

立法會

調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日開始 運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜 專責委員會

第13次公開研訊的逐字紀錄本

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出席委員

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機場管理總監香港機場管理局
韓義德先生

陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士

機場運作規劃經理香港機場管理局
唐禮俊先生

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜
專責委員會
Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

主席：

多謝各位出席今天舉行的專責委員會第13次研訊。

在未正式開始研訊前，我想提醒各位委員，整個研訊過程必須有足夠的法定人數，即連主席在內共5名委員。

我想藉此機會再次提醒公眾人士及傳媒，若在研訊進程序以外披露研訊上提供的證據，將不受《立法局(權力及特權)條例》所保障。因此傳媒應就他們的法律責任，徵詢法律意見。

在未傳召證人香港機場管理局機場管理總監韓義德先生之前，我想徵詢委員的意見，韓義德先生要求帶同以下人士出席研訊：他是香港機場管理局機場運作規劃經理唐禮俊先生。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許唐禮俊先生在研訊進行期間陪同韓義德先生，但他不可以在席上發言。

如委員對研訊程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊開始，並傳召證人香港機場管理局機場管理總監韓義德先生。

(韓義德先生進入會議廳，
並由唐禮俊先生陪同)

Mr HEED, thank you for attending today's hearing. You are summonsed before the Select Committee today to give evidence and to produce papers, books, records and documents related to the Select Committee's scope of enquiry. First of all, the Committee has decided that all witness must give evidence on oath. As Chairman of the Select Committee I will administer the oath.

You may either take the oath with your hand on the Bible or take an affirmation. Please follow the terms of the oath or affirmation put in front of you.

Mr Chern HEED, Airport Management Director of Airport Authority Hong Kong (Airport Management Director, AA):

I, Chern HEED, solemnly, sincerely, and truly declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Chairman:

Thank you. Mr HEED, Members have agreed that you can be accompanied by Mr Nigel Richard THOMAS. However, he must not address the hearing or prompt you in any way in your replies to Members.

Airport Management Director, AA:

But he can, if I ask him to refer something to me, he can refer something to me?

Chairman:

Documents, he can assist you with documents. The Select Committee will now deal with the papers, records and documents that the witness has been ordered to produce by the summons dated 20 October 1998.

The Select Committee notes that the witness has already provided the following document pursuant to the summons:

The witness statement of Mr Chern HEED

which you already have.

Mr HEED, are you formally producing to the Select Committee the document mentioned above as evidence pursuant to the summons?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am.

Chairman:

I now declare that the document mentioned above is admitted as evidence produced to the Select Committee.

As I have pointed out at the Eighth Public Hearing held on 15 October 1998, the documents provided by Dr Henry TOWNSEND, Chief Executive Officer of the Airport Authority (AA), and the further documents provided by Mr WONG Po-yan, Chairman of AA, excluding the witness statement of Mr WONG Po-yan, though not yet admitted as evidence produced to this Select Committee, may be referred to at the hearings of the Select Committee. AA has confirmed that it has no objection to this arrangement.

Similarly the further documents provided by Mr Billy LAM, Deputy Chief Executive Officer of AA, and Mr Douglas OAKERVEE, Project Director of AA, after they appeared before the Select Committee on 23 October and 16 October 1998 respectively, may be referred to at the hearings of the Select Committee before their formal production. AA has confirmed that it has no objection to this arrangement.

Mr HEED, I will now ask you the first question on behalf of the Committee. In your witness statement under Paragraph 3 - have you got it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I have.

Chairman:

You said: "My reporting relationship is to the Chief Executive Officer of the Authority, Dr Hank TOWNSEND. Since January of this year I have also been working closely with the Deputy CEO, Mr Billy LAM, on relocation, airport operational readiness and other related airport opening issues."

According to an organisation chart which has been submitted to us by Dr TOWNSEND, the chart shows - would you show the witness? - the chart shows that the Airport Management Division in fact works to the Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Mr Billy LAM. Can you please clarify your relationship vis a vis the 2 gentlemen whom I have just mentioned?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. You are absolutely right. The reporting relationship is through Mr Billy LAM, but that changed as of January this year, as I point out in my statement. And on some things I still report to Dr Henry TOWNSEND, but on most day-to-day and operational issues it is through Mr Billy LAM.

Chairman:

On what matters do you report to Dr TOWNSEND directly?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, it is mainly through the Executive Committee that he chairs. Now you asked me I can't think of anything off the top of my head, but I would agree that most of my reporting relationship is through Mr Billy LAM.

Chairman:

Mr Edward HO.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Thank you, Chairman. I would like to clarify the relationship between AMD and Project Division because we have heard different versions from different witnesses who came before this hearing. I would like to focus upon the so-called handover record, any one of those. Any one of these certificates shows ...

Chairman:

Can you give us the number of the document?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

OK, this particular one I have is Paper no. B96, which is in Volume VII.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Is it on the baggage handling system?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Yes. I am not really asking for the details of any of the systems, but I just try to clarify the relationship between Project and AMD as far as the certification of the systems or parts of the building. Because the way I understand it AMD would be responsible for managing the airport facilities after they have been completed, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Through the Chair, that is correct. AMD is in effect the owner of the

facilities, right.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

So, when different parts of the airport and the systems were handed over to AMD, the question is, did AMD have its own inspection and testing before taking over, or did they just rely upon the certification of the Project Division?

Airport Management Director, AA:

In most cases, or in all cases there is an inspection team that is formed which comprises operational staff from AMD as well as maintenance staff from AMD, and in some cases IT staff depending on if it is a system related, a computer-related system. And they do an inspection. They agree on the outstanding works, incomplete works and any defects, and the defects are itemised and they become part of the defects liability period, or the period that the contractor has to repair those defects. So, there is an inspection team and the AMD staff are involved in that process.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Madam Chairman, does that mean that the AMD is actually involved in all inspections of contractors' work before the Project Division certify acceptance? Is it a joint effort?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess maybe it is a little bit more complicated than that, Madam Chairman, through the Chair. There is a need for AMD to commence training on the systems before they are even handed over and they are still under construction. So, at that period the Project and the Contracts are in charge of the facility or the system that we'll be training on, and it is at their call that we are able to get access, or AMD is able to get access for training purposes.

When it gets to a point where we are ready to take over control of the facility and there is a need for the use of the facility for more intense training such as to get hands-on practice, etc, together with the inspection reports that I have just talked about, there is a hand-over of control of the facility, the care of the facility. At that time there are a lot of works still to be done in most cases. So, what happens is that when AMD takes control of the facility, the contractor

and Project cannot do any work or modifications to the facility. They cannot complete works without getting a work permit and permission from the AMD. Then we would call that and it would be at our call that they would do that.

So, that's that stage. Then there is a defects liability period which is administered by Project. They would ensure that all the defects and the outstanding works that have been identified would be completed. And that lasts approximately a year. At that point acceptance is finally initiated and the actual hand-over of the facility to AMD occurs. Then that is totally accepted. In that transitional period all we have is control of the facility and we call the shots on access to the facility by others other than AMD.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Yes, but Chairman my question is directed towards the time before you gain control of it. Maybe, when I asked about this and this particular certificate is on baggage handling systems, it just happened I laid my hands on it, but there are many, many different components in the airport. Some of them are building works which also will be handed over bit by bit to AMD. It so happens when we talk about systems, AMD is presumably more involved with testing, trials and training and so on. But what about building works? I mean, would AMD also have a team that goes around with the Project Division to inspect the works together before acceptance?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct. The same thing applies. We don't want the contractor coming in and playing with, for example, escalators or lifts without our knowledge, in that we could make the necessary operational changes to traffic patterns, whatever, we need to put notices up, etc, in that case that facility is out of operation. So, yes, our maintenance people would be the key people that would be taking over those facilities because from an operational context it is ...

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Mr HEED, I don't know whether you have got the right question, because according to the building contract, the Project Director or the Project Manager is responsible for the administration of the building contract and all the other contracts.

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

He is the authority as far as the contractor is concerned, and he is the one who ultimately has to certify completion of that part of the works, right? That is according to the general building contract.

Airport Management Director, AA:

He is the one who issues the Completion Certificate to the contractor. That's right.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

So, my question is, before he issues that, before he accepts anything, would there be a team from AMD to go around with him or indeed or at any other time to inspect the works which should be up to AMD's satisfaction? Or is it just the Project that would do it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, AMD would also be involved in that inspection process and listing the defects because we won't take over anything until we know what the outstanding works are, what the defects are and the timetable to rectify those works.

Chairman:

Dr Raymond HO.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Madam Chairman, I would just like to take up this point a bit further with Mr HEED. Now, when certain works are still going on and Completion Certificate has not been issued, and you said you have sent a team of yours to join in with the inspection team from the Project Division - that is a kind of joint inspection, right? - until you are satisfied that you can take over the facilities.

Now, if the list of defects has been established and the works are still going on, who will be responsible for seeing that these are completed?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It would be Project that are responsible for ensuring that those defects, uncompleted works, are completed. They are in charge of the contract. Now, we would be pushing them if there are certain functionalities that are causing us extra work because of workarounds or whatever, to ensure that that is completed as quickly as possible.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But if the contractor is not really carrying out the works to rectify those outstanding works as you all desire, who would be giving the instruction?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The only person who can do that is Project, the manager of the contract.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Right, but the works are under your care or your Division's care at that point in time. Would it be your people informing the Project Division people rather than going to the contractor directly?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct. We don't have an interface with the contractor on any contractual matters.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Contractually I am sure this is correct, but my question is that would mean a kind of working, close working relationship between AMD and the Project Division ...

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

... at all times?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

And during the last few days before AOD, the airport opening date, did you find any difficulty because the airport would be very busy, people dashing about. Did you find difficulty at all in chasing the Project Division to get certain works completed so that you would be assured of a smooth opening of the airport?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think if you know contractors it is always a problem, but we did push and we did get satisfaction on just about everything except there were some things, obviously, that didn't get completed. But we were comfortable that it was sufficiently completed that we could use the facility.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

For instance, escalators? If you found that certain escalators were not working did you find it difficult to get the Project Division to get the contractor to rectify them?

Airport Management Director, AA:

As an example, the Ground Transportation Centre, and there were escalators to the parking lots that were supposed to be in operation by AOD that weren't. That created some problems and people had to use the stairs, the internal stairs in the terminal building, to get into the terminal building. Those kinds of things did happen but there were alternatives to deal with them, not perhaps desirable in that there were a lot of people using the stairs within the terminal building that weren't designed to be used for that purpose.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Thank you.

Chairman:

I think what we will be doing is that we will be going into each individual areas that we have seen problems arising in. You remember there was this meeting on 14 July where you actually took stock of all the problems that arose on AOD, so we will be going into the various areas individually. Ms Emily LAU Wai-hing?

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to follow up on the Deputy Chairman's question about the delivery of things. If I may refer to Volume V Paper no. B77-2. That's an attachment provided to us by Mr HEED. That is an internal memo from Mr HEED to Mr OAKERVEE, and also "cc" to various people. This is dated 30 June 1998, so it is just a few days before the opening date. Have you got the memo in front of you, Mr HEED?

Chairman:

It is Attachment 2 of your statement.

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

In this memo you listed a number of things which are critical to the opening of the airport but which are still outstanding, and we are talking about 30 June. And on the airfield, and I think of particular interest to us is Item 2, the Passenger Terminal Building. In your statement, you told us you were particularly concerned about public address system, the access control system and FIDS. So, as things turned out we know there were lots of problems related to those areas.

So, can you tell us that when you sent this memo on 30 June and those items were still outstanding, I mean is it really acceptable for those things to still be outstanding just a few days before AOD? But of course just then you told us that in the end you said you were quite satisfied with the delivery of things, and also I guess you implied that the training that was required. Can you explain to us that if you have such a, what I would regard as quite a serious memo on 30 June, I mean how come you were still satisfied in the end?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Through the Chair, I guess the project test has been a matter of adapting to conditions as they came along. And in this particular case the items that you mentioned, the access control system, what we had to do there was to employ a lot of guards to guard those doors that didn't have proper access control system working. On the PA system we did get satisfaction on that. The main PA system was operational and there was a lot of local PA's, that is at the gates, that didn't operate properly and we are still having problems to this day. And in those kinds of situations we would have to use the main PA system. So, there are workarounds that we had to employ. Not an ideal situation but something that we did cope with during that time.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Well, as Madam Chairman said, we will go into all those things one by one later. But as we saw I don't think we would describe the situation as acceptable, what happened on the first few days of opening. But I think what you told us very similar to what Mr Billy LAM told us, is that you adapt to the situation. So, can you tell this Committee, is it true that originally when you people set out to prepare for the opening you had a set of standards, but then as things progress, as there were slippages and so on, you adapted those standards, you revised those standards, you lowered those standards?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Thank you for the question. When you set out on something like this you establish a framework which perhaps is the ideal world. As you know we never

or seldom get an ideal world, and that's what we encountered in this situation. And what we were required to do was to adapt to the situation, to find workarounds, to find alternatives that would be able to carry on the activity that was required or the function that was needed to be done, so that we could keep the airport going. So, yes, we did establish some. If you go back to some other correspondence that I generated in 1997 you will find that I had set some criteria that I wanted to meet. And in a lot of cases those criteria weren't met to the letter of what I expected, but we had to adapt in order to meet the opening.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Madam Chairman, I want to ask Mr HEED to refer the Committee to any document listing out those criteria which you describe as the ideal world. Can you refer us to those documents? And also can you refer us to meetings at which those criteria were down-graded and which were approved by the Airport Authority?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't think it was a matter that the Airport Authority signed off on those. As the AMD Director, it was my concern primarily on training. I was really concerned that we get the training in and asking for certain facilities and certain systems to be available at a certain time. And in a number of cases that wasn't met and we had to adapt. For example, we expected to have the FIDS training by 15 November. I think, if you look back in the correspondence that I generated, I wanted it. We didn't get that but what was provided in lieu of that was training centre, to do training within the training centre. We also had Interface House where systems were set up so we could do some training there. And then eventually we moved into the OCC so we could do training there. So, those are the kinds of things that I am talking about that we had to do in order to get people trained and be ready for airport opening.

