

立法會

調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日 開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜 專責委員會

第14次公開研訊的逐字紀錄本

日期： 1998年11月5日(星期四)
時間： 上午9時
地點： 立法會會議廳

出席委員

周梁淑怡議員(主席)
何鍾泰議員(副主席)
何承天議員
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證人

香港機場管理局機場管理總監
韓義德先生

陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士

香港機場管理局機場運作規劃經理
唐禮俊先生

主席：

多謝各位出席今天舉行的專責委員會第14次研訊。

在未正式開始研訊前，我想提醒各位委員，整個研訊過程必須有足夠的法定人數，即連主席在內共5名委員。

我想藉此機會再次提醒公眾人士及傳媒，若在研訊進程序以外披露研訊上提供的證據，將不受《立法局(權力及特權)條例》所保障。因此傳媒應就他們的法律責任，徵詢法律意見。

在未傳召證人香港機場管理局機場管理總監韓義德先生之前，我想徵詢委員的意見，韓義德先生要求帶同以下人士出席研訊：香港機場管理局機場運作規劃經理唐禮俊先生。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許唐禮俊先生在研訊進行期間陪同韓義德先生，但他不可以在席上發言。

如委員對研訊程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊開始，並傳召證人香港機場管理局機場管理總監韓義德先生。

(韓義德先生進入會議廳，
並由唐禮俊先生陪同)

Mr HEED, thank you for attending the hearing of the Select Committee again. You are summonsed before the Select Committee today to give evidence and to produce papers, books, records and documents related to the Select Committee's scope of inquiry. Please note that you are still under oath when giving your evidence.

Members have in fact agreed that Mr THOMAS will be allowed to accompany you during the hearing but he is not to address the hearing and he should not prompt you in your answering questions.

The Select Committee will now deal with the papers, records and documents that the witness has produced after the hearing on 3 November 1998. The Select Committee notes that the witness has already provided the following documents on 4 November 1998:

1. a letter dated 4 November 1998 from Mr Chern HEED to Clerk to the Select Committee;

2. a summary comparison of FIDS training as planned in the training programme September 1997 and that actually conducted;
3. an extract of the training requirements for systems training from AMD training prospectus August 1997;
4. revised training plan for FIDS by EDS, AA's contractor, February 1998;
5. service level requirements for FIDS as contained in the maintenance contract; and,
6. AA's internal e-mail, dated 15 May 1998, on system handover to AMD.

Mr HEED, are you now formally producing to the Select Committee all the documents mentioned above as evidence?

Mr Chern HEED, Airport Management Director of Airport Authority Hong Kong (Airport Management Director, AA):

Yes, I am.

Chairman:

I now declare that all the documents mentioned above are admitted as evidence produced to the Select Committee. We now continue with the hearing. Miss Margaret NG?

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, I would like to ask Mr HEED about the contingency plans. Could Mr HEED have Volume VII please?

Chairman:

Can I have the reference number of the document please?

Hon Margaret NG:

I am going to refer to several documents in Volume VII. Mr HEED, you are familiar with these documents which were provided to us by Mr Billy LAM. They are supposed to be a collection of various contingency plans, right? Now, we were referring to one of them, I believe, at Paper no. B108. On Tuesday you said that that was prepared at the end of 1997 and was used as a consultative document, is that right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

So that the next contingency plan which was issued, as directed by you, was Paper no. B100. That is Part 2 of FIDS Operations Procedure or, rather, FIDS Operations Procedure Part 2?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is the contingency plan for FIDS, yes. The policy procedure for FIDS, which includes contingency measures.

Hon Margaret NG:

Just referring to FIDS for the time being. The document is dated 1 July. Was that the date it was issued?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There was further consultation on this document on 10 June with the airline community, prior to being officially signed off by myself and the managers concerned.

Hon Margaret NG:

10 June, you had another consultation and this document was issued on 1 July. So, the first time that the airlines, the franchisees and staff in AA got hold of this document was 1 July, is that right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. The document, before it was signed, was consulted again on 10 June. It was circulated to those that took part in the 10 June meeting prior to its being signed off on 1 July.

Hon Margaret NG:

You are referring to the Paper no. B109, is that right? The one you said was prepared at first, at the end of 1997?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. After the consultation in late 1997, this particular document, the FIDS portion, was updated. There should be a letter in here - here it is - Paper no. B113, which was unfortunately only the minutes of the meeting but this was the agenda for discussion of this particular document before it was finished and signed off by myself.

Hon Margaret NG:

Actually, if you look at Page 2 of that document at Paragraph C, it refers to a stand-by fall-back operation and it says that the:

"AA has developed stand-by FIDS system to be used when FIDS is down. AOCC will inform airlines/handling agents when this occurs."

Then, if you look at point 4 under C:

"If stand-by FIDS is not available, airlines to use their own fallback signage at the check-in desk/gate desk and transfer desk."

So, the understanding, the impression given by this document is actually that the stand-by FIDS system will be switched on?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If there is a failure in the main FIDS system, yes. If the main FIDS system isn't working or fails, then the stand-by FIDS is available for use, yes. We would inform the community as such.

Hon Margaret NG:

So far as the impression given by this document, it is not what to do when FIDS is down. It says that when FIDS is down, stand-by FIDS would be switched on and you would be notified of it. Generally, it contains no further details?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This was for discussion purpose. It was an agenda for discussion.

Hon Margaret NG:

That was the basis of the discussion?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

You don't recall when the meeting was held but it must be sometime after this letter?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was held on 10 June.

Hon Margaret NG:

Right. After 10 June, was there any contingency plan issued?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This one at Paper no. B100.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. That is the one we were referring to and it was issued on 1 July?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

As far as the baggage handling system is concerned, in the context of consultation with airlines and franchisees, the discussion was still in an open stage by 27 May, isn't that right? You have a letter of that date?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There was a lengthy consultation meeting with ramp handlers, airlines, with the baggage system operator, etc, sometime in May. I can't remember the exact date.

Hon Margaret NG:

If you look at Paper no. B111 in the same bundle you will find a summary of meeting of 27 May 1998. Is that the meeting you are referring to?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I seem to recall more detail. Prior to that meeting there was a number of questions that were asked by the industry --

Hon Margaret NG:

Forgive me for interrupting. Is that the meeting you were referring to, 27 May?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This looks like a meeting that was just the contractor.

Hon Margaret NG:

Just pausing there for a moment. Looking at this document, do you see somewhere in the middle of the page "major system breakdown". It says:

“Flow charts for major system breakdown scenarios to be worked out.

Fall-back plans including staff deployment and throughput capacity by using OOG lifts to be drawn up.

System resuming procedures for power failure to be drawn up.”

Do I understand from the summary of the meeting that as at 27 May the arrangements were still very open-ended after the discussion?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Let me try and explain this, if I can. There was a BHS contingency plan, which was drawn up also in late 97. But it was also the responsibility of the contractor to prepare his, based on ours, and that is what was expected there. M009 refers to the contractor producing his plan related to the fall-back measures and how he is going to deploy his people. The one that was produced in late October was more general in the strategies to be used in a contingency.

Hon Margaret NG:

As of 27 May, whether from you or from the contractor, the fall-back plans were still in a pretty open stage?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Were they in an open stage?

Hon Margaret NG:

It is still left open?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think they were far along, but there was still room for changes, yes.

Chairman:

Sorry. That is not what the document tells us. I think it is quite important, Mr HEED, that you respond to Miss Margaret NG's earlier question vis-a-vis Paper no. B111, because it does say here that this fall-back -- which you told us would fall under the responsibility of the contractor, did you say, the contractor of the service? That they are to be drawn up. The question that follows must be, first of all, whether it means that they weren't drawn up at this stage, which was Margaret's original question, that they are open at this stage and, secondly, whether they were eventually drawn up and, if they were, where are they?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't answer that question specifically but I know that the operations manual was dated 12 May, which is Paper no. B114.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, but the operation manual doesn't contain anything like a contingency plan if FIDS breaks down or if the baggage handling system breaks down? It doesn't contain anything of the kind. I have looked through it, Mr HEED?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I'm not intimately familiar with it but --

Hon Margaret NG:

Pausing there. Why are you not intimately familiar with that? Isn't this part of your responsibility as AMD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. It falls under my area of responsibility, but I have a number of managers and over 600 staff that deal with various issues. Certainly, the fall-back arrangements were required and I will have to find out when they were actually produced.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, since you are not familiar with Paper no. B114, you can take it from me that it doesn't contain any contingency plan, any fall-back plans when the system breaks down. Really, we are reduced to Paper no. B100. That is the one which was issued to the airlines and AA staff on 1 July. In fact, after 1 July. No earlier than 1 July?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There is another one at Paper no. B110, which was an earlier version, and that was what the Swire Engineering were expected to adhere to but describes specifically how they were going to deploy their staff. That was the intent of what you see at Paper no. B111.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, if you look at Paper no. B110, this is Version 1.1A. In the headline it says Version 1.1A, February 1997. This is an earlier document?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Not a later one?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is certainly earlier, yes. That was the framework that was developed for contingency measures and we expected the contractor to come up with specifics as to how he was going to deploy his staff.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, you realise that it doesn't answer my question, that as of 27 May the contingency plan was still left open in very large areas? This is not a document which was after 27 May. It could not have finalised the plans following 27 May, because it pre-dates it, all right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. I will have to get back to you on that.

Hon Margaret NG:

Unless and until you get back to us we are really looking at Paper no. B100, issued on or after 1 July?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

In view of that, is Paper no. B100 what you have to rely on on AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

In view of that, would you not agree with me that airlines and franchisees and other staff of the AA really had very little time to familiarise themselves with the contingency plan?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The specifics of the contingency plan, I would agree with you. The generalities of how it was going to work were described earlier and known to staff.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, would you agree with me that the contingency plan was expected to be activated when you have a breakdown? That being the case, a really good contingency plan, in order for it to work, must be something that

people could lay hands on at once and know exactly what steps to follow?
Would you agree?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I would agree. But the people who are primarily responsible for that baggage handling system is the contractor, both up in the check-in hall and also in the baggage sortation hall.

Hon Margaret NG:

It is your responsibility to see to it that on opening day things worked smoothly and efficiently, isn't it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is right.

Hon Margaret NG:

It is in your interests to find out exactly how well people are fulfilling their part of their duties? Otherwise, if things crash on AOD, there is no point your turning around and saying "It is not my responsibility. It is somebody else's fault." Is that right? You wouldn't like that to happen?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is certainly my responsibility that that airport operates the way it should.

Hon Margaret NG:

I'm not talking about whose liability is it. I am talking about whether you knew to your satisfaction before AOD that it's going to be all right? Whether the plan came from the contractor or from your own staff is immaterial, as far as that question is concerned?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Margaret NG:

Do you not agree with me that people have very little time to familiarise themselves with the details of the contingency plan?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If it is May 27, with 6 weeks to go, yes --

Hon Margaret NG:

No. We are talking about 1 July. That is when this is issued?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But they were circulating before that.

Chairman:

But when you circulate something, Mr HEED, before it is actually finalised and issued as a finalised document, wouldn't you agree that you only work, as far as briefing everybody, members of staff and so on is concerned, you work with the finalised document? You don't work during the time when you are actually consulting. Surely, with a document that is being circulated for consultation, the purpose of that would be to make changes to that document which would be deemed necessary at that point. That is not for the purpose of smooth operation at a later date, wouldn't you agree?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess maybe I have a different concept of contingency from perhaps you do. You know, contingency requires not only the written procedures. When something happens you can't specifically follow the contingency because there are all sorts of variations that may occur. Therefore, you have to have the experience to be able to adapt to the situation as it develops. Familiarity with the contingency plan is one thing but then having the experience to react is

another and it is a combination of the two that enables things to work properly.

Hon Margaret NG:

Thank you, Mr HEED, indeed. You don't need only a clear contingency plan. You also need experience. So you need 2 things. I haven't even referred to the experience. I was just referring to a clear contingency plan. You surely need such a thing and that wasn't available on 1 July. That is what I am trying to call your attention to?

Chairman:

Until 1 July.

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes, until 1 July?

Airport Management Director, AA:

You are absolutely right, as far as the actual documentation is concerned. But we have many, many experienced staff who have worked at Kai Tak previously, they have worked at other airports, so --

Chairman:

Mr HEED, we are talking about a brand new system. This is not the Kai Tak system. I think by now people can see quite clearly - and you admitted it as much yourselves, I mean the management of AA - that the FIDS system was built specifically for Chek Lap Kok. It is a new system. That is why you require all this training, that is why you require all the contingency plans being drawn up, particularly in view of the fact that FIDS has been showing such signs of instability? Why do you require the contingency plans?

Members are interested to know exactly what contingency plans you have in terms of documentation and how they were actually passed on to people who were supposed to conduct the operation, so that when the system fails you have something that would be put into operation? We are trying to establish that. You are telling us that in fact these are so-called workarounds. From the answer you just gave, you seem to be indicating to Members that contingency plans are

one thing, but when it comes to it we don't know how the situation will come out so we have to rely on our experience.

You have to tell us, first and foremost, what contingency plans you have? How they are actually being passed on to people who are responsible for the operation? Then you are sure that they know fully what the contingency plan is, and how that is carried out into practice, so that we can relate all these things which are necessarily connected and linked up?

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, I wonder if I could put very simply to Mr HEED that the importance of reacting quickly to emergency is co-ordination, would you agree?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Everyone knows exactly what to do and goes and does it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

Doesn't that mean that you are going to have to have some prior agreement that everybody is very clear about?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, but keep in mind that a contingency plan is developed with experience. For example, the contingency plan on FIDS, just take that as an example. People had been working with the FIDS system for several months and, realising the problems that could occur, that is why the contingency plan wasn't actually finalised until the last month because there were new ideas coming up, new

thoughts being put in, and that was finalised. The people that were there that were doing the job were living with it every day and realising what the contingencies were.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, the airport was very big?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

There were large numbers of people involved?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

The integrated system of FIDS controls everything. That is the heart system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Hon Margaret NG:

If that breaks down, a lot of people are going to be affected? A lot of operators are going to be affected?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

At that point, at the point of breakdown, there are 2 things which can happen. One is that these people would call each other. This would be cumbersome and it would tie up all your telephone lines and all your fax lines. That is common sense, isn't it? The second possibility is that there is a pre-agreed common plan, so that everyone would know exactly what he or she has to do when that happens, isn't that right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

You are telling me that the second possibility didn't materialise until after 1 July, is that correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am telling you that the final document wasn't put in place until then, yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Let's look at that final document. Can you turn to the back of the document because that summarises it? I think the second sheet from the back you have appendix A? Can you find that? Page 24 of 26 marked on the right-hand upper corner?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The matrix, yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

There is a table. FIDS information flow chart. Do you see that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

We are still on Paper no. B100, right?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Madam Chairman, the second sheet from the back.

Chairman:

FIDS information flow chart?

Hon Margaret NG:

Yes. Looking at this plan, on the right-hand column you have AA/AOCC. That is the Airport Operation Control Centre, is that correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Margaret NG:

Following that column, it tells you how it works, how information is put in, how it gets its information and how it displays its information, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

The first box of the right-hand column is the seasonal schedule. We are not concerned with that. Then the second box is also seasonal schedule. We are not concerned with that. Going to the third box, you see daily flight schedule?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Does this part of the chart summarise your contingency plan, what happens if FIDS is down?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This describes the day-to-day procedure.

Hon Margaret NG:

Looking just at that part of it. The arrows pointing to daily flight schedule means how information on daily flight schedule is inputted into it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

It says here it is from the airlines, handling agents, BAC, and it says by fax or electronic link?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Can you tell us what the electronic link was?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The electronic link could be just a host computer link, like we have with Cathay Pacific, for example. They could feed in their daily changes, if there are daily changes to the seasonal schedule.

Hon Margaret NG:

Not the seasonal schedule. The daily flight schedule?

Chairman:

We are talking about the second part of the chart, Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I understand. The daily flight schedule is extracted from the seasonal schedule and then the changes for the next day are fed in by the airlines, the handling agents, Business Aviation Centre, etc.

Hon Margaret NG:

I understand. But it says by fax/electronic link. I was just asking you what are those electronic links?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Most of the information comes by fax but there is linkage with Cathay Pacific specifically. Cathay Pacific, on behalf of all the airlines, does the scheduling for the airport.

Hon Margaret NG:

What is the system used then?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is the SCC.

Hon Margaret NG:

So, going down the next lot to the box of daily movement update, cancellation, diversion, ad hoc flights, aircraft assignment and so on, you again have the airline handling agent BAC and then you have again fax, SITA messages, electronic link, and then the information input?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Margaret NG:

Again, fax or some electronic system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Chairman:

Miss Margaret NG, where are you moving to with this line of questioning?

