

# 立法會

## 調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日 開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜 專責委員會

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第22次公開研訊的逐字紀錄本

日期： 1998年11月26日(星期四)  
時間： 上午9時  
地點： 立法會會議廳

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### 出席委員

周梁淑怡議員(主席)  
何鍾泰議員(副主席)  
何承天議員  
李永達議員  
吳靄儀議員  
張永森議員  
陸恭蕙議員  
陳鑑林議員  
單仲偕議員  
劉江華議員  
劉慧卿議員  
蔡素玉議員

### 出席委員

馬逢國議員

### 第1節(上午9時至11時24分)

### 證人

香港機場管理局  
行政總監  
董誠亨博士

### **陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士**

香港機場管理局法律總監  
郭展禮先生

### **第2節(上午11時24分至11時30分)**

#### **證人**

赤鱗角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席  
鄭國雄先生

### **陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士**

萬世基律師行律師  
董彥華先生

### **第3節(上午11時30分至下午1時12分)**

#### **證人**

香港機場管理局  
機場管理科  
飛行區運作總經理  
林大志先生

### **陪同證人出席研訊的其他人士**

香港機場管理局  
機場管理科  
機場牌照及運作經理  
潘漢志先生

立法會調查赤鱸角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日  
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜  
專責委員會  
Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances  
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of  
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok  
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

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**主席：**

多謝各位出席今天舉行的專責委員會第22次研訊。

在未正式開始研訊前，我想提醒各位委員，整個研訊過程必須有足夠的法定人數，即連主席在內共5名委員。

我想藉此機會再次提醒公眾人士及傳媒，若在研訊進程序以外披露研訊上提供的證據，將不受《立法局(權力及特權)條例》所保障。因此傳媒應就他們的法律責任，徵詢法律意見。

專責委員會已傳召3名證人出席今天的研訊，分別是：

- 香港機場管理局行政總監董誠亨博士，他將會出席第1節研訊；
- 香港機場管理局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理林大志先生，他將會出席第2節研訊；
- 赤鱸角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席鄭國雄先生，他將會出席第3節研訊。

在未傳召第1位證人，香港機場管理局行政總監董誠亨博士之前，我想徵詢委員的意見，董誠亨博士要求帶同以下人士出席研訊：香港機場管理局法律總監郭展禮先生。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許郭先生在研訊進行期間陪同董誠亨博士，但他不可以在席上發言或提示證人如何回答委員的問題。

如委員對研訊程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊開始，並傳召證人香港機場管理局行政總監董誠亨博士。

(董誠亨博士進入會議廳，  
並由郭展禮先生陪同)

Dr TOWNSEND, thank you for attending the hearing of the Select Committee again. You are summonsed before the Select Committee today to give further evidence. Please note that you are still under oath when giving evidence.

The Select Committee has agreed that you may be accompanied by Mr

Josiah KWOK during the hearing to render you legal advice where necessary, but he will not be allowed to address the hearing or prompt you in any way in your replies to Members.

***Dr Henry TOWNSEND, Chief Executive Officer, Airport Authority Hong Kong (Chief Executive Officer, AA):***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

We now continue with the hearing. Dr Raymond HO.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Dr TOWNSEND, 2 days ago I asked you about the contract between AA and HACTL and why there was no clear contractual date mentioned in the contract. I also asked whether the term was really just "best endeavours" that HACTL was to make the facilities 50 percent available of their capacity in April, and then 75 percent by 18 August. Is that correct?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

That is generally correct. As I indicated the other day that basically, the agreement was being finalised in mid-'95. Until a few months later than that, the schedule for opening of the airport had been established as April '98, and so it was recognised in the communications by our Chairman, who was then also the Financial Secretary, that there would be a need to open the airport before 18 August. And so there were several letters exchanged at that time.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

I was asking you also, Dr TOWNSEND, whether or not Airport Authority could obtain better terms from HACTL at that time before the contract was signed than just "best endeavours"?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

We felt that first of all by the passing of time up to the point of discussing

the supplemental agreement with HACTL. Originally they were trying to move to 50 percent at the end of April through acceleration measures, and subsequently they said 75 percent.

However, we had to act within the terms of the franchise agreement which basically stipulated that, if there was a need for them to incur additional costs for acceleration to meet the date, this would be sent to us for our review and comment. However, it had to be within the terms of the franchise agreement. That agreement, to the best of my knowledge, did not give us the right to change the 18 August date.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

But wouldn't you agree that the supplemental agreement would actually call for additional and new terms to the original contract? That is why they sent a supplemental agreement to be established.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Well, it was, I believe it was still recognised that obviously they were going to put into place supplemental agreement that would have 75 percent available on airport opening day.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Because actually at the time when this supplemental agreement was prepared, the Airport Authority agreed to raise a large sum of money in the order of \$800 million, to be included in the base case financial plan inside the existing contract between AA and HACTL. Is that correct?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

There was a sum of money which represented an estimate prepared by HACTL for their total investment cost, including their entire cost for the facility, and obviously in dealing with their financiers for the project they had included an amount of contingency. But the amount of the contingency was determined by HACTL and the Authority did not enter into that.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Dr TOWNSEND, I would like to refer you to Paper no. A29, Volume I. This was ADSCOM's meeting dated 2 January 1998.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Just one moment. I have the right document. Yes.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Paragraph 3, please, on Page 2. Have you got that, Dr TOWNSEND? Page 2, Paragraph 3?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

It says:

"The Chairman ["Chairman" is the Chairman of ADSCOM] pointed out that April had always been the target date for HACTL to provide 50 percent of its air cargo handling capacity. D, NAPCO said that AA and HACTL were originally supposed to agree on an extra sum of \$200 - \$300 million for HACTL to instruct its main building contractor to acceleration work to meet the April date, but HACTL had apparently come back with a figure of some \$800 million instead. He believed high level intervention would be required to resolve the issue."

Why was this the case?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I see this was a meeting which included just the Government side and NAPCO. As I indicated, they allowed a contingency for their original estimates of the construction of the facilities and they had a nominal contingency to that amount. But when they went out to finance, of course, they wanted to be sure that they would have enough finance available to finish the project to that level. And so the matter of the financial part of it was a matter for HACTL.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

But this was really the cost, the amount of money paid to the contractor by HACTL for acceleration works, but in fact the contractor was slow in the beginning in the construction of Super Terminal 1. In the end the Airport Authority had to agree to such a large amount of money to be included in HACTL's scheme of control. That would mean a very high percentage, 75 percent, for calculation of this base case financial plan.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

I do not recall the exact number but we did not give them full approval up to the limit of their financing. I forget the precise number but I believe it was somewhere in the range of \$300 million or somewhere in that range. It is not the full amount. Although they did request us to approve it to that amount, in our opinion, that was not within the terms of the franchise agreement.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Was there any high-level intervention to resolve this issue in the end?

***Chairman:***

Dr TOWNSEND.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

This is the Government talking within the Government so I was not aware.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Were you involved in the negotiation later on?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, I was. However, as I indicated, we had to operate within the terms of the franchise agreement which was in place.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Dr TOWNSEND, I would like to refer you to another document, Paper no.

B70-1. I think it is in Volume III. B70-1. This was the response by Airport Authority to the letter from the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry on the New Airport dated 28 July 1998.

**Chairman:**

Volume III.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Paper no. B70-1. Have you got that, Dr TOWNSEND?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, I do, thank you.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Paragraph 3, Part 2 under the heading of "Air Cargo Facilities - Response to Commission, Item 1", Page 13 of 20, Part 2. "Response to Commission, Item 1", under the heading of "Air Cargo Facilities". Have you got that, Dr TOWNSEND?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I have, Part 2, yes, thank you.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Paragraph 3, please, heading "The problems encountered on airport opening."

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, I have that.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

I will read out just the first few lines:

"Despite several requests the Authority has not received any formal report



from HACTL detailing the problems it apparently encountered immediately prior to and on airport opening day with its own facilities and services, in connection with its interface with other operators, especially the ramp handling operators, and the other airport related services."

Now, it seems that HACTL were not actually giving the Airport Authority full cooperation in the course of the project. Was that the case?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

I think at this particular moment in time, HACTL and everyone were concentrating on their recovery programme and so they were working very hard and of course we did have regular meetings with them, as did Government and others during that period of time after airport opening day. They for various reasons had not officially responded to us although we had written them several letters, because we can request information under the franchise agreement. And so I believe that they acknowledged these requests but asked for more time, or did not respond to them.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Now, on the 3 points we have been talking about, firstly, in the beginning, on Day One, there was not really much bargaining power on the part of the Airport Authority in the negotiation of the original contract with HACTL. You had to give them what they wanted. They said "no contractual date, no clear contractual date, just best endeavours", then Airport Authority had to accept it.

Secondly they asked for a large sum of money, up to \$800 million for acceleration works despite the contractor was actually slow in the programme initially. You had to agree to very substantial sum of money so that they would agree to 75 percent capacity on AOD.

Thirdly, they did not really respond to you promptly, although you made a lot of requests subsequent to the chaos after, on AOD and after AOD.

Now, it seems that you were telling us, although you were telling us the other day that Airport Authority had overall responsibility for HACTL's performance and the compliance of this agreement between AA and HACTL, still you could do nothing about HACTL's performance. Is that the case, Dr TOWNSEND?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Under the terms of the franchise agreement they had the responsibility to design, build, operate their facility, ST1, and of course we did have the right under the franchise agreement to request reports, and they did provide us many reports right up to the airport opening. And then, as I indicated, because of their concentrating on the recovery programme, they did not respond in a timely way.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

That means you could only accept their reports on their face value? You could not actually carry out your duties to monitor the, or have overall monitoring of HACTL's performance?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I believe I also indicated that during and after airport opening day that there were regular meetings with HACTL to discuss their recovery programme. And as indicated and somewhat further on is ...

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND, can we concentrate on AOD, please.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Chairman:**

We are talking about the run-up to AOD.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, running up to AOD they were providing us regular reports. However, we did not receive the final month's report in a timely way.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Why did you not ask for their reports for the period shortly before AOD?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We did. We had been writing them, concentrating very heavily on trying to determine what the problems they experience during AOD and after their recovery programme.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Since which month they did not submit the monthly reports to AA?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It was the month immediately before, which would normally be due after airport opening day.

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND, here, I would like you to tell this Committee, we see Sit Rep from NAPCO to ADSCOM, the last one being the one that was in fact submitted or issued on 27 June, which is Paper no. C80. And in it the Consultant Project Manager was really very worried about HACTL and he pointed out that the BD had to abandon their inspections on 17 June due to incomplete works. "TOP, Temporary Occupation Permit, is now at high risk to be achieved before 30 June." Were you aware of this situation?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, we were meeting with them fairly regularly at that time, including NAPCO.

**Chairman:**

Yes, and then Paper no. A47 your status report as at 30 June 1998 which was for information of ADSCOM. Paragraph 6 says:

"HACTL have now revised their target dates for obtaining Temporary Occupation Permits for Super Terminal 1 to 2 July and the Express Centre to 3 July. All of the C and ED rooms except 6 have been handed over."

So, there were still outstanding rooms to be handed over at that point.