Chairman:

I think, Mr HEED, Ms Emily LAU is asking you to point us to the documentary evidence as to how you started; as you went along, what you compromised in the process; whether you have actually lowered the standard in the interim. Where are the documentary evidence to show that you have actually compromised and maybe in your view taken a pragmatic approach as you have just described, adapting to circumstances, but really in the meantime making changes and compromising standards. We want the documentary evidence to this because you did say "in an ideal world it should have been done this way", but in fact it wasn't done "this way". So, can you point us to the documentary evidence? Maybe you can do it after today. We are perfectly happy.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think that's a difficult one because it was sort of incremental in a lot of cases, and the fact that we have had plans to implement the Interface House and put in duplicate systems so that we could do training there. There is documentation related to that but that was one issue. Then there is other things like that. What I can do is to show you what I had initially planned back in, say, July and August 1997 and try to compare to it as to how we actually dealt with that in the future.

Chairman:

Perhaps as we go along into the various areas we could start with the position that AMD started with originally and then move forward from there. Miss Margaret NG, you want to supplement on that particular point?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, Madam Chairman, I wonder if Mr HEED could be shown Paper no. A20 in Volume I, that is the 1997 September plan in which is set out the minimum critical requirements for training. A20, Paper no. A20.

Chairman:

Volume I, and to respond whether that is his idea of the so-called ideal world?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, yes, at that time. The question is does Mr HEED accept that this was what they set out as the required plan for training?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The ADSCOM Document 34/97 was not seen by me until just a few days ago. This was not a document that was produced by AA. There is another document, 33/97, which was produced by AA which went to the same ADSCOM

meeting. Now, what was called "key critical", I mean the dates that, the table, for example, in Paragraph 9 is similar, but instead of being called, what is it here, "minimum critical requirements" in the document that was submitted by AA, it was called "key milestones". So, I guess it is terminology but those are milestones that we are trying to achieve at that time.

Hon Margaret NG:

Which is this document? 37?

Airport Management Director, AA:

33/97 was the one.

Chairman:

Paper no. A19, Volume I.

Hon Margaret NG:

Thank you.

Chairman:

The two are, I think, somewhat related.

Hon Margaret NG:

Sorry, which paragraph are you referring to?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If you compare Paragraphs 4 and 9 they are somewhat similar in that they have the same table, but the wording is quite different.

Hon Margaret NG:

Key requirement?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Key milestones.

Chairman:

"Key requirements" it says here.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right, now, can you tell us then, using that as a start, what did you think was important for you to achieve and then tell us what you ended up doing, and then tell us the difference.

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I think we did submit with Billy LAM's documentation a table which compared this to the revised AOD, and what the achievement was. And I am just trying to find that. There were some errors on that table by the way. We did it quite late at night.

Hon Margaret NG:

Isn't it simply, I mean the big outline is this, as of September of 1997, I mean narrowly referring to FIDS, you wanted to have 6-week training following integration of the system. First you want to identify the day when the integrated FIDS system is ready, right? And then following that you want 6 weeks' training. As of September of 1997 you consider whether to put as minimum critical requirement or key milestone, this was what you wanted to do, right? Now, by the time you arrived at the document, I think you said you prepared with Mr Billy LAM, the system was only handed to you, to AMD, on 23 June. Is that correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

And that left you, if my calculation is right, just about 2 weeks to do your training. Is that right?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, I think ...

Hon Margaret NG:

It is just a matter of arithmetic.

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, you are absolutely right.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, on the face of it, Madam Chairman, there is a great difference, right? Now, can you tell us why that was acceptable to you? Can you describe to us what that difference really meant?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

What it meant was that we were able to get access to the system for training purposes before that. So we had a period from about May to the end of June, or to July that we were able to do some hands-on training on the system, despite the fact that it was also undergoing testing and some work done on it.

Hon Margaret NG:

Now, pausing there, Madam Chairman, can I ask Mr HEED to compare the quality of training, you know, when your original plan is "the system is ready, the system is installed, the system is integrated and then you start training", right? So, it is hands-on training, if I get my terminology right. Now, what you substituted with was in test situation in Interface House and so on. Can you compare the difference between those two kinds of training?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

When I talked about the Interface House, for example, that was earlier on. That was in a period of December, January, February. We were able to get training on the system commencing in about mid-February and therefore we had a period from February onwards. Now, it wasn't 100 percent. We couldn't have the system all the time but we were able to circulate our people that needed the training through to get hands-on experience with it. And to some extent it is even better training than if you had the full system operational in that there was a need for people to adapt to the things that didn't work properly and therefore find workarounds and actually get into the guts of the system, which wouldn't be ordinarily be there, for example, in an perfect system operating on the ideal situation.

Chairman:

Mr HEED, I think you will have to convince Members here that an imperfect system is actually better than a perfect system for training. I think as far as Members are concerned our understanding is that, although the system has been installed, it continued to be unstable all through the period after it has been installed right up to AOD. And you are telling us that during that time you are training at the same time. So, problems are cropping up in the system. You have people being trained on the spot while the problems kept cropping up. And you are telling us that that is better than the original plan of having an integrated system to work with in training! I think we would find it very, very difficult to understand that logic.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Perhaps it may sound a bit far-fetched but just visualise the situation. If you are working with it and it crashes, and you have to figure out what happened and therefore you are learning by that exercise. But if you are working with a system that is humming along like it should, then once you get into the situation where you are working with it all the time in a live airport, then it crashes, then you haven't had that experience. That's what I am trying to convey here.

Chairman:

Well, I think you have to answer just one last question on that model that you presented in Paper no. A19. You never did have a system which was fully integrated before AOD, did you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We had a system that was fully integrated as of 23 June, that's right.

Chairman:

Well, not for Stand Allocation and also even on 30 June you still have that integration with AIDB and SCC as problems listed out as AOR critical in your document to Douglas OAKERVEE, which Ms Emily LAU read out earlier.

Airport Management Director, AA:

You are right. The AIDB, which we felt was working just a few days before, did not work on airport opening day. But there were workarounds to that.

Chairman:

No, no. My question is really that in spite of the fact that everybody kept saying, "Look, by 23 June we had an integrated system", we didn't actually have a stable integrated system because even you yourself in your document dated 30 June listed under FIDS integration with AIDB and SCC. So, you must have had your doubts as to the stability of FIDS even at that point.

Airport Management Director, AA:

There is no question that I did, but just before AOD that was working. The SCC did work. The AIDB failed or had extraneous data coming through it that we had to shut it down on the 6th.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Madam Chairman, I just want to ask Mr HEED the question that was put to him but I don't think it got a satisfactory answer. It was why he felt there was no need to inform the Airport Authority and ultimately ADSCOM on the fact that he was constantly downgrading the expectations and standards and relying on

workarounds and so on?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think everyone was aware of the situation, at least within the Airport Authority.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

So, no paper, nothing was needed in black and white? Just everybody knew it was just slipping, the standards, the expectations were slipping?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There were weekly reports to our Chairman on the status. There were discussions that the CEO and DCEO and others were involved in on a weekly basis. So, I think everyone within the Authority at least was aware of the situation. So was NAPCO, who sat in on a lot of these meetings that were held.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

I think it is true, if you look at the reports you know that there are slippages, there are problems, and so on. But it is quite a different thing to say that, for someone to put out, "these are the standards that we set out. Hey, we are not meeting them. Should we discuss this?" You don't think it is your responsibility to remind everybody that there were those standards and now, the way things developed, those standards are not going to be met?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Like I said, everyone knew or at least within the AA, what the situation was. No, I didn't write a strong memo to everybody pointing out that certain things are not being met, except this one here which just before AOD, that summarises some of the issues that were outstanding which I felt needed to be addressed before airport opening.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Given your responsibilities, do you not think you should have sounded the warning much earlier?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess I was taking solace in the fact that everyone knew and then there was no need for me to write strong letters when the obvious was pretty apparent to everyone.

Chairman:

Well, Mr HEED, perhaps going specifically back to the document which Ms Emily LAU referred to, the 30 June document to Mr OAKERVEE, can you say, I mean in your last paragraph you actually said:

"As you can appreciate, this is not a complete list of all actions required, but addresses the more significant outstanding items required for airport opening. Your efforts to get the enquiry hotlines in place today is appreciated."

Now, from the tone of that letter and all the points contained one can really appreciate that these are really very urgently needed. That was 30 June. Can you actually tell us of the list, how many of these were actually ready for AOD and how many were not actually addressed by AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Would you like me to go through the list?

Chairman:

Yes, can you just let us know, I mean, take stock at that particular point, and between that and 6 July, how many of these so-called critical items?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Let us start with the airfield. East airfield tunnel, the matter was dealt with. The aircraft bridge operation, keys were provided to the airlines to bypass the keycard access control system. So, that was done. The airport line markings were completed. The potable water was completed but subsequently we have had problems with meeting the Health Department standards so it has been turned off and the system employed at Kai Tak to provide water to aircraft by tanker truckers is employed. I might add that one of the reasons that the potable water failed the Health Department test was that because it wasn't being used and then water sat in the pipes for a long time. As you can appreciate outside it would get quite warm, so that was the reason there. The agreed signage improvements, a number were put in place but there were quite a few that were still outstanding and that was ...

Chairman:

Not complete, anyway?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Not complete. But there was signage there. It was a matter of the additional signage that didn't arrive. The flush water system was completed but we had some failures on.

Chairman:

But didn't work.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The APM occupation permit, that was OK. That was done. The lifts and ...

Chairman:

That didn't work well.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, we had some sensitivity problems but that was really a function of

loading the escalators and having to adjust the sensitivity. There was no opportunity, despite the fact that we had 12,000 people at the last trial, to put the type of load that a working environment would on the lifts and escalators, so we had to go around and individually adjust the sensitivity on them. The smoking lounges, there was one in operation on land side. The other nine have come into place since then.

Chairman:

Sorry, on AOD only one was operational?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right. The Level 5 toilets were operational. That is the new ones, the large ones that were installed on the arrivals level. Baggage sortation, Level 2 telephones ...

Chairman:

That didn't ...

Airport Management Director, AA:

There were not enough, let's put it that way. There were some there but not enough. Public address system: we have already talked about. Access control system: we have already talked about. The FIDS we have talked about. GTC: we had to ...

Chairman:

Sorry, access control system wasn't working, was it, on AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, it's not. It failed on AOD. We had some problems with it. The Ground Transportation Centre: signage we had to put up temporary signs. The bus loading area completion: there were 2 bays that were not operational. Taxi loading area: it was sufficient. Taxi staging area was OK. The canopy outside the limousine waiting lounge was partially complete. GTC management office: we did get into the GTC management office. Dynamic airline zones at departure kerb: they weren't dynamic but we were able to get static signs up to tell people coming up to the kerb.

Chairman:

So, not the real thing, then, in other words? Not the thing that you wanted?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right, but the areas are pretty well fixed so we will be able to put up the main airlines that operated at the airport in static mode. Road marking, lighting and taxi tunnel: that was done.

Chairman:

GTCC usability? That's the communications, isn't it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, that was partial.

Chairman:

So, it wasn't rectified according to what you ...

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, for example ...

Chairman:

... your needs?

Airport Management Director, AA:

... the traffic control system is still not operational but it was not expected to be in operation by then. We just wanted to have our ground transportation staff to be able to have some functionalities, some CCTV to monitor the roadways and kerbs and have some telephones and communication capability and that was provided. The roads: the kerbs completion: yes. Dynamic airline zones along the airport expressway: yes. Double yellow line: that was done. Traffic signals: I can't remember whether that traffic signal by the service

station was completed or not, petrol station.

Chairman:

So, in other words quite a few of the items that you have listed, particularly under Passenger Terminal Building and land-side, were not completed as you would have wished. Is that correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There is a few that weren't complete. That is correct.

主席：

李永達議員。

李永達議員：

主席，我首先想跟進剛才劉慧卿議員和吳靄儀議員提出的問題，接著我想問一個新問題。剛才，Mr HEED說在訓練的初期有一個指標，即“milestone”，後來情況逐漸改變……

Chairman:

Did you get that? Sorry, come again.

李永達議員：

我重複我的問題，你聽到嗎？我跟進剛才兩位同事提出關於訓練的問題。Mr HEED，你剛才說訓練初期有一個指標，即“milestone”，由於其後情況有變，因此指標亦相應更改。

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am sorry. It is on Channel 3 and I had it on Channel 2. I am sorry, can you start over again, please?

李永達議員：

我重複第3次。我跟進兩位同事的問題。有關Mr HEED剛才提及的訓練，機場管理局在初期曾訂定一個指標，即“milestone”，但後來情況改變，你便將訓練時間逐漸縮短，並改變做法。據你所說，這是逐漸的改變，即“incremental change”。我想問一點，你是否因為訓練時間緊迫而自己作出改變，抑或是你與同事經討論後決定逐步作出改變？換言之，是你自己決定，還是你與同事一同決定？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think if you will look at some of the schedules that have been provided to the Select Committee you will note that, and we provided it through Billy LAM, that the training schedule that was established in September '97 was in fact achieved by the end of April. And that's approximately one month later than it was originally scheduled for. So it is not, I guess maybe I have been misleading you, the training was completed. The thing that we missed most, I suppose, would be actual hands-on time with the proper working system.

The schedule that we have provided to the Select Committee, you can note that all the training except for maybe a couple of courses which were not critical to the, I am just trying to find it, like for example the traffic control system, which is still not in place. That training hasn't been completed and a lot of the ground transportation-related training hasn't been completed. And the billing systems integration is still not complete. The training hasn't been completed. But all the key training for airport operation related to the various standalone systems to operate the Passenger Terminal Building and the airfield on a day-to-day basis is in place and all the training was done.