Hon Margaret NG:

OK. Isn't it right that what this shows here is that there are 2 possibilities of getting information - from the airline handling agents and, finally, the last box from ATC?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

And it is either electronic link, as described by you, or by fax?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

Is it right that your contingency plan is really that when the systems are down you rely entirely on fax? Or on telephone and fax?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Fax and telephone, that is right.

Hon Margaret NG:

In fact, if you go to the earlier parts of the Paper no. B100, it really says no more than that if the systems were down you would have to rely on fax, on telephone, on messengers?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Hon Margaret NG:

Going to the last page, Appendix C of Paper no. B100, FIDS Fall-back Procedure. We have just talked about the input aspect of it. You just have to rely on fax, on telephone and on messengers from these airlines, handling agents, BAC and ATC, right? Now, the last page is about display. I am sorry. It isn't about display.

Chairman:

Fall-back.

Hon Margaret NG:

This is the fall-back position. Leaving that for the time being, leaving out Appendix C for the time being. Forgive me for so simplifying your contingency system. But, looking at a very large airport, looking at the fact that what it amounts to is that if FIDS is down you have to rely on doing things by fax and doing things manually, were you satisfied that if this contingency plan were to be put into operation the airport would still be run efficiently?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I was. As a matter of fact, this is the same contingency plan that exists at most airports. The airports that I have worked at, major airports, fax, telephone, SITA is the way to communicate if the electronic link isn't working.

Hon Margaret NG:

I would invite you now to look at Paper no. B105. Somewhere in the middle you find FIDS log details. I can't tell you what the page number is because they are variously numbered.

Chairman:

Can you identify it by the date?

Hon Margaret NG:

Do you see the log details?

Chairman:

Which one are you referring to in particular?

Hon Margaret NG:

On 6 July.

Chairman:

That is the first page of the FIDS log details. Have you found it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Hon Margaret NG:

Before we look at it, Mr HEED, are you telling this Committee that it would be a wonderful thing if this sophisticated FIDS system works but, if not, if we have to rely on fax, on messenger and telephone, it still would be efficient? I find that answer very astonishing?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Let me understand your question? Can you just repeat it again please?

Hon Margaret NG:

Are you saying that if FIDS, this very sophisticated system, breaks down, doesn't work, and you have to fall back to fax, to telephone, to manual, to messengers, the airport will still function efficiently?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It won't function as efficiently as with the automatic system. Otherwise, why have the automatic system? But we were confident that the arrangements will keep it going. They can't go forever, but for a short period of time it should function.

Hon Margaret NG:

What was your version of functioning, keeping it going? What is your standard of efficiency if that contingency plan were to be activated? Have you estimated how it would work?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Just as an example, on the displays that you see in the terminal building there are eight displays for arrivals and eight displays for departures. There is something like a maximum 80 lines of information that can be put on those displays. In other words, 80 flights can be put on there. That gives you, during peak hour, up to 3 hours of information and more at non-peak hours. The fact is that if you have a short outage it is not going to create adverse problems for the travelling public.

Chairman:

Unless the information contained there is changed during those 3 hours?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct. For example, if we had a gate change to one of those aircraft that was shown and we didn't update it, then we would have to announce it on the PA system.

Chairman:

Was it not the case when FIDS broke down you had these outages and the information was actually frozen and yet there were changes during those times?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, there was.

Chairman:

Which rendered the information being given totally inaccurate?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That did happen and we used the PA system to broadcast throughout the terminal building.

Hon Margaret NG:

Didn't your PA system also eventually have problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was down for about 40 minutes that day, yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, I think this Select Committee will make up its own mind as to whether it worked efficiently. Your answer was that at that time you considered this would work efficiently, it would keep it going. I still don't get your idea of efficient working? For example, how do you expect people to communicate with each other if FIDS is down if they have to rely on fax? How were the ramp handlers, for example, supposed to communicate with each other?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They would communicate via fax, or telephone, or mobile radios. That is

the arrangement that they have.

Hon Margaret NG:

If you look at the log that I was referring you to a moment ago, in fact the very first item, 0600 hours, says "AIDB/AODB interface were down". You see FIDS working slowly, FIDS going out, all kinds of problems, and on the comments column you then set up your whiteboard and so on. To sum it up and cut a long story short, you were finding difficulty coping on the basis of your contingency plan?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, we were.

Hon Margaret NG:

So how can you tell this Committee that it would work efficiently?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think what happened here on that day, even by 10 o'clock no one really understood the extent of the problem. The contingency measures that were in place were working to a fashion but, as the day progressed, it got progressively worse.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, please explain why these contingency plans were working to a fashion, as you tell us now, rather than working efficiently, as you expected?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am just relying on our 10 o'clock meeting that we had with the airlines, ramp handlers, etc. There was no serious concern that there were major problems at that time, even though the situation was starting to -- there were some problems, there was no question about that, but the extent of the problem wasn't really known by people.

Hon Margaret NG:

Pausing there. Mr HEED, are you telling us from this log that up till 10 o'clock it was not considered to be a serious problem?

Airport Management Director, AA:

When you look at it in retrospect perhaps it looks worse than it was at the time but, talking to the various people, I didn't get the feeling that it was that serious, yes.

Chairman:

Mr HEED, I really have to follow up on that particular question.

Hon Margaret NG:

I find it really surprising.

Chairman:

If you look at the first item in the log details, the first item on the first day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

At 0600 hours you have "AIDB/AODB interface were down". If you look at the information flow chart which we were referring to just now and Paper no. B100, immediately you are talking about estimated arrival time and all the sort of vital information from ATC. Already you are talking about a failure inputting that into FIDS, which meant that FIDS did not in fact have the information to disperse immediately. Even at 0600 hours which meant immediately after commissioning of the airport, you would have to resort to faxes, telephone lines, etc. Are you still saying, even at the point go, that the problem was not serious? They could just go on and you were anticipating efficient operation

even though the system was not working right from the very start?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The AIDB link was down. That meant that the ETA had to be received by telephone from the air traffic control centre. The information was still being received. As far as ordinary person was concerned, and I was concerned, looking at a monitor, the information was there.

Chairman:

But not necessarily accurate, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But I didn't know that.

Chairman:

But you know that it was down. You know that AIDB/AODB, you know the interface were down. You know that the information that you were seeing might not be reliable, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, because the telephone linkage is still there. We are not that far apart between air traffic control and ourselves.

Chairman:

You were telling us a while ago that when FIDS is down you have certain information which would last for a period of time, you said for three hours?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Correct.

Chairman:

And this information is still there, while at the same time you resort to the

contingency plan, which is faxes, telephone lines and so on?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Correct.

Chairman:

As we see down the log, there are quite a lot of changes during the day, flight changes, and so on and so forth, as you went along. Those changes were actually conveyed to you through the telephone lines, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Correct.

Chairman:

On the one hand, you were looking at information fed by the FIDS system, which was not necessarily reliable but was there? You have in fact 2 sets of information: One from the not so reliable FIDS which you were trying to reboot from time to time?

At the same time you were receiving sets of information by telephone and fax lines. We are not just talking about ETAs, right, we are talking about other inputs as well. So you had 2 sets of information at the same time. Now, what did you feel at the time? How would your operators be handling the situation while all this was going on, a dynamic picture, information coming in, changing all the time, conveyed to them by telephone, faxes and so on, and then FIDS, on the other hand, with certain information which might or might not be reliable?

Airport Management Director, AA:

First of all, FIDS was not down. FIDS was slow at that time and I didn't even really appreciate that until --

Chairman:

Not working, would you say?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, it was working and the information was displayed appropriately. At that time in the morning there weren't that many flights, so the problem wouldn't be evident because most of the arrivals and departures would already be on the FIDS board.

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, may I direct Mr HEED to the document itself. Under 0700 hours, the last part actually says:

"About 80 per cent of the boarding gates either unable to display correct flight information or cannot display anything on it. Problems included faulty LCDs, incorrect connection, and could not refresh."

At 0800, the second paragraph:

"FIDS workstations performed very slow, not able to handle all the input by ACC, AOCC and BHS. This especially caused great problems --"

Great problems:

" -- in updating the TMS with the stand/gate allocations."

And we know later on what sort of havoc that caused:

"Outstanding issue before AOD".

Then at 0830 hours, again, we see slow response of TMS and frequent hang-up of ACC workstations. Then when we arrive at 10 o'clock, FIDS station and workstation at BHS control room, BHS operator was not able to input reclaimed belt assignment. Then you have the meeting with ramp handlers, AOC members and so on, reporting FDDS now not available. So, there was a problem. You see Paragraph 2, that they have communication problem.

Can you account for the fact that they had communication problem if you

had very good contingency plans?

Airport Management Director, AA:

When the FIDS started to slow down the problem was with the LCD boards where the gate number is, but the monitors themselves were still showing the information. The big LCD boards were the ones we were having the troubles with. There was information in the terminal building at that time.

Chairman:

But not necessarily correct information because the information changes all the time.

Hon Margaret NG:

Do you agree, Mr HEED, that the information was either not correct, not up-to-date, not in time, or not available?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would agree partially that that is true.

Hon Margaret NG:

Can you answer the earlier question as to why was a great communication problem experienced?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Why communication problem was experienced?

Hon Margaret NG:

Looking at the 10 o'clock meeting, isn't great communication problem the major complaint? They couldn't get hold of information. They didn't know where the aircraft was. They didn't know how to handle the situation. They didn't have updated information?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But that wasn't all really in FIDS though. There were a number of other issues that arose at the same time. That notice at 10 o'clock relates to the trunk mobile radio.

Hon Margaret NG:

No, Mr HEED, it is when FIDS breaks down that people have to rely on other things. When FIDS breaks down, the common communication breaks down and they have to rely on other communication methods they find that they have a difficulty. I am asking you, since you were trying to create a contingency or fall-back plan when FIDS breaks down, why that hasn't worked?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There is sort of a multiplication of a number of factors that --

Chairman:

Mr HEED, looking at the log details, you don't really have to look beyond even 10 o'clock that morning. It is full of all these details which tell you a breakdown of the transfer of information from one part of the PTB to another. That was what led to all these other problems surfacing because there was no information flow which was intended in your chart earlier under Paper no. B100. Would you agree that there was a failure of the flow of correct, reliable information between the various parts of the operation? Would you agree to that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. But we did have contingencies like the whiteboard.

Chairman:

No, we are not talking about whiteboards. We are talking about between 6 am to 10 am that very morning, the first morning. You said that FIDS was working. We are putting to you the details we see in the log. Would you agree that these problems arose because of the lack of the flow of information that was

required under your original plan, under the flow chart? FIDS being the nerve centre, you needed all this information to be flowing between all the various parts of the PTB. It did not occur and that led to all these other problems surfacing. Would you agree to that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. It was a symptom of the slow response of the system, the input to the system.

Chairman:

Although in your terms FIDS was working would you agree that the details reflect the fact that it wasn't actually working to the effect that you would need to have in order to achieve smooth operation?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

It wasn't operating smoothly?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's correct.

Chairman:

And the information that FIDS was giving was either not reliable, not up-to-date, or incorrect? At some point anyway?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think you are painting a bleaker picture than it actually was. Information was perhaps not correct or wasn't updated but the problem that we were having

was updating of that information. For example, if there was a gate change we couldn't input the gate change. That information wasn't there.

Chairman:

If you had information that was there but was not reliable and incorrect, what good is that information? Isn't that what this is all about? The failure of FIDS led to the lack of flow of correct information to the various parts of PTB and, therefore, led to all these other problems that came up because people just didn't have accurate information to work to?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Chairman:

Wouldn't you agree that the contingency plan you had in the first place relies on all these other means of transmitting the information in place of FIDS? That was the basis of the contingency plan but it really didn't work very well at all on that first day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I wouldn't agree with that.

Hon Margaret NG:

It worked well on that day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There are other factors.

Chairman:

It is either one or the other? Did it work well or did it not work well? You wouldn't agree, so where would you say it was on the first day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The system, it was slow but --

Chairman:

But did it work well or not work well?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is a fact of the equipment not the contingency plan.

Hon Margaret NG:

Let me just put this to you. Looking at the log again. Let's look at the comment column. The comment column is really what you did at the time, is that right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Around 7 o'clock the whiteboards were put up, right? You see 0700 in the right-hand column. This is what you did, Appendix C of Paper no. B100, FIDS fall-back procedure. That is your fall-back procedure?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Then rebooting. You can see at about 8 o'clock, rebooting. Now, skipping the next page, then 1330 hours, do you find that entry?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

At the right-hand column again, AOCC placed staff at ACC and ATC to personally collect estimated time of arrival and landing time directly. AOCC also communicated with ACC by telephone and by fax for the ETA, bay allocation and so on, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Margaret NG:

This is your evidence that the contingency plan was put into operation?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

As far as the operation of that is concerned, you say that it worked. But what the log shows us very clearly is that, in spite of you putting your contingency plan into function, we are still seeing massive confusion. That is to say, it shows us that your contingency plan, though activated, was unable to handle the situation. Would you agree with that?

Madam Chairman, I really shouldn't waste the Select Committee's time reading out things which are really very obvious from the log, the FIDS was getting worse, communication was getting worse.

Chairman:

I think the question has been posed. Would you answer that, Mr HEED? Would you agree that the contingency plan didn't really fulfil the original purpose that it was intended to fulfil?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't think the contingency plan could be written any differently to do any more. I think the contingency plan was OK. It was just the number of things that weren't anticipated.

Chairman:

So you are saying FIDS was the problem but the contingency plan was not?

Airport Management Director, AA:

From my experience, I just can't see what else there could be in the contingency plan that would have corrected this situation.

Chairman:

Mr SIN Chung-kai.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

May I refer members to Paper no. B101, Page 15 of 17, Decision for Change-over.

Chairman:

We are on to stand-by FIDS now.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Yes. Page 15 of 17. This is the decision table, decision flow chart, for turning on the stand-by FIDS. When does it first come to your attention that it takes 3 hours to switch to stand-by FIDS?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That was established early on in June.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

In June. Do you know that it takes 3 hours to turn on to the stand-by FIDS when it was presented to the main Board in February?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Perhaps I should just explain a little bit on that. The stand-by FIDS was, in my mind, designed for catastrophic failures. In other words, if the system went out and it wasn't going to be back in 3 hours, a catastrophic failure that it was known right at the beginning it was going to be out or something that failed and then after 2 hours it still was not back on, we would then activate the stand-by FIDS. That was the decision criteria. If we knew it was a catastrophic failure right at the beginning it would take us 45 minutes to get it back on. But, if it was something that the contractor and others felt could be saved within the next 3 hours, then we would let them try to fix it. The decision point was 2 hours. In other words, at 2 hours, if they hadn't fixed it, we would go to stand-by FIDS.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

You specified the requirement to the contractor?

Chairman:

Who was responsible for that decision?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The decision was a joint decision by myself and the Head of Information Technology.

Chairman:

I think your earlier question, whether this was actually put to the Board --

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't recall if it was specifically told to the Board. But, clearly, you have a FIDS system that has cost us something like \$300 million and we are spending

\$20 million on a stand-by system. It's not going to have the same functionality. There were a number of other considerations that went into: whether the stand-by FIDS required a lot of functionalities that wouldn't be there, for example. It had to be a significant failure that we would go to stand-by FIDS.

Chairman:

How would you define a significant failure or catastrophic situation that you were talking about earlier? How would you describe a situation to be serious enough for you to switch to stand-by?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If we were given a clear indication that, for example, the system was totally out, the whole server burnt up or whatever. The regular FIDS has a stand-by system as well. We have 2 separate Comms Rooms. If the first system fails, it's a hot stand-by to the next system. The third option is the stand-by FIDS. If we knew that for some reasons the whole server or the software crashed totally and the contractor and ourselves estimated that it wouldn't come back on, then we would switch to stand-by FIDS.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

May I turn your attention to the FIDS log details, 7 July. It is the second day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Can you give me the Paper no. again?