Now, wouldn't you say that that was exposing the whole opening to a tremendous risk whereby air cargo facilities may not be available for AOD?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Well, I think the important point is that they had been working with the Buildings Department through that whole period and also the Authorised Person is the individual usually dealing with the Buildings Department.

**Chairman:**

No, I am not talking about the building. I am not talking about the TOP. I am talking about the state of Super Terminal 1 at that point. I mean, even you yourself reported to ADSCOM that at that point, when you reported to ADSCOM and obviously the report was written before 4 July, they hadn't even obtained their TOP. So, NAPCO was fully briefed on the situation because they had the CPM. You were fully briefed because you had your project managers looking at the day-to-day situation. They hadn't even got the TOP at that point. So, wouldn't you say that that was a tremendous risk to run?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

In fact they did receive their TOP ...

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

On 3 July.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

... on 3 July and so that's a continuing programme. It isn't just an abrupt change. It is an on-going programme and they did receive it on 3 July.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

But wouldn't you say that that was very, very late, Dr TOWNSEND? 3 July, 3 days before opening?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, but they certainly could operate within the parameters of checking all of the facilities and other areas, and the TOP actually allowed them to operate the facility.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

You said you were not able to get their monthly reports just prior to AOD, and in fact your Deputy CEO of AA, Billy LAM, got the verbal comfort from Mr Anthony CHARTER just over a cup of tea at Grand Hyatt. Is that the way you tried to get information from HACTL?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

No. In fact as we indicated there were regular meetings with them, and as you look through they actually began an operation in ST1 in furthering their development of their systems and they were handling some cargo in there, I believe, starting on 4 July.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

In the last hearing on Tuesday you told us that you assigned the duty of monitoring HACTL's performance to Mr Peter ASHMORE.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

That is correct.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

And Mr ASHMORE actually is a Project Manager in the Project Division under Mr A J THOMPSON.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Alastair THOMPSON, yes.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Mr THOMPSON is the Head of Construction, and he is under Mr OAKERVEE who is the Head of Project Division.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

That is right, yes.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Why did you assign such an important duty to a person who is 3 ranks below you?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Well, he was a very senior person in our organisation and in fact he had another equivalent project manager working with him to monitor HACTL, Mr Paul BURN. But Peter was our official representative in terms of the franchise agreement following the construction and other operations. I think that when you see the size of the project you would recognise that it was necessary to assign the day-to-day activities to someone with his qualifications and capabilities.

The other part of it is that we did have our Commercial Division, who was responsible for handling the administrative aspects of the franchise and activities. They were also involved in meetings and discussions with HACTL at various times. And so there was collaboration between Commercial on the commercial aspects of the agreements, and with Project Division on the physical progress area.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

Now, my last question, Dr TOWNSEND. Can you tell us, as Mr ASHMORE was responsible for day-to-day communication and liaison with HACTL, who was the key person in respect of HACTL's performance?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Anthony CHARTER and K K YEUNG were the 2 principal people.

**Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:**

No, within AA.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Within AA? It would be Mr Peter ASHMORE and a gentleman reporting to Raymond LAI, who was the Commercial Director.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Sorry, my question, if I put it the other way, Dr TOWNSEND. Was it you or was it somebody under you who was the senior person that Mr ASHMORE had to report to?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

He would report to a number of us including Mr OAKERVEE, to Billy LAM as DCEO, and I would also receive copies of the reports.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

But, Dr TOWNSEND, we all understand from various witnesses that the Project Division did not report to Mr Billy LAM.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, but he was certainly aware generally of what was going on with HACTL because the reports were rather widely distributed within the Authority.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

No, I am sorry, Dr TOWNSEND. I am not asking how the reports were circulated. I was asking who was the key person within AA to look after HACTL. Was it yourself or anyone under you.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

It would be Douglas OAKERVEE and Mr Raymond LAI who was in charge of Commercial, and obviously I would know what is going on.

***Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai:***

Thank you.

**Chairman:**

Mr CHEUNG Wing-sum.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Dr TOWNSEND, if I would like to put some details to you? Do you agree that the HACTL design is a fairly sophisticated, highly computerised design which needs integration of different levels of control, and that this particular design basically evolved from the Kai Tak system but with a much enlarged capacity? Do you agree with that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, I do.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

You do? And as a professional, qualified person, do you agree that with this sort of sophisticated system, you must, and it is absolutely essential, have sufficient time to do testing, not only the testing of the separate systems but the testing after integration of the system, and then after commissioning with trials and training in order to ensure efficient operation? Do you agree with that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, in fact HACTL started early on those programmes and in fact some of the training was done at K2, at Kai Tak, since there was some similarity between the systems. Then that gradually moved over to the new airport where they also carried on additional training, and so they in their various discussions with us indicated that they were satisfied with that degree of training.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Do you agree that there were repeated delays in terms of the building works?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

There was slippage on the construction programme at various times, yes.



***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

And this particular delay actually lingered on from end of September even up to just before AOD in July?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

They had had slippages in various phases of their programmes, starting early on, and of course they were working with their contractors to try to accelerate those works, to keep to the milestone dates, and of course to pull all that together for first the end of April date, with 50 percent capacity, and later with 75 percent. They entered into supplemental agreements with their contractors.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

But you agree that the slippages continued up to a very late date before the AOD?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, they did have some slippages in their construction programme.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

What would you understand in terms of the sort of timing that would be required for a proper testing, training and trial for this sophisticated system? What would you like to have at least in terms of 3 months, 6 months, after integration?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Well, I think there are several aspects to that which have been by now rather roundly debated. I believe that first of all they had considerable experience operating at Kai Tak, which certainly was a major step forward on the overall process. Again, then moving to the new ST1 they did have training sessions, they did have trials and commissioning and other activities. I think the main point that was coming out of that is that they did run some trials simulating loading ST1 prior to operation, as I indicated, and perhaps some time before that. The question is when the airport opening day started they did have a multiplicity

of problems which made it difficult to operate.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Dr TOWNSEND, you said they did run some trials. Do you personally know exactly what sort of trials and tests that they have run, and did AA participate in those tests?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

We were aware they were going on. In fact on several visits I would walk through and some of that testing and trials would be going on.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

You used the words "walk through" and "aware". I mean, did AA participate in those tests, monitor and observe those tests?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Some of our staff were there at various times to observe some of the tests and that should be addressed to Mr ASHMORE.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Can I put it to you, if you can look at Mr SIEGEL's statement, Paper no. G1, I think it is Volume IV, to see whether you agree with some of Mr SIEGEL's comments in his statement. That is Paragraph 10 of Mr SIEGEL's statement.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, I have it, thank you.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Paragraph 10, you see that Mr SIEGEL, as the General Manager of the Kai Tak Airport, he was previously involved in the development of the new system for Kai Tak Airport including the baggage system, the airport I.D. system and he

was saying in that particular paragraph further on, that:

"While none of these systems were of the complexity proposed for the new airport, they all clearly demonstrated the need for there to be a substantial period of operational testing. As regards systems developed by CAD, I considered and it was agreed by the CAD electronic engineers that a period of 6 months should be allowed after integration has been completed to operationally prove the system to the point that it is sufficiently stable to be brought into service."

Would you generally agree that this is ... ?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

I think he was referring specifically to air traffic control, and in fact they did have a period of training. They used simulators and they did have adequate opportunity to continue training prior to airport opening day.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

But do you generally agree with what he said?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

I don't necessarily agree with the "up to 6 months period".

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Then, what do you think would be a necessary period for the purpose of testing a sophisticated system like HACTL?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

I think, first of all, to fully test HACTL, it would be necessary to have live operations to be sure that it was meeting its requirements, and so of course a very important part is that they would have to have sufficient cargo to be able to run it and that was really only achievable on airport opening.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Did they have live load tests?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

They did do some simulation testing prior to airport opening day which went reasonably well.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Do you agree that you need the live load test basically to find out problems which you may not be able to foresee, or problems that may be unforeseeable without a live load test?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

And do you agree the slippages basically have compromised, and the effect of the slippages has severely affected the timing and cut down the timing for testing, trial and training?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

As I indicated they had been doing work prior to airport opening date, and in fact in their various comments to the Commission they felt that it was sufficient for them to begin operation on airport opening day.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

You didn't answer my question, Dr TOWNSEND. Do you think the slippages, the effect of the slippages have cut down the ideal timing, the proper timing and the scheduled timing for HACTL's testing, trial and training?

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I believe that they have said that they had finished their training and had completed a good part of their trial by simulation and that they were ready to operate on airport opening day.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

And what sort of assurances you are basing on? You are basing on, you told us earlier that you just walked through, you basically did not participate in the tests and trials and you are relying on the assurances just on paper?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

No, as I indicated, the Airport Authority had people who were watching the situation somewhat carefully, and I was on other duties for the Airport Authority immediately prior to the opening.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Dr TOWNSEND, can I refer you to a couple of the documents to see the slippages and the delay. The first one, if I can refer you to Paper no. A42.

***Chairman:***

Volume I. This is the ADSCOM minutes of 6 June 1998, yes?

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Yes.

***Chairman:***

Mr CHEUNG.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Now, that's in Paragraph 5, and that's 6 June, OK. In Paragraph 5:

"NAPCO, the Director of NAPCO pointed out that HACTL was also very

much behind programme." "They targeted occupation permit by June 20th and there would not be sufficient lead time."

So, you agree with that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

That was what the Director of NAPCO said and as we were discussing earlier, they did receive the Temporary Occupation Permit. And they can work in their facility prior to it being issued.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Can I refer you to Paper no. B36, which is the Airport Authority minutes.

**Chairman:**

Of Volume III, Paper no. B36, date of the minutes?

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

28 May.

**Chairman:**

Yes, paragraph?

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Paragraph 5.3.3.

**Chairman:**

Have you got it, Dr TOWNSEND?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Just one moment please. Paragraph, please again?

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Paragraph 5.3.3.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Thank you.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Dr TOWNSEND, please refer to the latter part of that paragraph which refers to:

"With regard to HACTL (Paragraph 12 refers), The Director, NAPCO commented that their works were about 4 weeks behind the target completion date...."

You see that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

That is Paper no. B36?

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

That is B36 Paragraph 5.3.3.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Thank you.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

In the latter part of that paragraph we refer to again, the Director of NAPCO, basically on 28 May, was saying that the works were about 4 weeks behind schedule. Do you agree with that being the progress?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

That was his opinion at that time. You will notice that Mr OAKERVEE and others had commented after that, but I believe that that was his expression.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Do you agree with him?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

We have to recognise Government had a specific interest in HACTL for many reasons, but also predominantly among that was having the facilities ...

***Chairman:***

Sorry, Dr TOWNSEND, please stick to the lines pointed out to you which doesn't refer to Government facilities. It refers to the HACTL as a whole.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Do you agree with that?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, I am just trying to explain what the relationship there is, is that Government ...

***Chairman:***

I think Mr CHEUNG was asking ...

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

At that time, you were in the meeting even though you didn't speak about HACTL but Mr OAKERVEE did. Do you generally agree that that the progress of HACTL was 4 weeks behind ...?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Generally this was true but it had to do with the services being provided also for the Customs Department.