李永達議員：

你剛才回答我們同事時提及有些改變，那改變是指甚麼？“incremental change”是指甚麼？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am sorry if I misled you there. There was no incremental changes.

Some of the courses were rescheduled a little later, but what I said was that by the end of April all the essential training required for the Passenger Terminal Building operation and for the airfield operation was completed. And some of that was on standalone systems. For example, the billing systems integration really brought together seven standalone systems, and that has still not been done, but we can operate for example the close circuit TV, the PA system, the fire control system, the security system, all individually. It is just that we can't bring it all together on one console so that one operator can handle all of it.

李永達議員：

你的意思是不是指在機場開幕前沒有進行綜合性訓練及整體性訓練？

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

李永達議員：

鑑於你認為綜合性訓練和測試需要延遲進行或趕不及進行的情況可以接受，我想問，是你個人認為可以接受，還是經與同事討論後，你認為可以接受？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Definitely after consultation with my colleagues. What it required was more staff in order to man all the standalone systems. Rather than having it all appear at one console we had to have 2 or 3 staff looking at 1 or 2 systems.

李永達議員：

Mr HEED，我想你是一個經驗豐富的機場管理人員，因為你曾在加拿大管理機場。如機場的系統相當複雜，但從未嘗試進行綜合性訓練和測試，你認為這情況會否減低你對機場能順利開幕的信心？又或你是否認為不需要進行訓練及測試，這情況不會影響你的信心？

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. What the integrated, at least in the billings systems side of thing, what it does is it achieves some efficiency and effectiveness in the staffing that you

need. The individual systems can still be operated, albeit not individually, and therefore can do the function. I mean most airports, at least the ones that I have been operating in the past, have had standalone systems. So, this was an extra degree of sophistication that was being installed at the new airport in Hong Kong.

李永達議員：

但Mr HEED，你是否同意，新機場不少系統須與其他系統整合，然後綜合運作，即以“integrated”的狀態運作？即使你剛才說有些單獨運作的系統運作正常，其實也不表示整個機場可以正常運作。“FIDS”的情況便是這樣。

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

FIDS is a very complex system. I think perhaps we made it overly complicated in trying to integrate too many things into it, but nevertheless that was the system that we had and had to work with, and it was necessary in some cases to have workarounds. And just go back to the AIDB as an example, even the schedule coordinator, we would have got that by a floppy disk from Cathay Pacific and used it on a standalone basis as well. So, there were methods of getting around some of the deficiencies in the integration that weren't there on opening day.

李永達議員：

Mr HEED，你也同意“FIDS”這系統非常複雜，而且和機場其他運作系統有很多聯繫。我想問，當你不斷壓縮(即“squeeze”)訓練和測試時，你和你的同事有沒有設定底線？你們又是否認為，既然已決定機場要在7月6日啟用，即使只剩下兩個星期，或者1個星期，甚至兩日，也得進行訓練和測試？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The training, I just want to emphasise again, I was comfortable that the staff were properly trained to operate the system. So, I wasn't worried about the training itself and the competence of our staff to be able to operate the systems. We also had back-up support from contractors who were also there so the degree of comfort there was OK. The concern, if there was any, was just on stability of some of the systems and what we had to do, like for example, the access control system, to hire something like 300 guards in order to man all the doors because the system wasn't working properly.

李永達議員：

我剛才問你的是，你和你的同事有沒有底線，有沒有“bottom line”？若有底線，請你告訴委員會你的底線是甚麼？若沒有，請你對委員會說你沒有底線。

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess what I am trying to say is that I was comfortable that the staff had enough training. So, as I said earlier, the training that was planned was completed by the end of April except for those few systems that I mentioned, and those were not really critical. The fact that they had to continue with refresher training as new software upgrades and things like that were put in place, and the stability of the systems, perhaps were the only question mark that were left. The software upgrades, as they came along really didn't change what needed to be done. They just provided additional functionality in order to make the job easier.

李永達議員：

我只是問一個簡單的問題。你最後對各項計劃，即“programmes”

作出那麼多改變和壓縮，你有沒有一個底線？請回答委員會，你有沒有設定底線；若沒有，為甚麼；若有，是甚麼底線？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, there is a bottom line. If I hadn't got the training in then we wouldn't have been comfortable with it. But the fact is that all the training that was required for airport opening was in place by the end of April.

李永達議員：

你可否告訴委員會，你是否與其他同事及其他有關部門進行討論，然後以書面設定底線？又或是所設定的底線是否只有你自己知道，你看著計劃、“programme”，便知道底線在那裏？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, there were a number of reportings that I had to do. One was to the Board every month and the other one was the chairman had a weekly review meeting, at which time I had to provide information on the progress and the training. Keep in mind that we had a bit of a complicated situation because we had approximately 195 people at one time working at Kai Tak which needed to be rotated through ...

Chairman:

Mr HEED, I think the question is not that.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

My question, Mr Chairman, is really that you have said, in the question of the programme of your part, you said you have a bottom line. My question is whether you had a bottom line plan in writing and you have discussed this with your colleagues, or actually you only have the bottom line plan in your mind and just use this plan to monitor the whole programme. Which one is that?

Chairman:

In other words, does such a document exist as far as your having made changes in accordance to changing circumstances? Did you make changes and if you have such documents are they the work, collective work of the people who are involved with working those systems and operating those systems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The training plan, the September '97 training plan as modified to change the date slightly, that really is our training plan, and if we weren't able to achieve that then I would have had to flag it up. So, I didn't write a bottom line memo or anything like that, if that is what you are asking, but I would have been really concerned if we weren't able to achieve our training plan, and we did achieve our training plan.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

But Mr HEED, but if you don't have a bottom line plan or if you don't have a plan that you cannot further lower the standard, how can you be sure that actually the changes that are going through the whole period of time, are actually going or sinking to a standard that is not acceptable to you?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't think, we shouldn't confuse it. The standard for the training was adequate. The training that was done we feel very comfortable with, and watching our staff performance during the trials which was really one of the

objectives of the trials, was to assess the training that was given to the staff. So, I was comfortable with that. If there was any standard that perhaps we didn't meet or didn't achieve for airport opening, that was related to the functionality of the systems, but we had workarounds to deal with that, and that is a degraded level of standard than having the full system, of course.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Mr Chairman, Mr HEED mentioned the workaround many times. Is it true that because you have in your mind this kind of workaround so any kind of change to a plan or lowering of standard will not give you that kind of signal, that have to give warning to other committed concerns?

Chairman:

In other words, are you using the workarounds as an answer to the lowering of standards? You think that there are workarounds so it is alright if the system crashes or if there are certain faults that come up, or problems that come up with the system. "That's alright, we can work around it."

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Yes.

Chairman:

And as you work around it, you have a lowering of standards as a result of it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's basically what I am saying. That's right.

Chairman:

I think Miss Margaret NG wants to follow on this specific point.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, Madam Chairman, just that I am quite puzzled about all the training programme being completed in April. Let me ask short questions and I hope Mr HEED will give me short answers. Now, what was the date on which, referring specifically to FIDS now, when was the integrated system fully tested and commissioned? What was the date?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That was 23 June.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right, and since then how much training did you have on that integrated system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Before AOD?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes.

Airport Management Director, AA:

2 weeks.

Hon Margaret NG:

2 weeks? So, your training on the integrated system, the fully-tested integrated system, could not have been completed in April. That is not what you are referring to when you say all the training was completed by April. Is that right? Must be.

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Just to, OK, let's go back to FIDS. I mean there are a number of integrations required of FIDS, and I can't put my hands on the chart which shows

the various integrations that come into it, but for example the baggage handling system was integrated with the FIDS. That was done in January and there were a number of things like that that were completed. So, the things that were outstanding were basically the AIDB and the schedule coordinator.

Hon Margaret NG:

Sorry, Madam Chairman, I must interrupt Mr HEED. Now, the system, the FIDS system which eventually was used, aimed at using on AOD, was a fully integrated system. Isn't that right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It wasn't fully integrated in that some of the, for example the AIDB did not work.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, apart from AIDB. We knew that. It still doesn't work.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

But the system to be used on AOD, as far as FIDS was concerned, was a fully integrated system, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Airport Management Director, AA:

So that is what we are talking about, the training on that system. And you just told us that it didn't start until the 23rd.

Airport Management Director, AA:

That was the hand-over date but it was available for training much before

that.

Hon Margaret NG:

Well, what is available for training before that was not the fully integrated system.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, it was.

Hon Margaret NG:

When was it fully integrated in that case?

Airport Management Director, AA:

When were all the other factors integrated into the FIDS? I would have to get back to you on that.

Hon Margaret NG:

Allright, give us that date. But now referring to your statement, I think that was your statement to the Select Committee, that is Paper no. B77 in Volume V.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Is it my statement?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, your statement, Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Hon Margaret NG:

Now, there were several tests, several trials, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Let's look at, I think the relevant passage, part, starts on Page 11, Paragraph 17. You refer to the starting point, that is in October 1996 there was no clear strategy in preparing AMD to take over. Right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is when I joined the AMD.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, you see that? Now, going further on, on Page 13 you find FIDS.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Now, Paragraph 21, you said that in March and April of '97 you became concerned that, because of the changes to FIDS proposed by EDS, AMD would have insufficient time to test and carry out trials, and so on, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

Now then, in the middle of the paragraph you refer to the second trial, that is 4 April, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, second trial was 15 February.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, 4 February was 11 days before trial. You said that for that second trial, in fact FIDS was only partially available during the second trial and AMD staff were not able to use it for training purposes, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, you couldn't use it at that time? Over the page, you refer to the third trial on 25 March, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

And you say that as far as that was concerned it appeared that training on FIDS, TMS CUTE was satisfactory to the extent that select AMD and airline staff were able to operate FIDS at third trial, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, that remains select. It was not the full system.

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, no, no. That meant that a certain number of staff were able to use it,

yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, was it the full system, the fully integrated system at that point?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The fully integrated, except those two that I talked about, yes, I believe it was.

Hon Margaret NG:

Could you check?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Because Build 2.0 actually integrated the main components of the FIDS system. There were a few ancillary integrations like AIDB and SCC that were still outstanding but basically the baggage handling system, what else was there?

Hon Margaret NG:

If you can't tell us off-hand never mind, but you said select AMD and airline staff. Can you tell us the extent to which you were able to participate in the third test on the 25th of ...

Chairman:

Trial.

Hon Margaret NG:

The third trial.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Actually the third trial was on the 28th. The 25th we had a pre-trial trial. In other words the people that were going to participate in the trial actually went through the process.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, you stated in that paragraph, this is 28 March.

Airport Management Director, AA:

So, on 28 March the AMD staff and the airline staff actually operated the system. In the first 2 trials it was EDS that operated the system.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, I know. You said "select AMD and airline staff", right? I am asking you which were the select AMD and airline staff? To what extent did you participate?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK, what I am referring to there is that all the staff weren't able to have sufficient training to be able to operate the system so we took, say, half a dozen staff for the AOCC that were sufficiently trained to operate that system at that time.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right, now, you then go on to say "by AOD I was satisfied as a result of my discussion with manager and assistant managers of the AOCC that AMD airfield operation staff had sufficient training on FIDS to operate the system to an acceptable level." So, this satisfaction refers only to airfield operation, is that right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think I erred there. As a matter of fact I pencilled in a correction in my own statement, my copy here. It should have been "AOCC and the AMD airfield staff", yes. Sorry.

Hon Margaret NG:

Now, when you go to the terminal operation trials, and that's why I drew your attention to airfield operations, now, referring to terminal operations trial, then you give a different picture in your statement. In Paragraph 24, sorry, end

of 24 you refer still to the first and second trial not being sufficient. Now, then you don't seem to give us any account of what happened in the subsequent trials. You then go to Paragraph 29 and it seems there that this links up to 19 June and Attachment 3, that is the memo that my colleagues have been looking at. At that time you were clearly concerned. Your concern with FIDS was that it was not stable and it seemed to crash intermittently, right? Then you say it continued to improve and that would be, it would be, and by 19 June FIDS reliability tests indicated 97 to 98 reliability. Now, this was what you relied on, isn't it ...

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

... for your confidence? Was there anything else you relied on?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Partially. You know, the trials, the fourth trial and the fifth trial certainly demonstrated to me and to our managers that are directly overseeing these activities that the staff could operate the systems and did have sufficient knowledge to operate the system. So, the fourth and fifth trial, because I didn't mention them, after the third trial the confidence level was building and the fourth and fifth trials just reinforced it. The fifth trial was in fact a full dress rehearsal. In other words we did the opening day scenario, the opening day flight schedule for, I think we took four hour's flight and compressed it into 3 hours.

Hon Margaret NG:

No, my question to you, Mr HEED, is whether your 97 to 98 percent reliability was your own, the result, your own observation ...

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, it was not.

Chairman:

... of the trial?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was not. It was, that was on the system itself. That was the equipment, the reliability and stability of the equipment, if you want to put it that way.

Chairman:

Where did that come from?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That came from our IT staff that did, during that 2-week reliability period that was conducted in June they gave me that number, that it was 97 to 98 percent reliable.

Hon Margaret NG:

But at the same time your staff were being trained on the system, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is right.

Hon Margaret NG:

Now ...

Airport Management Director, AA:

Refresher training, I should say.

Hon Margaret NG:

You say, you say that your concern prior to 19 June was that the systems stability, you were concerned with system reliability as it seemed to crash intermittently, right? That was your experience, your feedback through training. Is that correct? As you tried, you trained your staff on the system you found that it was crashing intermittently.

Airport Management Director, AA:

But you are referring to Paragraph 24 again.