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Paper no. B105. It is 7 July. It is the second day. Under the second day log there are a number of occasions, for example, at 0645 hours, "FIDS cannot log in", at 0800 hours, "FIDS monitor screens shaking", at 1000 hours, "FIDS monitor out of order at gate G21", etc, etc. This is not information and some of the problems are fixed 22 July, 18 July, 17 July, etc. These problems do not trigger your decision to turn on the stand-by FIDS? It is already the second day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But those are specific failures at a check-in desk. There are 288 check-in desks.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

These are check-in desks?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. It is not the whole system, no.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

In the morning at 0500 hours, FIDS system performance problem similar to 6 July. Similar?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right. In other words, slow response.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

This is not classified as catastrophic?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, sorry.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

May I turn back to 6 July. Do you know how many times FIDS has to be rebooted?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was only rebooted once at about 10.40 am in that morning. It was

rebooted again during the night but it wasn't rebooted during the day.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Exactly. At 10.30 am there is a remark, system rebooted and back to normal at 11 o'clock. The comment is "back to normal". But in the log, 11 o'clock, after the rebooting probably, AOCC FIDS workstation performed even slower, took 20 to 25 minutes to allocate a reclaim belt. At that time, yourself and K.S. NG went to AOCC to understand the problem. It was already 11 o'clock. Did you discuss whether you needed to turn on the stand-by FIDS having tried to understand the problem at 11 o'clock?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, we did not. We took a decision prior to that and that's what led to the rebooting.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

I am sorry. May I ask again? You took the decision to reboot the system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

But, after rebooting the system, the result is that the performance is even slower?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think that was related to one specific area and that was in the baggage reclaim hall. You can reboot the workstation as well. Now, the problem was when --

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

At 10:30 am you rebooted the main FIDS system, am I right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

After rebooting the main FIDS system, not the workstations?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

But, after the rebooting, AOCC FIDS workstations which is in your AOCC's control centre performed even slower?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think they were talking about the workstation in the baggage sortation hall, because they are talking about --

Chairman:

Mr HEED, we are looking at all these log details. Let me make a general comment, throughout the log details we see the FIDS system failing at one point or another all over the place.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Especially, that is why I drew Members' attention to 11 o'clock because they rebooted the system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But the reboot wasn't complete until after that. It was about 11 --

Chairman:

I think Mr SIN's point is that even after rebooting it was not working as it should. Your log shows it is back to normal but it's not back to normal.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

It is even worse.

Chairman:

All the other points are actually telling you that everything was not working well at all, yet you didn't feel that the situation was serious enough to go to stand-by. Why is it?

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Starting at 6 o'clock in the morning there was a series of problems and at 11 o'clock you made the decision to reboot the system, which is the normal practice probably. After rebooting the system, you still found evidence of even worse performance. At that time, at that moment, did you discuss turning on the stand-by FIDS? Are you following the decisions of change-over on the contingency plan on Paper no. B101, that is the chart I drew attention to earlier on?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am just looking at some notes here --

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

There is no specific definition of FIDS system down. There is a chart that only says, "FIDS system down." Probably, the system was available, but it's not -- am I right to say it is available but not reliable?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, yes, I guess you are right.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So now system is available but not reliable but you did not follow the contingency plan?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think you have to keep in mind there was a very dynamic situation that morning and there was a lot of things happening. This wasn't the only problem that we were having. My attention was on a number of things at the same time. The seriousness of this --

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Mr HEED, under the log at 11 o'clock it clearly says you yourself and K.S. NG went to ACC to understand the problem. Of course you were busy the whole morning but probably these important issues drew your attention and you yourself clearly went to understand the problem. You are the master of this Airport Management Division and you have to make the decision on the stand-by FIDS operation procedures?

Airport Management Director, AA:

When I went to the ACC that morning - I think it was just before 10 o'clock - we looked at the situation and there were some IT specialists helping to deal with the problem that they were having. It looked like they were catching up and sorting out the problem that was causing the FIDS not to -- I am starting to get tongue-tied here. For example, there was a gate change, they put the right gate in there. The problem was if you put in a correction it wasn't being translated into the machine. I was given confidence or at least I was assured that the problem had been resolved and they were trying to catch up to the backlog of corrections that they had to put into the FIDS.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Can you turn to Page 105. At 8 o'clock in the evening, FIDS workstation continued to perform slow. Looking back today, do you think that you should have turned on the stand-by or do you still think that using the FIDS is the correct decision?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I personally feel that we made the correct decision. The thing that we learned by it was to work with the FIDS and solve the problems. If we hadn't persisted, it could have dragged on for a lot longer than it did. That trial under fire probably did more to getting it up and running quickly than it would have if we had gone to stand-by FIDS. For example, with this reduced functionality and the number of deficiencies that it has, we wouldn't have got to the state that we did by about the third day.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So what is the purpose of having the stand-by?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Just for that - for catastrophic failures. No other airport that I know of has a stand-by FIDS.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

No airport has stand-by FIDS?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Not that I know of, and I challenge you to tell me which one has. This is very unique.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So who made the decision? Who insisted on having a stand-by FIDS? It is \$20 million which has never been used?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, the stand allocation part of it was used. But the decision was the Board's decision. It was based on the performance of the contractor in getting the FIDS up to the state that it was and there was the fact that there seemed to be continuous delays. The Board felt we had to have some rudimentary system in

place.

Chairman:

Did you feel that you needed a rudimentary system in place because of the instability of FIDS? Did you feel the need for that as the Head of AMD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I did.

Chairman:

When did you feel that it should come into operation? Did you agree that it should come into operation 3 hours after FIDS was down?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

On the day, it was a decision to be made by you, was it not??

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is a joint decision by myself. I'm not that technical, so --

Chairman:

Yourself and IT?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Chairman:

It was actually in your hands? You could have said "Trigger stand-by"?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

But you didn't feel it was needed at that time. The rebooting, the refreshing, and so on, was in fact adequate to at least make it cope?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I was given encouragement that that would solve the problems, yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, we have to make this very, very clear. It is not together with anybody. Mr HEED, would you agree that you were the person authorised to give instruction to use stand-by FIDS? It is your decision? You have the authority, do you agree?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is a joint decision, but, yes, if I had insisted, I guess it would have happened, yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

No. It is your decision. You are the person who could put stand-by FIDS into operation. It is for you to decide. Is that right or wrong?

Chairman:

Who is the authority, can you tell us?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The authority is myself and Kiron CHATTERJEE.

Hon Margaret NG:

No, not at all, Madam Chairman. Isn't it right that when FIDS is down you assess the situation, upon consultation with whoever you like, including the head of IT, you then estimate, with his assistance, whether FIDS is likely to be down for 3 hours or more. Isn't that right? You can consult whoever you like but it is your decision, it is your responsibility to decide? Let's make that very clear.

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's not the way it was set out. I guess if I had insisted --

Chairman:

You have to make this point very, very clear to Members. It is a point that I am sure Members feel you must make absolutely clear to Members. It is not good enough to let us have a sort of half-baked answer as to, oh, you are sharing certain responsibilities. We are talking about decision-making at a very crucial point when certain things are happening. You are dealing with a crisis situation, the whole question of dealing with a crisis situation at that point in time. It is absolutely crucial for you to tell Members here who is actually the authority? Who has the authority to make that decision, is it you or it is not you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Madam Chairman, if I may, I think it was set up in the organisation that it was to be a joint decision. If there was disagreement amongst us, if either of us felt strongly one way or the other and it wasn't going to be done, it then goes to the CEO or the DCEO.

Chairman:

First of all, where does it actually say that it is a joint decision? Under the chart which Mr SIN quoted just now, Airport Management Division, that is very clearly something which falls within the purview of AMD. It was actually told to us by Project that this was something that fell entirely within AMD's area of responsibility and authority. You have to tell us whether that is indeed true. You see, if it is unclear, then we could have had a situation where Mr CHATTERJEE thought it was your responsibility and you thought it was his responsibility and, as a result, neither of you made that decision. We have to

know exactly before the event who was actually supposed to make that decision. We are not talking about the day. Before that event who was supposed to make that decision and on that day who was actually supposed to be the authority who was to take charge of that, Mr HEED?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The decision as to who would make the decision was made at a meeting in June and it was to be a shared decision between the Head of IT and myself.

Chairman:

This was what meeting?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There was a meeting on the stand-by arrangements. I could produce the minutes for the Committee.

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, maybe we would look at that minute later.

Chairman:

Ms Emily LAU.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Madam Chairman, Mr HEED just said about no other airport in the world have a stand-by FIDS. Is it your feeling or the understanding among you and your colleagues that this system would never be used, unless of course there is complete paralysis of the whole airport? But somebody had wanted it, ADSCOM and certain AA members, so we just wasted \$20 million of tax-payers' money to put it there. As far as you and your colleagues are concerned, you don't think you will ever use it? So, on that day, although the system was so unstable, it never occurred to you to use it because all along you didn't want to use it and because it's not a very good system for a start. Is that correct? I'm

not really worrying about and your colleague disagreeing, because you already agree you would never use it. Is that correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. It is still an alternative to a full failure of the FIDS. Believe me, during that day that occurred to me many times but I stuck to my guns and stayed with the regular FIDS.

Chairman:

Occurred to you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

To go to stand-by, yes.

Chairman:

Did you discuss it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Between you and IT?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Not with IT but internally with some of my managers.

Chairman:

How did you discuss it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Just in casual conversation more than anything else.

Chairman:

There wasn't really any serious consideration, any debate, any discussion, serious discussion, between yourselves and IT?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

I also want to ask whether the AA Board and members of ADSCOM ever knew that you people had such reservations and this system would only be used when there was almost complete paralysis of the airport? Or was it just an understanding among you and some of your colleagues?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was certainly an internal meeting that established that decision process. Whether it was communicated to the Board, I can't recall. I had a thought in my mind but I have lost it, sorry.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Do you not think you have a duty to inform the Board and ADSCOM, bearing in mind, particularly in the final few meetings of ADSCOM in the run-up to the airport opening, they were so concerned? Somebody should have told them "Hey, although we wasted or spent \$20 million, this thing is not going to be used until the whole airport breaks down"?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The Deputy CEO knew the decision process and it was that which we relied on.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Madam Chairman, may I ask who explained the stand-by system to the AA Board?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Mr CHATTERJEE, Head of IT.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

But you were there?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I was.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

You and Mr CHATTERJEE, did you bear in mind that it takes 3 hours to turn the stand-by FIDS on and did you explain the situation to the AA Board?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Let me just clarify one thing. It doesn't take 3 hours to turn it on. That was the decision criteria that was established. It takes about 35 to 45 minutes to turn it on. Was it fully explained to the Board? I can't answer that question.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

You were there?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I was there, but I can't remember it. I think they were aware of the situation. It physically requires going round to each of the Comms Rooms, the 27 Comms Rooms, and unplugging some cables and then plugging them into another server which has its own problems especially in the heat of the moment. It has reduced functionality. It is not bilingual. Only one airline logo can be

displayed. Each check-in desk has to be opened manually by the AOCC operator, and all the transfer and departure gates, etc. It has a lot of deficiency which would require extra manpower and that to get going. To my mind, it would require a major failure of the FIDS before I would take that decision.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

To your mind. But did you explain this mind to the AA Board? When they approved 20 million Hong Kong dollars, did they know what you believe, what you know?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think if it wasn't for the 45-minute decision that wouldn't be too much of a problem because, if it was instantaneous you could switch it on, I think it would have been an easier decision to make. The fact you get an outage for nothing for a while was a major concern to me, personally. I think you would have to ask others about whether the Board understood that arrangement or not.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Did you specify the requirement of that FIDS to CHATTERJEE?

Airport Management Director, AA:

To who?

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Did you specify the requirement for stand-by FIDS?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess we were partially responsible for developing the requirements. The decision was taken in March to develop the stand-by FIDS so there wasn't a lot of time to get it in place.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

You said it is a shared responsibility. Shared by which parties, CHATTERJEE, yourself and who else?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Our Project people were involved to some extent on it as well because we need their co-operation.

Chairman:

I think the Project people actually told us they were not concerned at all with the stand-by system. That is actually in the record I think.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Mr HEED, I want to draw to your attention that when Mr WONG, the AA Board Chairman, came to this hearing he failed to explain the functions of stand-by FIDS and he was not aware of the time lag, the 3-hour decision?

Chairman:

Maybe you had better put it in such a way that Mr HEED could answer. Do you recall in the presentation to the Board whether the fact that it would take you, first, a catastrophic situation when FIDS is down and, secondly, that it would take 3 hours before -- 2 hours in fact for you to take that decision and another hour --

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

The operational procedure manual is 3 hours, down for more than 3 hours.

Hon Margaret NG:

Estimated.

Chairman:

Down for more than 3 hours before you actually switch to FIDS No. 2 and, third, that it takes 45 minutes to switch on. Were these actually presented to them at the point when the stand-by system was presented in March?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't confirm that but I have gone through the minutes of the Board meetings and there is no reference to it.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

I think we have the minutes.

Chairman:

We do have the minutes. I am just asking Mr HEED whether he was aware that they were presented at that time. On this particular point, Mr HEED, perhaps you can turn to Paper no. B37, which is the Airport Authority's minutes of the 43rd meeting held on 25 June. This is in Volume III, Paper no. B37. I think it is opportune for us to look at this particular record of the minutes because this was a meeting which was pretty close to opening. In Paragraph 2.2 there is a specific mention of the FIDS stand-by system. Do you see that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

You were present or were you not?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I was.

Chairman:

Paragraph 2.2.1, in the fourth line:

"A special test would be carried out on the switching from the main FIDS to

the stand-by system."

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Later on in the paragraph it says the system, the main FIDS:

" -- was found to be operating satisfactorily at about 98.7 per cent of the time....."

Then:

"The problems identified in the testing had been remedied within a short period of time. The main FIDS and the stand allocation system should be in operation on airport opening."

Would you not say that at this very crucial point in time the AA management, and of course you were in fact the person directly responsible for this particular area, gave the impression to the Board that everything was ready, the stand-by system was ready, a special test would actually be carried out to switch from one to the other and this was a very convenient, very easy thing to do? Would it not give you that impression? Would you agree that it would give you that impression? We can only have the minutes to go by but you were there at the meeting. Would you confirm that this was the impression given to the Board?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, it was.

Chairman:

You did not in fact mention 3 hours, you did not mention catastrophic situation, you did not mention the 45 minutes, did you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The 45 minutes -- I can't recall.

Chairman:

After this meeting in fact the test was conducted?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Did you actually have the switch-over from one to the other?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, we did.

Chairman:

Was it at that point that you found out it was 45 minutes? When did you actually know?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I knew for quite a while because that was the way it was configured to do it quickly. We didn't want to disrupt the testing on the main FIDS system. The displays and the LCD boards are the same. They don't change. To go and replace duplicate monitors and LCD boards throughout the terminal building just wasn't on. It would look silly anyway to have all these spare monitors blank half the time. The decision was taken that we would have to use the existing monitors and LCD boards. You could have an electronic switch so they could do it immediately but that was at additional cost. So the decision was taken to actually do a physical unplugging of cables from one server to another server.

Chairman:

The whole process would take 45 minutes?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right. That is to go to the 20 different Comms Rooms throughout the terminal building to do that.

Chairman:

You felt that that was acceptable at that time when you actually put together the stand-by?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Going back to the fact that I thought it was for major failures of the system, yes.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Madam Chairman, 2 short questions. Would you refer to Paper no. B34, minutes of AA Board meeting on 23 March. At Paragraph 3.9, recommendations for stand-by systems. Maybe you have said something but in the minutes it is not there. You haven't said anything in these paragraphs.

On the appendix there is the presentation made probably by Mr CHATTERJEE, that is, the Airport Authority airport meetings, stand-by flight information system update and recommendation, 23 March 1998. Just to be brief, I have gone through the charts and there aren't any points mentioned by Madam Chairman. Your three points, these three points were not on these presentations?

Chairman:

Can you confirm that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If you look at the slides that are attached, I suspect it was discussed, because the Comms, as described in the GEC discussion 23, 98 -- there are no page numbers here. It is about 5 or 6 pages in. Switching procedures from EDS to stand-by software. The last bullet point under Comms.

Chairman:

Which document are you referring to?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If I can just show you here, it is this one here.

Chairman:

The pros and cons?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

The stand-by system proposal. Where does it say?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right at the bottom under Comms, switching procedure from EDS to stand-by software.

Chairman:

Where does it say the 45 minutes?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It doesn't say 45 minutes but it indicates that the manual switching

procedure was discussed -- or at least mentioned.

Chairman:

First of all, the 3 points that I mentioned earlier, where are they reflected?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Sorry?

Chairman:

The 3 points. One is catastrophic situation when FIDS is down, as indicated in your decision for change-over in that paper. When FIDS was down, total catastrophe, as you put it. Secondly, the 3 hours. Thirdly, the 45 minutes. It is quite important for Members to know the understanding of the Board and the understanding of the management when you presented the stand-by system for a Board decision. It is very, very important that we are given information on that, Mr HEED?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am just looking at the rest of it.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

May I ask a final question? Do you think the Board would approve this \$20 million if these 3 points were presented to the AA Board?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If the facts would have been presented to the Board?

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

Yes. If Madam Chairman's 3 points were presented to the AA Board at the

23 March meetings about the stand-by FIDS, do you think that the AA Board would approve this \$20 million project?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't answer that question. That is speculating.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

In that case, do you think that it is necessary for you or anybody to present these 3 points to the AA Board?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would agree with you on that, yes.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So who fails in this job?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Between myself and Mr CHATTERJEE, yes.

Hon SIN Chung-kai:

So you admit that you failed to correctly present that to the Board?