**Chairman:**

I don't think that was what it referred to, Dr TOWNSEND. It said that it was 4 weeks behind the target completion date. I don't think they made any reference to Government facilities.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Don't forget the TOP is only issued on 3 July. OK, you would generally agree with that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I would generally agree with that. However it was discussed later, I would like to point out.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Dr TOWNSEND, can I then refer you to ..

**Chairman:**

If I can ask you to speed up a little bit, please, Mr CHEUNG.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Yes. If I can then refer you to Paper no. A47 as well as A46, OK.

**Chairman:**

Volume I. ADSCOM papers.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Paper no. A46 first in Paragraph 23 ...

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We are having a little binder problem. Just one moment. Paragraph

number again, please?

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Paragraph 23.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Thank you. Yes, I have it.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

So, in the whole of that meeting the only thing you referred to HACTL is just TOP being obtained on 3 July, OK, and nothing else.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

That was reporting the fact that they had received the TOP, yes.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

And nothing else about HACTL?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

In that particular context, no.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Madam Chairman, I would like to put to Dr TOWNSEND that with such a sophisticated system, with the repeated delays and slippages in HACTL's building works, and with the delay having been compromised and the fact that the time for tests and trials, Dr TOWNSEND, can you show us in which particular document or whether it is in the AA Board meeting or in the ADSCOM meeting, that you have ever brought to the knowledge of the AA Board regarding concerns on tests, trials and training?

***Chairman:***

Dr TOWNSEND.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Certainly we could go through and look specifically on that subject.

**Chairman:**

No, did you or did you not? I mean, did you have ...

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Did you bring up those ...?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We discussed those items. However, the information was also being provided by HACTL and it was found to be quite accurate.

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND, were you personally concerned that the air cargo service might not be able to come up to the standard which you required it, given that the TOP was only issued on 3 July and everything was in a very rushed state?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

No, I was not overly concerned because in fact they had started material handling and other activities in the terminal before airport opening day.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Ah, that may explain you are not overly concerned and that's why, do you agree that you have not specifically raised those concerns apart from just generally delays, but you have not specifically raised those concerns with the Airport Authority and ADSCOM regarding the compromised tests, trials and training?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, but they had accomplished a great deal of their programme and in fact, as we indicated, HACTL management was confident that they were ready for the

opening of the airport.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

But why didn't you even alert them of the risk?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Well, the risk obviously occurred on airport opening day for a multiplicity of factors, including the real operation and real time.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

But you do appreciate that such slippages also created a situation whereby you would have to install equipment while the building works are still continuing? You are a technical person. You are certainly aware of that, isn't it?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Well, the equipment was all installed and was operating at that time up to a capacity adequate to handle the opening day cargo levels, which I might add was in the 50 percent range, and they had more capacity than that on airport opening day. The difficulty, of course, was that until they got into the real time situation it was this compounding effect of various problems.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

But you foresee all those problems, don't you?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

No, I don't believe we foresaw them nor did HACTL foresee them.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Why didn't you foresee those problems?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Because they could only be fully established in real time in real operation.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

That is exactly the reason. Because of the slippages, they were not able to do real time and sufficient trial and testing after integration, isn't it?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Well, the reason was, as you say, that they were unable to do that because the airport had to be open in order to provide that opportunity.

***Chairman:***

Dr TOWNSEND, are you telling this Committee that, in spite of all the slippages, all the problems that your Project Manager had been telling you about HACTL, the fact that they only got their TOP on 3 July - TOP, not the occupation permit, it was a temporary occupation permit, which means that they have still failed to satisfy some of the conditions - you had a level of comfort which required absolutely no contingency plan, nothing? You didn't ask what would happen if they could not handle? You knew that they weren't up to capacity and yet you didn't feel that anything needed to be done or ascertained with HACTL, although of course they are responsible for their operation. But surely you, being the person overseeing the overall operation of the airport, it must have occurred to you what would happen if the cargo facilities failed.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Of course everyone would be concerned about an important asset like ST1 being unable to operate, but we were confident that they were at the point where they could go ahead and operate. It was all these other events that occurred on airport opening day that prevented them from achieving that.

***Chairman:***

In spite of everything that happened right up to 3 July with HACTL, you were still very confident that they could do it?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, their systems were running. Material handling was running. They were running tests on the various systems and they felt confident. And I believe that we felt, to the work they had done, they had done a professional job.

**Chairman:**

Wouldn't you think that is over-optimism on your part, just as it was over-optimism when you pushed ahead with the April date when HACTL said they wouldn't be ready for April? You pressed ahead too. I mean, isn't this a second instance where you actually ignore all the signals and just left it to fate?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

No, I don't believe we left it to fate because we knew that some of these issues would only appear on the actual opening day when they were dealing with the real situation.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Dr TOWNSEND, did you consider a contingency plan?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

This had been discussed at some length with HACTL going all the way back to '95, when the franchise was being put in place.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

No, I am referring to just a few months before AOD?

**Chairman:**

Did you have a contingency plan for HACTL on AOD?

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

Did you have a contingency plan?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

HACTL's contingency plan had to do with the redundancy and the modular building of ST1. And they felt that or they did not foresee that the problems that arose on opening day would require a contingency plan, which is why they moved their whole operation to the new airport just prior to airport opening day. And certainly for a contingency plan of the scale that was experienced you would have to take remedies such as their moving part of their operation back to Kai Tak.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

So, there is no contingency plan in short?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

There, well, since their systems essentially were not functioning there was no real opportunity for other contingency plans.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Did you consider at any time to ask for a postponement of the AOD?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

No, I believe they felt that they were ready to go into operation and they did not raise the subject with us at all.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Why didn't you ask for a postponement of the AOD?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

We did not ask for a postponement of the 6 July date.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Why didn't you? Have you considered that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

No, we were concentrating on getting the airport open on that day.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

I would like to put to you, Dr TOWNSEND, do you agree that there is really gross misjudgment in terms of firstly not telling the AA Board and ADSCOM the full risk of the situation? Your judgment of putting Airport Authority on April opening date based on HACTL achieving 50 percent capacity on the 50/50 chance of achieving that, and then moving on to AOD in July with insufficient time for trials and tests, and TOP only issued on 3 July, and ending with the disaster encountered by HACTL on 6 July, that this is a gross misjudgment, highly risky. You are adopting a highly risky decision and a gross misjudgment on your part.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I do not agree with that.

**主席：**

陳鑑林議員。

**陳鑑林議員：**

主席。我想問董誠亨先生，剛才提到在高層干預方面，他本人有直接參與。我想請問董誠亨先生與翟達安先生曾就機場啟用的日期商談了多少次？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Of course, there were many conversations and considerable information passed back and forth through the organisations when the supplemental agreements were being discussed. In addition Mr CHARTER was working primarily at Kai Tak still at that time, although he was spending more and more time at the new airport. And I would talk to him on whatever occasions were necessary.

(Dr Hon Raymond HO, the Deputy Chairman of the Committee assumed



Chairmanship at this juncture in the temporary absence of the Chairman)

**主席：**

陳鑑林議員。

**陳鑑林議員：**

你與他商談機場開幕的日期時，是一直堅持在4月開幕，還是覺得有可能會延遲？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I believe when we were discussing the April date at that time and the possibility of deferring the airport opening, as I indicated, the April date originally came, starting back in '95. And of course they were talking then about the end of April. But starting in November, December '97, the parties involved were aware that the Government was taking into consideration whether to, when to set the date for opening of the airport. And of course we did report to the Board and ADSCOM the concerns that had been expressed by HACTL and, as Mr CHARTER commented, the 50/50 probability and that was certainly one of the factors considered, I am sure, by Government in setting the date for 6 July. And so I think that we had a lot of conversation at that time and everyone was waiting for a Government decision which finally came out in January.

**陳鑑林議員：**

在97年11月至12月期間，由於政府還未決定把啟用日期延遲至7月初，你催促翟達安先生加快建築工程速度，你提及的啟用日期是否仍然以4月為依歸，還是說有可能要延遲？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

The conversations at that time were directed towards maintaining the end of April date. However, with the passage of time to implement that programme, it was really waiting for Government to announce the actual opening day. But HACTL had considerable discussions with their contractors on what to do to achieve the end of April date, and they had a programme to implement that. What happened in fact was that after the date was announced by Government obviously they decided to go for 75 percent capacity on airport opening date.

**陳鑑林議員：**

主席。我想請董誠亨先生參閱“E2”這份文件。

**主席：**

哪個“Volume”？

**陳鑑林議員：**

“Volume IV”，文件E2，第141段。

**主席：**

“E2, Paragraph 141”。

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I have E2.

**陳鑑林議員：**

這份文件是翟達安先生的證供。你有沒有？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**陳鑑林議員：**

這裏載述了翟達安先生說話，指出“AA”其實沒有訂出須延遲多少時間開幕。在12月19日，他把一份“Supplemental Agreement”交給董誠亨先生，當時他清楚告知董誠亨先生屆時應只能啟用百分之五十的設施。接着的一句說，其實當時翟達安先生及董誠亨先生均預期“opening day”是在6月底。董誠亨先生與翟達安先生商談日期時，其實已表示該日期會延遲，而不是在4月。所以我想了解一點，董誠亨先生看到這份補充協議時，基本上認為該協議是以機場在4月底啟用，還是在6月底啟用作為基礎？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

The original agreement had been under discussion, the original supplemental agreement had been under discussion for some time between HACTL and their contractors, and that was for a date as at the end of April. When we were getting into mid-December, the end of December, Government was undertaking consultations with various groups to get input for their decision on the deferral of the airport opening date. And so we felt at that time, particularly HACTL did, that it would be delayed for a period of time. However, we did not know at that time what airport opening date would be established.

So, we felt that if it was to be deferred what would HACTL do? I'm sure HACTL was thinking that too. So, actually there was another supplemental agreement then. Rather than 50 percent capacity at the end of April, HACTL then modified that to represent acceleration measures for 75 percent on airport opening day.

**陳鑑林議員：**

主席。是否可以這樣說，由於他當時的說法，即兩方面在商談時，董誠亨先生提出機場開幕可能延遲至6月底，因而讓對方較為放心有一段時間去商談另一個新的協議？

(Hon Mrs Selina CHOW LIANG Suk-yee  
resumed Chairmanship at this juncture)

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, because if the date were to be deferred, and I might add I had no knowledge of what the deferred date was going to be set by Government, but if it were to be deferred it would enable them to optimise the supplemental agreement, the second supplemental agreement, to achieve the higher capacity by opening day. But they did have the programme in place. It had been discussed with their contractors. They had been instructed to begin acceleration of the work in that period of time.

**陳鑑林議員：**

主席。經過那次談話後，其實翟達安先生心中已明白機場開幕的時間有可能會延遲至6月底，但在12月23日，你給他的一封信，仍然說啟

用日期應該是4月底？這是否有點反覆？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

No, I did not go back because the Government had not announced the airport opening date, and the airport opening day has implications within the franchise agreement. So I could not second-guess the Government as to what the airport opening date would be. One, I didn't know, and second it would not be appropriate under the franchise agreement.