Chairman:

29, just the sentence before, the 97 and 98 percent reliability, the sentence before that.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, that was prior to that, yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, prior to 19 June, through your training, your experience through the training, you felt you were concerned because the system seemed to crash intermittently. That's how I understand it.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I was comfortable with the training. It was the equipment stability that I was concerned about up to that point.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, you found that the system, as you went through the training the system was crashing from time to time.

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is right.

Hon Margaret NG:

And you were worried about that.

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is right.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, how did you arrive at the 97, 98 reliability in the meantime? The test was going on. Was it in your experience? Now, the sentence I just read

"intermittent crashes" was your experience. Now, the second sentence, you go to 97, 98 percent reliability, was that your experience or was it something you were told?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That was not my experience. That was something I was told.

Hon Margaret NG:

Allright, what was your experience during that period, between 19 June?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would have to rely on this number because we didn't do any analysis ourselves on the stability.

Hon Margaret NG:

Was it your experience after 19 June that the system was still crashing intermittently?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, it wasn't. During that period it was quite stable, the 2-week period.

Chairman:

So, what prompted you to then put those items in your note to Mr OAKERVEE? You were still referring to 2 aspects of FIDS which weren't really, which actually didn't have your confidence. You were really still very concerned about those aspects of FIDS.

Airport Management Director, AA:

But I didn't mention stability in that letter on FIDS.

Chairman:

What were you referring to if it wasn't stability?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I was referring to the fact that the link to the AIDB and the SCC wasn't integrated with the FIDS system.

Chairman:

They didn't exist at the time. That was what you were saying?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, Madam Chairman, do I understand from Mr HEED that in fact his experience coincided with this high level of reliability following the period, in the period following 19 June? You were satisfied from your own training experience that FIDS was fairly stable. It wasn't crashing intermittently any more?

Airport Management Director, AA:

When you say "intermittently" I mean are you talking about long periods, number of times? I guess ... I am sure ...

Hon Margaret NG:

Well, at the earlier date you were concerned because FIDS was crashing intermittently.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

My question is, in the period after 19 June were you confident and was it your experience that FIDS was no longer crashing intermittently as it did in the earlier period?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was not my experience but it was what I was told by the technical experts.

Hon Margaret NG:

No, I am not interested in what you were told because I understand what you were told, but I am asking you specifically your experience in the course of the training.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Talking to our manager of terminal systems, she felt that it was OK.

Hon Margaret NG:

I don't want "OK", Madam Chairman. I mean, was it crashing intermittently or wasn't it crashing intermittently?

Chairman:

Factually, I think.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would have to get back to you on that. I don't know if it crashed and how many times it crashed in that period.

Hon Margaret NG:

We just want to know the basis of your confidence. You said so many times that you are confident, and we read you as saying that, but the basis? Now, if you look at Paragraph 28, Mr HEED, the same statement, now there you say on 30 June 1998 you sent a memo to Douglas OAKERVEE and set out AMD views as to principle issues which needed to be addressed before airport opening. "Of these issues the three which caused me most concern prior to airport opening were FIDS, the ACS and public address system." So, FIDS was still an important concern. Does it not seem to contradict what you have just said?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Does it contradict what I said?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess yes and no. At the time when I made that judgment I felt that that was usable for airport opening, but I was still concerned because according to past history it had potential to fail.

Hon Margaret NG:

How do you mean by "usable"? Is that a different concept from reliability, stability, availability? Now we have new thing called usability. I am sorry, I don't mean to be argumentative but I just want to understand what your criteria and your standards were at that time.

Airport Management Director, AA:

When I refer to usable I mean that the operator could use the system to do what needs to be done.

Hon Margaret NG:

And does that also mean that you were confident that it won't crash?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Was I confident that it wouldn't crash?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't say that I was 100 percent confident that it would not crash, but I was comfortable that if it did crash that we could recover fairly quickly.

主席：

單仲偕議員，你想跟進“FIDS”的問題？

單仲偕議員：

我也想問Mr HEED，你多次提及有97點幾“percent reliability”，你是否應該告訴我們，有多少“percent crash”，有97點幾“percentage”不會“crash”？你是否應該知道這些數據？

主席：

請你再問一次你的問題。

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

You mentioned several times that the reliability of the system is over 97 percent, but when answering the questions raised by Margaret NG, she asked, she did ask about usable, and then you answered her question about usability. Then you failed, you are unable to answer the percentage or the probability of crashing the systems.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess ...

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

The simple question, is it equivalent to say 97 percent of reliability meaning that 97 percent of, you know, not crashing?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's a difficult one to answer. The 97, 98 percent figure was given to me by our IT people, our IT experts. Even that infers that 3 percent or 2 to 3 percent of the time there could be some failures. So, to say that I was

comfortable or at least to say that it wouldn't crash, that wouldn't be accurate. I still expected some down time but I felt that the staff, and with what we had available for contingencies, we could deal with that.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

In Paragraph 20 of your witness statement, you did mention that you had set up a Task Force headed by Mr CHATTERJEE. The Task Force reported to you and Mr Raymond LAI that the purpose of the Task Force was to support Project and to work with AMD on the testing and commissioning of the systems. So when Mr CHATTERJEE reported to you the percentage of reliability, did you ask the meaning of the percentage of reliability?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I did ask what that referred to and what he told me was that the equipment was operating for that period of time, in other words, 97, 98 percent of the time the equipment did not crash or fail during that period.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

May I refer to another document? Paper no. B176, Volume, I think probably Volume V. No, sorry Volume VIII. In this document there are a number of terms. The meaning of acceptance ...

Chairman:

Just a minute.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Volume VIII. The Paper no. is B176.

Chairman:

Have you got it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

There are a number of terms: acceptance, handover, handover certificate, handover notifications. It did mention the owner of particular systems. May I ask you the first question? Who owns the FIDS?

Chairman:

Who is the owner?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, the handover, that's all that's occurred at this point, is, the ultimate owner would be IT, OK. In other words Mr Kiron CHATTERJEE would be the owner of the system. That would be the ultimate owner, but right now the control of the FIDS is with Mr CHATTERJEE. The acceptance has not been completed and therefore until that is done the actual owner is Mr CHATTERJEE at this time.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Who is the ultimate owner?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The ultimate owner is IT, Information Technology, which is Mr CHATTERJEE.

Chairman:

So, it is currently with Mr CHATTERJEE. It will eventually still be Mr CHATTERJEE?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

May I refer to another document? That is Document Record, Paper no.

B188. That is hand over certificate. I think it is Page 6 of 7. CHATTERJEE did not sign this document. Does it mean that the system has not been handed over?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The handover notice has been issued. The certificate has not been signed in this particular case. You are right.

Chairman:

Actually, if I may point out this is a rather curious document. Perhaps Mr HEED can clarify for us. There is one handover certificate and then there is one handover record. The handover certificate does not have any reference. The record does, which is numbered 73, and it refers to various documents of which, I think, the handover certificate is part. Can you ...?

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Madam Chairman, may I refer to the third document, then I have finished my questions?

Chairman:

Yes, OK.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

In the same pile of documents which are handover records, on Page 3 of 3, there are a Project Manager, K C TSUI and the other, Project Manager's representative, Lloyd BROOKE, who signed the handover record to Maintenance Manager, Kiron CHATTERJEE and user representative, Vivian CHEUNG, on 31 August. Does it mean that the handover was completed in August?

Chairman:

Was the handover done in August, Mr HEED?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The handover was effective on 23 June. The documentation was completed on 31 August. That is what that says.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So, does it mean that on 24 June the system has been passed from the Project Division to CHATTERJEE already?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The system would pass from, the control and care of it would pass from Project to CHATTERJEE on 23 June.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So, when CHATTERJEE accepted the handover on 23 June, he is responsible for accepting the FIDS?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

On the 23rd ...

Airport Management Director, AA:

With all its deficiencies, I should say.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

I beg your pardon?

Airport Management Director, AA:

With all its deficiencies.

Chairman:

With all its deficiencies. There is a list of deficiencies, in fact.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

OK, in your witness statement, Paragraph 20, you mention that Kiron CHATTERJEE reported to you through a Task Force. Am I right to say so?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is only related to that Task Force. The actual reporting relationship of Mr CHATTERJEE is to the Chief Executive Officer.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So, you are not responsible for, so, in what sense are you responsible for, when you have this working group through which CHATTERJEE report to you, but CHATTERJEE does not report to you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is right.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So, what do you do in your working group? Do you advise? Do you, you don't, because in this working group it is your part of your job, the purpose of which was to support Project and to work with AMD in the testing and commissioning of the systems. Do you advise CHATTERJEE to accept the FIDS system?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The working group actually ceased to exist as of about the end of December, end of '97, sorry.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

End of '97? So, when CHATTERJEE signed this document on 23 June does AMD staff have any input to CHATTERJEE?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. Vivian CHEUNG is our Manager of Terminal Systems.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So, Vivian CHEUNG accepted the system as a user side, as a user she is satisfied with the system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

OK. May I ask another question? That is would you refer to the Paper no. B175, still Volume VIII. One of your staff, no, not your staff, Kiron CHATTERJEE, he sent a memo to Vivian CHEUNG who is your staff outlining 38 outstanding items of AMD IT concerns on 18 June 1998. The memo was "cc" to you and a number of senior staff of AA, including Henry TOWNSEND and OAKERVEE, and this is on 18 June. And still there are 38 outstanding items. So, with these 38 outstanding items AMD advised Kiron CHATTERJEE to accept the FIDS?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The 38 items were identified in a schedule that was produced by Vivian CHEUNG on 9 June. There were subsequent meetings with EDS and with IT, Kiron CHATTERJEE's group, and the items were either dealt with or workarounds were developed to the point where Vivian CHEUNG was satisfied that those items had been dealt with.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So, she was satisfied? So, are you satisfied?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am satisfied because she is more of an expert than I am.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Madam Chairman, can I have one point on this?

Chairman:

Just a very short one, because I think Mr LAU Kong-wah has waited a long time.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

On that Appendix paper referred to by Mr SIN Chung-kai, Paper no. B175, there is a table ...

Chairman:

38 items?

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Yes, this table, I think, lists the details of the kinds of things mentioned by Mr SIN. On the "Remarks" column there are many remarks talking about no workaround, no workaround. What is meant by that? Because I am a layman, I don't know what is meant by that. Does it mean that there is no alternative if the system is down?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Give me an example.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

1 and 2. Item No. 2.

Chairman:

Yes, let Mr HEED answer.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

On the "Remarks" column it mentioned "no workaround, no workaround, the third function not agreed by AMD". What is meant by that?

Chairman:

Does it mean no workarounds existed?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That was in Vivian's, that was her assessment of the situation when she produced the document. If you look through the meeting notes, I am just looking at No. 1 here. I can't read it too well but it says: "Improvement noted. Acceptable for airport opening ...", and then something else, "Outstanding work is to ..."

Chairman:

I think the question is when you say "no workaround" does it mean that there doesn't exist any workaround that they can rely on should the system fail? I mean, that particular part of the system fails?

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Does it mean that all these functions will stop altogether and no alternatives can be found?

Airport Management Director, AA:

What it refers to, just taking it in general, is that if that function or that activity cannot or doesn't work right now with the FIDS there is no workaround to that system. That was Vivian's assessment. At the meeting with EDS and with IT I gather it was demonstrated that we could live with that situation.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

But, Chairman, because the meeting notes are only in writing, hand-written and I think Mr HEED now wants to guess with Members of the Committee.

Chairman:

No, I think in fairness, Mr LEE Wing-tat, maybe the question is best put to Vivian CHEUNG.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Yes, OK. Madam Chairman, can I just ...?

Chairman:

Just a minute, just a minute. Miss Margaret NG, let me hear your question first.

Hon Margaret NG:

I just want to ask Mr HEED whether he knows whose writing it is under "meeting notes"?

Chairman:

Is that Vivian CHEUNG's writing, do you know?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It looks like Kiron CHATTERJEE's writing.

Chairman:

It is Kiron CHATTERJEE's writing? Thank you. Mr SIN Chung-kai?

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Let me finish my question. In your statement you mentioned that you had 20 years of airport management experience. Do you set criteria with Vivian CHEUNG on advising, on accepting the systems when advising CHATTERJEE? Do you have objective criteria on accepting the systems, FIDS?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Did we have written objectives? No. It becomes her assessment of the usability of the systems because she is the user.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Do you have any input on her assessment?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We discuss it, yes. There is K S NG, as her manager, myself and Vivian would have a discussion on this matter, yes.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

You have discussions? So, what do you conclude? I mean, you, K S NG, Vivian CHEUNG and yourself?

Chairman:

Conclude what?

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Conclude, on what criteria you accept it? Because you said you do not understand the meaning of 97.8 percent?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I did? Well, I said that it was really related to the equipment availability, that's right.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Equipment availability? Again availability?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Reliability, availability. I am not going to get into a discussion on what the meaning of each of those words is.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

It is important.

Chairman:

I think that you will find that it is going to be a very, very important point that we need to deliberate on.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

But, Madam Chairman, when CHATTERJEE signed the document he is serving AMD, am I right to say? So, as a user of the FIDS, AMD is responsible for advising CHATTERJEE, "OK, you are OK to sign." If you find problems during your tests you should advise him not to sign. But it is your responsibility. Am I right to say that?

Chairman:

Maybe Mr HEED should provide the answer. Who is actually the ultimate person responsible for saying, "look, this is acceptable. The 38 points we have enough there for us. We feel that this is satisfactory, that we can accept this as a bottom line for AOD, for FIDS to operate"? I think that is the answer we are looking for. Is it Vivian CHEUNG? Your staff? Or is it CHATTERJEE, who I think by this time is not a member of your staff any more?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right. CHATTERJEE is the owner of the system but at the same time if we don't agree that it is acceptable for use then he couldn't sign off on that, so we would have to agree with him that it is acceptable and it could be handed over.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So, my very simple question is on what basis did you agree, on what basis?