Chairman:

I think Mr HEED has answered that question.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

I would just like one detail to be filled in that was brought up by Mr HEED. In Mr Billy LAM's statement he mentioned a meeting just before 10 o'clock on 6 July at the AOCC to discuss specifically whether or not the stand-by system of FIDS should be switched on or activated. Could you tell us who were involved in that discussion when the decision was made not to activate it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There was myself and Mr CHATTERJEE. Mr Billy LAM came upon us as we were discussing it.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

The CEO was not involved in that discussion?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The CEO was not involved.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

This decision was made between the 3 of you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was made by myself and Mr CHATTERJEE, on his advice, and Mr LAM was aware of the decision that was taken.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Was it agreed or there was some consensus that all the things that happened during those 3 or 4 hours that morning and also the problems encountered by the people using the PTB were actually just considered to be teething problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I guess, would be the answer to that. The system hadn't failed, as I said, and we would work through the problems, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

You agree that was a wrong decision to have been made?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, I don't say that at all.

主席：

陳鑑林議員。

陳鑑林議員：

主席，我想就吳靄儀議員剛才問及有關“efficiency”的解釋稍作跟進。“Mr HEED”說當日的運作繼續進行。我想知道“Mr HEED”認為怎樣才算是“efficient”？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Looking back on what happened, I would agree the efficiency was not good. But, in the heat of the moment, the extent of the problem really wasn't evident.

陳鑑林議員：

請告訴我們，你認為7月6日當日的運作是否算是具有“efficiency”？

Airport Management Director, AA:

If I look back on it now, like I say, it wasn't very efficient. You are absolutely right. But, at the time, certainly there were efficiency problems but I didn't realise it was as bad as it was.

Chairman:

You didn't realise at that time that it was as bad as it was?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，我想詢問“Mr HEED”有關機場“airbridge”的問題。“Mr HEED”，你是否知悉赤鱘角機場的“airbridge”和啟德機場的“airbridge”

是否屬同一型號？

Airport Management Director, AA:

They are not.

陳鑑林議員：

若是一間新的操作公司，又或要面對新型號的“airbridge”，你認為事前是否需要進行測試或為操作員提供培訓？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The ramp handlers would be the ones who would be operating the bridges. There was extensive training of their staff. As a matter of fact, we actually certified each of the operators to operate the bridge, because it was an asset that the Airport Authority owned and we wanted to ensure that only people that had been properly trained would be operating the system. In addition, we insisted that they had to have 50 operations, actual live operations under supervision, before they would be allowed to do it by themselves.

陳鑑林議員：

我想問“Mr HEED”，“AOD”發出“certificate”的準則為何？

Airport Management Director, AA:

The criteria was that they would receive the training. Then one of our staff would do the actual certification, would witness an operation, albeit up against a dummy--It wasn't a real live aircraft but it is a dummy to look like an airplane. Our staff would watch the operation and certify the individual. Now, if a new operator had never operated a bridge before, he had to get the 50 operations before he could be certified to do it alone. For example, if they had operated a

bridge at Kai Tak then they were given some dispensation on the 50-turn criteria and those were the ones that were actually the supervisors or the trainers for the staff that did the docking.

陳鑑林議員：

我想知道你認為有關的測試和培訓是否足夠？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. As a matter of fact, we originally said 100 operations and we received a lot of criticism from the ramp handlers, saying that was unrealistic and that was going to cause all sorts of problems in their staffing and things like that. It really is a matter of just practice to be able to do it properly. If you travelled in the first week you would have noticed that it took maybe 3 or 4 minutes to dock a loading bridge against the aircraft. If you went out there now, it would be done in 1 or 2 minutes.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，請參閱第VIII冊文件B180內有關“Handover Notice No.66”。我了解一下，“handover”的日期是7月23日，“Mr HEED”，你可否告訴我們，為何於7月23日才“handover”？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Paper no. B180?

Chairman:

Handover notice number 66, Paper no.B180.

Airport Management Director, AA:

What system is it? Maybe I can answer the question anyway.

Chairman:

The aircraft loading bridges?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The handover is actually done earlier. I think there should be a date on there somewhere when the handover was actually done. The certificate was issued on 23 July.

Hon CHAN Kam-lam:

Handover notice number 66?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It says the same day on there. Date of handover and the actual --

Chairman:

I think Mr HEED is referring to the next page which is C370, the handover certificate. Here the dates of 28 May and 2 June were also indicated. The user representative didn't come in until 23 July, Mr HEED?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct, but the actual handover was prior to that. The documentation followed. Alan LAM is our general manager of airfield operations. He didn't sign it until 23 July. Y.U. FUNG was our Maintenance Manager from AMD as well and he did sign it on 2 June.

陳鑑林議員：

原因為何？

Chairman:

Why was it taken over on 23 July? I think that is the question.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think it was an administrative matter that everybody was so busy that it didn't get around to being signed off until --

Chairman:

I think the gist of Mr HEED's reply is that the problem doesn't seem to arise from the operational side. The operators seemed to be well trained, they have had their time and so on. If we look at the problem which was mentioned in the paper of 14 July, perhaps Mr HEED could answer us why the auto-leveller was in fact problematic, which seemed to have been the device which caused the problem on the first few days? Why couldn't it have been made perfect before the airport opening?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is a function of the loading and unloading of an airplane. As you can appreciate, when the aircraft is fully loaded it sits lower and then when it is unloaded it rises slightly. The bridge has to go up and down with it, otherwise you will do damage to the airplane. We were not able to simulate that during the trials or when we had the aircraft come into the airport because they were unloaded, they were always empty. We didn't have that situation arise.

Chairman:

But it is not the first time the auto-levellers are ever used?

Airport Management Director, AA:

You are absolutely right. I can't explain that. These bridges are used at other airports as well. It was a software problem that was fixed by us on 11 or 12 July.

陳鑑林議員：

會否有其他問題？例如我們看到“Handover Record”內，即在“Handover Certificate”之後，有關“Senior Construction Engineer”簽收“airbridge”的情況。我們可以看到，他們通常於“not available”一欄簽署，但基本上甚少於“available”一欄簽署。這是否表示他們認為於接收

時仍有很多問題未獲解決？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

There were some problems outstanding, yes. I don't have an account of all the individual ones. The potable water I know has been a problem and continues to be a problem to this day. The pre-conditioned air was available on most bridges but there were periodic failures of the pre-conditioned air.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，我不清楚“Mr HEED”是否知悉有關情況，但請問“Mr HEED”可否告訴我們，他所知“handover”的情況是否如此？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. The situation was known at the time of the handover. There were these random problems with the bridges.

陳鑑林議員：

在這情況下，你有否請有關負責人作出應變措施，或要求“contractor”盡早完成有關工作？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. That is why the list is prepared for them to respond and correct those

problems as quickly as possible. There was a full realisation that some of those problems wouldn't be resolved by airport opening but it wasn't going to affect the functionality of using the bridge. Now, the auto-leveller problem was not known, I will admit that. That was something that came up in the course of events. There was another problem that occurred which was related to just excitement by the operators in pushing the limit switches and disabling the bridge, which required a maintenance reset and caused 3 or 4 cases of late boarding or departing of aircraft.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，有一份文件指出，他們最後發現這是“software”的問題。剛才“Mr HEED”亦有提及，其實這一類型的“airbridge”在其他機場也有使用，為何“software”會有問題出現？其他機場也同樣有“loading”和“unloading”的“aircraft”使用此類“airbridge”，為何只在香港才有問題出現？你們於安裝時是否沒有在“software”方面進行足夠的測試？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, they are used at other airports. I can't explain why the problem occurred here which wasn't picked up at other airports. The bridges are manufactured under licence in Malaysia. We had to have the US representative come out, fly out, to solve the problem. The local people from here, the contractor and the Malaysian people, weren't able to fix the problem. It was a US person who came out that eventually found what the problem was and that was on 11 or 12 July, as I recall.

陳鑑林議員：

主席，我沒有其他問題。

Chairman:

Can you tell us whether specifically the auto-leveller device was in fact tested and trialled, in spite of the fact that there were no live loads or no live aircraft used and, if there were tests, if there were trials, how were they

conducted?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was part of the acceptance procedure to test all those features and it was also tested in the installation process. I must emphasise that not all the auto-levellers alarmed. There were only about half a dozen out of 74 bridges, or maybe a little more but it was less than 10, that we had a problem with. It was a very random thing but it still was annoying and needed to be fixed because it had a potential of damaging an airplane.

Chairman:

It was more than annoying, surely? In some cases it took up to sometimes even an hour for the disembarkation to be effected because of the problems of the airbridges, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But not necessarily the auto-leveller. The first 2 problems that we had were related to the operator hitting the limit switches in trying to move the bridge. It was just the excitement of the day.

Chairman:

Human error?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

When you say 10 out of 74, 1 or 2 cases may have been human error because of the opening, teething, which you call the inexperience?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

But the rest would be the auto-leveller device?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The majority were the auto-levellers.

Chairman:

The seriousness of the consequence of that would be the delay of departure of aircraft, wouldn't you say, and that would have impacted on --

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, it wouldn't have because you could pull the bridge back from the aircraft. So, if you had an auto-leveller problem you could pull the bridge back from the aircraft. The only danger was that it would damage the airplane when you were loading or unloading it. It didn't affect the loading of passengers or unloading of passengers, unless the auto-leveller started to alarm when you were actually loading or unloading passengers.

Chairman:

Wasn't it the fact that it was taking much longer for the whole process of loading and unloading for all those aircraft which were actually parked in places next to the problematic airbridges? Would you not say that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would agree with you that that did cause delays, yes, but not significant delays though. It wasn't an hour or anything like that.

Chairman:

Passengers were actually complaining that they were kept delayed waiting in an aircraft for anything up to an hour before they could disembark?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That wasn't necessarily due to the auto-leveller problem. I want to distinguish between the auto-leveller and some of the other human problems, and I think there was even a power supply problem that occurred.

Chairman:

What you are saying is that the delays caused by the auto-leveller device were not really serious enough to impact on the other problems and aggravate the other problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was another annoyance we had to deal with, that's right.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

I don't know whether this question has been asked. If it has, then OK. I just want to ask whether the whole airbridge and the levelling system and all that is a product that has been used 100 per cent in other airports or whether parts of it have been developed for this particular airport?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is a product that has been used at other airports. I can't tell you for sure that some parts of it weren't specifically developed for this airport.

Chairman:

Who could tell us that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It would be the Project people.

Chairman:

Perhaps we can get that information. Go on?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

It is certainly different from what was used in Kai Tak, isn't it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

We have heard a lot of passengers complaining of waiting on the plane before they were allowed to disembark because of this airbridge being fiddled around with for some time. You said just now that the auto-levelling problem was not known before the AOD. You just said that. Can you tell us why this problem would not have been known?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't tell you whether it occurred at other airports or not. At this airport we weren't able to test that feature except in a simulated situation, and that didn't occur. It was a random thing that it didn't occur in all bridges and hence led to the fact that we weren't able to create the situation.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Unless all those people who complained to us were the unfortunate people who were on the 10 out of the 74, but the general comments that we have heard were that these airbridges took much longer time to connect and then get people to disembark. Is Mr HEED saying that the other 63 airbridges operated 100 per cent correctly without any delay and so on?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct, yes.

Chairman:

Can you tell us right here and now or would you like to look at your records and furnish us with the information afterwards as to whether all the airbridges were in fact functioning all right, not only in terms of the auto-levellers but other problems as well? You were saying there were other problems, like operational problems. This being one of the major causes of complaint of passengers on those early days of opening, could you furnish us with data? You must have them in the log?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I have it right here in front of me. As a matter of fact, there were 5 auto-levelling alarms on the opening day and there were a number of other problems, for example, a canopy can't be retracted, the bridge couldn't be operated. The faults, one started at 10:25 am and ended at 11:25 am. Bridge can't be operated because of operator's mistake. They didn't know how to use the round key. Things like that occurred. I have got the outage times here as well. From 1215 to 1310 hours, for example. I can leave that with the Secretary.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

That is on opening day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

That showed 5 airbridges having trouble, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

On the auto-leveller, yes.

Chairman:

There were other problems, operational problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There were altogether 21 bridge problems reported that day.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

I think the follow-up question then is about human error that was talked about, was that because of lack of training?

Chairman:

We actually tackled that and Mr HEED said there was adequate training but then it was the opening day and they had to work with dummies because they didn't have real aircraft to work with the operators. I think that was your response, wasn't it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

The dummy, it should have been a more intelligent dummy? The dummy could also simulate the elevating and lowering of the plane?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Perhaps I should use the work "mock-up" rather than "dummy".

Chairman:

Not a very intelligent mock-up. Would you say, Mr HEED, that the mock-ups were not very adequate to reflect the real situation?

Airport Management Director, AA:

In some cases it was dependent on the ramp handler. They provided their own mock-up. Some of them actually had the shape of a fuselage. Others just had a forklift with something to dock up against.

Chairman:

Was it adequate or not, in your view?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The one that simulated the outside of an aircraft was probably more adequate than the one that had the forklift with the sill on it sort of thing.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Is Mr HEED saying he left everything to the ramp handlers? They made their own tests and then they are satisfied? There are different ramp handlers, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

For their training, they did their own training and we trained their trainers. As a matter of fact, the contractor trained their trainers and then they trained all their staff, the 380 staff that they had certified. The actual testing of the bridges and that was done by the contractor and ourselves. The contractor had to provide the same thing. He provided the fuselage section.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Was that a satisfactory arrangement?

Chairman:

I think the question must be asked. That was in fact the responsibility of the ramp handlers but you were there to supervise that the training was

adequately and efficiently done. You told us that they had to be licensed and they had to go through some kind of tests before they were actually allowed to operate in the end and they in fact indeed passed those tests. The point I think Mr HO is asking is whether you were satisfied that the training conducted by the ramp handlers and the quality of the training were professional enough and adequate enough to ensure smooth operation on AOD?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Whether AMD has any role in monitoring the quality of the training?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Very definitely we had a role in monitoring the training and also to witness each operator do a simulated airbridge docking. Sorry. I forgot the first part of the question?

Chairman:

You were responsible but were you satisfied that they were professional and adequate and of a quality that was acceptable?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. We were satisfied, yes. Those bridges are not inexpensive and, therefore, we had to be assured that they wouldn't damage the bridges and cause us more grief. So, yes, we were satisfied that the training was adequate.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Then there is really no answer to why there were so many human errors, right, if the training was adequate, they were monitored, they were licensed, and all that?

Chairman:

There were 20-something cases of problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

How many of those were actually due to human error and how many due to the auto-leveller device?

Airport Management Director, AA:

For example, one human error was that they didn't have the right key. It is not an operator's error. I would say probably about 3 of those were operator's mistakes. I find one here which caused about a 3-minute problem until somebody came along. It was the same thing again that they haven't got the right key.

Chairman:

Why didn't they have the right key? Who was responsible for their not having the right key?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Their company.

Chairman:

The ramp handling company?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right. There is another one here where they hit the limit switch and that is just the excitement of the moment when you get into live operation.

主席 :

I think what we need from you, Mr HEED, is that paper and also an analysis

on the sort of breakdown as to who was actually responsible for what? That was one of the complaints which was sounded that day so we need to have supplementary information on that? 李永達議員。

李永達議員：

主席，你打算繼續進行研訊還是稍作休息？

Chairman:

I was going to propose to members that we would not have a break today because we really want to finish today's hearing by 12:30 pm.

李永達議員：

主席，我會集中詢問有關保安的問題。我希望“Mr HEED”參閱文件第III冊B64、B65、B66及B67。這4份文件是有關“Airport Works Schedule of Critical Activities Weekly Status Report”。我想詢問“Mr HEED”有關“access control”的問題，即機場和機場停機坪之間的門及通道。文件B67的開端指出，在773個通道中，只有562個設有保安，即“securable”。而這562個設有保安程序的通道中，其實有325個是可以用“monitor”來控制的。我發覺這數字經常在文件B65及B66內出現，表示在700多扇門中，差不多超過半數是不可利用遙控方式控制的。我想問為何至文件B66，當時已是機場啟用前約1個星期至10日，情況仍如此嚴重？我們當然清楚知道該處有很多門，但為何延至那時，絕大部分的門仍未能利用遙控方式控制？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The access control system is still not working properly as of today. As you will note by Paper no. B66 we had to deploy guards in order to protect the doors, the airside security doors. The problem you see here, going from 662 down to 631, is sort of the nub of the problem. A door that was securable today wasn't securable tomorrow and that was happening with the system. As a matter of

fact, even last night when I tried to leave my office I couldn't get into the lift because my pass wouldn't work on that lift which has been working for the last 2 months.

李永達議員：

“Mr HEED”，很多謝你如此坦白，承認這系統至今仍未能運作，你昨晚也差點兒無法離開辦公室。我想詢問這系統本身如此複雜的原因為何？新機場的開幕有三個原則。陳太曾以“ADSCOM”主席身份對我們說，即使機場的效率不高，運作不佳，但仍是很“safe”，很安全的。那麼，你如何向委員會交代，截至今日為止，今日已是11月5日，即機場開幕後4個月，我們的保安系統仍有很多問題，原因為何？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

With the access control system there continue to be problems, although it is getting better, although after last night's experience I wonder about it. What we had to do, we had to ensure that the facility was secure in order to meet the Hong Kong aviation security programme requirements, the Hong Kong security ordinance, that is, the Aviation Ordinance. What we had to do was to deploy, as I mentioned the other day, about 300 guards at each of those doors to ensure that there was no unauthorised access through those doors.

