PICs require further examination and treatment, they will be referred to visiting medical specialists or to public hospitals for continued follow-up. Therefore, MOs seconded from DH will not refer PICs to receive private medical services.

18. Rules 204 and 213 of the PR respectively stipulate that every PAT or every appellant may, for the purposes of his defence or appeal, receive a visit from a registered medical practitioner selected by him or by his friends or legal adviser. The legislative intent of these rules is not to enable PATs/appellants to receive treatment from private medical practitioners, but to facilitate PATs/appellants to see private medical practitioners if there is a need to adduce medical evidence in their course of defence or appeal (common examples include obtaining expert opinions from private medical practitioners on the mental state of the PAT/appellant at the time of the offence). Therefore, the conditions on such visits are the same as those for legal visits (i.e. the visit shall be conducted in the sight but not in the hearing of an officer of CSD). Same as the legal visit mechanism, there is a need to further enhance the relevant system to effectively guard against the risks arising from abuse of the relevant system.

19. With reference to the above-mentioned mechanism under which applications can be made to the magistrate for the imposition of appropriate restrictions on PIC's connection with his particular legal representatives in view of specific circumstances of endangering national security, etc., it is proposed that the PR be amended to the effect that visits to PATs/appellants by a registered medical practitioner for the purposes of defence/appeal will be subject to a similar mechanism, under which applications can be made by the CSD to the magistrate for a warrant for the imposition of appropriate restrictions on such visits in view of specific circumstances of endangering national security, etc., and similar procedural safeguards would also be incorporated into the mechanism. Similarly, the PAT/appellant is allowed to consult other registered medical practitioners for the purposes of defence/appeal.

(3) The regime respect of provision of clothing for PICs, and the regime in allowing PATs to procure food and wear private clothes

20. It is CSD's established policy to provide standardised clothing to PICs. In the case of PATs, the style of the clothing provided to them differs from that of convicted PICs as they are awaiting trial and have not been convicted. One of the important purposes of providing standardised clothing to PICs is to maintain the security, good order and discipline of correctional institutions. In formulating its policies on clothing to be worn by PICs, CSD will consider factors such as types of correctional facilities, PICs' practical needs arising from different daily routine activities and their health needs, etc.

21. The existing Rule 26 of the PR stipulates that every PIC shall be provided by CSD with a complete outfit of clothing adequate for warmth and health in accordance with a scale approved by the Commissioner and shall wear such clothing and no other. Exemptions are only allowed in special circumstances. In order to enhance the clarity of the considerations in setting the criteria for PIC's clothing, we propose that amendments be made to the PR to make clear the purposes of CSD's system of supplying uniform to PICs, i.e. ensuring the safety, comfort, health and hygiene of PICs; protecting the privacy of PICs; ensuring PICs are properly dressed; ensuring PICs are appropriately dressed during the course of work or other activities in which they may likely be engaged; and maintaining the security, good order and discipline of the prison.

22. As for PATs, although Rule 196 of the PR allows them to wear private clothes, this may give rise to security risks of bringing unauthorised articles into prisons, and may also lead to the use of specific styles of private clothes by PATs to show off, or take a political stance, or establish influence, thus posing a threat to the discipline and order of correctional institutions. We note that the legislation in Singapore does not allow PATs to wear private clothes, whereas the legislation in Australia (New South Wales) requires PATs to wear clothing provided by the correctional institutions, unless with the approval of the correctional authorities. With the changes of time and society, and taking into account the fact that the CSD has all along been providing PATs with adequate and suitable clothing of a different style from that of convicted PICs, allowing PATs to wear private clothes no longer meets the needs of managing correctional institutions nowadays. In order to effectively maintain the security, good order and discipline of correctional institutions, we propose to repeal the relevant provisions of the PR which allow PATs to wear private clothes.

23. As for diet, under Section 24A of the Prisons Ordinance, the Chief Executive may determine the dietary scales for providing plain and wholesome food to PICs. According to Rule 31 of the PR, no PIC shall receive or have in his possession any food otherwise than in accordance with the scales (except in special circumstances with the permission of the Commissioner or on the recommendation of the MO on medical grounds). On the other hand, according to Rules 192 to 195 of the PR, every PAT may procure for himself, or receive food and alcoholic beverages (hereinafter referred to as “private diet”). However, private diet can easily become a tool for PATs to engage in secret dealings and has become one of the main causes of disputes and fights among PATs. From 2018 to 2024, there were over 300 cases of disciplinary offence caused by private diet. Some of these cases involved collective disciplinary offence by PATs and some PATs made use of private diet to build up influence in prisons to challenge the governance of CSD and undermine the security, good order and discipline of prisons. Moreover, allowing private diet increases the security risk of bringing unauthorised articles into prisons.