Chairman:

Do you know the answer to that, or ...?

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

You have signs that there are so many problems, even at the last moment.

Chairman:

I think we need to ask Mr HEED whether he knows the agreement between Vivian CHEUNG and CHATTERJEE, after all this is inter-department, isn't it, whether you know the basis of this agreement between the two people?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This matrix that Vivian had prepared on 9 June was sort of her bottom line as to what needed to be done. She met with CHATTERJEE and with EDS staff and was convinced that those could be lived with. In other words we could either have workarounds or they weren't serious enough to delay the airport opening and that we could operate the system on opening day. So, that was the assessment basically.

Chairman:

So, going back to that particular memo, Paper no. B175, which is a memo signed by Kiron CHATTERJEE to Vivian CHEUNG. You are confirming what Mr CHATTERJEE says in that memo which stated that that there were no outstanding show-stopper items. Is that your understanding that it was actually fully agreed between the two parties and accepted by AMD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Am I right to say you accepted the FIDS with 38 problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The 38 problems were discussed at that meeting and Vivian was satisfied that they were workarounds or that the matters were not serious enough to delay the airport opening.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Do you agree with Vivian's assessment?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would have to because I am not expert in that area.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

You have 20 years of airport management experience!

Chairman:

I think we are going, look, we are talking about the system, the FIDS system here. I think already Mr HEED has said that Vivian CHEUNG is the person who has the expertise and is in charge. He needs to answer us as to whether he is agreeable on what his staff have done. He has said that he trusted Vivian CHEUNG's judgment on that. I think we leave it at that. Mr LAU Kong-wah?

劉江華議員 :

主席，我想先跟進有關“handover certificate”的問題。韓義德先生，為何移交證明書內有些空白的地方？例如在文件B189及B190，移交證明書內有關廣播系統和電話系統移交的地方是完全空白的，這代表甚麼意思？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

What that means was that there was no handover of those 2 items.

劉江華議員：

為何這些重要的系統在機場開幕之前仍未移交？

Airport Management Director, AA:

For example the PA system, as an example, we were able to use it for the trials and it was handed over to us for use on 30 May, but we were not satisfied if it met the criteria that we had established for official handover for care and control.

劉江華議員：

主席，這不僅是形式上的問題，因移交證明書內多個項目已先後獲具名簽署，而部分則沒有。有關廣播和電話系統的兩部分更特別，是完全空白的！即表示全未移交。這兩個系統在機場開幕前究竟有何問題？

Airport Management Director, AA:

The access control fell into the same category. The four criteria that we had set up was that we were ready to take over control, that Project was ready to hand it over and that we had a need for it. Then there was a fourth criteria, the desired level of usability, the major problems, defects, outstanding works, etc, had been identified.

Well, first of all although we may be ready to take it over because we needed to use it, the defects, problems, etc, were not sufficiently articulated that we felt comfortable that we were taking over something that we knew what the outcome of, sorry, not the outcome ...

Chairman:

It was not ready for handover?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right, that's right.

Chairman:

It is not ready for handover, so that was why the documents were not signed, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, because we, in order to take handover we had to identify all the outstanding issues and that couldn't be done because they couldn't be articulated. There were so many outstanding issues.

劉江華議員：

我剛才聽到的是，如果“handover”的話，又或如現時的情況，證明書完全空白並未進行移交，即表示當中仍有嚴重的問題未獲解決，故移交尚未進行。但剛才聽到韓義德先生所述，鑑於有需要使用有關設備，唯有不顧後果，先“takeover”設備如常使用。韓義德先生，作為一位重要的管理人員，你怎能在機場開幕當日如常使用這些仍有嚴重問題的重要設備？你明知會有嚴重的問題出現，身為管理人員，竟不發出任何警告，原因為何？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

On the access control we had a workaround to that, and that was to deploy guards. The PA system, a part of it worked sufficiently so that could be used as the main system. And on the telephone system, as you have heard and have evidence in front of you, it wasn't complete, but there was enough there that we could go into operation.

Chairman:

Mr HEED, this is exactly what we are talking about, the lowering of standards. You seem to say that, "because 6 July has been determined to be the opening day there is nothing we can do but to accept what we've got and work around whatever we've got", and as a result we have all the mayhem on 6 July.

I mean, can you tell us how many of these systems were not satisfactory, not according to, at least, I mean after all, handover is a check-list that AMD uses at least to determine whether certain systems are acceptable at least for operational purposes with deficiencies and defects and all, at least ready for AOD?

You have some of the systems, as pointed out by Mr LAU and others, which were not even ready for handover for AOD. Can you explain why you accept them since they are not even ready for handover? I mean these, the lifts and the escalators have not been tested and so on and so forth. Can you tell us which are the ones which, in fact we can certainly go down the list but you can give us a clear list as to which are the ones that AMD considers not even good enough for handover? And yet you tell us "we can work round them", and experience shows that you couldn't? Can you tell us how come you accept them without even shouting for help?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Just take the 3 systems we have just been talking about. The access control, I have explained that we did have a workaround and that was we would use 300 guards to deal with that situation.

Chairman:

Yes, you use 300 guards. Were you actually thinking of using 300 guards for ever until an indeterminable period of however long it would take for the ACS to be delivered in a satisfactory state? 300 guards! That is the workaround that you are talking about? How many of the other workarounds? You have to tell us. You seem to have the answer. Everywhere the system fails there is a workaround. Sure, there is a workaround. At ACS it is a 300-people workaround. But, just now Mr LAU says PAS, it wasn't even ready for handover. You weren't even ready to sign the handover yet, you know, AMD. How many of these systems, can you tell us how many of these systems were not actually ready even for handover and yet you had to work with them and have workarounds? Mr HEED?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, those 3 systems that I talked about, and I can't list them off the top of my head but ... The air-conditioning system? I can't remember if that was handed over or not.

劉江華議員：

主席，就算只利用這3個系統，其實我們也可以繼續問下去。

主席：

請你繼續發問。

劉江華議員：

主席，剛才所提及的3個系統，分別為出入、電話及廣播系統，其實全部均未移交，故當中必定有很多問題。韓義德先生，在這3個系統尚有嚴重問題的情況下啟用機場，以你豐富的經驗，加上全球均已訂明指標，規定機場必須暢順、安全和具效率，而這其實只是最低的標準，假如機場於這3個系統未達完善並有重大問題時啟用，會否影響上述3個指標？根據你現時的判斷，究竟會還是不會呢？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I want to stress first of all that safety and security were paramount. I mean, they had to be there. The PA system, for example, the main system, in other words that broadcast everywhere, was working. We were having problems with the local PA, in other words at the gates themselves in a number of cases. So, that was, I felt comfortable that the main PA system could be used in an emergency situation. The telephones, I am not talking about public telephones but I am talking about telephones at the gates, for the offices, etc, for operational uses. We had those that were required for safety purposes within the AOCC and, as a matter of fact that was one of the reasons why that particular area was used as the Emergency Control Centre for the weeks following airport opening.

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

我不需要這種答案，我需要的答案很簡單。以你的經驗判斷，這3個系統對那3個目標有否構成影響？

Chairman:

Just short answers.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am saying, we had to ensure safety if the second and third criteria of efficiency and smoothness obviously could not be achieved.

劉江華議員：

如果你當時判斷這是不可行的，亦明知這兩個極低的指標也是無法達到的，為何不向高層反映？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't think that was any surprise to anyone. Those parameters were being monitored very extensively over the weeks before airport opening.

劉江華議員：

主席，我的問題是，你明知欠缺那3個系統會對這兩個指標構成如此重大的影響，為何不向上級反映？

Airport Management Director, AA:

The Management was aware. I think, if you ask anybody - Mr LAM, Mr TOWNSEND - they were all aware of the situation.

Chairman:

Of the 3 systems? We are talking specifically of the 3 systems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

劉江華議員：

主席，我認為有一點更加嚴重。請他看看文件A47，關於機策會於7月4日舉行的會議，那是在開幕前兩天向機策會作出的匯報。文件A47

第12段第一句是：“All critical systems are available in standalone mode”。你當時向上級反映所有重要的系統都“有了”，請問這項宣稱的內容是否真實？

Airport Management Director, AA:

If you take the words 'precisely available', yes, they were.

Chairman:

They were available, but not necessarily working. Is that what you mean?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, no. The public address system, for example; all the rest were working, and totally available. The public address system was available in a form that could be used. The main system was available.

劉江華議員：

主席，若韓義德先生是這樣理解此事，那麼請他再看看文件A46。這份文件提及多項政府的系統，包括廣播系統及其他系統。我們所看到的實際情況是，在49項系統當中，只有4項可以操作。你如何理解這一點？比方說，我已經容許你慢慢地逐步降低要求，只要在接收時可以操作便當作可以使用，所以你才會寫下這句“All critical systems are available”。現在看來，問題十分顯而易見，即使已裝設了這些系統，但在49項當中，只有4項可以全面使用。你對此又有何解釋？

Chairman:

Annex A of A46.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Is this the annex with the...?

Chairman:

Annex A of A 46. These are Government systems.

Airport Management Director, AA:

These are Government systems?

Chairman:

Yes.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I wasn't associated with those particular systems, so I really can't answer your question.

Chairman:

That's not part of your responsibility? Is it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No.

Chairman:

No. The Government systems are not part of the responsibility.

劉江華議員：

該由誰人負責？

Chairman:

I think they are handed over to Government departments by Project Division.

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

劉江華議員：

是否這樣？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, it's the Project Director.

主席：

劉江華議員，你還有其他問題嗎？

劉江華議員：

沒有。

Chairman:

Just because you keep referring to the PA system, the public address system, as a system that's been working. According to Paper no. B39, which is the operational problems in the first week after airport opening, dated 14 July, in Paragraph 19: "There have been recurring problems with the main public address system, and the local PA system remains unavailable". Now, as far as we know, in fact, even the main public address system has had recurring problems. Can you confirm that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Chairman:

So, it's not really functioning a 100 per cent as you had indicated?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There had been some failures of the main system. One occurred on AOD, as a matter of fact.

Chairman:

In other words, the system which didn't even satisfy you on hand-over conditions did actually fail on the day. Didn't it?

劉慧卿議員，你是否有些問題要跟進？

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Yes, just very briefly. Because Mr HEED just then said that no one, it was not a surprise to anyone that all the problems occur on that day in relation to specifically the public address system, the telephone system, and the access control. You said everybody knew. So when all the problems cropped up on that day no one was surprised! Is that what you are trying to tell this Committee? That you knew, you anticipated all these problems, you expected them when they happened, no one was surprised and nobody did anything about it prior to AOD?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't think I said that, but, to be fair, I think we all anticipated problems. Now, the extent of the problems and the multiplying of the problems was not anticipated, though we anticipated that we would have failures of equipment and systems on AOD.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Maybe you don't think the problems were severe enough to ask the Administration to delay the opening day. But, at least, you should have warned the AA Board and ADSCOM about what you anticipated, asked them to discuss it at meetings to brief everybody and see if somebody else may have some bright ideas on how to handle the anticipated problems. You didn't do that at all?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, if anybody asked me, and some did, I indicated that there would be problems.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

You did warn someone?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Can you refer us to the documents?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There's no document. I said, if anybody asked me, I'd.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Oh, if anyone had asked you, oh!

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, they did ask, and, as a matter of fact, I did say that we would have problems. Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Who asked you and when?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Oh, there was a number of people. I mean, industry people, as well as within the Authorities, so, but they were all, you know, verbal discussions.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

You didn't feel the need to formally inform the Airport Authority, as well as ADSCOM, about all these people who came to you? Obviously, they were very worried, and you were very worried, but you didn't try to 'blow the whistle' and say, "Hey, there are these problems that are anticipated. It could cause chaos"?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I didn't feel that they were sufficiently severe that we should delay the opening.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

But at least to warn them about this, and let them put their heads together to try to work out some better contingency plans. You didn't do that at all?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. I didn't.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

You just left it to luck, to fate?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We had contingency plans for every system that we had in operation, and we felt that we could manage the situation when it arose. There are some situations that we did not anticipate and I don't think anyone did. Now, and I've had numbers of years' experience, and I must admit that what happened on that day was beyond my expectations.

Chairman:

But these were not the problems that you didn't anticipate, I hope. You couldn't, just now you mention the 3 systems without hand-over notices?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Anticipate those? Yes.

Chairman:

Yes. In fact, in the critical list that you gave to Douglas OAKERVEE, most of them, now looking back, even you knew the PA system and so on, were not stable. You did anticipate problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Yes. And they were not resolved as you would have liked them to be resolved. So you couldn't actually call them 'teething problems' on AOD. Could you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But we did manage those problems. Those didn't contribute to some of the bigger problems that we had on that day. I mean, they are all contributing in a way, but that alone wouldn't have caused any major upset of the day.

Chairman:

But you, as the person in charge of the entire Division of operation, you should have had the overview of how they all inter-related. All the various specific problems would have inter-related to snowball into something else much bigger. Did you actually think about that in those terms?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I anticipated some of that. I mean, not specifically, but forecast that, in my mind, that we would have to deal with that, and that's why we had senior people around, and that's why we arranged to have the airline people attending a daily meeting for the first week.

主席：

副主席。

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Just a very simple question for Mr HEED. Now, this morning, you've mentioned many, many times about workaround arrangements. Although we've mentioned a list of 38 outstanding defects, and other things not ready, all the time, you said, 'We are going to have these workaround arrangements'.

Now, was it your idea that you would rely on workarounds, or were you told that this could be the means to resolve all the problems that you may anticipate?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The workarounds, we did discuss them individually to ensure that we were comfortable with the workarounds.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Sorry, Mr HEED, my question is, 'Was it your idea that you could rely on workarounds, or was it somebody else who told you that workarounds will be the answer'?