李永達議員：

主席，我的問題並非在於請300個保安人員看守通道，甚至請1,000個保安人員也可以。問題是這是一個相當複雜的系統。我想問的是，截至今日為止，你們管理階層是否知悉這系統至今仍未能按其原本設計的形式運作的原因？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think that is another question that perhaps you should ask Mr OAKERVEE, who is still responsible for getting it installed.

李永達議員：

“Mr HEED”，我假設你未“sign off”，未“accept”，未接受該系統，但該系統已“handover”給你，而你亦已使用該系統，是該系統的使用者。我相信你也應該詢問工程部也好，“IT”部門也好，為何該系統至今仍未能按其原本設計……

主席：

首先弄清楚一點，“Mr HEED, the ACS, you know, that security system, has nothing to do with IT, right?”

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, it hasn't.

Chairman:

It is strictly Project handing over to AMD, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

李永達議員：

因此，我的問題是，為何你不詢問他，截至今日為止，相隔已有4個月，該系統仍未能按其原本設計運作，而你仍要請數百個人負責看守各通道？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I must say at a considerable expense those guards are employed. Yes, we ask this question almost every day and we are working with the contractor and Project to get the system in place and operating properly. Actually, we are going through confidence tests on it right now, so hopefully by the end of November we should have it operational.

李永達議員：

主席，我想提出另一個問題。這系統現已不能使用，故需要聘請數百名保安人員看守，此舉實在令人難以接受。我還想問在文件B66中，提及這系統不能使用，需要請保安人員看守。你亦曾指出，在文件B66的第.....沒有“page number”.....

主席：

是不是C396？

李永達議員：

C396，“access control”.....

主席：

“Contract number”是C396，關於“access control”。

李永達議員：

這一段的最後兩句載明：“It has been agreed with FSD”，我相信應該是“Fire Services Department, to cover and immobilize push buttons of 178 of the airside and landside bounding doors. Further doors are also being considered by FSD”。我們知道保安和防火經常會互相矛盾。很多家庭想裝設大閘，但又擔心其難以開啟。我想問“Mr HEED”，“immobilize push buttons of 178 of the airside and landside bounding doors”是甚麼意思？是否表示整扇門已被鎖緊並無法開啟？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, it doesn't mean that. We had a break glass at just about every door, that you could push and get access through that door. It also sounded an alarm. Especially in the early days contracting staff had become used to using their favourite routes through the building as that was an easy way to get access. They were presenting no end of problems and we ended up taking some of those out, but, if a fire occurred in the building, the fire alarm would release those doors. That was basically another redundant feature to enable people to go through the door by pushing the break glass. In fact, the fire alarm would release the door and that was proven to FSD.

李永達議員：

主席，我不太明白。你的意思是不是以這178扇門來說，即使有火警發生，亦不會開啟？我想再問清楚，所謂“immobilize the push buttons”的意思為何？

Airport Management Director, AA:

There is a break glass for each door but also in the area there was a fire alarm as well. So, if there was a true fire, you could push the fire alarm button and it would release the door, or, if the heat detector had detected a fire, it would release the doors as well automatically. The little white button that we had beside the door was used inappropriately by a lot of staff and it was difficult to catch up with them. It was so convenient. It was right there. You just pushed a button. But the fire alarm would be a little further away and it was red - or green, I can't remember, red or green, I think it is green. Therefore, that was to be the alternative because we were having so many problems before. I must add that we had not only a conflict between FSD and Security but also with the Buildings Department.

Chairman:

What was actually agreed with FSD? I think that is Mr LEE's question?

Airport Management Director, AA:

What was agreed was that some of the door alarms right beside the doors would be immobilised and the fire alarm that was in that vicinity would be the primary exit from that area.

李永達議員：

一個較為嚴重的情況，例如火警發生時，大家當然會找一個最方便的地方按“button”。我想問的是任何改變，會否令火警發生時.....

Chairman:

Mr HEED has told us that in case of a fire it would automatically release, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Automatically release, so that the door would open and the locks would be released.

李永達議員：

因此，我想問的是，這些“push button”原本設計的作用為何？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't know. That is part of the design.

李永達議員：

主席，我認為他要向我們提供資料。我很難相信你會特別造些不需使用的“push buttons”.....

Chairman:

I think Mr HEED has already told us - correct me if I am wrong, Mr HEED

- that as the user Division, your Division up to today is not totally satisfied with the way that the system is working. We have to find out elsewhere why the system has been designed the way it has been and why it is not working. Mr HEED has told us he is not the person to answer this.

李永達議員：

我想繼續提問。“Mr HEED”，你既然也承認這系統的表現未如設計般理想，你是否同意，截至現時為止，機場的出入問題仍未解決？因為在機場開幕時，有報道指出，記者、乘客或參觀人士均可輕易進入停機坪瀏覽一會才返回大樓。我想問，你作為管理層，是否可以接受這情況？

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is certainly not acceptable and I hope it isn't happening today. I think we are very secure. There haven't been any reported incidents. Incidents do happen, for example, in the tenant restricted areas, but they usually are caught very quickly and we are taking those issues very severely and prosecuting individuals that somehow get onto the airside without being authorised.

李永達議員：

你的意思是，截至今日為止，在開始時曾發生的情況，即記者、乘客和遊覽人士無需出示任何證件便可進入停機範圍的情況，現在是否已沒有再發生？

主席：

李永達議員，我不“allow”這問題。這問題已經離題，請你留待“panel”上再問。

李永達議員：

主席，我想詢問有關文件第II冊文件C11。這會議是“AOR Review Meeting”，於6月23日舉行。我想問你是否知悉該文件所載事項？請參閱第8段“Aviation Security Arrangements”機場保安安排，這部分討論關於美國總統克林頓和江澤民主席來港訪問的情況。請看第8f段，我現在把它唸出來，“DOPS, HKPF said that the integrity of the ESRA must not be compromised. There was evidence that ESRA had been routinely

compromised. That would have serious consequences on both aviation security and the forthcoming VIP visits. He added that the situation must be remedied by AAHK immediately”。這裏討論關於機場的保安，以及美國總統和國家主席來港訪問的情況。警方代表對機場保安措施表示極大的疑問，他們尤其指出你們在保安方面做得不好。我想請問，在平常的日子，當發現保安通道的工作做得不好時，可安排護衛負責看守，這也是可行的辦法。可是，原來警方對你們的保安措施十分不滿，你是否覺得這是個非常嚴重的問題？尤其是在開幕時，兩位重要人物來港訪問，你覺得你們的保安措施是否足夠？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

The aviation security is the responsibility of AVSECO, which is the Airport Authority's subsidiary for security at the airport, as well as the Hong Kong Police. It was on 14 June that we established ESRA, the enhanced security restricted area, and procedures were to be in place to ensure that only authorised people were in the ESRA area. Your question is, did we do that?

李永達議員：

你有沒有採取足夠的保安措施來保護這兩位訪港的重要人物？雖然你沒有出席該次會議，但是否知悉或你的下屬有沒有向你匯報，警方曾投訴你們的保安措施做得不好？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I was aware of the meeting. I wasn't at that particular meeting. There were some concerns about ensuring adequate security for those two high profile VVIPs and, indeed, that was provided by enhanced police presence as

well as AVSECO staff.

李永達議員：

主席，這不是關乎“concern”的問題，警方指出的是“routinely compromised”，可見這不是“concern”的問題，在第8f段已清楚指出，警方覺得你們經常性地把保安的制度及程序妥協，意思是降低標準。雖然你們知道有兩位這般重要的人物即將訪港，但居然以這種態度來處事。幸而這次沒有發生任何事故，你是否覺得運氣非常好呢？請問，如果美國政府和中央政府知道保安情況是這樣的話，你認為他們還會讓總統和國家主席來港訪問嗎？

主席：

李永達議員，我相信“Mr HEED”難以回答你的問題。

李永達議員：

請問你是否覺得在保安方面已經做得足夠呢？

Airport Management Director, AA:

It wasn't totally my responsibility but certainly if you had been at the airport when those two gentlemen were passing through you would have felt the security. It was everywhere.

李永達議員：

我想問的不是後果，而是在此之前，在這種情況、這種狀態之下，你是否覺得已做足一切準備呢？此外，請問你有沒有把這個現象、處境或“situation”向你的“CEO”，即行政總監報告。警方投訴你們就接待這兩位重要人物而採取的保安措施錯漏百出，你有沒有向上司報告這件事呢？

Airport Management Director, AA:

As I said earlier, the enhanced security restricted area was established on 14 June for the last trial. I don't know what the police are referring to that had happened before, that had happened during the week leading up to that. I'm not

too sure. There was certainly every intent or it was established that security would be in place for that.

李永達議員：

我想問，負責保安的公司“AVSECO”是否由你負責監察“monitor”？該公司負責整個機場的日常保安事宜，你的職責是否亦包括監察這家公司的工作？縱使這是一家外判的公司。

Chairman:

Do they work to you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This is a tough one to answer.

Chairman:

Do they or do they not work to you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They don't report to me but we have a role to monitor their activities.

Chairman:

Whom do they report to?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They report to their Board and to Security Bureau.

李永達議員：

但你身為機場管理的最高負責人，如果該公司在這方面有問題，你認為無需向“AVSECO”公司詳細查問嗎？雖然你說這家公司是直接向

他們的董事局或保安局負責，但你亦應該了解他們的保安情況，認為滿意後，才讓他們繼續，對嗎？難道你認為你沒有責任向他們查問清楚嗎？

Chairman:

Do you have that responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No doubt about it. We work closely with them and if there were problems that we saw, we would discuss it with them and they would take appropriate action.

李永達議員：

但你剛才告訴本委員會，關於警方投訴“ESRA being routinely compromised”的問題，你不清楚其細節？其實你是知道還是不知道？

Chairman:

I think it is quite important, Mr HEED, for you to establish that for us. You said that they don't work to you. They don't actually come under your area of responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No.

Chairman:

But in the next breath you tell us that in fact you have the responsibility to oversee their operation. Now, do they work to you or do they not work to you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They do not.

Chairman:

They do not account to you in any way?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

It once again reflects a very strange structure within the AA?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Do you consider you have the responsibility or not for them?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I'm not even clear in my own mind at times.

李永達議員：

我覺得此事很奇怪，這間“AVSECO”公司是一家很特別的公司，它差不多由政府全資擁有，卻又不用向你報告。你作為機場管理的負責人，應該明白你的職責不單要確保機場運作迅速和暢順，亦要向所有乘客保證機場是安全的。若你今天向本委員會說，你身為機場管理的最高負責人，尚且不能保證知道該公司在做些甚麼，以及它所做的是否符合你的要求，請問公眾和我們又如何得知該公司所做的是否足夠和安全呢？

Chairman:

Mr HEED.

Airport Management Director, AA:

We do meet with them regularly and we do monitor their activities and they do co-operate with us. Not that we are totally independent and going about our own business totally independent of each other. We do work very closely together and if we have any concerns there, they do address them. I don't want to create the impression that we are totally working at opposite ends of the spectrum. We are working together but the reporting relationship is a little strange, yes.

Chairman:

Structurally, it is unclear, is it not?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, but they are totally responsible. That is the understanding.

李永達議員：

主席，對不起。我從文件得到的信息不是這樣，文件顯示他須負上全部責任。我想問，當時公眾所知的情況是，機場管理局負責興建機場和監察機場的所有保安事宜。你作為管理機場的負責人，而這家公司卻不是向你直接負責，你又如何向公眾顯示你確有能力處理機場範圍內的所有保安問題呢？

Airport Management Director, AA:

Co-operation is the way we do it. Keep in mind that some of the AA Board members are also on the AVSECO Board.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

Are you a member of the Board of AVSECO?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't even attend the meetings, no.

李永達議員：

你是否覺得很奇怪？你作為機場的最高管理領導人，卻不在董事局成員之列。

Airport Management Director, AA:

Sorry. I should correct that. I do have my deputy who attends the meetings.

Hon LEE Wing-tat:

But he is not on the board of directors?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No.

李永華達議員：

你覺得這是為甚麼呢？

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't explain that.

主席：

“I think.....”，李永達議員，或許我們看看“organization chart”，便會發現有一件事頗為奇怪，這裏其實沒有標示“AVSECO”，即是說保安方面似乎不屬於這個範圍。我想即使我們再進一步查問此事，可能“Mr HEED”亦未必能夠作答。現在他能夠給予的答覆就是他亦不太清楚，但實際的情況是怎樣，我相信我們需要進一步傳召其他人就此事作答，“OK”？現在到劉慧卿議員發問。

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

I just want to follow-up on security. If I may refer to Volume II, Paper no.

B16, which is a paper prepared for the AA Board for discussion on 28 May 1998.
Does Mr HEED have a copy?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

If we look at Page 8 of that paper, there is a section on airport security,
under which there are about 4 paragraphs on that topic. Do you have that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

That is mainly on staffing. All the problems highlighted by Mr LEE
Wing-tat were not contained in the paper, if we look at the actual minutes of the
meeting, which you don't need to refer to. I will just tell you. It is Volume III,
paper no. B36, which is the Airport Authority meeting on that same day, 28 May.
There was no discussion whatsoever. My question is: Do you not think you
had a duty to inform the Board that there were all these problems, the concern of
the police and others? People were breaking in and all that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would have to know the specifics of what the police were talking about
there. I am aware that there were 1 or 2 incidents of inadvertent access.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

You are telling us that in general there is no problem in terms of people
breaking in and you have to station guards at all the doors?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. That was a conscious decision taken to station guards, yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Why do you have to station guards if the system is working?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Sorry? The system wasn't working.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Why were the guards needed? You mean the guards were part of the system?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Part of the security system, yes. The airside, landside boundary, yes.

Chairman:

But the guards were there because ACS was not working properly, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

That is right. If it is not working properly do you not think the Board should be told and informed?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They knew.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

It is not in the meeting, it is not in this paper of 28 May, and it was not discussed at all in the Board meeting? That is my original question. That is why I refer you to the papers? I am asking you whether you and your colleagues have a duty to present such problems to the Board to inform them at least so that they can make the decisions ultimately on what to do. If they just look at the paper, they would have thought there are certain people coming and going, people being hired. You did not even bother to alert the Board. If they had bothered to read newspapers, they would have known that there are problems. I find it quite amazing?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think you would have to look at other documentation.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Of course there are, but I am talking about the Board meeting which I guess is the highest authority of AA. Ultimately, we hold those people responsible. If people in management do not present these important problems to them to discuss at Board meetings --

Airport Management Director, AA:

I'm not the author of this particular paper.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Do you not think you had a duty to work with other members of management when you present such papers to the Board, particularly just a few days before the airport opening? Do you think that under this topic all the important problems should be highlighted and discussed? You were present at the meeting and you didn't even mention it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think the problem was known though. Maybe I didn't bring it up to the Board. Certainly, some of the Board members knew. There were various people monitoring us, NAPCO, Works Bureau --

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

There is no need to pass the buck, Mr HEED. We know what we asked them. I am asking you, in your capacity, whether you had the responsibility? If you assumed everybody knew everything, there was no need to have any meeting at all?

Chairman:

I think the question is: Did you or did you not at any point raise the security of the airport as an issue, which should be a fairly major issue of concern, at the highest level. The system is not working properly and the whole thing is of concern to you? Did you raise it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is the access control system you are talking about, is it?

Chairman:

Yes, the security as a result of the ACS not working. You had to post guards and you had to do all these things. Did you ever raise it? The question is did you ever raise it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't recall.

Chairman:

It certainly is not reflected in the minutes of the AA Board. Even as late as the meeting of 25 June, which is the one that you expect people to take stock of the major areas of concern, it was not mentioned. You certainly had not raised it. I think the question is why did you not raise it since security must be a fairly major area of the operational aspect of the airport?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, you are right. It is a very important aspect.

Chairman:

You did not feel it was your job to raise it or you felt somebody else should have raised it? You just didn't feel the need to raise because everybody knew anyway, or what?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Also, it wasn't handed over to AMD.

Chairman:

Sorry?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The system wasn't handed over to AMD.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

You are not responsible?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am not responsible for the system.

Chairman:

Is it because you feel that you are not responsible for the ACS system and you are not responsible for AVSECO, so you didn't feel you needed to raise it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Partly, yes. I would agree I guess I had a duty or a responsibility to flag it because it was a serious issue, yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

And you did not?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I did not.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

What is he responsible for then in this area, as AMD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

On security?

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Yes.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, once the access control system is working, it would be my responsibility, yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Because up to now, in November, it is still not working, that is why it is still not your responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct, yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Who is responsible for it right now?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is the Project Director.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Amazing, Madam Chairman.