**陳鑑林議員：**

主席。雖然是這樣說，但翟達安先生在這份供詞說“surprisingly”，即他覺得非常意外，為何時間改變了，但不是在6月底？我想請董誠亨先生再參閱另一份文件，他到底有否清楚告知機管局兩者之間的默契是甚麼？請參閱“Volume III”的文件B31，第1.3段。

**Chairman:**

AA Board minutes dated 12 January.

**陳鑑林議員：**

這份會議紀要的1.3段記載了機場開幕的日期。關於“HACTL”這一點，董誠亨先生提到曾與“HACTL”商談，以及會制訂一些加快工程的協議。我想知道董誠亨先生當時曾否告訴機管局，翟達安先生其實已理解到，開幕日期可能是在6月底？

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

They were aware of the conversations that we were having with HACTL at that time and that supplemental agreements were in an advanced stage of development between HACTL and their contractors. And I believe that at this time, which was 12 January, when the deferred opening date was announced, that

in fact it was then possible, it was widely disseminated across the community at that time. Also, as I indicated, the Government undertook some broad consultation at that time with various people in Hong Kong trying to gain input for their decision on the opening day. And so it was commonly known that it was under consideration by the Government.

***Chairman:***

Dr TOWNSEND, you look at the next Paragraph, 1.4:

"The Chairman said he would have to reply to the Chief Secretary on the airport opening date soon and sought views from members on whether they felt the new airport would be ready for opening in April 1988."

In fact the Authority did insist that you were ready for opening in April 1988, despite the Government's announcement. Now, would you not say that, knowing the condition of HACTL, being engaged in negotiation with HACTL, that it would be irresponsible of you not telling the Chairman of AA that HACTL just wasn't ready, and therefore AA just couldn't put forward responsibly an opening date in April?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

I think first of all this was immediately prior to the Government announcement of the actual opening date.

***Chairman:***

But you had already been informed.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

We had not been informed of the opening.

***Chairman:***

You personally?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

I had not been informed of the opening.

**Chairman:**

When were you informed?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

The day, the evening immediately before the announcement so that the announcements could be coordinated with the Government.

**Chairman:**

You mean you were in fact notified on that day, the day of the meeting, that is 12 January?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, but at that time the actual announcement was coming, at this point what we were doing, they were looking and I believe there was a, I have to look at another paper ...

**Chairman:**

But that is not quite relevant, Dr TOWNSEND, when they announced the July date, because my question relates to your attitude regarding the Chairman's point of putting forward April as the opening, still April as a viable opening. And at that time you knew already that HACTL couldn't open in April. So, why didn't you tell him that HACTL couldn't open in April?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

At that time, in our communications with the Board and with ADSCOM, we always made special note of comments concerning the HACTL progress.

**Chairman:**

No, but could it or could it not open in April? At the time of the 12 January Board meeting your view as to whether HACTL could open in April?

Can you tell this Committee?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

They had already begun accelerating their works to meet the end of April date.

**Chairman:**

No, they were in discussion with you about the June date. By that time they were in discussion with you on the June date already. They in fact told you in December that they needed more time, and you went into negotiations with them by January. So, at that time you knew that HACTL could not meet the April date. They told you so. And you negotiated with them. So, why did you not raise that in the Board meeting, to say "HACTL couldn't meet the April date, therefore we couldn't put April forward"?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

But the April date was what they were working on at that time.

**Chairman:**

No.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

The end of April date.

**Chairman:**

No, you were in correspondence with them and they already told you that they couldn't meet the April date. That's why you went into negotiation on the supplemental agreement.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

What they indicated was they had a 50 percent chance of meeting the end of

April date and we reported that to our Board and to the Government, and that was one of the factors taken into consideration in deferring the opening date.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam Chairman, is Dr TOWNSEND saying that a 50/50 chance was good enough?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

No, we said that first of all we wanted to be very precise on what was being reported to us by HACTL, and it was reported that it was 50 percent at that time and we did report that to the various groups. What we were saying was that there was a risk element there and that in fact everyone was aware of that because of the continuing conversations on HACTL. And as I indicated, it was one of the important considerations in deferring the opening date.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

But Madam Chairman, since Dr TOWNSEND was making a recommendation for a late April opening date, was he not at the same time recommending taking a 50/50 chance as to HACTL's readiness?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

We felt that the Airport Authority's works, all of the other franchisees which were very considerable, licensees and others would be in a position to open by the end of April, and that is why we treated HACTL as an exception and highlighted it so that everyone clearly understood the implications of it. And of course that was a factor in deferring it.

***Chairman:***

Dr TOWNSEND, please, I think you have to tell this Committee why, after hearing from Anthony CHARTER on 19 December through a letter in which he said:

"I would recommend the supplemental agreement is still implemented as it will give HACTL a better chance of having more CHS equipment operational at the end of June otherwise there is a danger that no more than



50 percent will be available at the end of June."

He told you that in fact he had less than 50 percent operational ability before end of June. And yet in the Board meeting that we have just quoted you pressed on for an April date. How could you do that? I mean, it would be grossly irresponsible, wouldn't you agree, to have done that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

In the earlier letter that we were referring to 15 minutes or so ago in the discussion with Anthony CHARTER, as reported in his statement to the Commission, at that time obviously they were going to go for 75 percent capacity rather than 50.

**Chairman:**

No, no, no. I just quoted from this letter. Dr TOWNSEND, are you refuting this letter which I quoted from?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Could you please refer me to it again?

**Chairman:**

This is in fact a letter which Anthony CHARTER referred to in his statement to us. This is a letter written by Anthony CHARTER, dated 19 December to Dr TOWNSEND, the contents of which have actually been summarised in the statement that was in front of you, which I think Mr CHAN Kam-lam quoted from.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

If I could just read from the letter, please?

**Chairman:**

Yes, Page 2.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

There is a heavy bar under it there. As I explained, one of the difficulties we face, etc, etc, with a view to achieving operational status by end April or end June '98, it is our concern that any consequential additional cost may not be allowed and we said we had no objection to any additional cost to achieve that date because it was HACTL's decision.

**Chairman:**

I don't think we are referring to the cost. We are referring to how much operational capacity they would have by the end of April.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It depended on how much money they were going to spend in the supplemental agreement to achieve the date.

**Chairman:**

No, they told you quite categorically that even without that they would not be able to meet a 50 percent operational capability by the end of June.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

But at this particular point they were, we were discussing the additional cost to achieve that.

**Chairman:**

Wouldn't you say, Dr TOWNSEND, that the least you should have done was to alert the Board that there was this discussion going on and that HACTL has actually raised this so that an April date would actually be at risk?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

The Board was generally aware of the situation of HACTL.

**Chairman:**

But you certainly didn't raise it in this meeting, which was the crucial one

on 12 January.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, but at that time we, everyone was aware of the situation with HACTL.

**Chairman:**

Ms Emily LAU.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Madam Chairman, can I just ask a follow-up question? Referring to the Board meeting, the same Board meeting on 12 January, if Dr TOWNSEND can go back to that meeting. If you look at Paragraph 1.5, have you got that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Which reference was that again, please?

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Paper no. B31.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Page 3, Paragraph 1.5.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

And we have one of the Board members speaking, Dr Peter WONG. If you look at the last sentence of that paragraph:

"Peripheral matters such as HACTL, would be taken into account by Government in its consideration of the airport opening date."

Is that a view shared by you?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

I guess probably I am asking you for your assessment of the view of the Board entirely. Is that a view shared by most of the Board members?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I believe that most of the Board members, I can't say all of them were, but I believe the consensus would be, yes, and of course we were aware that Government was concerned about it and that it would certainly be taken into consideration.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

So, I mean, when I read this sentence my impression is that (a) it is a peripheral matter, not a very important, significant thing; (b) it is really the responsibility of Government so they will take that into account, and it is not for you people to alert them to the dangers or to really go into it. Is that a right impression?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I think we fully advised Government, as did NAPCO on the status of HACTL.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

But Madam Chairman just pointed out these letters of correspondence. You didn't, you didn't refer the Board to it.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, but again, as I said, this had to indicate, with implementing the supplemental agreements, and it was discussed on cost and it had to go from 50 percent capacity to 75 percent capacity.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Can you explain why you regard HACTL as a peripheral matter on airport opening date?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Those certainly were not my words. HACTL was very important.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

But you said you agreed, I thought 2 minutes ago you said you agree with the description?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I didn't agree with the word "peripheral", but I do agree with the fact that the Government would probably taken that into consideration.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Can I ask a question on the same Board meeting? Paragraph 1.3:

"The Chief Executive Officer said that HACTL had instructed acceleration and had provided the Authority with draft copies of the supplemental agreements. However, HACTL was negotiating with the contractor on these agreements. A detailed response from them had yet to be received."

In other words in that particular Board meeting you told the Board that there was some acceleration agreement going on, not yet finalised. But nevertheless the airport will be ready by April. Is that how ...?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

By the end of April, yes.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

By the end of April?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

But we also pointed out that there was a risk involved in it.

**Chairman:**

Where? Where was it pointed out? It was not stated in the minutes.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

It is not stated in the minutes.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It is not in the minutes but in other correspondence at that time.

**Chairman:**

Where was it pointed out that in fact HACTL had said that they would not be able to meet even 50 percent of operational capacity by end of April? Where is it ever pointed out? Can you point it out to us?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It was pointed out in the letter where they claimed that it was the 50 percent probability of meeting the end of April date.

**Chairman:**

Letter to whom?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It was a letter, I believe, from HACTL to ourselves.

**Chairman:**

Sorry?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

To the Airport Authority.

**Chairman:**

No, no, no. I think Mr Edward HO was asking you whether you pointed out the risk of HACTL not being able to meet operational capacity of even 50 percent by the end of April, and you said there was a letter, but where is the documentary evidence that you have put forward to the Board or anybody else regarding this risk that HACTL would not be able to meet an April opening date, albeit late April.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Right, there was a letter that Mr CHARTER sent to us and that is the basis on which we advised the Board and Government of the 50 percent capacity and 50 percent probability.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

But where is it?

**Chairman:**

We are asking for your documentary evidence of your warning people about the risk, not about Mr CHARTER's letter to you negotiating on an extended time.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Oh, I am sorry. I am sorry.

**Chairman:**

We are talking about where did you actually raise the risk, raise the alarm to anybody regarding that risk? We see in the Board minutes that you actually talked quite positively about acceleration programme. You did not mention any risk regarding an April opening date. The Chairman said he would write back on an April opening date. You certainly did not dispute that and in fact he did. He did write. So, I mean, where did you in fact raise the risk, raise the alarm that HACTL might not be ready by the end of April?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Of course this was being influenced by the implementation of the first supplemental agreement we were talking about for the end of April, and there was considerable information in there on how that was to be achieved with their principal contractors.

**Chairman:**

No, where did you actually raise the point that HACTL might not be able to meet an April, end April opening date? Did you raise it, and if you did raise it, where did you raise it?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We would have to go through and check the correspondence on the specific item.

**Chairman:**

No, because as far as the minutes are concerned it is not there. The minute that you were just shown, the AA Board, on 12 January, you were actually talking about an acceleration programme, and anybody would in fact regard that as assuring them that HACTL would be ready.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

But we always said there was that 50 percent probability.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**



No evidence anywhere.