Airport Management Director, AA:

In some cases, I didn't have the expertise and I had to rely on their judgement, but, in a lot of cases, I did understand the situation and I felt that the workaround was acceptable. Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Was this your experience before you joined the team here?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

You know, in Canada, for instance?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

That was your experience also?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

主席：

劉江華議員，你是否有問題要跟進？

劉江華議員：

我想簡單地跟進一些問題。剛才他說，每個人都知道這些系統有問題。請問所謂每個人，是否指所有機管局高級行政人員都知道有這些問題？

主席：

你所指的是每個問題？特別是每個問題？

劉江華議員：

對。特別是每個問題，高層管理人員是否全部都知悉？

主席：

你可否指明是哪幾位高層人員？

劉江華議員：

例如上至Billy LAM、柯家威先生及Mr TOWNSEND。

Airport Management Director, AA:

Were they aware of all the problems? I can't answer that question, but they were aware of the major problems. Yes.

劉江華議員：

是否上至機管局的董事會都知道？

Chairman:

Was the Board aware of the specific problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I believe they had an awareness.

劉江華議員：

Sorry，這是甚麼意思？

Chairman:

Well, what do you mean by they have an awareness? Do they know, or do they not know?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, some members would have a better understanding of the problems than others.

Chairman:

Well, does the Board in a collective terms know?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I really can't answer that question. I think you have to ask a Board member whether they understood that or not.

Chairman:

Well, in other words, have you actually done anything to make sure that they know?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Through our AOR Steering Committee, which is a Board's sub-committee,

the issues were highlighted.

Chairman:

These issues individually were highlighted in those meetings?

Airport Management Director, AA:

For example, the PA instability is an example. Yes.

劉江華議員：

主席，我具體地以3個系統來說，他說機管局的董事都應該知悉，但他身為負責運作事宜的人，若明知是不可行的，有否應在董事會會議中主動向他們提出或告訴他們？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I cannot recall specifically, bringing it to their attention. In other words, at a Board meeting, standing up and advising them that way. They were discussed in Committees like the AOR Steering Committee.

Chairman:

The AOR Steering Committee was not meeting in the months leading up to AOD - not the Board's sub-committee on AOR?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. I think the last meeting was probably the first week of June. Was it? I can't remember now.

Chairman:

No, no, no, the AOR meeting, attendance at the meeting on AOR issues, as we have, is confined to senior management of AA, not the Board.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Sorry, sorry.

Chairman:

You are thinking of the Steering Committee?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There is a Steering Committee. Yes.

Chairman:

Which is convened much earlier, but which fell by the wayside somehow, you know, towards the end of the journey. I mean towards AOD. I think.

劉江華議員：

我清楚指明是董事會。

主席：

對，機管局的董事會設有一個“AOR”會，我指出讓“Mr HEED”知道。

Airport Management Director, AA:

Excuse me, the AOR progress report to the Board, I think there were committee meetings. I think in the last three or four weeks, there probably wasn't a committee meeting, but a Board paper was still filed.

Chairman:

I see, and that was filed by your Department, or by the CEO's Office?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was put together by the Planning Co-ordination Director, but had input from myself and from the Project Director.

Chairman:

OK. So, that's the AOR progress report to the Board?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Chairman:

The last one being?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Probably 26 or 28 June? Would it be? I don't know. I can't remember when the.

Chairman:

So, I think to answer your question, Mr LAU, is that the Board is informed, but we have to look at that record, that report to see how much of it has been reported.

主席：

吳靄儀議員。

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, how can that be? Given the document we've just looked at, which is Paper no. A47, that is the report to ADSCOM from the Airport Authority dated 2 July 1998, it is said that all critical systems including the public address system were available in standalone mode. So, as far as that document is concerned, the understanding rather is that it was available. There was not a problem there. So, how can I understand that, on the one hand, AA told ADSCOM that there is no problem and, on the other hand, the AA is fully aware of all these problems.

Chairman:

Yes. I think that Mr HEED has told us the senior management somehow, one way or another, is aware of these problems. Now, we have to determine whether the Board, in fact, has been specifically notified of these problems, and

certainly the documents that we have on ADSCOM level is that they are not aware that they have actually been told that they are 'all systems go'.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, Madam Chairman, I wonder if Mr HEED actually wants to offer any response to this. The paper at A47 is signed by the Airport Authority, so this is an Airport Authority paper to ADSCOM.

Chairman:

This is the ADSCOM paper. Right?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. But it is prepared and presented by AA. In this paper, AA seems to say, under Paragraph 12, that the systems were available and therefore not a problem. Now, that, I'm afraid... .

Chairman:

Now, have you seen that paper, Mr HEED?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. I have. Yes.

Chairman:

Yes. Have you seen it before you went to ADSCOM?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

So, you are aware?

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, on the face of what Mr HEED tells us, I'm afraid it sounds terribly like that AA is telling ADSCOM a lie, because, on the one hand, you say that the AA Board does know. I mean, all the senior staff in the Airport

Authority did know all these problems. On the other hand, this paper states that there aren't any problems. So, please explain, because the implication seems very clear?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I've spoken of this already. The public address is the one that we are concerned about here. The rest we are not, we are not disputing, I don't think. The public address was available. The main system was available, and we did use it.

Chairman:

I think the question is that you are presenting a picture where all the systems are all right. All the critical systems that are required on AOD are all right. The question is, 'Are they all right'? Were they considered by yourselves to be all right at that point. You just told us that you were aware of the problems. Senior management, as a whole, was aware of those problems. Members should look at Paper no. B18, which is the AOR progress as at 22 June 1998. That is the paper which was actually presented to the Board with more details as to systems and so on. Now, it seems even in this paper that the impression one gets is that the systems is by and large all right. At least, there is no cry for help. There is no alarm, no warning signal that it may impact on AOD. So, the question must be, 'Has senior management been reflecting the true nature of the problems before AOD to the Board and ADSCOM, if you were so concerned yourself at that time'? Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

For example, take Paragraph 33 on the access control system. The first sentence probably gives you a little bit more optimism than it deserves, but the next sentence, "The hub of the system is suffering from constant disruption and damage as a result of working back", etc, etc. So, I think it's....

Chairman:

So, as you have said yourself, the first sentence gives you the optimism that it is working, although it is susceptible to certain damage, but it certainly gives the impression that the problems have been resolved and remote control of door-locks has been progressively implemented. In fact, it didn't work on the day, did it? This system, in fact, was one of the systems that you had doubts about even in your memo of 30 June. So, why was it reflected the way it was reflected to the Board? One step further, you know, by the time it got to ADSCOM, everything was wonderful? Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't answer the question precisely. I guess it was couched in optimistic terms. Perhaps it could have been painted a little bit differently.

主席：

李永達議員先發問，然後到劉江華議員發問。由於我們即將稍事休息，所以只可發問簡短問題。

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Well, it's Papers no. B164 and B165 in Volume VIII.

Chairman:

Volume VIII.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Volume VIII. Papers no. B164 and B165. Can you get that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

So, these are the senior management meetings attended by senior management members of the Airport Authority, and, Mr HEED, you just mentioned that you have discussed the problems before the opening of the airport, but I refer to these 2 papers. It seems to me that, even in the senior management meeting, there's no such thing mentioned at all, even among your senior colleagues. Within the internal discussion, there's no mention of anything that you have to be aware of, you have to mention to other members of the senior management?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think you would have to get other meeting minutes. For example, the FIDS was a weekly meeting between the contractors and our Project Division, which I didn't even attend.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Mr HEED, are the 20th meeting and the 21st meeting on AOR issues?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Correct.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

So, I just have a quick glance at the minutes of these 2 meetings. There is actually no mentioning of anything that you have to worry about before the opening?

Airport Management Director, AA:

These were primarily the facilities, and.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Is FIDS a facility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

None of the systems are mentioned here.

Chairman:

The systems are not mentioned here, Mr HEED had just said. Mr CHAN Kam-lam?

主席：

陳鑑林議員。

陳鑑林議員：

主席，我想跟進剛才提問關於3個沒有“handover”的“systems”。Mr HEED說“the main system is available”。他沒有“hand over”卻有“take over”。到底他有沒有一份“list”作為依據，以便知道就這3個“systems”來說，他究竟“take over”了甚麼？有沒有向有關的.....

主席：

你指在開幕之前？

陳鑑林議員：

對。他“take over”了甚麼？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Madam Chair, we took over the entire system, but we were only satisfied that the main system was working properly and, for example, the PA system.

陳鑑林議員：

不過，主席，若我們翻看文件B39.....

主席：

第幾本？

陳鑑林議員：

第III冊，文件B39，7月14日的“AA Board”文件第19段關於“PA system”。

主席：

剛才曾翻閱這部分。

陳鑑林議員：

對，剛才曾翻閱關於“PA system”這部分。Mr HEED曾說“the main system is available”，但若我們看看“action”這部分，其實有很大問題。最後一句是“However, management’s confidence level in the contractor is low and consideration is being given to appointing another contractor to install an alternative local PA system”。實際上“local PA system”是否存在？這個我不知道。不然，為何會找另一個“contractor”去“install”另一套新的“PA system”？所以我想知道，當時你到底“take over”了甚麼“systems”？

Airport Management Director, AA:

When we took it over, we took over the entire system. Now, the local PA was not functioning properly, although some of the gates were OK, but, by and large, it was not satisfactory. The main system was operating successfully and what's being referred to here is to put in a separate system for the local gate PA systems. It was determined very shortly thereafter that that wasn't a good choice, or a good decision to take, because the two systems had to work together. You can't be talking on one and the other one also in operation at the same time. So, in fact, we had to go on the course that we were on.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，在“AOD”之前沒有“handover”，那麼在“AOD”之後，何時才有“handover”？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, still not taken place, but we are continuing to use the system.

Chairman:

We break here.

劉慧卿議員：

主席，多問一句可以嗎？ Access control, also the hand-over.

Chairman:

Can we do it after the break, because I really would like to have a session with you on this?

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

OK.

主席：

Quarter to twelve. 11時45分繼續，請往會議室B。

(研訊於上午11時47分繼續)

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

主席，我想再集中討論那幾個系統，特別是通訊系統的問題。我想請韓義德先生翻閱文件第III冊B67，這份文件基本上是機管局每星期制訂的報告，講述截至7月5日新機場開幕前一天的情況。請韓義德先生參閱報告中有關那3個系統的內容(即C382的廣播系統、C383的電話系統及C384的無線電話系統)。根據這份報告，基本上廣播系統仍然有很多問題。韓義德先生，你是否同意這點？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would agree. Yes.

劉江華議員：

C383載述電話系統有80%“now achieve”。我想問，“now achieve”是指電話安裝妥當，可供使用；抑或電話完成安裝工作，但不可使用？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I find that this refers to the other telephones, not the public pay telephones. It's the other telephones, OK? And that means 80 per cent of the total number of phones are installed. That's right.

劉江華議員：

你是否知道，差不多70%的收費電話不能使用？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am aware of that. That's the pay telephones.

劉江華議員：

這是7月5日的狀況，80%的電話可以使用。柯家威先生出席本委員會的研訊時提到，有一段時間，部分電線被人損壞。你是否知悉此事？

Airport Management Director, AA:

There were a number of problems with cables and everybody was working frantically. The 3 telephone companies or 4 telephone companies, I can't remember now - Hong Kong Telecom, New World, New TNT - I think 4 telephone companies were all working to connect their telephones plus the system that the Airport Authority had for ourselves and Government. There were a lot of people working and, at times, there were problems with somebody disconnecting one telephone and connecting their own telephone. So, there were some disruptions in that respect and some cables damaged as well, but that would be isolated to one area or that the phones wouldn't work for a period of

time.

劉江華議員：

主席。根據機管局所言，有80%的電話可以使用。你可否具體提供可使用的電話的數目？事實上，“tenants”一定要在6月23或24日前申請安裝電話，截至當天為止，機管局共收到多少份申請？如何可證明有80%的電話沒有問題？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I must go back and must indicate that I'm not the primary person for telephones either. That's Mr CHATTERJEE. If you look at the top of that, they refer to AA phones and Government phones. They were not tenant phones which were to be installed by the various telephone companies. So, the 80 per cent referred to those phones that were to be used on the telephone exchange that the Airport Authority owns and operates, and that includes Government and ourselves.

劉江華議員：

韓義德先生，你負責哪類電話？你是否負責“AA”的電話？

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. I was not in charge of any of the phones. IT is the owner of the telephones, but, of course, we need them to work, so I am interested in that we have sufficient phones to conduct our business, and we had sufficient phones in the Airport Operation Control Centre and in the Apron Control Centre.

劉江華議員：

雖然你並非負責電話安裝或一些技術層面的工作，但你作為管理機場運作的主要負責人，了解電話可否使用及可否以電話通訊，是很重要的。你是否知悉，在機場開幕當日，實際上是否確實有80%的電話可以使用，在溝通方面是否真的沒有問題？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. I am comfortable with that number. Yes, there were. We had a number of problems. As a matter of fact, if you go to the airport now, you'll notice that you can't lift the phones any more. We were getting about 30 to 40 stolen every day from the various gate desks and the loading bridges. So, we

had a sort of an on-going problem to ensure that there were workable phones in the various locations.

劉江華議員：

主席，我想再詢問有關無線電話系統的問題。根據文件，這系統“has been handed over.....”。你是否需要負責這個無線電話系統？為了確保機場開幕當天各部門能互相溝通，以致順利運作，你是否需要確定這個系統一定能夠使用？

Airport Management Director, AA:

The TMR, now, let me just describe the scenario. There are actually 3 TMR systems operating in the Airport. One is the Airport Authority-owned TMR system which was operated by the Airport Authority, as well as Government, and that includes FSD and Police. That worked perfectly throughout the opening days and continues to work well now, although the Police are not totally happy with some of the coverage at the beginning at the extreme ends of the Island, but for operational purposes it worked well. The other system, the Hutcheson system, did experience saturation on opening day as a result of the users all getting on the system at one time. The China Motion system which is the third system also worked well during that day.