Chairman:

But security surely must be? You have already said earlier just now that security is a very important area, a part of airport operation?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, it is.

Chairman:

You said it was. You felt that you had to monitor AVSECO?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

You felt that ACS was of concern?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

You know the problems existed. You did not mention you were worried because you felt everybody else knew about it. Was that why you didn't raise it or was it because somebody else was supposed to do it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Certainly, a number of people knew about it. But Ms LAU is right. I should have brought it up, yes. I failed.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

In fact, in all the reports, even prepared later by the Airport Authority, I am sure you had input into it, Mr HEED. Actually this problem was referred to very clearly in at least the 2 last reports before AOD. The AOR progress report as at 22 June 1998, Paper no. B18, if I just read out to you a short paragraph, Paragraph 33:

"Access Control System software problems have been resolved and remote control of door locks is being progressively implemented. However, the system is suffering from constant disruption and damage as a result of workers breaking locks on glass encased releases on fire escape doors. Measures have now been introduced with AVSECO and HKP to stop this deliberate damage being carried out and enable the PTB to be properly secured."

Then the next report dated 30 June 1998, Paper no. A47, Paragraphs 16 and 17, the AOR status report as at 30 June 1998. It says here that the police conducted another sweep of the enhanced restricted area on 28 June, only a few days before the AOD. The access control system stability has improved and the system is now on-line. It says here, I think in a very subtle way, that the system is not really reliable. "The stability has improved" means that it is still improving?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

It is still some way from perfection and guards have now been posted in the PTB to avoid any further damage, etc. Work has been continuing to improve the reliability of card readers. So, the problems were actually identified. With your experience, wouldn't you have thought that something should have been highlighted and brought up to the Board and to the CEO at least?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This is an ADSCOM report, is it?

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Prepared by the AA?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Prepared by the AA. It does point out that we are having problems with it although it is very subtle in the way it describes the problem. The fact that we had to post guards at all would lead one to conclude that it is not a normal situation. That is a warning that there are problems with it.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

This is a very important part of the management of the airport and you are the Director of AMD. With your vast experience on airport management, wouldn't you have actually sounded out the warning to the Board of the Airport Authority or at least to the CEO?

Airport Management Director, AA:

This report does that really.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

I was saying that this was actually prepared in a very subtle way. "ACS stability has improved" means it is not really working perfectly?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Then that work has continued to improve the reliability of the card readers.

Chairman:

I think that Mr HEED has actually conceded that he should have flagged the problem but did not.

Airport Management Director, AA:

In a more direct way than I did.

Chairman:

He has already conceded that.

李永達議員：

我想問一個很簡短的問題。

主席：

必須是很簡短的。

李永達議員：

這個問題“Mr HEED”能回答便回答，若不能回答我再問另一位。你們在6月底要領取一個叫“Aerodrome Licence”的牌照，而簽發這個牌照其中一項最重要的考慮因素是保安，我們有幾位同事曾問及保安的問題，得悉在6月底時還有很多問題不斷湧現。我想問一個我很感興趣的問題，請問為甚麼新機場還可以取得這個牌照呢？雖然這個牌照是由民航處處長簽發給你們，但機場在保安方面出現了那麼多的問題，卻仍然可以取得牌照，會令人覺得這是因為機管局和政府的關係似乎很密切。為甚麼機場在保安方面問題多多，卻仍然可以取得牌照？

Airport Management Director, AA:

When The Director of Civil Aviation issues the licence he has to be satisfied that there is adequate security to protect the ESRA, as we call it. This can be done with a system like the access control system or it can be done with guards. Because of the problems with the access control system -- the access control system was turned on but we did have back-up guards as well-- he had to be satisfied that we had guards there to protect against unauthorised access. He was satisfied that we did have guards, yes.

Chairman:

Another one of the workarounds?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is right.

李永達議員：

主席，最重要是在6月底時，即在取得牌照之後幾天，仍然有很多工人可以在機場範圍及有限制範圍自由出入。雖然你在回答我的問題時，很間接地表示你可以辦得到控制出入，但事實證明當時是辦不到。為何你認為你可以取得這個牌照呢？是否因為政府覺得……

主席：

我認為你這個問題要“DCA”才能解答。他已經解答你的問題，當他認為那個“system”未能運作，便安排“guards”去看守。劉慧卿議員。

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

On the baggage handling system, if I may refer Mr HEED to 2 papers. One is Paper no. B39 in Volume III, that the AA Board prepared on 14 July 1998 about problems in the first week. We can look from Paragraph 8 onwards. The other paper I want to refer to is Paper no. B70-1 in Volume V, the response that the AA prepared for the Commission. We can look at item 7 in that bundle.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Item 7 in Paper no. B71.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Paper no. B70-1, item 7, baggage handling system. Have you got both papers in front of you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

These 2 papers together try to list out some of the problems on that day, which I have no doubt Mr HEED is very familiar with anyway.

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Can you confirm for us, first of all, that all along the various weekly status reports and all that stated that there was no problem in this area and It was very smooth. Although the handover did not take place until 29 June, in the various reports, in terms of testing, handover and training, you were very satisfied. Is that correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

I guess you would have been quite shocked to find all the problems on AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But there weren't problems with the baggage handling system.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Let's just take a look at some of the problems and then you can tell us why they happened?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

If we look at the response to the Commission, first of all, they said leftover bags at Kai Tak with unrecognisable labels were shipped over and some of the bags from the KLM flight were misloaded into the transfer system. There were communication and organisation concerns, whatever that means, that ramp handlers were not dealing with late problem bags. Also, there were unrecognisable bar codes and invalid airline baggage source messages. Then, there were airlines which did not comply with the flight numbers and further down, if you look at the next page, it talks about problems with FIDS, number 11, and then number 12 are the relative inexperience of the baggage handling operators in operating the system. Now, you tell us your reasons?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Concerning the bags that came in from Kai Tak, about 800 bags were left over from Kai Tak. That were brought over and approximately 460 of those were inputted into the baggage handling system behind the check-in counters without getting baggage tags and the reconciliation with the baggage handling system. When they got fed into the baggage system, they weren't recognised and they went to the problem bag area.

The KLM flight was an error by the company. The ramp handlers, instead of putting the bags on the reclaim belt, put them on the transfer system so obviously they would go to the problem bag area. There were problems with ramp handlers taking efficiently the bags off the laterals and loading them into containers.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Why?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They just weren't getting there quick enough. There was communication -- whatever. They weren't getting there. The lateral got filled up and then there was no room, so they would circle the baggage system 9 times and then go to the problem bag area. The BSMs, there has to be a message from the

departure control system of the airline to the baggage handling system to recognise the bag that is coming down. For approximately 10 flights of Japan Airlines, Thai and some others, there were reading problems that the baggage source message was never relayed. We had approximately 10 aircraft loads of baggage that wouldn't be recognised by the baggage system and would end up in the problem bag area.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Why was that again? Why would they not be recognised?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Because the message from the departure control system of the airline didn't get past the baggage handling system.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Why did it not get past?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Because of a problem in the departure control system of the airline, the host computer of the airline. Once the baggage tag is produced by the airline, the message should go to their host computer and back to our baggage handling system. There were some problems with the labels, the bar codes on some of the bags weren't read properly so they ended up in the problem bag area.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Why was that, the problems with the bar codes? Whose fault is it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It could be attributable to no read by the automatic baggage sensors or the quality of the baggage tag.

Chairman:

Who is responsible for that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Well, if it is a no read by the baggage handling system, that meant there was some odd --

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Is it the airline's fault?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. That could be just the way the bag was positioned as it went through and it didn't read it. But the quality of the tag is an airline's problem, yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

All in all, you are telling us that it is mainly the airline's problem and none of this was anticipated?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. There was another problem with, not the system, but the operation of the system. We have a lot of emergency buttons to stop the system in case something went wrong or somebody maybe got their hand caught or whatever. The ramp handlers were bumping up against these emergency stops and stopping the equipment as well. They are all minor problems but they all contributed to the problems in the baggage hall.

Now, the system itself did what it was supposed to do. The fact was that the buttons were maybe a little too obvious and people bumped up against them and stopped the machine. What we have had to do now is put shrouds around those buttons. They are still there but at least they won't be accidentally bumped up against and stop the machine.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

To give us an idea of how severe the problem was, at one stage how many bags were there in the baggage handling hall?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There was estimates of up to 10,000 but when we did our reconciliation of it there was about 4,500 bags in the baggage hall.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

As far as you were concerned, that was totally unanticipated?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

You were quite shocked by what happened?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Everybody was, yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

To what extent did the collapse of FIDS contribute to this problem?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It would contribute in that the baggage ramp handlers were getting the bags in from the aircraft and getting the bags out to the aircraft. Primarily, it would be communication problem as a result of saturation of their trunk mobile radio.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Actually, if you look at the causes in Paragraph 9 of Paper no. B39, the first one, the AA listed the delay in mobilisation of sufficient ramp franchisee staff

resources. So, you think that is mainly their problem? When they saw this they should all have gone out and got thousands of people to come in and carry the bags? That is the contingency plan, isn't it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

For the baggage system operator, yes. But that is not relating to that though. That is for the ramp handlers. The baggage system contractor, Swire, operates the baggage system and the ramp handlers are the ones that pick up and deposit the bags, pick them up at the problem bag area, etc. When the problem bag area ends up with 10 flights of problem bags plus other problem bags that we've just talked about, it becomes very quickly a very unmanageable situation, as you can appreciate.

That is what happened in the baggage hall. Of course, that translated into delays in getting baggage to the aircraft. That meant that the aircraft stayed longer on the stand and that the aircraft that was coming in couldn't go to that stand and had to be allocated elsewhere. That is what I talk about as the snowball effect.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Because this was so unanticipated, we can't really ask you any questions about training in terms of getting prepared for such an eventuality, is that right? Is it right for us to think that because it was so unanticipated nobody expected this to happen, and when it did happen, nobody knew what to do and so you had thousands and thousands and thousands of bags accumulated?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We knew what to do. For example, on the baggage source message, we got after the airlines immediately to get the linkage between their computer and our baggage handling system which worked properly. Now what we have done subsequent to that is, as soon as we detect an abnormal number of bags going to the problem bag area, immediately we would contact the airlines and tell them to stop putting more bags down until they have sorted out the problems, that sort of things.

Chairman:

Mr HEED, just one small question on the bags, the leftovers from Kai Tak. Was that problem not taken on board or anticipated with the relocation exercise? Didn't they expect some bags to be left over from Kai Tak and shouldn't some way have been devised to deal with those, even before they piled up?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is quite clear that just about every night we have some bags that are left over, usually transfer passengers that are transferring late at night and the flight doesn't leave till the next day.

Chairman:

They were not unanticipated, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They were not unanticipated. The problem here was basically we had about 800 bags altogether. The ramp handlers just put the first 460 of them behind the check-in counter. After that, they did it properly and they took it down and put it through the --

Chairman:

We are interested in how could that have happened? We keep hearing about teething problems and unanticipated situations? Surely, you cannot say that the leftovers, the bags from Kai Tak, was an unanticipated situation? You knew, you anticipated it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

There must have been some way or some device to handle those bags from Kai Tak, even before you started at 0600 hours?

Airport Management Director, AA:

You are right. We knew there were bags coming over.

Chairman:

Nobody really had a way of dealing with them?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess we didn't focus on or at least get the message to the -- they should have known really because you just can't --

Chairman:

Who should have known?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The ramp handlers, because you just can't put the bags into the baggage system without proper tags.

Chairman:

Was that issue ever discussed with the ramp handlers?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Not that I recall.

Chairman:

This is important because it all aggravated the situation. You started off with this whole stack of bags from Kai Tak as a result of the relocation. Wasn't it supposed to be your Division's responsibility to tell the ramp handlers that there would be hundreds of bags coming in from Kai Tak, maybe not down to the exact number, but you would have anticipated bags coming in?

Airport Management Director, AA:

You have to keep in mind that the bags belonged to the airlines or they belonged to passengers but the airlines were the custodians. The airlines know how our baggage system operates.

Chairman:

Was it ever discussed with the airlines "Look, there are these handover bags. You will have to deal with them"?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I feel it is self-evident.

Chairman:

We are talking about a huge exercise of relocation and everything. Mr HEED, you seem to tell us from time to time that certain things are self-evident. One would have imagined that this is almost like a military operation. It really is the management of details, right? The question must be, as the person responsible for operation, were you satisfied that every detail was actually being attended to and you would try to avoid the kind of problems that were coming up? We keep hearing about unanticipated problems. Were they reasonably unanticipated? Certainly, the bags from Kai Tak were not or could not be qualified as an unanticipated problem. They shouldn't have been there, surely? Would you agree?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would agree, yes.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Can I clarify one thing? I think Mr HEED said the airlines were the custodians of the bags?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

In fact, the people who handle the bags are the ramp handlers, right? They are not the airlines?

Airport Management Director, AA:

In this particular case, the security company was the custodian of the bags. The airlines trusted the bags to the security company, Securair, which was at Kai Tak. They delivered the bags in their custody to the airport. Instead of putting them into the transfer system, like they should have, they just unloaded them behind the check-in counter without putting new tags. So the baggage system would have no record that they are even coming down the system.

Chairman:

Was that process ever covered in your planning of the move, the transfer? If it was Securair who was partly responsible, were they ever told that they should have put the bags at a particular point instead of letting them put the bags anywhere, which eventually did create a problem for you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They weren't given that training, that's right.

Chairman:

They weren't given any information as to where they should deposit the bags?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right. But the airlines should have done that, not us. We are not dealing with the bags.

Chairman:

Sorry? Was it really the airlines? They came in and the airlines had entrusted Securair and Securair was the party responsible for overseeing these bags from Kai Tak to CLK?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Delivery, right.

Chairman:

And you were actually responsible for the relocation? When I say "you" I mean AA?

Airport Management Director, AA:

What happened, getting it to the vehicle at Kai Tak, whoever was getting it to the vehicle -- we just looked after the route to the airport and to the off-loading point. From that point onwards it was the tenant's responsibility.

Chairman:

It was a sort of loophole then? Nobody attended to that particular point so it created a problem for you, was that it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, I guess.

Chairman:

And you certainly did not cover that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We did not cover that.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

You may also want to tell us how much training there was because in your reply to the Commission, you said it was inexperience of the people handling the

system. In terms of the airlines, you are totally not responsible. They are out there on their own whether they are trained or not?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The airline staff were given training at the new airport --

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

How much? Since what date? For how many days or hours have they been given training? The system was handed over on 29 June?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

How many days or how many hours of training did they receive?

Chairman:

Are you talking about the airlines or the ramp handling?

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Both, because he was trying to split up the responsibility.

Chairman:

Separately. Can you answer separately?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The airline training started in December with some of the trainers who had become familiar with the baggage system and the bulk of their staff training occurred in April, May and part of June. It was a one-day course for all their check-in staff. The proper use of tubs -- which is still a problem. It is just one of those things, that it is easier to throw the bag on the belt rather than haul it on a

tub and put it in. Things like that continue to happen and will continue to happen forever.

Chairman:

What about the ramp handling operators?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The ramp handling operators had the same training in the baggage hall. It was part of our programme.

Chairman:

You know that they have completed that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. Just to tell you that there are some complaints that they didn't get proper access to the baggage hall, that is, to drive in the baggage hall, until quite late on. But they could walk into the baggage hall at any time and look around to see what the lay-out of the facility was, to familiarise themselves where the problem bag area was, where the transfer bags, the reclaim, and all that sort of stuff was.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

You are satisfied they got adequate training?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Under Paragraph 12, Item 7, Page 4 of 8, you told the Commission that one of the reasons was the relative inexperience --

Airport Management Director, AA:

I'm looking at my notes but I don't have that Paragraph 12. Yes. There was a lot of staff hired in the last month and they may have seen the baggage hall for one day but they would still require more familiarisation. Some will learn better than others.

Chairman:

There is training but there is also a delay in mobilisation of sufficient ramp franchisee staff resources. You are talking about 2 things, right? One is inexperience, unfamiliar with the situation, so they push a button and everything else, all right? The emergency buttons you mentioned?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Also, the shortage of resources too, right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was our assessment at the time that they had problems in getting in sufficient staff, yes. At least one of the ramp handlers.

Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:

Was it because they didn't anticipate the problems so they didn't have the people to stand by?

Chairman:

Did they have the number of staff that they committed to you to have, or are you talking about extra staff?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We did not count their staff. We did not look to see if they had sufficient staff or not. It was up to them to supply the staff, depending on the clients that they had.

Chairman:

Wouldn't you say that it was AA's job to be satisfied that the contracted service was actually having enough people to handle all this?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Definitely not. We are not there as mother to hold hands for everybody.

Hon Margaret NG:

Isn't it right, Mr HEED, that although the training in many cases was provided by the contractors and the manufacturers, you did have the job and the responsibility of co-ordinating the training?