**Chairman:**

Well, you will have to provide us with the evidence because it is not there at the moment.

**Chairman:**

劉江華議員。

**劉江華議員：**

多謝主席。在機場開幕前，政府高層人員曾兩次參觀新機場，其中一次在6月14日，曾蔭權先生與你一起去巡視“HACTL”的設施，當時“HACTL”對在開幕時是否可以應付得來？有何詳細的表示？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, they gave assurances to Government that they would be ready for airport opening.

**劉江華議員：**

若他作出了一個保證，你覺得這個口頭上的保證是否可當作口頭承諾？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, when it comes from their senior management who are running their project and their enterprise, yes, that's a commitment.

**Chairman:**

What commitment, sorry?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

That they would be ready to open on airport opening day.

**Chairman:**

Are you quite sure of that because from our other evidence we were told that in fact he told, he put it to the Financial Secretary that they would only do it on "best endeavours" basis?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, because of the franchise agreement committing, still going back to the historical problem that existed, that it was 18 August for 75 percent capacity. And obviously they would probably maintain that position.

**劉江華議員：**

主席。我不想再談歷史，我說的是6月14日，當時董誠亨先生覺得是一個承諾，你認為根據所有文件及從你的角度看來，這個承諾是否有法律約束力？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I would have to refer that to the legal people. However, if I recall properly there was also a follow-up letter from the Director of NAPCO to HACTL on that point where he also received assurances.

**劉江華議員：**

主席。另外我想問關於“NAPCO”的“Sit-Rep”的內容，即剛才主席提過的一份，第II冊C78號文件，剛才董誠亨先生說曾看過。

**主席：**

“Volume II”，文件C78。

**劉江華議員：**

文件C78。顧問公司每星期都會寫出一些他們的看法。

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**劉江華議員：**

在下面的部分，即“Airport Operational Readiness”，其中一個“Current Assessment”的環節。是否找到？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, I have got it.

**劉江華議員：**

在6月13日，他有一個“comment”，“The airport systems have not yet achieved a state of Day One operational stability and this represents one of the greatest risks to a smooth opening”，你看到“greatest risks”這兩個字？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**劉江華議員：**

這是否表示若機場開幕，會是一個很重大的危險？

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

As I indicated, HACTL felt that they had run through their systems and simulated a load through their system and that in fact they were ready to operate.

**劉江華議員：**

我想知道董誠亨先生的看法。既然你已知有這樣大的危險，你有甚麼可做？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It was obviously being watched very carefully and there were conversations with HACTL, and their initial operation before airport opening, I think, verified to them that they were in fact ready to operate.

**劉江華議員：**

你看到這樣的字眼便會有這樣的做法。請你翻閱隨後一星期的報告，在同一處，但換了一個字。即文件C79，在右面的第2行，同樣的描述，但字眼轉換了，“the continous system delays and operational problems represent a significant risk to a smooth opening”，我想請問董誠亨先生……

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Could we continue with HACTL rather than go back to the airport systems? Because I think this refers not to the HACTL but to the airport systems.

**劉江華議員：**

主席。不是這個，是整體的表現，到底是否可準備得到？而“HACTL”便是其中一項。

**主席：**

我們現在說的是“HACTL”，一定要集中在“HACTL”。如你的問題是關於“HACTL”，我們便要依著“HACTL”的範圍。如你返回“Systems”的範圍，我們又會轉到了另一個主要的範圍。

**劉江華議員：**

主席，我可以在哪一個環節問這事項，這是整體的……

**主席：**

因為我們在前兩天已討論了很多關於整體“Systems”的問題，若現在又返回該部分，我相信時間上不會容許。若你現在想跟進“HACTL”的問題，便請就這方面提問。

**劉江華議員：**

若你許可的話，我可以稍後才問。

**主席：**

“OK”。何承天議員。

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Going back to HACTL first of all ...

**Chairman:**

Sorry?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Perhaps after Mr HO has asked his question. I just wanted to state I was not present nor were people from the Airport Authority. The Sit Rep were between NAPCO and Government.

**Chairman:**

Yes, we are aware of that, thank you. Mr Edward HO?

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

OK, all the problems that occurred on AOD as far as HACTL is concerned which is actually a very major chaos even probably more so than what happened at the Passenger Terminal Building. So, just a very simple question, was this problem foreseen?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We and HACTL did not foresee the combination of events that caused the difficulties with their operations on airport opening day.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

OK, it was not foreseen. So, I would like to ask Dr TOWNSEND, because he said earlier this morning that he thought they were ready based upon what they told him. He said they felt it was ready. The impression I got was that AA knew all along and monitored all along all the problems as far as AA's own contractors are concerned like the FIDS and the building and all that, but very little monitoring on what went on as far as HACTL was concerned, except when

they would get the TOP which is really the building structure. So, my question is: Did you just rely on what they told you? Was there any monitoring mechanism to check what they were doing?

**Chairman:**

How close was your monitoring?

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Not just the building, the system, the trials and everything.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, there was considerable monitoring and I would really suggest that that question be directed at Peter ASHMORE who was directly involved.

**Chairman:**

Well, how much are you aware of? I mean, given that HACTL was such a sticky point in the whole progress, slippages and all that, you must have taken quite an interest as the senior management. So, who was actually responsible for overseeing the entire progress of HACTL, rather than just the construction. I think that is the question, isn't it, Mr Edward HO?

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Yes.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Well, actually our project manager representative in the commercial group, who were involved in the franchise and they had knowledge of comparable operations, they were meeting regularly. And I was aware that HACTL had started their programme before airport opening day to trial being ready to take on the load. So there were no reports from them. I didn't personally go to HACTL several days before to check because I was preoccupied with the terminal building and other matters of the Authority.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

But the team, you said there was a team within AA who would monitor the progress of HACTL.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

They would monitor the progress but things move very quickly in the last day or two.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

I think it is sort of monitoring the problems.

**Chairman:**

I think the question was did you have anybody monitoring their systems, not just the building, first of all? Can you answer that question?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, I will. The systems, of course, that they had for cargo handling with their 2 major contractors were actually on the site and they were being tested and trialed before airport opening day. I might add that on their own computer systems and proprietary systems they were not willing to reveal much information because it was actually a total business system and there was very confidential and commercial information in addition to coordinating the various inputs.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

No, but nevertheless, Chairman, was there a regular monitoring of the progress of the systems, the trials? I mean, in spite of the fact that they might not have the details of the system and all that, but were they assured of the milestones ...

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

There were milestones, yes.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

And are these documented and reported to the management and then to AA?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, this was being reported through their regular monthly reports in considerable detail to us.

**Chairman:**

So, you were aware, in fact?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

And all these indicated that things would be fine and there would be no problem?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Well, certainly there were problems but they were overcome before airport opening day.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Chairman, the thing I find it very astonishing is that if you look at all the papers, like, for instance, the airport opening, operational readiness status up to even 18 May or the Board meeting minutes, 30 June and so on, there was never any mention about the status of the systems. There was only a question of TOP, when they would get the TOP, and that was delayed. Which leads me to believe that AA was only interested as far as when they would get the occupation permit. If they get that, everything is fine.

**Chairman:**

Either that or they were not allowed access to the information, given what was told by Dr TOWNSEND a minute ago that they were very confidential about their commercial secrets and all that.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**



In fairness to HACTL, of course, those things involving the actual cargo handling, I forget the word they use for it now, but the mechanical/electrical control systems programmable logic that was working on that, you could visibly see that in ST1, and those matters were being followed because there were programmes provided for their contractors in those areas. And HACTL was very confident about their software programmes since they had evolved from K2, in fact.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Madam Chairman, they were confident but my question is whether AA had any role in or did it take upon itself any responsibility in monitoring what was happening during the whole process of construction and system installation, testing and trialling? I understand that you probably could not go in and witness everything, but at least was there a team that ticked off, OK ...

***Chairman:***

Are you tracking the milestones in other words?

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, they were being tracked. NAPCO was also following it closely, and in fact major meetings were held by-weekly as opening date was being approached, starting earlier in '98, and of course there were tours around the facility at various times. And it was being monitored fairly closely.

***Chairman:***

I think we are running short of time. Would Members please try to be as brief as possible in your questions. 李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

主席，我的問題很簡單，董誠亨先生你在……

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Madam Chairman, I have one more point.

**Chairman:**

One more? OK. Mr HO.

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

One more point was that Dr TOWNSEND mentioned earlier also that the HACTL operational systems can only be tested or the result of which can only be known upon full operation. Now, is that a reasonable thing to expect?

**Chairman:**

Assertion? Reasonable assertion?

**Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:**

Yes, that there was no assurance that things would not happen, that problems would not occur after operation?

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I think that in fact before the airport opened, as I indicated, they were running various trials and they did simulate a trial, I forget what date it was on, but they did simulate a trial over several hours which essentially was to reproduce the capacity requirements of ST1. And they did that obviously by moving containers over so that they could be handled through the system.

What happened, though, was that when airport opening date started they had the problems of the detectors. They had some software problems. They had

some human error in handling of containers in other areas, and that could really only be done in a real live situation.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Well, that is what I want to query, like the sensors and everything.

***Chairman:***

Yes, I don't think you can query Dr TOWNSEND on this.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

No, I mean his own opinion. He expressed an opinion.

***Chairman:***

But really it is not a question for him. It is not a question for him. If you want to ask that question you ask HACTL.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

Yes, but he has, excuse me, Madam Chairman, Dr TOWNSEND as AA CEO, AA has a monitoring role of what went on and what is going to happen, right? And if their opinion, AA's opinion, now in the words of the CEO, was that none of these could happen ...

***Chairman:***

Could have been avoided because it would have been able to be tested before real time.

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

... before real time, and that is crucial.

***Chairman:***

Yes, if that is his opinion ...

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

That was his opinion just now.

***Chairman:***

You mean none of the problems could have been avoided?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

They were unanticipated to the scale and the combination of the events that happened, yes.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam Chairman, I think we should pursue this question. If Dr TOWNSEND's view is that no matter what test HACTL were to have before AOD the real problems can only come out in a live situation ...

***Hon Edward HO Sing-tin:***

That is my question.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

... then did he tell this to anyone, to the AA Board, to ADSCOM, to tell them that "look, these tests are going to be pretty peripheral because whatever you do you will only know whether they are ready or not on AOD"? Did you make sure that this understanding was put across to AA Board and ADSCOM?

***Chairman:***

Dr TOWNSEND?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, I think that it was made clear that all of those problems that, first of all were discovered during trials, training and other things, were important and they were resolved.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Sorry, in the interests of time, what you are telling us is that you did put this understanding very clearly to AA Board and ADSCOM?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We indicated that in addition to all of the problems that had been discovered and solved prior to AOD ...

**Hon Margaret NG:**

You did?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

... there would be other problems arising when the airport went into operation.

**Chairman:**

As far as HACTL is concerned?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

As far as everyone was concerned.

**Chairman:**

No, no, no, we are talking specifically here about HACTL, so let's not generalise. We are talking specifically about the question of the statement you made earlier. You said that the cargo facilities handling capability could not have been tested fully until real time. So, in other words, you were taking a tremendous risk into the unknown, so to speak, because you never knew what was going to happen on AOD, I mean, basing on what you told us earlier.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, but I believe we felt that the problems that would be expected would be manageable, and certainly HACTL had plans to ...