劉江華議員：

主席。在機場開幕當天，你是否認為在這3種系統中，只有和記的系統出現問題？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Unfortunately the Hutcheson system was used by just about all the ramp handlers, line maintenance companies and other tenants in the airport. It experienced a really heavy usage and we did have some problems.

劉江華議員：

資料文件明顯指出，就警方的無線電話系統而言，機場有很多通訊盲點，以致警方在該等地點無法使用無線電話。在機場開幕前，你們是

否知道此事；若然，為何沒有作出改善？

Airport Management Director, AA:

With every radio system you will find blind spots. I think you've encountered it yourself even on your mobile system. Now, the blind spots in the airport for the Police primarily occurred in the eastern end of the Island and those are being dealt with by improved coverage in those areas. They weren't totally complete at airport opening, as I recall, but you would have to talk to Mr OAKERVEE or the Police to get more details on that.

Chairman:

Can you just clarify for us? You said that the telephone system is actually the responsibility of the IT Division. You are the users of that system in terms of AA operations, right? You are the users of the system in terms of TMR, the Trunk Mobile Radio, as well as all these land lines which connect various points?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's correct.

Chairman:

Right. Is there a specific hand-over procedure similar to the ones on FIDS, that you actually have IT accepting as the owner, because what you are saying is that they are the ultimate owners? Right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct. Yes.

Chairman:

And you are the user?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Is there a procedure?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Same procedure.

Chairman:

Same procedure and the system was properly handed over before AOD.
Was it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, it was. Trunk Mobile Radio was handed over on 30 June, for
example.

Chairman:

And the rest?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Which one? Telephone?

Chairman:

Yes.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The telephone system hasn't been handed over yet.

Chairman:

Why has it not been handed over?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The note that I have here is that the hand-over documentation is in
circulation.

Chairman:

Since when? Since June, July, August?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't have specifics on that but I could get that for you.

Chairman:

Can you supplement that for us after this hearing because it would help? Is it unusual that since the system was actually working well on AOD that we didn't even have the hand-over certificate? Why? When are procedures being followed and not being followed before AOD? I mean, how do you rely on the certification to provide you with a degree of comfort that certain things have actually been done?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't answer why the telephone system isn't done and I would have to get back to you on that. I'm sorry. I just don't know.

Chairman:

But you know that it's been working well?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, it has. Yes.

Chairman:

On AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We've had failures of that as well but they have been momentary and/or isolated to a particular area. By and large, it's been working well. Yes.

Chairman:

Yes. What about fax lines? Is it part of the system as well because on the day, when FIDS failed, everybody had to rely on something else to communicate all the messages? Right? And AOCC was also relying on faxes from various points on AOD. Are the fax lines working all right on the day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

As far as I know, they were working all right. Whether it's part of the AA system or not, I can't verify that right now. I know in my own office, Hong Kong Telecom provides the fax line into my office although my telephone is on our own PABX.

Chairman:

It's a very, very complicated system and I don't know whether the complexity of the system contributed towards the confusion in the end. You have to tell us exactly what worked and what didn't work on the day because it's such a complex telephone and fax communication system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

As far as the telephones and fax are concerned, there were no reported problems of any outages on airport opening day, for sure.

主席：

劉江華議員，你是否還想提問？

江華議員：

主席，我想繼續詢問電話方面的問題，有些地方仍不太清楚。第III冊文件B39載述機管局在7月14日列出的所有問題，其中提及幾個關於電話的數字，我想弄清楚有關意思。第16段提到，“not all AA's help phones in the PTB were available”，“help phones”是指甚麼電話；是否用來求救的電話？有多少部這類電話不能使用？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't have the number, but the help phones are located throughout the

Terminal Building. What it does is, when you pick up a help phone, it automatically connects you to our AOCC. So, just like dialing Airport Information from your home, you will get an operator within our Airport Operation Control Centre, who would respond to your enquiry. That system, the help phones are on the PABX system owned by the Airport Authority. The New World Telephone was the supplier of the public pay phone and they weren't all installed either.

Chairman:

Now, I think the question is, when you say, "Not all AA help phones in the PTB were available", are these help phones on both land-side and air-side? Right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Chairman:

And they're supposed to be used by members of the public?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's correct.

Chairman:

And it actually says 'help phone'?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

So, when people want certain information they will pick up a help phone and try to get the information? Right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

And they weren't working. How many percent of those were not working on the day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I'd have to get you the actual percentage. There was a large number working but there were some that weren't working as well.

主席：

劉江華議員。

劉江華議員：

有關第18段所載的兩個數字，我不知是否又是由他負責？該段記載，“All public pay phones on the landside and 90 out of 261 on the airside of the PTB are now operational.”。很明顯，這個比率很低。請問他是否負責這些電話？

Chairman:

Pay phones are not AMD responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's not my responsibility. Yes.

主席：

但接著那句“.....all landside help phones except those are fully commissioned and airside to be finished by 15 July.” In fact, that again refers to the help phones. So, what we need to know is on AOD, how many of those help phones were working and by what time they were all working. I think, if you can supplement on such information.

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Chairman:

Deputy Chairman.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would just like to ask about the CEO's appearing inconsistent information and clarify them with Mr HEED. Just now, Mr LAU was referring you to Paper no. B67, this Contract C383, talking about this 80 per cent of the phones now achieved. All right? Can I refer you to another document, which was actually also referred to earlier on? Paragraph 13 in Paper no. A47, Mr HEED. This Airport Operational Readiness Report as at 30 June 1998 was a paper dated 4 July 1998 for the ADSCOM meeting. So, really the date of reference is earlier than the one referred to earlier on in Paper no. B67. Right? And the fifth line says, "More than 95 per cent of the telephone sets have now been installed in the PTB." Now, this document dated earlier than the other one, but it says 95 per cent. The other document, Paper no. B67 dated the week ending 5 July, a bit later than the other one, says only 80 per cent. Why is there such a discrepancy? Both are AA reports.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't explain that. I would have to find out what the basis of those numbers was.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

You agree that there is some inconsistency?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There certainly is.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

The other way round. The later date, in fact, has a lower percentage?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The 14 July one has 80 per cent. Is that 80? No. Where was the 80 per cent? Sorry.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

80 per cent is in Paper no. B67, under Contract C383. "80 per cent of the phones now achieved."

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right, right.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

This is, in fact, later than the date declared in the other document, it says only 80 per cent but the other one says more than 95 per cent. I would like to have your clarification on this. Why was this so incorrect information passed to ADSCOM, the Airport Development Steering Committee, misleading members of the committee. Can you clarify that later on?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We'll clarify that.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Now, the second point is, Mr HEED, the same document, Paper no. B67, was signed by Mr OAKERVEE and also Dr TOWNSEND but you did not sign this document. Why was that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It's probably because I didn't get an opportunity to review the text before it was forwarded to the chairman's meeting. This document was prepared by Mr

OAKERVEE. Generally, we have a discussion on some of the items that are of concern to me in order to get my interpretation or the way I see things.

Chairman:

While on anomalies, I'd just like to fill in on the help phones. Can you also refer to the 2 documents that the Vice-Chairman referred to just now, Papers no. B67 and A47? In A47, Paragraph 13, the last line, 'Public Enquiry Service Hotline'. These are, in fact, the help phones? Are they?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Paper no. A47?

Chairman:

Yes.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Paragraph?

Chairman:

Paragraph 13 which we were referring to just now, the 95 per cent. The last line, 'The public enquiry service hotline'. Those are the help phones, are they?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct. Yes.

Chairman:

Yes, and it says, "The public service enquiry hotlines in English and Cantonese will be available from 1 July."

Airport Management Director, AA:

Excuse me. That was the outside numbers. So, people dialing in from their

residence or from outside the airport, that is what that refers to. There is a hotline, an English hotline and a Cantonese hotline.

Chairman:

I see. So, that's not the help phones?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's not the help phones.

Chairman:

OK. Going back to Paper no. B67, the last line of C383, Contract 383, "Hotlines are connected and help phones are almost all connected." Correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct. So, that is distinguishing between the two, the public enquiry service hotline is the first reference, and the second one is the help phones.

Chairman:

Yes, but we heard that the help phones were not really operating. Quite a few of those were not operating. So, you will have to give us the exact figure on that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

主席：

吳靄儀議員是否詢問關於電話的問題？

吳靄儀議員：

不是關於電話，而是關於其他事宜。

主席：

劉慧卿議員，妳在詢問電話的問題？

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Yes, very briefly. Please refer to Paper no. B39. That's the AA Board paper of 14 July 1998. That is in Volume III. Paragraphs 16, 17, 18 are about telephones but it seems that they are just about public pay phones. So, are we given to understand that there are no problems with other telephones?

Airport Management Director, AA:

A conclusion?

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

How come the problems are not listed then,?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't explain that either.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Do you know the severity of the situation affecting airlines and so on?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I know the AA system, the Government and AA were in fairly good shape, but I also know there were a lot of complaints from Cathay Pacific and others that their phones weren't all supplied.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

So, who should be held responsible?

Chairman:

IT, IT.

Airport Management Director, AA:

IT.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

I see, but that's under him?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, no, no.

Chairman:

No. IT is not under him. IT reports directly to the CEO.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

I see. OK. You are so happy. The first time we see you smiling so broadly, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

OK. Miss Choy So-yuk?

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Actually, I would like to refer to this similar paper, which I find here, concerning the operational problems in the first week after airport opening. It says about the problems on building services.

Chairman:

Paper no. B39.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Yes.

Chairman:

B39.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Paragraph 25 says there were a series of failures of electrical and mechanical systems during the first 2 days of operation on 6 July. This affected at various periods during the day - air conditioning, potable water supply, flushing water supply and the operation of escalators, etc. Now, with these specific problems, and I read through some of the papers, obviously, Mr HEED was aware of these problems before AOD. I would like to refer to your internal memo sent to Mr OAKERVEE, Paper no. B77-2, which was referred to earlier today. In this memo you had also mentioned about water problems; in Paragraph 2 on Page 2, the Passenger Terminal Building; and you also mentioned about flush water system and toilets, so on and so forth. My question to you is: Having sent this memo to Mr OAKERVEE, what did you do following to ensure that what you had listed here would be completed in time for AOD? Let's say, citing water or electrical or whatever as an example?

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

All those items, for example, water and air-conditioning were working but they also failed for very short periods of time and some of them on airport opening day. So, I've got no way of judging it except to see that it's working and that it's OK.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Now, Mr HEED, obviously you must feel that there might be problems before you sent this memo listing the items there. My question is: Following this memo, did you ever speak to Mr OAKERVEE or any of his staff, or did you know that some of your staff did speak to him or some of his staff, to know exactly when this kind of facilities would be repaired or remedied before AOD'?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, I recall one walk-through with Mr OAKERVEE himself. And my staff, of course, were dealing with specific issues. When I wrote that, I guess we just had flush water system problem and I was concerned that we had to get it fixed and the problem would not be repeated on opening day.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

So, did he reassure you that those would be fixed before opening day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, we did. Yes.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

When did he mention that he would have those completed before opening day? At what date he told you that they would be completed?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, we walked through the buildings and we discussed a number of these issues. He assured me that they would be fixed within the next day or the day after. You know, it was discussions like that.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

So, did you note down the dates when these discussions were held?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I did not.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

After Mr OAKERVEE had told you that they would be fixed before opening day, did you do a walk-around to see whether all these had been

completed?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I didn't. On opening day or the day before?

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Before opening day.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The day before. Well, we all walked around the Terminal Building *ad nauseum* the day before, as well as tried to monitor the relocation exercise. We had reports from our daily staff as well and generally those kind of things of flush water and the mechanical systems were working on that day.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Did you ask your staff whether they had checked every item of those in the memo which you sent right before AOD? I mean, did your staff check whether these items had been remedied after your memo was sent?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't believe specifically. They would report anything that wasn't working as part of their normal routine.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

But you mentioned that it wasn't reported. My question is: Since you raise these points, do you feel that that's the end of the story because you have already told Mr OAKERVEE that these are the problems, and then your job is finished? Is it what you feel now?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, although it may look that way, the thing was that there were a lot of things happening just before AOD. I did do a walk-around with Mr

OAKERVEE. The staff would be following up on anything that didn't work and reporting it. The reporting system was in place, so that, for example, if a flush water system wasn't working in one location, I would be notified through the daily log.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Madam Chairman, I would like Mr HEED to tell us if after you sent a memo to, say, Mr OAKERVEE, would you normally receive verbal or written acknowledgement from him saying that he acknowledged the problems? How does it work?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, in this case, I certainly didn't receive anything in writing back from him, though he did call to do a walk-through.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Yes, and did you assign some of your staff to check that they had been finished?

Airport Management Director, AA:

For these specific items, no.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Why not?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would expect them to pick it up as part of their daily routine.

Chairman:

So, it was not ascertained. In other words, Mr HEED did tell us earlier that they were not ready, as he would have liked them to be.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Some of the items, yes.

Chairman:

On AOD, but can we go back to that Paper no. B39, which refers to the building services. It says, "A series of failures of electrical and mechanical systems." You said that they didn't fail before AOD but somehow they all crashed on AOD. How could that be possible? Could you help Members understand a little bit more about these failures? Did you eventually find out what happened and can you please explain AMD's role in this? You know, you are the users. Right? You are the users and these are fairly basic building services which are normally in place for most buildings. Now, how could that have happened on the day that suddenly there were these failures of electrical and mechanical systems? You mean there were no warnings and all of a sudden, they just all failed?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They didn't all fail at once. They failed sporadically. Keep in mind that this is the single largest Terminal Building in the world, 550,000 square metres, and it's got extensive water, plumbing systems, electrical systems, and failures will occur. So, that's not unexpected. Now, perhaps the reliability, for example, the air-conditioning systems should be better but there were problems prior to that with the pressure systems. I am not a technical person on that side of it but maybe Mr OAKERVEE can deal with these in more details.