Airport Management Director, AA:

What we were doing was co-ordinating the interfaces to ensure that the operations on the apron areas and the baggage hall were done safely and properly. We don't know their clients and the demands that they are going to have on their staff. That is their business. We don't interfere with who they have as airline clients, etc.

Hon Margaret NG:

Madam Chairman, I am just wondering if Mr HEED had done all he could to ensure that all the airlines and the franchisees knew what was expected of them and required of them. Could I ask Mr HEED to look at Paper no. B166 in Volume VIII. That seems to be the minutes of a meeting held on 7 July, that is, the day after AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. I have got it.

Hon Margaret NG:

I don't find your name in the present list. Were you there?

Airport Management Director, AA:

On 7 July I probably wasn't there because I had so many other things going on.

Hon Margaret NG:

CH is your initials, is that right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Margaret NG:

In that meeting it seems that the ramp handlers and the franchisees don't seem to have any idea of what was expected of them? What is expressed there seems to show that they had no training?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think this is perhaps --

Hon Margaret NG:

Look at 1A and 1B. It is certainly very strange if you say that they have been given adequate training. It seems that that is your responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I was to look into the matter. I don't think it is my responsibility to provide them with radios. They contracted with a supplier for a radio system and the radio system saturated. They did add additional channels but it was their responsibility to get that, not mine. I would try to assist them. If there was any need to add additional antennas, whatever, we would work on that and there were

a number of cases where we had to do that.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, I am afraid you can't take this very detached attitude. After all, if there is any crash on AOD, any failure of the system on AOD, it is going to fall in your lap?

Airport Management Director, AA:

But at the same time we have a number of franchisees. They are independent businesses, basically. I see my role as ensuring that the interfaces between them and our systems work properly. Whether they have enough staff to handle the baggage for a particular airline or not is an issue between that company and the airline.

Chairman:

Mr HEED, can you refer to your statement to this Committee, which is Paper no. B77. Under Paragraph 3 you say quite clearly:

"AMD is responsible for overseeing the activities of its franchisees, tenants, contractors and other business partners. My responsibilities include ensuring that these activities are in accordance with the Aerodrome Licence and other procedures and regulations, thus ensuring the airport's operational efficiency, safety and security."

Surely, you have a responsibility vis-a-vis the franchisees, tenants, contractors and business partners to make sure that they are doing their job to provide you with the standard of efficiency that is expected of an airport of this stature?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would agree that I would certainly be interested but it is not my job as far as the efficiency of the service that they provide to the airlines.

Chairman:

From what was just quoted, you seem to have been completely taken by --

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. If you look at that, the Aerodrome Licence, I am concerned about the safety aspects of operating the airport.

Chairman:

"Operational efficiency, safety and security". That is what you said in your statement. "Efficiency, safety and security". Surely, you are not telling this Committee that efficiency is not part of your job?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It is related to the efficiency of the operations on the airfield.

Chairman:

On the airfield? Not the PTB?

Airport Management Director, AA:

And the baggage hall, in this particular case, yes.

Chairman:

Exactly. So you have out-sourced certain services. We understand that that is the policy of the AA not to take on permanent staff to do everything?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Chairman:

You out-source certain services and you get certain contractors to take up certain services. Surely, it is the AA's responsibility to ensure that these contractors are providing the services at the sort of standard that they have committed to you? Surely, it must be your responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If it is in the contract and if it is a contractual issue, it is the responsibility of our Commercial Division. As far as the AMD's responsibility is concerned, it is related to the operations on the --

Chairman:

But how do you ascertain that the levels and the standards of services which you have out-sourced are indeed the standard that they deliver?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is not my responsibility.

Chairman:

Whose responsibility is it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is the Commercial Director's responsibility.

Chairman:

Commercial Division? Where does that come under that Division? It doesn't come under you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. It doesn't come under me.

Chairman:

You mean the Commercial Division is responsible for the overseeing of the

ramp handlers?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Not the day-to-day operation, but their efficiency, whatever commitments they have made in the agreements that we have with them. The franchise agreements are signed with the Commercial Division.

Chairman:

They may be signed with the Commercial Division but you are the people they work to. When it comes to baggage handling, they don't work to the Commercial Division. They work to the AMD, don't they?

Airport Management Director, AA:

If they are standards associated with whatever they are committed to in their agreement, that is the responsibility of our Commercial Division. The day-to-day operation to ensure that it is happening in a safe and efficient manner is my responsibility.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Mr HEED, can you confirm that you are familiar with the standards committed to by the operators?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We would try to be familiar with the standards as they relate to the interfaces on the airport, within the PTB on the facility. Let's take HACTL as an example. What happens inside their building is of no concern to me. What happens outside on the apron areas I would be concerned about because it interfaces with other areas.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

I am just talking about the operation. You are responsible for the operation, the efficiency of the operations?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

And you are very familiar with the standard of the operation that you would like to have? That's right?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Have you made sure that those standards actually matched the terms of the agreement, matched the commitment of those out-sourced operators?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Just take as an example, the ramp handlers. One of the things that we started to track and continuously monitor is the first bag-last bag, because that is important to people waiting in the baggage hall. That is a commitment within their agreement as well but we are addressing it from an overall efficiency point of view. We are the ones actually tracking that. If there is a failure, we would go back to our Commercial Division to deal with that.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

You are basically enforcing the agreement? You are basically making sure that --

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am monitoring the performance of the agreement.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

You are monitoring the performance of the agreement?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

And you have a copy of the agreement?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I do.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Have you looked at the agreement?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I happened to have done that when I was the Commercial Director previously.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Have you looked at that agreement when you are Director of AMD?

Chairman:

He is aware of the agreement. Let's put it this way.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

When you are monitoring that agreement and you find that the standard is falling behind, you would certainly inform the Commercial Division?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

That is where the Commercial Division comes in, in terms of the negotiations, in terms of dealing with the contractual terms actually?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

But it is still your responsibility in terms of the operation, in terms of monitoring the operation, in terms of alerting that the operation standard falls behind the commitment of the contract?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. I guess I would like to draw the distinction. You are right, as it affects, for example, the operation of the terminal building, as it affects the operation of the apron areas, as it affects the baggage handling. What happens behind that, I have no particular interest in.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

You do agree that it is your responsibility to alert Commercial Department that certain things may not be in compliance with the requirements or the commitments under the agreement?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right. From an operational perspective, yes. Can I just add one thing here? For example, if they are not meeting the objectives of an airline, that is between the airline and the ramp handler. If there is an agreement by the airline that they must get their bags into the baggage hall within 10 minutes, then that is between the ramp handler and the airline. I would monitor that. I would monitor more on a global basis. There are certain criteria we have set, that the last bag must not be more than 38 minutes I think it is.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

That is the part that I don't understand?

Chairman:

What are you responsible for?

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

I thought your job is to monitor the overall standard of the performance of the airport in terms of efficiency, unless you are telling me that that particular arrangement between the ramp handlers and the airlines does not come into the overall efficiency of the airport?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is an arrangement between themselves. Just take another example --

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Are you aware of that arrangement?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am not aware of that arrangement. Let's take another example. Say an airline decides they are not going to pay for 6 check-in desks. They are only going to have 2. That is going to take a long time for people to check in. That is of no concern to me. That is an issue between the airline and the passenger handling agent, unless it starts to interfere with the flow in the terminal building. Then I would be concerned.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

We are talking about the flow of the baggage?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I just use that as an example.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Let's go back to the example of the flow of the baggage from airlines to the ramp handles. Take that example. Who should be responsible or who should be aware of that particular standard being set?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Being set? That is really between Commercial Division and the operators. We would monitor that standard once the standard is set.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

So you know the standard?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right. But it wouldn't be a specific standard between the airline and the ramp handler. It would be what is in their contract agreement. In the case of baggage right now, there was a 6-month trial period and there were some basic parameters they would try to achieve and over 6 months evaluation they would set the standard. So we don't really have anything at this particular time.

Chairman:

Mr HEED, I was really surprised because you seem to compare the baggage handling operation to HACTL just now. You said HACTL would mind its own business and of course we don't intervene. That of course we understand because it is a separate operation altogether and it has its own management and all of that.

But, baggage handling must be one of the functions that comes under the operations that are under your care and responsibility. In the record which was referred to by Miss Margaret NG here, it says that there appears to be no management of the 3 ramp handlers and baggage operators. You are telling us, "Look, it is something between them and the airlines". How can the person who is responsible for airport operation ensure that it is smooth and efficient? How can you be taken by surprise after the event to discover that there is no management of the 3 ramp handlers and baggage operators after the event? This is after the event - 7 July. Suddenly you seem to discover that there is no management of the ramp handlers.

You might not be doing this yourselves, not hiring permanent staff and so on, but these are contracted services which you have taken on. You are responsible for airport operation and you are taken by surprise after the event. As the person responsible for the operation of the airport, how can you explain that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I am afraid I don't know what this refers to unless they are talking about the fact that somebody needed to be in the baggage hall to co-ordinate amongst the 3 ramp handlers. That is the way I took that and I put staff down into the baggage hall to monitor day-to-day operations to ensure that they are all working together.

Hon Margaret NG:

Mr HEED, I don't know if you would appreciate that it is a very special situation, in that it is different from the running or the day-to-day management of an ongoing airport. There is going to be AOD. Everything has to come together. Many things can go wrong. Therefore, the person responsible has to make sure that the orchestration of everybody involved will be correct. Otherwise, AOD is going to be a failure. I am sure you appreciated that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Margaret NG:

If the airport is already up and running and the airline decides to use 2 check-in desks instead of 5, clearly you don't have to intervene until it becomes a problem?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Hon Margaret NG:

If we are looking at AOD, then co-ordination, making sure that everybody knows what each other is going to do, must be paramount, would you not agree?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, we expected a special situation on opening day. Because we could not have a contingency for everything, at least in my mind, we had sent out the notice to everyone, the AOC and the ramp handlers, etc., and we would have daily meetings starting at 10 o'clock in the morning to sort of fire-fight in effect for any issues that arose. In addition, at the working level, for first thing on the 6th, we also set up a meeting at 6 o'clock, where representatives from the ramp handlers and passenger handling agents, etc, were to come to the AEC to deal with any issues that might arise, and that did occur.

Hon Margaret NG:

I am not talking about 6 July which is already AOD. I am talking about, for the sake of having a smooth and efficient airport opening did you first make sure what everybody is going to do on that day, in order to satisfy yourself that AOD is going to be smooth? Secondly, do you have in place meetings, forums, discussions, consultations, bringing everybody together so that everybody is in the know of what each other is going to do on that day?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. We had those meetings.

Hon Margaret NG:

Did they fail?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't think so. The interface arrangements were worked out with the whole community. Those kinds of meetings, pre-planning meetings were held. We have our way of dealing with anything that was sort of in the fire-fighting mode, if we use that expression or if I want to use that expression. That was the

reason for getting all the experienced people to come to the AEC to discuss any issues that may be of major concern that day.

Chairman:

I don't think we are talking about fire-fighting here. What we are interested in is why wasn't enough done to prevent the fire? I think this is the key question that this Select Committee wants to address. Here we are hearing things about how you fought the fire. We are more interested in why nothing was done enough to prevent that from happening.

Going back to the notes again, the one on 7 July. You were not in that meeting but you were put down as the person responsible for the action of making sure that this question of no management of the ramp handlers would be addressed. That seems to reflect that you must be the person regarded in the AA as the person responsible to oversee that this should not affect the operation. The question must be why were you not aware of this problem, in the first place, that they had no management?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is somebody's wording or perception of that, perhaps. The fact is we had interface arrangements, interface meetings with all the ramp handlers and all the agencies involved. We had meetings on the baggage handling system prior to airport opening. Everything that I thought was needed had been done relative to ensuring that everyone was working together, everybody understood everybody else's problems, etc.

Chairman:

How did you understand that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Through those meetings.

Chairman:

This was based on what? The management of the ramp handlers?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The interface arrangements, for example, that involved the ramp handlers were established with the ramp handlers and with the cargo companies, etc. That was to make sure that everybody understood what the arrangements were among themselves and also with the Airport Authority.

Chairman:

Could you point us to the documentation?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't know if it is here but I can get you the documentation.

Hon Margaret NG:

Perhaps the period of time Mr HEED is referring to, when and the frequency of these meetings, so that there is no misunderstanding?

Chairman:

When were these meetings held, the frequency?

Airport Management Director, AA:

These are the so-called CROW meetings that led to the interface arrangement.

Hon Margaret NG:

The CROW meetings. What period of time are we talking about?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They started in 96 and continued to June 98. A final draft of the interface arrangements was produced in May, I believe.

Chairman:

If you could let us have those?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

It seems that you are trying to say that the management of the ramp handlers was mainly between them and the airlines, but you are also saying that you were responsible for the macro or the global aspects?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Particularly on the airside. However, in Paper no. A27, the letter dated 10 December 1997 from the Chairman of the Airport Authority to the Chief Secretary, Mrs Anson CHAN, if I could just read out a sentence to you on Page 3:

"The Airport Authority is monitoring very closely the progress of our key business partners and franchisees towards airport operational readiness."

Wouldn't you say that, according to your terms of reference and also your witness statement, you were the person responsible for dealing with this aspect?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

In the other document referred to earlier on, Paper no. B39, Paragraphs 4 and 5, the first sentence:

"There was considerable confusion and inefficiency in the performance of ramp handling functions."

Then the next page, Paragraph 5. I won't read out the whole lot but particularly Paragraph 5(a) :

"An apparent lack of general preparedness on the part of the 3 ramp handling franchisees to cope with the very different operating conditions," etc.

Having seen these documents and also heard what you admitted you were the person responsible for this aspect, would you say that you have actually failed your duties to ensure that this did not happen?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would disagree that I failed my duties. We did monitor as the letter to the Chief Secretary points out. We did review all the operational procedures of the ramp handlers, for example, and we did have trials with the ramp handlers, but they were individual, they were running from one aircraft down to the baggage hall, for example. When we got into the dynamic situation with aircraft everywhere, having to respond and poor communications and things like that, we did have problems, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

You see, I am sure you, as the person responsible, would have ensured certain aspects were actually there. Just talking about the staffing of the 3 ramp handlers and also the equipment, for instance, the dollies, wouldn't you take some interest in ensuring all these were adequate?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The ramp handlers are certainly more familiar with their work than I am, or any of my staff is. On the dolly issue, we were involved in discussions with them. It was their decision as to the number of dollies that were required and it was deemed that in fact a little over a thousand, compared to the 600 at Kai Tak, was adequate. We had no reason to dispute that. As it turns out, that is all that was needed, although the shortage that occurred was because of other problems

and the fact that cargo wasn't moving and occupying dollies. I forgot the first part of your question, sorry.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Did you or did you not actually ensure that all these were adequate in this situation?

Airport Management Director, AA:

As I said, we did review their operational procedures and we did ask for amendments to the operational procedures where we thought they were inadequate. I believe that we did all we could, without doing their job for them, in ensuring that they were prepared.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Did you actually leave this to your subordinates rather than taking an active interest in all this yourself?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I wasn't personally involved in a lot of these meetings. You are absolutely right. I was briefed by the General Manager of Airfield Operations, for example, on meetings and discussions that they had and I would see minutes of meetings as well.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Mr HEED, you cannot just rely on reading minutes because you are supposedly the most experienced airport management person brought in to this project, with your 36 years experience behind you?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

How could you leave some of these very important aspects to your subordinates? For instance, HACTL should have been in close liaison with you, or your team, on the provision of, for instance, dollies and the arrangement for the interfacing situations. Would you say that this is an aspect that should have been dealt with by yourself rather than your subordinates?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't think so. The interfacing arrangements are really airfield related and the number of dollies is a judgment based on experience at other locations. As a matter of fact, the number of dollies is a red herring anyway. It was proven that it really wasn't a problem except for the fact that cargo wasn't moving. The interfacing arrangements doesn't need my personal involvement. I can't be involved in everything. There were hundreds of things happening or thousands of things happening.

Chairman:

I think, Mr HEED, in fairness, you really have to answer that question on the apparent lack of general preparedness on the part of the 3 ramp handling franchisees. Do you or do you not consider that as your responsibility, AMD's responsibility, to ensure that they are adequately prepared for AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess I have a responsibility but it is not my primary responsibility.

Chairman:

We are not thinking that you yourself personally or even a member of your staff is to manage that because we know you have out-sourced the service. But surely, it is not only in your interests but it is also within your area of responsibility to ensure that nothing like what actually happened happened?

Airport Management Director, AA:

They assured me that they were prepared.

Chairman:

You listened to them. They said they were prepared and you took their word that they were prepared and that's it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right. I think this may be a little bit of exaggeration here as well.

Chairman:

This is your own paper, AA Board paper. You mean you did not have a part to play in putting this together for the Board?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I reviewed it, yes, but I didn't prepare it.

Chairman:

You raised no objection to it?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, that's true.