**Chairman:**

How could you come to that conclusion if you didn't know what was likely to happen?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Yes, because, Madam Chairman, how can that view be compatible with the view of being confident that on AOD things are going to be all right?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Well, I think there is, until the airport would actually go into operation that is the only way that you could really test that, and of course all the systems were lined up as best as possible for operation and they did have contingency plans in place.

**Chairman:**

What contingency plans? We were just told you didn't have a contingency plan.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

No, what I indicated to you was that they did have flexibility in the operation of their system. They did have the necessary manpower and they felt that they would be able to handle these normal problems as they would come up.

**Chairman:**

But what contingency plans? You told us some time ago there was no contingency plan. Now you tell us there is contingency plan. What is the contingency plan? Where can we find the contingency plan? Are you aware of what that contingency plan is? I mean, you can't just sort of, every time we come to a question then you give us an answer which we cannot find any documentary evidence on, Dr TOWNSEND.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Well, I believe there was, in the earlier conversation I indicated they did

have contingency plans that were contained within the ST1 facilities systems and other activities. They had all the modular approach so that they could move things around fairly easily.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

But Madam Chairman, forgive me for interrupting. The situation is very simple. I mean, the view that you can't tell what is going to happen on AOD until AOD is simply logically incompatible with confidence that everything is going to be all right on AOD. I think I must put that to Dr TOWNSEND.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

I feel that that is perhaps not my interpretation of it. I think that all of the things that were foreseen during all the efforts put in for training, trials, other activities that occurred, would have allowed the airport to be operated successfully. What was found was that there were other problems that had come up or the combination of events that created the problems for HACTL. And those, of course, could only appear when the airport went into operation.

**主席：**

張永森議員，快點。

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

Madam Chairman, if I can remind Dr TOWNSEND that in his evidence given to the Commission of Inquiry, and this is actually along the line of questioning that I have actually made earlier this morning, that it is very clear on 18 September in his evidence given to the Commission of Inquiry he has actually agreed that the reason for the ...

***Chairman:***

What reference? Paper no. B70 in Volume V, Paragraph ...?

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

That refers to the evidence to the Commission of Inquiry.

**Chairman:**

Paper no. B70-1?

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

That is the evidence of 18 September, not to this Select Committee.

**Chairman:**

Oh, I see, the evidence given in the verbatim transcript. OK, please go on.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

In the verbatim transcript on Page 149 all the way to 151, and that is 18 September. And that dealt very clearly, Dr TOWNSEND, if I can refer you to that particular document?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I do not have a copy of it.

**Chairman:**

Can you just paraphrase that for the witness?

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

If I can paraphrase that, yes, you were asked:

"The reason for the operational need to test is, however clever you may be at trying to simulate things, there is no substitute for real life."

And your answer is "yes".

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**



And then it goes on to say that:

"Because experience shows, does it not, that however imaginative and with whatever foresight one looks there arises during the live use of things various problems that may be unforeseen and perhaps indeed were unforeseeable."

And your answer is:

"Yes, you have to be conservative with regards to expecting those types of problems to arise."

And the question just goes on further saying:

"And therefore, the only way to identify unexpected problems of this sort is tests under live load."

And your answer is "yes".

So, Dr TOWNSEND, I am putting this to you that, in fact, you know a simulation test is different from a live load test.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

And you know that they were not able to do the live load test simply because of the slippages.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

No, because the airport had not opened yet.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

And the live load test do not necessarily have to involve opening of the airport.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

They would have to be able to operate with planes coming in and out.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

But that can be done prior to AOD if they have sufficient time.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

But it means we would have to open the airport to the extent to allow that to happen.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

But that can be done.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

It was not possible.

***Chairman:***

It wasn't done, was it?

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

It wasn't done.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

No.

***Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:***

It wasn't done because of time.

***Chairman:***

Well, never mind the reason. It wasn't done so I think Margaret NG's

question comes in. If these tests were not done, what actually gave you the degree of confidence for AOD?

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Madam, with respect, my point is that the 2 things are not compatible. Dr TOWNSEND cannot today tell us that he has done his best because the only real thing, the only test which matters, can only happen on AOD. I mean, this is not an acceptable answer. Because if it were the case then you would never have been able to have confidence. So that is why I put that question to Dr TOWNSEND and ask for his comments.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Yes, I think it is very important, first of all everything that was required to manage the airport in a workable condition had been done prior to AOD. That does not exclude the possibility of other unforeseen problems from occurring, and that was what happened.

***Chairman:***

What was unforeseen?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

Well, the combination of some of the events and the circumstances just came up to the point where HACTL was unable to move cargo through their facility.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

No, no. Madam Chairman, there is a difference. Either you say we've done our best, all the tests which need to be run are run, so that we are confident, and there may be unforeseeable problem on the day, but that is a different matter. No, he's not saying that. He's saying that, 'yes', we've missed a lot of tests, but anyway it doesn't matter because what happens on AOD will happen on AOD and there is no way of your telling beforehand what's going to happen. Now, that sort of attitude is not compatible with rational confidence.

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

That was not the attitude. The attitude.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

That was. With respect, that was the attitude, which Dr TOWNSEND was putting across to this Select Committee several times already in this enquiry.

***Chairman:***

In other words, you are actually putting forward conflicting messages.

***Hon Margaret NG:***

Indeed, Madam Chairman.

***Chairman:***

On the one hand, you are saying you are confident, but, on other hand, you are saying that a lot of the tests couldn't have been conducted because you had to wait for real time. So, in other words, then, a lot of tests which should have been conducted weren't conducted. So, what actually gave you that degree of confidence?

***Chief Executive Officer, AA:***

That's not correct. There were tests that were run prior to AOD that would cover the range of activities that would happen after AOD, but the full load, the full stress of the systems, the human factors involved in it, occurred on AOD that presented the problems, and certainly everyone did their very best to try to overcome those by having contingency plans in place, as well as additional resources.

***Chairman:***

Yes, but what is your contingency plan? You haven't told us. What is your contingency plan? You seem to have left it, you know, just to HACTL telling you that everything was all right. When things started to happen, you did not, as far as AA is concerned, have any contingency plan. Otherwise, you know, the chaos wouldn't have happened to the degree that it had.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, but, in the case of AA and our activities, we did have contingency plans in place, and we fell back on those in order to keep the Airport in operation. In the case of HACTL, they also had contingency plans, some of which I mentioned; the redundancy of systems and the modularity of their operating systems, and so those places were considered.

**Chairman:**

No. Perhaps to put it another way, Dr TOWNSEND. Did you have a common contingency plan, which you discussed with HACTL in anticipation of failure of their cargo handling capability?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes. We were aware of the capacity of their system, the redundancy of their systems, and other areas, and, again, it was through these events that occurred on AOD that resulted in their having to shut the facility down. I might add the Express Cargo Centre, for example, continued to operate through the whole period.

**Chairman:**

We are talking about HACTL. Mr CHEUNG Wing-sum?

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

One very quick question, Madam Chairman. In respect of contingency plan, have you made previous arrangement before AOD for the re-opening of Kai Tak for the neighbouring airports to support the import and the export of air cargo? Had that particular arrangement been done before AOD, and that is exactly what we call the contingency plan that has been operative after AOD?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes. I think to answer that question generally is that it was HACTL's decision to move their entire operation to airport immediately prior to AOD. They had the option to talk to Civil Aviation Department and the Lands Group, if they wanted to retain part of their operation at Kai Tak, which they chose not to

pursue. After the difficulties came up, CAD and Economic Services went and talked to the various groups.

**Chairman:**

I think, I think, sorry, Dr TOWNSEND. You have to answer.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

The specific question. Let's not answer it generally. Were this arrangement previously discussed, arranged and planned prior to AOD?

**Chairman:**

'Yes' or 'no'?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It was not arranged. It was done by Government.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

It was done by Government after AOD?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Ambrose CHEUNG Wing-sum:**

So, in other words, there is no contingency plan?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

From that particular point.

**主席：**

李永達議員，你想詢問的事是否與“HACTL”有關？

**李永達議員：**

是關乎我們剛才討論的一個問題。

**主席：**

是否與“HACTL”有關？

**李永達議員：**

不是。

**主席：**

不是？吳靄儀議員，“no more question”？劉慧卿議員。

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

To go back to the 'best endeavours' undertaking. Mr HO talked about monitoring. Did you make any effort prior to AOD to check that HACTL had actually used their best endeavours?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

They certainly were working very hard on it, in my opinion.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

No. best endeavours, to a layman, means 'leaving no stone unturned'.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes. They were making the best endeavours, as you define it.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

How did you check that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Through their efforts in supervising their construction and training and other activities. They were very serious about meeting their commitment.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Did you check with your lawyers to see whether that is actionable? Is there a legal context to 'best endeavours'?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I would have to refer that to the legal representative.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

I asked, did you ask your legal advisers, because even the Financial Secretary raised that. So, you say, "Oh, it's not in the contract. Oh, they gave an undertakings 'best endeavours'", but what I'm asking you is, is it a legally actionable thing, if they say they would do it according to their best endeavours?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I would have to, again, rely on legal advice on that.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Did you or did you not ask for legal advice? I mean, prior to AOD and subsequent to AOD, especially when a number of senior officials have been talking about, you know, seeking legal action? You did not then?

**Chairman:**

I think that, Dr TOWNSEND, you would have to answer Ms Emily LAU whether you, as a party on behalf of the AA to the Agreement which was signed between AA and HACTL, do you understand 'best endeavours' to mean no contractual obligation or 'yes' there is contractual legal obligation. You have to answer that.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It was left at the point of the determination of the Franchise Agreement that it would be.



**Chairman:**

Sorry. That's not good enough. Is it contractually, you know, as Ms Emily LAU says, actionable?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It has.

**Chairman:**

Or is it not?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes. Perhaps I could answer. It has been referred for some time for legal opinion.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

When did you refer it?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Starting at the time, in '95, at the time of the Franchise Agreement, and it's still under review.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Still under review from '95?

**Chairman:**

No, sorry, Dr TOWNSEND. This is totally unacceptable. I mean, you signed the Agreement in 1995 with a completion date which was supposed to be 18 August 1998. You went into a negotiation on the Supplemental Agreement, where you tried to alter the date to July. The opening date failed. Right? So, there must be a very clear understanding of what the contract is saying today on 'best endeavours'.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

And I would have to rely on legal opinion for that.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

I don't think it's good enough, Madam Chairman. First of all, he can provide us with a very simple definition of his understanding of what 'best endeavours' is. Then he must provide us with all the documentary evidence to show that he and management went through all the steps to ensure to their own satisfaction that HACTL had performed according to their best endeavours. That's the second point. The third point is, when you sought legal advice about whether this commitment is actionable because some lawyers may say, even though it's not in the contract, if you go back to cases, you know, you can find people saying they will perform according to their best endeavours. So, I am asking you whether you had done that. I mean, these are very simple, straightforward questions. Can you help this Committee, please?