24. The provisions allowing PATs to have private diet in the extant PR originate from the related legislation of the UK. Over the time, dietary arrangements of correctional institutions have become rather comprehensive and the UK abolished the requirements related to private diet as early as in 1988. As for jurisdictions including Singapore, Macao, Malaysia, Western Australia and Korea, no such private diet system is available to PATs. It is proposed to repeal the provisions allowing PATs to procure for themselves private diet in the PR, so as to ensure the effective maintenance of the security, good order and discipline of correctional institutions.

(4) Other proposed amendments for further enhancing the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security

25. CSD, as the last element in the criminal justice system, has been committed to ensuring the dual emphasis on safe custody and rehabilitation, as well as maintaining the penal stability and safeguarding national security. Apart from the above-mentioned proposed amendments, we also propose to amend other relevant provisions to clearly stipulate the factors taken into consideration by correctional officers in exercising their powers in relation to penal management, including “key purposes”, such as safeguarding national security, maintaining the security, good order and discipline of the prison, etc. The relevant provisions

include those relating to the matters listed below: regulations for PICs to send or receive letters (Rule 47); screening of PICs' outgoing and incoming letters (Rule 47A); handling publications from outside prison (Rule 56); the removal of PICs from association (Rule 68B); and the arrangements for means of occupation supplied to PATs (Rule 202).

(5) Proposed amendments for enhancing the enforcement effectiveness of CSD

26. Unlike many existing ordinances, particularly those relating to law enforcement agencies⁶, which provide for the offence of resisting or obstructing the relevant officer in the performance of his functions and the power of arrest, there are no similar provisions in the PR. With a view to ensuring that CSD officers can effectively perform their duties of ensuring the safe custody of PICs and maintaining security and operation of prisons, and effectively cope with all kinds of extreme situations endangering national security that may arise in the future, with reference to other legislations, it is proposed to stipulate an offence in the PR to prohibit any person from resisting or obstructing CSD officers in the performance of their functions. It is proposed that offenders shall be liable on conviction to a fine at level 1 (\$2,000) and imprisonment for six months. In alignment with the relevant mechanism, it is proposed that the PR empowers CSD officers to arrest any person whose acts pose a serious threat to prison security or personal safety such as obstructing a CSD officer in the performance of his functions, escaping or assisting a PIC to escape, engaging in riotous conduct, etc., and allow them to use reasonably necessary force and detain the arrested person until he can be handed over to the custody of a police officer.

27. In addition, under Rule 238 of the extant PR, when necessary, CSD officers may use arms against PICs under specified circumstances which pose a serious threat to prison security or personal safety (including escape, engaging in riotous conduct or combined outbreak, or in an attempt to force or break open the outside door or gate or enclosure wall of a prison, or use violence to a CSD officer or other person that grievous hurt is likely to be caused to him). We note that legislations in some jurisdictions (e.g. Western Australia and Queensland of Australia) expressly empower the

⁶ Examples include Sections 50(1) and 63 of the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232), Sections 12(2) and 19 of the Immigration Service Ordinance (Cap. 331), Sections 17A (1) and 17F of the Customs and Excise Service Ordinance (Cap. 342), etc. Although Section 23 of the Summary Offences Ordinance (Cap. 228), "resisting or obstructing a public officer or other person lawfully engaged in a public duty", applies to all persons engaged in a public duty (including CSD officers), CSD officers are not empowered to make arrests for suspected acts in violation to the said ordinance.

authority to use arms (against, including, non-PICs) where necessary to prevent escape, attempt to escape of PICs or an attack likely to cause seriously bodily harm or death.

28. It is proposed to improve and rationalise the relevant provisions with a clear stipulation that CSD officers, under the above-mentioned specific circumstances in which any person has committed or assisted a person to commit an act posing a serious threat to prison security and personal safety, may use arms in reasonably necessary situations to stop the person from committing the concerned acts. Examples of these specific circumstances include a PIC escaping or attempting to escape, or any person assisting a PIC to escape; any person engaging in collective disturbance by PICs; any person attempting to force or break open the outside door or gate or enclosure wall of a prison; a PIC or any person together with PICs using violence to another person and any person using violence to CSD officers in the performance of their functions or PICs (when CSD officers have reasonable grounds to believe that grievous harm is likely to be caused to the person), etc.