Chairman:

You are now telling this Committee that it is overstated, that in fact the ramp handlers were prepared,?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think if you talk to the ramp handlers, they would disagree with that statement.

Chairman:

I am talking about you. We are not asking the ramp handlers. Of course they would have a very different perspective. We are asking you on behalf of the management of AA. Do you think that they were adequately prepared for AOD, given what you know of the problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Certainly, there were problems.

Chairman:

Were they prepared?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I believe they were.

Chairman:

Here, in black and white, the apparent lack of general preparedness on their part?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I believe they were prepared, yes.

Chairman:

You are disowning this paper or are you saying that this paper gave the wrong information to the AA Board? This is your area of responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I believe it overstates the situation, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

I think, Mr HEED, you have to tell us categorically that you agree with the contents of this paper at Paragraph 5(a) or not? Please give us a very explicit

answer.

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think the key word there is apparent lack of general preparedness. It is a perception.

Chairman:

And you don't share that perception?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't share that perception.

Chairman:

Being the person responsible for airport operation, being the person who actually had a part in the preparation of this paper to the Board and allowing that to be included in the paper, it is a very serious matter, Mr HEED. I don't know how Members feel about this, but I think it is a very serious matter that the Director, who is responsible for airport operation and who is assessing the situation as and when the problems arise, is now telling us that in fact you do not share the view that was put forward by the management to the Board on this particular problem?

Airport Management Director, AA:

As you can appreciate, this paper was probably prepared a few days before the 14th and in the heat of the moment. We may have felt that way but, in looking back at it, I don't believe that is an accurate statement.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Mr HEED, I would like to ask you did you actually tell the Board or the CEO that you did not actually share the perception in this particular section of the paper? Did you tell them that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There was a discussion, as I recall, and I think one of the companies was perhaps less prepared than the other two.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

That is not what I was asking?

Airport Management Director, AA:

What I am telling you is that this was discussed in that context, OK.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Did you tell the Board that you did not actually agree with the wording here?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I didn't say that. What I did say was that one of the companies was less prepared and was causing more problems than anyone else.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Although you were saying many times that the franchisee agreements were signed between the 3 RHOs and the Commercial Director, right, you were supposed to look after their contracts?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't look after their contracts. I look after the operational aspects of their contracts.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

But the contracts have been signed with the Airport Authority and you would be the person looking after the contracts once they come under your ambit, your responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

From an operational context only, on the day-to-day operation.

Chairman:

You enforce the terms of the contract? Let's put it this way?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, I don't.

Chairman:

Who enforces the terms of the contract on behalf of the AA?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The Commercial Division. I think I described earlier to Miss NG --

Chairman:

The Commercial Division enforces the terms of the contract?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

But on whose advice? I mean, who will tell them?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It could be on my advice, yes.

Chairman:

But it is not your responsibility to enforce?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

I think you are giving us some very unclear answers to this one, if I may say so. Contractually, the Commercial Director on behalf of the Airport Authority signed those contracts with the 3 companies?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

You would then later on be the person ensuring that the contracts were actually enforced according to the terms of the contract?

Airport Management Director, AA:

As it deals with day-to-day operational matters, I would be monitoring those activities.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

The performance of the ramp handlers?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

If you find that the performance is not satisfactory --

Airport Management Director, AA:

Then I would refer it to the Commercial Division to deal with.

Chairman:

Have you ever referred any case of such unsatisfactory performance to the Commercial Division?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Perhaps not on the ramp handling side, but on other matters I have, yes.

Chairman:

Even after AOD you have not referred?

Airport Management Director, AA:

There have been discussions with Commercial Division on some of the performances, yes.

Chairman:

But did you refer? You are the person who is --

Airport Management Director, AA:

I haven't written any letters or anything like that, no, not written.

Chairman:

If you are not satisfied, like on AOD, in the heat of the moment, you have all these problems that you were facing, how did you actually refer or how did you tender that advice to Commercial Division to take action?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I think the Select Committee has copies of the Task Force meetings, the daily Task Force meetings that occurred as a result of the Chief Secretary's visit on the 7th. You will note in there that the Commercial Division was also

attending those meetings and they were asked to deal with certain actions on a contractual basis.

Chairman:

I think that the way we understand it and the way you have told us, the Commercial Division is responsible for the drawing up of the contract, signing of the contracts, the legal aspect, the contractual aspect and all that; but Commercial Division would not have anybody there to actually see what the ramp handling operators are doing on a day-to-day basis?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Chairman:

Your people have that responsibility?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is correct.

Chairman:

When they see that the ramp handling operators are not performing as they have committed themselves to perform in the contract, surely you would have actually said to the Commercial Division "Look, this they haven't done, that they haven't done", and so on and so forth?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That's right.

Chairman:

Where does it occur? Is there such communication between yourself and the Commercial Division?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I don't believe we have any issues to deal with related to that.

Chairman:

Not even after AOD? Not after all these baggage problems have surfaced?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Not to my knowledge.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Mr HEED, just following up on this. In the morning of 6 July at 10 o'clock there was a meeting between the representatives from the airlines and the ramp handlers. Were you there also?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. I chaired the meeting. Actually, Eric WONG, General Manager of Operation Support, set up the meeting so he started to chair it but, after that, I chaired all the rest of them, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Just now you were telling us that you were at least not happy with the performance of one of the 3 companies?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

You did not inform the Commercial Director at all although you could have taken action yourself to make sure that the performance of that particular operator should have been improved?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That was discussed at length at various meetings with the company and with Commercial Division present, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

Coming back to this meeting I mentioned just now, was it actually at that meeting you found out that you should have done something about it to solve the lack of management problem? Was that the point in time you realised that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

At 10 o'clock in the morning no one had an appreciation of the magnitude of the problem. As a matter of fact, the problem wasn't very well defined at all. It was not until we called another meeting at around 4 o'clock on that day, which wasn't planned, the problems really became apparent. That was when we started to take action, yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

The problem was aggravated more and more later on when the shortage of dollies was getting worse and worse because of dollies being tied up at the various locations in the airport?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:

At that time you still thought that the 3 companies were actually ready, were actually prepared for the airport opening, even at that point in time? Just now you were saying that apparently they were prepared. It is only the apparent lack of preparedness. You are trying to play down the seriousness of that particular aspect?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The lack of dollies is nothing to do with the ramp handlers. The fact that the cargo was tied up in the dollies -- as a matter of fact, the ramp handlers went off and dumped cargo off the dollies in order to get them back.

Chairman:

I think we should focus on the lack of preparedness and the lack of management of the 3 ramp handling operators.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

He has already answered that, hasn't he?

Chairman:

You would only agree that one of them was a problem, not all 3?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes. One of them was causing more problems, right.

Chairman:

You said one of them was causing more problems than the others. We are talking about preparedness. Do you or do you not agree that there was an overall lack of preparedness?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, I do not agree.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

He has already answered many times. I think that is a very crucial question because Mr HEED said that when he was referring to the efficiency of the baggage handling, the objectives were set by the airlines. A normal passenger, all he or she cares about is how fast the baggage could be loaded onto the belt and he can retrieve that, right? Whether it is United Airlines or Cathay

Pacific, he doesn't care. I would like to ask: say, how quickly a baggage can be retrieved, is that established by the Airport Authority or by various airlines at different standards?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Certainly, the airlines with the ramp handlers. They have an internal agreement to do that. What the Commercial Division has done is to establish some guidelines and standards for the ramp handlers to meet. I mentioned the 18 minutes and 38 minutes, as a general criteria, to be evaluated after 6 months for baggage receipt. That was set up because no one knew how the larger area of CLK would impact on baggage delivery. In fact, it is much better than that. We are achieving time right now, average time of around 13 minutes for the first bag and the last bag of around 35 minutes. So, we are doing better than that. It is up to the Commercial Division to put that in concrete for us to monitor in the future, yes.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

But the question is: These criteria for performance are set by the Airport Authority rather than the airlines, right?

Chairman:

The first and last bags?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The general standard is set between the Airport Authority and the ramp handlers. It is not unilaterally set by the Airport Authority.

Chairman:

But it is set anyway?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is right.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Earlier on in the hearing, you said these objectives are set by the airlines and it is their business. You referred to checking in, I understand, because if I go Singapore Airlines or Cathay Pacific and one airline has 5 counters and this one has just one, I know. But, getting luggage is a different matter, right?

Chairman:

He has already answered you that there are guidelines, as far as AA is concerned, with the ramp handlers - first bag, last bag, and how long it takes.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

So that he would modify what he said earlier, right, in this hearing?

Chairman:

He actually did say that there are certain guidelines. He said that they are not responsible for overseeing how many people they employ and all that, but that there are certain guidelines.

Airport Management Director, AA:

That they should meet, yes.

Chairman:

There are agreements between the airlines and the ramp handlers, OK.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Can we now move on to cleanliness and waste management? There are two major areas: the toilets and the other areas including the PTB. Can I focus on the toilets first? Prior to AOD, do you anticipate that problems will arise from the toilets?

Airport Management Director, AA:

You are probably aware that during the trials we had a lot of observations on the toilets related to size and room. Did I realise that the cleanliness problem would be present? Cleanliness is of course the most important thing that you have to get right in an airport because that is what's noticed first. We were very cognisant of it. We had worked very hard with our cleaning contractor to ensure that he had appropriate staff and training to deal with that effectively.

It wasn't necessarily all there on opening day. As a matter of fact, having about an extra hundred thousand people in the terminal building didn't help either. But, the fact is the cleaning contractor let us down in the cleanliness of the facilities and we are continuing to work with them to improve that. We found some other problems such as the ventilation wasn't quite adequate either in there, that contributed to the general condition of the toilets. We are continuing to work on that, yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Did you anticipate the water supply problem?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Did we anticipate any water supply problems? We didn't anticipate those problems although there had been failures previous to airport opening, so we did mobilise the contractor staff to be on hand to deal with any failures that might come up. I shouldn't say we didn't anticipate. We were prepared for it, let's put it that way.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

What sort of plan had you put together to prepare for any problem arising out of water supply and cleanliness of the toilets? Any contingency plan?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The contingency plan that we put in place for the toilets was to put a person in each toilet during the first month or month and a half. We downgraded that to only having a toilet attendant in the main washrooms. In the most used washrooms we still have one but we have discontinued it at some of the less used toilets to save costs.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

That didn't happen on AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

AOD, yes, we had every toilet manned. We were ready for that, yes.

Chairman:

You say you were let down by the janitorial contractor?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I would say that the training of his staff wasn't up to standard, yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Is cleanliness in the toilets a major issue or a major concern in your portfolio prior to AOD? Are you particularly concerned about this problem?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I guess I have a fixation on toilets because of my past experience of dealing with cleaning contractors. It was certainly a major concern to me and I was emphasising that one to the highest degree that we must get right.

Chairman:

How was that ascertained? That you get it right before AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Complaints. If we didn't get complaints.

Chairman:

No. How was it ascertained that the service that they provide would be up to standard?

Airport Management Director, AA:

By just observing through the trials. We did have quite a few people on open days and things like that. To be frank, the quality left something to be desired. So, we were at the contractor continuously on that issue.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Can I bring you through a number of documents and perhaps you can answer whether you have really focused on this problem. Can I request you to look at Paper no. B165 in Volume VIII?

Chairman:

Ambrose, I am afraid I have to warn you that we have to go very quickly.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

If I can just point out to you in Paper no. B165, Paragraph 4, on maintenance, it is vitally clear that there are modifications to the flushing water pumps and that would only be completed by 3 July, OK?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

And you have been actually requested to make sure that the toilets would be working on 4(b)? That is the first document?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That is our Project Division, by the way.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

The Project Division? But on operation you would be concerned?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes, definitely, because it reflects on the --

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

You have been with the whole project for a long time. You were concerned, OK. Secondly, if you look at ADSCOM document Paper no. A46, on 4 July, the Chairman of ADSCOM focused on restrooms. I can actually read it out to you much more quickly:

"CEO said that the whole flushing water system would be turned over and completed that weekend."

In fact the Chairman was very concerned and after seeing the report the Chairman asked the CEO of AA to keep the situation under careful review. So, toilet is in focus. In that document the Financial Secretary actually said the AA should put an attendant in each toilet to ensure its cleanliness. The 2 documents have actually set the basis of what you should be monitoring. Can you look at Paper no. B166?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Very quickly, this is 7 July, after AOD. The problems with the toilets and water supply on AOD, I put it to you that on 7 July in your senior AA management meeting that problem has not been mentioned at all? Mr HEED, I think my question to you is that you should be well aware of the issue. You know that the modifications to the flushing water system is only completed and turned over by 3 July. What have you done between then, from 29 June to AOD, to try to make sure that nothing would go wrong? It has been very specific. Also, I would like you to show to us to make sure that you did say that on AOD

each toilet was attended by an attendant, is that correct?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Chairman:

Mr HEED, what was done? What action was taken?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We did put a toilet attendant in every toilet for AOD and, as far as the flushing water situation was concerned, our Engineering Maintenance Department were tracking the contractor to ensure that that work was done.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

I think there were a lot of complaints about the inadequacy of toilets. I would just like to ask a very short question. Who approved the design?

Airport Management Director, AA:

I can't answer that question but it was part of the design by the architects.

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

I know who designed it. The client ought to know what he wants too or maybe that is not the case?

Chairman:

Who represented the client at that point?

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:

Maybe first tell us whether the client knows anything about airport design?

Chairman:

I don't know whether Mr HEED can answer that question but you can certainly answer us whether you are the person or whether there is somebody else?

Airport Management Director, AA:

That was I think one of the problems. Somebody like myself should have been on the Airport Authority right at the beginning. The first Operations Director came into place sometime in 1993 when the design was already under way. I became the Operations Director in October 1996 after the building was well under way. Who was the client at that time? I don't believe there was anybody. I think it was all done by Project.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Madam Chairman, I haven't actually finished.

Chairman:

I will cut off at 1 o'clock.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Mr HEED, with all those warning signals from top level to operational level to system level, you have not put in any satisfactory contingency plans to avoid any problem arising on the AOD? Do you agree with that?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No, I don't agree with that, of course. Are you talking about the mechanical systems, toilets, things like that?

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

The toilets, the water pumps, the flushing pumps and the water supply?

Airport Management Director, AA:

The contingency plans are to have staff there. What else can you do?

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

You mean the attendants? The attendants are not going to rectify your mechanical problems?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. For mechanical problems, it was to have the contractor staff available right there to deal with any problems that came up.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Can I put to you Paper no. B70-1, which is an AA response to a letter from the Chairman of the Commission regarding the problem of water supply. In Part 2, Page 6 of 6, if I can refer to that particular Paragraph 6 on counter measures which refers in detail to the measures on the night of 7 July and which AMD has established. That is a fairly comprehensive and complicated plan about having a shift system with a plumber stationed in each tank room, hourly report and daily status sheet, electricians along with supervisors, covering night-shift, monitoring operations to assist any call-outs, contact numbers for hydraulics and electrical support and identifying names of persons to contact on a 24-hour basis. All this could have been done?

Airport Management Director, AA:

It was done.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

But that was on the night of 7 July?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. It was done on the 6th as well.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

According to here, from the night of 7 July the AMD established these counter measures. We are talking about counter measures that deal with the problems that have arisen on AOD?

Airport Management Director, AA:

OK. That was to put our own AMD staff in there and the staff of the contractor as well. The contractor was already there.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Do you agree that is bad judgment when you haven't done that prior to AOD, having got all those warnings from top to operation level?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Perhaps, in retrospect, you are right.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Can I move on very quickly to the janitorial contractor?

Chairman:

Quickly.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

The general impression you have given to this inquiry is that you are not happy with the janitorial contractor?

Airport Management Director, AA:

We continue to be dissatisfied, yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Continues to be dissatisfied. Do you agree that it is your duty to monitor

the operation?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Right.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

To monitor and to make sure that they actually perform to their particular service standard level?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Do you agree this is an out-source contract?

Airport Management Director, AA:

Yes.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

To the extent that it bears a lot of resemblance to the ramp handles, there are certain standards that you would have to monitor to make sure that they are performing and you are operationally enforcing the contract?

Airport Management Director, AA:

No. The ramp handlers is sort of a hands-off agreement whereas the janitorial contract is something that we in AMD administer so any deficiencies related to it are AMD's responsibility.

Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:

Madam Chairman, with your permission, if I can just move quickly on to one or two questions?

Chairman:

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日

開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜

專責委員會

Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

I am afraid I have promised Members to cut off at 1 o'clock. I think Mr HEED has actually answered the major part of the questions that we intended to put to him. If there are other questions that we wish to put to him at this point we will put it in writing and hope that he will respond in writing. If there is a need at a later stage for us to call him back, we might decide to do that at a later stage.

At this point I think today's hearing will end here. I hope that Mr HEED will note that if this Committee considers it necessary to order you to give further evidence you must attend further hearings. You may withdraw now. Thank you.

(The hearing ended at 1:03 pm)