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND, you have to answer that question.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I would have to. First of all, all of the things that you have mentioned have been followed carefully from the beginning. Including other commitments that have been made by HACTL's management and shareholders, together with this whole situation have been under review for some time, but with the possibility of legal action being undertaken, that, I would have to rely on comments from our legal advisers.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Madam Chairman, I don't think I am getting any sensible answers.

**Chairman:**

I think we'll break here.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

So, Dr TOWNSEND will have to stay? Isn't it?

**Chairman:**

Oh, yes, of course. We'll break here. Conference Room C.

*(The hearing resumed at 11:25 a.m.)*

**Chairman:**

The hearing resumes. 李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

主席，請問董誠亨先生，在7月6日機場發生事故那天，甚麼時候你才開始知道機場的混亂情況；是否有職員通知你，或是你一開始便知道？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes. Early on the evening of the 6th and from the 5th, I was at the Airport site following the relocation exercise, and I was also there early in the morning for the arrival and departure of the first flights. I then went home to shower and have something to eat and other things, and I did receive telephone calls before the 10 o'clock meeting that was held, explaining to me the situation that was occurring at the airport. Of course, it was necessary then. I went back to the airport shortly after, after that, and was there most of that day.

**李永達議員：**

董先生，你何時返抵機場？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Arrive back at the airport?

**Chairman:**

At what time?

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

What time?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It was before noon.

**李永達議員：**

是11時半還是12時？你能否清楚記得是甚麼時間？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I do not know the exact time, but it was before noon time.

**李永達議員：**

你返回機場後，見到當時情況很混亂，你曾作出甚麼即時決定？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes. There were a number of things that were going on at that time, and I was being kept advised by Billy LAM, who was there at the time, as well as Chern HEED, and, so we were aware of it going on, and obviously, again, it was a matter of developing a programme to resolve the situation and get the recovery programme underway.

**李永達議員：**

你作為行政總監，看到機場如此混亂，你當時曾否作出即時決定？舉例而言，你當時有否決定立即使用你告訴專責委員會的後備系統或採取緊急應變措施，使這些不能預見的情況所引致的損害減至最低？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

The senior staff people involved by the Authority and airlines and others were taking action in those areas and were keeping me advised.

**李永達議員：**

主席，董誠亨先生沒有答覆我的問題。董誠亨先生曾向本委員會表示，他認為機場管理局高層管理人員預先知道各個系統（包括“HACTL”、航班資料顯示系統）均設有後備應變系統，而他亦告訴本委員會，這些後備應變系統經過測試，而他亦對這些系統有信心。請問董誠亨先生，他當日在11時多或12時返抵機場後，為何不決定使用這些他認為穩定並經測試證明沒有問題的系統，以期令損害減至最低？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

The staff were implementing the programmes that had been agreed upon, and were trying to recover the situation. The difficulty was in the case of FIDS, for example, which we discussed at some point.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

No, no. Madam Chairman, I am not talking about individual systems. I am talking about the overall chaos that you actually knew after you returned back to the airport at about noon.

**Chairman:**

Yes. Can, can we perhaps put it in more general terms? Maybe Dr TOWNSEND can address the question. What role did you play when you walked into the PTB and you watched the whole thing, you know, building up into a crisis, and we all knew what happened on that day? What role did you play there and then in the face of that crisis?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

There were several things that were required. First is that the parties involved. Again our staff, airlines and others were already beginning to meet and talk about ways to set up in the Airport Emergency Centre and implementing the plans that had been planned, and so we found, at that time, things were going on, and I would generally walk around the Terminal Building to make observations and offer any suggestions I could, but it's really up to getting it to the level of the managers with their hands-on responsibilities on the airport.

**Chairman:**

Who was actually in charge at that crisis? Who was actually in charge and what was the forum?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

The meetings were generally with representative of the Airline Operators' Committee, who had the....

**Chairman:**

No, no, no. On behalf of AA, I am talking about. Who is actually in charge on behalf of AA, when in the face of this crisis? Crisis management, who is in charge?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

There were a number of people. Chern HEED was involved, being responsible for operation of the airport, Billy LAM, Douglas OAKERVEE were involved. Most of us were quite involved in the first day.

**李永達議員：**

主席。據董誠亨先生表示，機場出現危機時，他主要在機場巡視，觀察情況。董先生，你作為行政總監，你是否認為你實際上須負起管理危機的職責，在出現危機時，你須作出決定性的決策，調動資源，並指揮屬下的總監處理各事項，而不是由他們自行作出決定？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Directors, of course, are responsible for their own individual areas, and my role is to co-ordinate them and to give them help when they request it, and so the actual decisions for many of the items that occurred were at the director level of the Airport Authority.

**Chairman:**

How did you co-ordinate them?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

This would be by talking to them personally or through phone conversations that would occur over that period.

**李永達議員：**

主席。我不明白為何董誠亨先生在這階段仍說，你的角色是要等待屬下的總監向你提出要求及處理方法。你作為行政總監，見到危機出現時，為何不積極及主動地作出協調，謀求解決個別總監的問題或機場內不同範圍的問題，以及處理多個問題所造成的累積影響？正如你所說，很多問題是相關的，並造成累積影響，這些問題並不是個別總監可以獨力處理。董誠亨先生，你是否認為你這種處理手法十分奇特？在機場出現大危機時，若行政總監只負責巡視機場，不主動及有系統地與下屬保持聯繫，謀求解決問題的方法，則你的職位有何作用？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

First of all, again, is that the people had been trained, and many of them had prior experience in operating airports and so they were prepared to take the necessary actions. I might add that my role, in addition to listening to what they were doing, generally concurred with the way in which they were performing their various activities. At the afternoon sessions, we did manage to get together, most of the directors and others, so that we could enumerate exactly what was happening and what actions were going to be required to recover that evening, so that we'd be ready to operate the next day in a much better fashion, which, fortunately, we were able to do.

**Chairman:**

Could you tell this Committee maybe what decisions you personally have taken in that co-ordinating role on AOD?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I think mostly, on my part, is that it was a matter of making sure that they had spoken to the right people, to make sure that the measures had been agreed upon and were being implemented. So this meant very broad consultation amongst the airport community. It was not just one isolated incident.

**Chairman:**

No, but specifically, I mean we knew that things were falling apart and FIDS was crashing and SAS was not functioning and so on and so forth. I mean, can you recall any specific decisions that you have made, or you know, sort-of you have led to make?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

As I indicated, most of the hands-on decisions were being made on a moment by moment basis by the directors responsible for the activities and my role is not to get too involved in their issuing of instructions, but I concurred with what they were doing.

**李永達議員：**

主席。我想提出一個具體問題，這問題可反映董先生有否行使他的權力。根據我們其中一位證人吳其成先生所作的證供，機場啟用當天，處理行李方面的情況十分混亂，他需要大量人手進入機場禁區處理行李，但進入禁區的“pass”或“permit”須由“AVSECO”發出，而該公司又不肯發出通行証。他其後要求董誠亨先生提供協助，但似乎“AVSECO”亦拒絕董誠亨先生的要求。

**Chairman:**

Yes. Do you remember that particular issue that cropped up?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**李永達議員：**

你親自提出的要求亦同樣遭該公司拒絕。該公司拒絕你的要求後，你有否採取任何行動？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We notified the people, and I might add that I did not do that personally. It



went through the organisation and it was conveyed over to the Security Service Providers and our staff that were co-ordinating the issuance of the permits, and it was resolved by the end of that day.

**李永達議員：**

主席。鑑於“AVSECO”的總負責人須向保安局局長負責，請問董先生有否親自致電保安局局長或政務司司長，提出需要採取緊急應變措施？你似乎沒有親自跟進這事。

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We had Dick SIEGEL, who was then Director of Civil Aviation.

**Hon LEE Wing-tat:**

No, no. I am talking about you. Dr TOWNSEND, don't redirect my question. My question is whether you yourself have urgently made a phone call to the Secretary for Security or the Chief Secretary, Mrs Anson CHAN, informing them that you encountered this problem and you needed urgent help to clear this, because it actually needed a lot of labour to the restricted area to clear the deadlock at the baggage handling. Have you done that?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I would feel that that problem was being handled at the airport itself and would not feel it necessary to advise the Chief Secretary.

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND, perhaps we will put it to you that you, in fact, really did not perform the role of a Commander-in-Chief, as you should have done in such a major crisis, which occurred even beyond anybody's anticipation. You have told us time and again that, you know, the problem snowballed and there were a lot of problems which were unforeseen and, you know, things were happening all over the PTB, and you, as Chief Executive Officer of AA, surely would be the Commander-in-Chief that everybody looked to in the AA for overall sort-of leadership. Wasn't it? I mean, instead of your leaving things to your staff?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

But these matters were being handled at the appropriate levels within the Authority and also with the partners.

**李永達議員：**

主席。當天吳其成先生無法處理問題，需要你協助，但你卻無法協助他。在危機出現時，無論是你屬下的高級管理人員還是公眾，均期望你能迅速和積極處理危機、解決問題。你是否認為你在當日未有積極處理這事；你是否未能達到公眾對你作為行政總監的要求；你是否未有負起應有的責任，換言之，你是否失職？

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I do not agree I was in dereliction of duty, and I felt that the responsibilities were being met within the organisation, and, as I have said before, I offered profuse apologies for the incidents that occurred, and I think that we tried our very best under very trying circumstances to recover the airport.

**Chairman:**

Miss Margaret NG, do you want to ask a question?

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Madam Chairman, I think, in fairness to Dr TOWNSEND, we should ask for his comment. Dr TOWNSEND, you put forward the view that, on AOD, when the crisis had occurred, the best thing was to leave things to the director level. That's your view, isn't it?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes, but.

**Hon Margaret NG:**

Your view is to let them go ahead with it. Now, my colleagues have proposed a view to you, that is, you ought to have been hands-on. You ought to have taken over the command of the crisis management. I understand that you do not agree that this is what you should have done. Clearly, that wasn't what

you have done. So, my question would be, can you explain to us why you consider what you did to be the right thing, rather than to take over command personally?

**Chairman:**

Dr TOWNSEND?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I believe that the incidents that were occurring were being handled at the appropriate level, which is quite important, and the directors had their specific responsibilities and authorities within their organisations and they were certainly many of them, particularly in airport operations, better qualified than I am to lead into those decisions, and so they did a good job - in my opinion anyways - in coming up with the way to solve the problems, especially considering that some of them had been unforeseen and that it would not be appropriate for me, as the Chief Executive Officer, to bypass the chain of command in those responsibilities, but I did try to offer assistance and give directions, where necessary, to help facilitate those discussions.

**Chairman:**

Did it occur to you that you should have called an Executive Committee meeting there and then?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

We did have a meeting later that day to get all of us together to discuss more precisely what was happening and to put the recovery plans in place to make sure that, by the next day, we would be in better shape.

**Chairman:**

When, when was that meeting?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

It was in the afternoon.

**Chairman:**

4 o'clock?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Well, 4 o'clock was with the airlines and others. There were some meetings after that to discuss the overall situation and what the problems were, and, of course, in-between times, various members, senior members of the Airport Authority staff were attending and participating in meetings related to their areas of responsibility.