29. The law empowers CSD officers to use arms in necessary situations for the purposes of ensuring a safe and secure custodial environment and protecting personal safety. In any event, CSD officers using force or arms shall strictly comply with the relevant requirements in the PR. As with any law enforcement officers who may be required to use force or arms, CSD has formulated clear internal guidelines and principles for the use of force continuum, coupled with sufficient training to ensure that correctional officers shall use force to stop illicit acts and make arrests in accordance with the law only within the reasonably necessary scope.

30. Besides, according to the extant provisions of Rule 67(1)(b) of the PR, handcuffs are the only mechanical restraint that can be used by CSD officers to remove PICs or hold them in legal custody outside the prison, which may cause controversy. There were cases in the past where PICs struggled free of their handcuffs for an escape during detention in an open ward of hospitals. We note that other jurisdictions have put in place statutory provisions empowering the authorities to use handcuffs and mechanical restraints other than handcuffs for factors such as ensuring the safe custody of PICs during removal or while outside any prison and in legal custody (e.g. New Zealand and Singapore). For avoidance of doubt, we consider it necessary to amend the relevant provisions to clarify that CSD officers may use any mechanical restraints as approved by the Chief Executive, e.g. handcuffs, ankle cuffs, etc., in order to ensure the safe

custody of PICs during removal or while outside any prison and in legal custody, with a view to coping with any risks and unexpected situations effectively.

(6) Proposed amendments for making the PR more up-to-date

31. In addition to the above, having reviewed other provisions in the PR, we propose the following amendments to make the PR more up-to-date:

(i) Revising the scope of “specified persons”

32. CSD handles PICs’ letters⁷ in accordance with the PR. Under Rule 47C of the PR, except in specified circumstances, CSD officers shall not open or search or, in any case, read the contents of PICs’ letters to or from a “specified person” (i.e. the Chief Executive, a member of the Executive Council, a member of the Legislative Council (“LegCo”), a member of a District Council (“DC”), a visiting justice, The Ombudsman appointed under The Ombudsman Ordinance, or the Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption). The aim is to ensure the confidentiality of the contents of the letters for PICs to say whatever they want to the “specified persons”, so as to facilitate “specified persons” to handle complaints lodged by PICs against CSD or its officers. With the amended District Councils Ordinance (Cap. 547) coming into effect, the reformed DCs have their positioning reverted to being district advisory and service bodies which are not organs of political power under the Basic Law⁸. As the functions of the reformed DCs have no direct relationship with the handling of complaints lodged by PICs against the CSD or its officers, we propose to remove “DC members” from the definition of “specified persons” in the PR, so that persons fall within the scope of “specified persons” would include those whose duties necessitate the handling of PICs’ complaints. Subject to the passage of the proposed legislative amendment, CSD will handle letters between PICs and DC

⁷ Generally speaking, for security consideration, CSD officers may, in accordance with Rule 47A of the PR, open and search all letters to or from any PIC for the existence of any article which may pose a threat to any individual’s personal safety or to the security, good order and discipline of the prison. Under specific circumstances, CSD officers may read letters to or from PICs.

⁸ According to Article 97 of the Basic Law, “District organizations which are not organs of political power may be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to be consulted by the government of the Region on district administration and other affairs, or to be responsible for providing services in such fields as culture, recreation and environmental sanitation.” The functions of District Councils set out in Section 4A of the District Councils Ordinance (Cap. 547) are related to district affairs.

members in accordance with the general provisions related to letters in the PR⁹. This will not prevent PICs from giving views to DC members on matters relating to their districts of origin.

(ii) Repealing obsolete provisions

33. As stipulated in Rules 144(j) and (k) of the PR, the MO shall attend on every occasion when corporal punishment is inflicted in the prisons, or attend every execution. There is neither corporal punishment nor execution nowadays. The above provisions have become obsolete and we propose to repeal them in this legislative amendment exercise.

WAY FORWARD

34. As mentioned above, it is the duty of the HKSAR to continue to improve the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security steadily. Amid the present complicated geopolitical situation, national security risks still exist. It is necessary to amend the PR as soon as possible to prevent and resolve relevant risks in a timely manner, the earlier the better, for safeguarding national security effectively. We are pressing ahead with the legislative amendment exercise, and after hearing the views of the Members, we will strive to finalise the amendments to the PR the soonest for tabling to the LegCo for scrutiny under the negative vetting procedures. Considering that the proposed amendments to the PR are necessary for safeguarding national security effectively, continuously strengthening the legal basis for CSD officers in discharging their duties and for enhancing enforcement effectiveness, the proposed legislative amendments will take effect immediately on the date of gazettal.

35. Members are invited to give views on the above legislative amendment proposal on the PR.

Security Bureau
Correctional Services Department
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⁹ Rules 47 and 47A of the PR.