Chairman:

Ah, but Mr OAKERVEE had already handed over the system to the Maintenance Department which is also under your control. Right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is under me. Yes.

Chairman:

This is Paper no. B184 which is the hand-over certificate. That was actually signed over from the Project Division to your staff in June.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

So, you know, your staff, Mr Y.F. WONG, would actually have received these systems, these services?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

And he would have ascertained that these services were performing at acceptable levels?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Because he had signed them?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Chairman:

So, could you tell us what actually happened? Whether there is something wrong with that process, that he probably accepted them too hastily or that the system somehow was not stable enough to remain in working conditions between June, middle of June and 6 July?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The fact is that failures will occur. You know, you can accept it one day and you get a failure the next day and perhaps not fail for 6 months.

Chairman:

But there were failures and there are failures. I mean, whether they are acceptable and whether the stability of such services should have been ascertained before the building opened? I think that is really the question that Members would like to address. Could you say they didn't all happen at once but in Paper no. B39, Paragraph 25, it did say that a series of failures of electrical and mechanical systems during the first 2 days of operation on 6 July occurred? So, we are talking about all these happening within the first 2 days.

Airport Management Director, AA:

At various periods during the day. Yes.

Chairman:

Right. Do you actually have a list of all these failures? Do we actually have to look at the log or are they all logged down? Would they be already included?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They would all be recorded. Yes.

Chairman:

In the log?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

And they happened at one area or another?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

Air-conditioning, flushing water, this, that and the other?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

Yes, you were satisfied that they were actually the normal 'teething problems' that you would face in a normal opening of the Airport Terminal Building or would it be the scenario as I mentioned that they were actually accepted too zealously.

Airport Management Director, AA:

It's a tough question to answer. I guess the answer is 'yes and no'. For example, just take the sea-water supply for the chillers for the air-conditioning system. There was some pressure problems. Now, that shouldn't occur in a normal operating system. You know, that should have been stabilised before airport opening, but that did occur on that day.

Chairman:

But you've had problems with chillers before?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, we did, but there were electrical motor failures and things like that prior to that. I don't know if there're any pressure problems with the sea-water supply. I know the sea-water supply and the chillers were 2 different contractors and there was an interface problem. I can't explain much more than that.

Chairman:

But did you already find out after the problems had surfaced as to whether it was just the system, or whether it was operation of the system? Did you, in fact, talk with your staff and did you go into it to establish the reasons?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, this one was of serious concern to us because air-conditioning is the first thing that people notice if it isn't working. We spent a lot of time on that

and Mr WONG who is our mechanical/electrical specialist was personally involved and so was the Head of our Engineering Maintenance Department in trying to resolve the problems. So, we were quite actively involved and I was kept apprised of the situation.

Chairman:

So, what was your understanding of the air-conditioning?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was considered acceptable.

Chairman:

Sorry. What was considered? The failures or the system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, the system was acceptable for take-over or hand-over.

Chairman:

But then it failed afterwards?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Tell us why, all of a sudden, there was all this series of failures? I mean, maybe a small part of it would be a 'teething problem' but why, on the opening day, there were such a long series of problems happening on that same day? What was the ultimate cause of it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Excuse me, Miss CHOY. If I showed you the log from yesterday, I think

you would find a number of failures as well. In a large building like that, there will be problems like that.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Madam Chairman, of course, I understand that in such a large building, you obviously would expect that lots of small things could have happened. But the point is, how could you explain that just on these electrical and mechanical systems, there was all this long series of problems and failures all occurring at the same time on the same day? Why was it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

On the escalators and moving walkways, just to take that item C there, that was a sensitivity problem on the loading when the full load of passengers, etc., got on the escalators. That was something that we had to adjust over about a week's period. The sensitivity level of each individual escalator had to be adjusted. There was also a problem on the escalators and walkways with bags hitting the stop buttons and we had to put modifications on the buttons, so that they wouldn't be hit that easily, you know those kinds of things. Now, perhaps they should have been foreseen but they weren't. We just didn't have the amount of people going through the building to give it a full test. The other, the flushing water, and air-conditioning, and electrical, plumbing problems and electrical problems will occur every day. I don't know how else to answer your question.

Chairman:

Mr HEED, this answer keeps coming back to haunt us. You didn't anticipate the stress situation. You didn't expect the crowd coming into the airport and so on and so forth. Surely, as people who are very experienced in operating airports elsewhere, you would have had some estimate as to what sort of crowd you are expecting. Of course, you don't produce the same crowds for trials but you would have an idea of how many people would actually be passing through the airport. How many people you have to cater for on the escalators and in the lifts and so on to make it an anticipated situation. I mean, we keep hearing about unanticipated problems that crop up. Are they really unanticipated problems or should they be anticipated but were not?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It's difficult to adjust the sensitivity unless you get the people on it. Let me give you the airbridge problem as an example. At no time did we have a fully loaded aircraft come into the Airport. So, we could only find the auto-leveller problem out once we had an airplane that was fully loaded and once all passengers got off, the aircraft rose, and the auto-leveller alarm. You know, we had to find that out with actual experience. There was no way of testing that. You know, the auto-leveller could be tested but it behaved under the test procedures all right. The same thing happened to the escalators which were turned on months before and used. We had tested them but we didn't encounter those kinds of problems.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Madam Chairman, I think, Mr HEED had explained here that stoppage of escalators was due to an unexpected number of people. You were not actually suggesting that the breaks in potable and flushing water were also because of unexpected number of people on opening day? Are you suggesting that the same reason applies to electrical and water failure, all because too many people were there on the same day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right. I am only attributing the unexpected number of people or the loading problem to come up. These related to travelators and escalators.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Right. How about water and electrical failures?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't explain those. May be the pump systems or whatever reasons.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Right.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Failed. Yes.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Yes. Why did they fail, all on the opening day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't answer that question.

Hon CHOY So-yuk:

Were they working properly on 1 July?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Yes. Mr HEED did say that they worked prior to AOD, but somehow, on the day, all crashed on him.

Airport Management Director, AA:

To be fair, there were probably failures even before that. You know, periodic outages but, as far as we were concerned, it was working as expected.

Chairman:

Miss Margaret NG.

Hon Margaret NG:

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to ask some questions on the contingency plan which is very much AMD, but I can see that there isn't time really to go into details. So, can I just ask Mr HEED a couple of questions to clarify the documents? Could Mr HEED be given Volume VII, please?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The reference?

Hon Margaret NG:

It's Volume VII. There is Paper no. B109. The name of the document is 'Airport Contingency Procedure During Systems Outage'.

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Now, what is the date of this document?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This document was produced in about late 1997.

Hon Margaret NG:

Late 1997. How late? Would it be as late as December?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think it was round October/November.

Hon Margaret NG:

All right.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I'm guessing here.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Now, in this, there is a plan here. If you look at Paragraph 5.0, this is apparently the contingency plan for Flight Information Display Systems, FIDS. Right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Paragraph 5.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Was this plan ever been put into operation on AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was put into operation fully. Let me just clarify this. This was a document that was produced in late '97, like I said, for consultation purposes with NAPCO, Government as well as the airline industry. It was subsequently revised and reissued in various forms in late - well, just before airport opening.

Chairman:

Right. Now, do we have the revised version?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, you do.

Hon Margaret NG:

Which is the revised version?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Related to FIDS, it's in here as well. I saw this part here, the packages that the Select Committee has.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Mr HEED, if you look at the same bundle, Paper no. B103, you find another FIDS AOB Outage Contingency Procedure. Are you referring to this one?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. I'm referring to Paper no. B100.

Hon Margaret NG:

Paper no. B100. This says FIDS operation, Part 2. Where is the contingency plan, updated contingency plan?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If you read through the text, it says 'fall back' through in various locations.

Hon Margaret NG:

Can you direct me to the paragraph number?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK. Let's look at Paragraph 5.2.2.

Hon Margaret NG:

Paragraph 5.2.2.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Items 1 and 2 on Page 8.

Hon Margaret NG:

So. Right.

Airport Management Director, AA:

It lists a couple of things and then it's fall-back, "check next day". So, it's written in that context.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. So, you say that the revised document is Paper no. B100?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, that's part of it. That relates to FIDS alone, and there are other documents relating to other portions of it. Some were not necessarily updated *per se*. The same procedure applied. For example, the procedure for the baggage handling system that was put in place or the draft was the one that was applicable on the day.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. What would be the revised contingency plan for baggage handling?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That wasn't revised. It was the same one that was produced at the time in October '97.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. And that is? Which one was that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is.

Chairman:

You mean Paper no. B109? The one that Miss Margaret NG referred to at the beginning of this line of questioning?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Papers no. B108 and B109?

Chairman:

B109. Is that the one?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. There's only one. I can't....

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. It's a one-liner. It sets out....

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, no, no. That's not it.

Hon Margaret NG:

Attached, but it wasn't attached.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, then, I've got here in my documentation. I thought it was part of Paper no. B108, but I don't see them there either. No. I did see it in here, somewhere though.

Hon Margaret NG:

Well, could you direct us to it maybe on the next occasion, or in between. So, there was a set of contingency plans and this Paper no. B109 is only part of it. You say subsequently after consultation they were revised. That's the idea, is it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Now, can you direct us to the consultation itself?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK, then just on the baggage system, by the way, I've found it now. It's Paper no. B110. It's here.

Hon Margaret NG:

Ah, right. B110 is the baggage system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

All right. May I ask also if we are still looking at B109, Paragraph 5.0? That relates only to the display? Right? Must be.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Paragraph 5.0.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Sorry, Paragraph 5.1.1.

Airport Management Director, AA:

It deals with the....

Hon Margaret NG:

Because the contingency system is to use the PA system to announce temporary signage and so on. So, all these are display?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think these are dealing with the total system outage.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. Now, what I want to know is, supposing this addresses the situation when FIDS cannot display the information, but we also know, as we understand it, there are systems inputting, I mean, data inputting into FIDS. Now, do you have a plan for what if that fails?

Airport Management Director, AA:

For example, the schedule.

Hon Margaret NG:

Schedule? The estimated time of arrival, all that.

Chairman:

No, it's what failed on the day.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Where was the contingency plan for that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think you would have to look at the other document that I referred to, Paper no. B100, was it?

Chairman:

Paper no.B100.

Hon Margaret NG:

Paper no.B100.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. If you wish, I could brush up on that by next time we meet.

Hon Margaret NG:

That's also in B100, is it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It should be in B100. Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, you are familiar with this bundle provided to the Select Committee?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, but I wouldn't say that I know every line of it.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. So, would it be right to say that if we are interested to find out what contingency plans were made, the first ones, how they revised the revised versions, we would find all of them in this bundle?

Airport Management Director, AA:

All of them?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes.

Airport Management Director, AA:

As far as the FIDS for the public was concerned. Yes.

Chairman:

How do you mean? What's not there?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK. What's not there is what we had to do on opening day relative to providing information to the ramp handlers and the outside groups.

Chairman:

It's not there?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, what we implemented is not here. It's there now only because we wrote the procedure after we implemented the action on airport opening day but it's not described in the procedures that were in place.

Chairman:

So, where does that come in? Members are interested in whether you have any plans in anticipation of a system failure which would in fact plug all the holes that FIDS was supposed to fail. There is a side of information input, there is a side of display information to the public and there is a side of linking the system, the 'nerve system', as you put it, at AOCC with all these other systems, the interface. OK? So, we want to know when there is a total system outage, what contingency plan has actually been put in place to the understanding of everybody, that they knew exactly, if there is a total system failure which was what happened on the day. What was the understanding for all these parties?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK. I think you can take it that what's here was implemented except we had to do one additional measure and that is to get information to the ramp handlers and passenger handling agents and to communicate that information. Because of the number of factors, we implemented the Emergency Control Centre, we set up a whiteboard system which were located in the Emergency Control Centre. The system could be used for them to translate the information by telephones to the companies.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Madam Chairman, that refers to what actually happened as a result of emergency on AOD.

Airport Management Director, AA:

But the procedure for that was to telephone or fax the information to those companies.

Hon Margaret NG:

And we would find that plan referring to the fax and the telephone here?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Which document in this bundle would we find that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Oh.

Chairman:

Well, maybe, Mr HEED, you can let us know afterwards. OK?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Chairman:

What we want is a total picture of the contingency plan as it existed before AOD.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Madam Chairman, perhaps I would make it even more concrete.

Now, Mr HEED, is it right that as at the end of 1997, you had a set of contingency plans? Right? Having formed those plans, you consulted NAPCO, the franchisees, the tenants and so on. As a result of that, you revised some parts of the plans. Is that right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We also published procedures which picked up on a lot of those plans that were produced in '97.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. And the end product was what you implemented on AOD. Is that correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

And we would find all the documents within this bundle before us?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, all related if you are talking about FIDS. Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

No. All the contingency plans. Not just FIDS.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, you don't have all our procedures and I don't think you want them, because they relate to all sort of land-side actions.

Chairman:

No. I think we are actually interested first and foremost in FIDS and the way that all the other systems in FIDS, that are linked up.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Through FIDS.

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Hon Margaret NG:

Indeed, indeed, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

All right?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes.

Chairman:

So, you have to point us to all the documents if they are already with us. If they are not with us, you have to supply them.

Airport Management Director, AA:

All right.

Chairman:

What we need is a total picture of the contingency plan.

Hon Margaret NG:

Thank you very much.

Chairman:

I think we'll end our session today here. Mr HEED please attend our

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜
專責委員會

Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

Select Committee's hearing to be held at 9 a.m. on Thursday, 5 November, to give further evidence and you may now withdraw. Thank you very much. Will Members please go to Conference Room B.

(The hearing ended at 12:32 p.m.)

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