**Chairman:**

No, but, surely, you know, the crisis has actually hit you in the morning. That's when you received the call and you had to rush back. Why did it not occur to you that you needed to summon, you know, all your generals as a first step to make sure that everybody is, in fact, up to the crisis?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I think everyone, again, was aware of the developing situation, especially in the late morning of airport opening day, and, so everyone was working very hard in their areas of responsibility to hold it together, and, of course, they did know how to operate the Airport, so the co-ordination was not that difficult. Now, from hindsight, someone may come to a different opinion.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Dr TOWNSEND, you received an urgent call and came back. Was that what happened?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Yes.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

What time did you receive that call, because you just told us, you went back to the airport shortly before noon?

**Chairman:**

He was called up at ten o'clock, thereabout?

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

What time did you receive the urgent call?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I received the urgent call some time between nine and ten o'clock.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

And you went back immediately?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I went back as soon as I could. Yes.

**Chairman:**

Noon. Noon. He arrived at noon.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Yes.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

I arrived before noon.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

But you didn't tell them to notify you earlier because, looking at the logs, FIDS had problem very early - 6 or 7 o'clock - but you did not leave instructions to your staff to notify you?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

But they knew where to reach me, and, of course, we did have earlier operations. The arrivals/departures went relatively smoothly.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

What was the instruction that you left to your staff?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Well, they know where to reach me 24 hours a day.

**Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing:**

Under what circumstances should they try to reach you?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Whenever a major emergency or other problem arises, and I did get calls from various people advising me of the situation at the airport.

**主席：**

單仲偕議員。

**單仲偕議員：**

主席。董誠亨先生可否向專責委員會提供資料，說明你當日的行蹤、曾處理甚麼事情、與甚麼人會晤。此外，請你現在告訴本委員會，根據你的記憶，在機場開幕當天，你曾作出甚麼指示，以解決當日出現的問題？

**Chairman:**

I have already asked the second question. I don't know whether such a thing exists, but we can put it to Dr TOWNSEND. Do you keep a log of your activities that day?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Considering the situation at the Airport that day, there was no log of my activities being kept.

**Chairman:**

And I think Mr SIN have asked you a second time, you know, whether there are any directions that you issued personally in resolution of the crisis?

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Again, this was a matter of having Project supporting AMD, the contractors supporting AMD and areas of that type. The decisions were being implemented by the directors and the people within their organisations.

**Chairman:**

Right. OK. I think the first session of today's hearing will end here. Dr TOWNSEND, please note that, if the Select Committee considers it necessary to order you to give further evidence, you must attend further hearings. You may now withdraw. Thank you very much.

**Chief Executive Officer, AA:**

Thank you.

(Dr TOWNSEND withdrew from the hearing)

*(The first session of the hearing ended at 11:24 am)*

## **第2節研訊**

**主席：**

專責委員會決定接著先行傳召原本安排在第3段時間出席本會研訊的第3位證人，即赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席鄭國雄先生。在未傳召鄭先生前，我想徵詢各委員的意見。鄭先生要求帶同萬世基律師行

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日  
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜  
專責委員會  
Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances  
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of  
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok  
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

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律師董彥華先生出席研訊。若委員沒有異議，我建議容許董先生在研訊進行期間陪同鄭先生，但他不能在席上發言，或提示證人如何回答委員的問題。

如委員對研訊的程序沒有其他問題，我宣布研訊繼續，並傳召證人赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席鄭國雄先生。

(鄭國雄先生進入會議廳，  
並由董彥華先生陪同。)

鄭先生，多謝你出席今天的研訊。本專責委員會今天傳召你到本委員會席前作證及出示與專責委員會研訊範圍有關的文據、簿冊、紀錄及文件。首先，本專責委員會決定證人均須宣誓作供，我將以專責委員會主席身份為證人監誓。你可以選擇以手按聖經以宗教式宣誓，或以非宗教式宣誓。請依照放在你面前的誓詞宣誓。請起立。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席鄭國雄先生：**

本人鄭國雄，謹以至誠，據實聲明及確認本人所作之證供，均屬真實，及為事實的全部，並無虛言。

**主席：**

請坐。鄭先生，專責委員會已經同意董彥華先生陪同你出席研訊，並在有需要時向你提出法律意見，但他不能在席上發言，或以任何方式提示你如何回答委員的問題。

專責委員會現在處理1998年11月25日發出的傳票命令證人出示的文據、紀錄及文件。專責委員會知悉，證人已根據傳票，提供下列文件：

鄭國雄先生的證人陳述書

鄭先生，你現在是否根據傳票，正式向專責委員會出示上述文件作為證據？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

是。

**主席：**



我現在宣布上述文件獲接納為向專責委員會出示的證據。

除了上述的證人陳述書外，專責委員會希望鄭先生提供你向新機場調查委員會呈交的證人陳述書。你現時是否持有這份文件？

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

主席，哪份文件？

**主席：**

是你先前向新機場調查委員會提交的證人陳述書。若你現時未能向我們提供，可在會後交給我們的秘書。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

我相信我已提交該份文件。

**主席：**

你所提交的文件是向本委員會呈交的證人陳述書。我們希望你能提供你向新機場調查委員會提交的證人陳述書。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

好。

**主席：**

鄭先生，由於今天的研訊時間有限，專責委員會決定暫時不向你提問。我們請你出席12月3日上午9時的研訊，向專責委員會作證。你現時可以退席。多謝。

**赤鱘角停機坪作業聯席工作組主席：**

多謝。

(鄭國雄先生退席)

**(第2節研訊在上午11時30分結束)**

### **第3節研訊**

**主席：**

在未傳召證人，香港機場管理局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理林大志先生之前，我想徵詢委員的意見，林先生要求帶同以下人士出席研訊：香港機場管理局機場管理科機場牌照及運作經理潘漢志先生。如委員沒有異議，我建議容許潘先生在研訊進行期間陪同林先生，但他不可以在席上發言或提示證人如何回答委員的問題。

如委員對研訊的程序沒有其他意見，我宣布研訊繼續，並傳召證人香港機場管理局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理林大志先生。

(林大志先生進入會議廳，  
並由潘漢志先生陪同)

林先生，多謝你出席今天的研訊。本專責委員會今天傳召你到本委員會席前作證及出示與專責委員會研訊範圍有關的文據、簿冊、紀錄及文件。首先，本委員會決定所有證人均須宣誓作供。我將以專責委員會主席的身份為證人監誓。你可以選擇以手按聖經以宗教式宣誓，或以非宗教式宣誓。請依照放在你面前的誓詞宣誓。請起立。

**香港機場管理局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理林大志先生：**

本人林大志，謹以至誠，據實聲明及確認本人所作之證供，均屬真實，及為事實的全部，並無虛言。

**主席：**

請坐。多謝你，林先生。專責委員會已同意潘漢志先生可以陪同你出席研訊，並在有需要時協助你翻查文件，但他不可以在席上發言，或以任何方式提示你如何答覆委員的問題。專責委員會現時會處理1998年11月25日發出的傳票命令證人出示的文件、紀錄及文據。專責委員會知悉，證人已根據傳票提供下列的文件：

林大志先生的證人陳述書

林先生，你現在是否根據傳票，正式向專責委員會出示上述文件作為證據？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**主席：**

我現在宣布上述文件獲接納為向專責委員會出示的證據。

林先生，我現在代表委員會向你提出第1條問題：在機場啟用當天究竟使用“TMS”還是“SAS”的問題，其實早在該日之前已有所決定。請問這個決定是在何時作出？該項決定有何根據？誰作出該項決定？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們在5月曾與“BAR”，即由航空公司代表組成的“Board of Airlines Representatives”進行討論。他們要求盡早向航空公司提供擬議的停機編排。我們在6月評估“TMS”及“SAS”的進度時，發現“TMS”有若干問題尚待解決，不能編排班次，而“SAS”則可處理這項工作。因此，在6月中，我便向韓義德先生建議，我們需要以“SAS”處理編排班次的工作。我們在9月18日向航空公司提供這些資料。

**主席：**

9月18日？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對不起，應該是6月18日。由於在5月，“TMS”尚未能處理編排航班的工序，因此我們才作出這項決定。

**主席：**

你們是否由於“TMS”存有不穩定的情況，因此才決定採用“SAS”作為後備？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

沒錯。

**主席：**

你們是否安排另一個承建商負責裝設“SAS”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

沒錯。

**主席：**

請問你剛才向我們表達的意思，是否指出，在6月時，因為原本作為正式系統的“TMS”不能使用，所以需要使用後備系統，以處理編排停機位的工作，即原先作為後備的“SAS”系統變為正式的系統，而“TMS”則只發揮其中一項功能，是不是這樣的情況？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

正如我剛才提及，在5、6月期間，我們很密切“access TMS”的運作。在6月初，“TMS”的運作仍存有很多問題。有見及此，我們當時認為，在機場啟用當天，不適宜依靠一個未能完全測試成功的系統運作。鑑於“SAS”已能處理編排航機的工序，我們建議把工作分開處理。“TMS”基本上有兩個功能，除處理編排航機的工作外，亦可把有關停機坪機位的資料發放至“FIDS”，而第二項工作必須由“TMS”處理。正如主席剛才所說，我們在6月中認為需要同時以“SAS”和“TMS”處理不同工作。不過，直至6月最後兩個星期，“TMS”的功能已續漸改善。

**主席：**

在當日0600時前，即由7月5日晚至7月6日凌晨，你們有何決定？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

在開幕前一天，“TMS”和“SAS”兩個系統的運作均沒有問題，兩者都已“set up”，7月6日的航班資料在系統內亦可正常地“set-up”。因為當晚會有29班飛機從啟德機場飛到赤鱸角機場，所以我們在7月5日下午已把資料整理妥當；晚上8時，我們根據“SAS”所編配的位置，在“TMS”系統內安排了同樣的停機位；當晚9時後，當飛機開始到達後，我們把航機的資料“input”到“TMS”和“SAS”系統內。直至所有29班飛機抵達赤鱸角機場為止，所有資料都沒有出現任何特別問題。

**主席：**

但在凌晨3時，兩個系統均出現問題？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對。我們在凌晨2時半做了一個“swap function”，即更改航班時，便出了問題。

**主席：**

甚麼問題？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

本地的航空公司每晚都會向我們提供因飛機調動而導致飛機抵港的班次和離港的班次對調的有關資料，我們的“TMS”和“SAS”系統均提供可以進行對調工作的“function”，但由於這個對調的“function”失靈，不能將班次整理正確，以致當日的整體航機編排工作出了問題。

**主席：**

“Flight swapping”這項功能有否經過測試？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

“Flight swapping”功能其實在“TMS”和“SAS”系統內均有經過測試。但就“TMS”而言，在測試時，所有的資料仍是不足夠的。

**主席：**

這是甚麼意思？請你解釋，為甚麼不足夠？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

因為有關飛機“registration”的資料，導致“swap”的操作出現問題，而在進行測試那時，我們尚未有“registration”的資料。

**主席：**

即未經過測試，對不對？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不對，我們曾對“swap”進行測試，但我們當時不知道有關“registration”的資料會影響“swap”的功能。

**主席：**

因為有一部分功能尚未測試，即是說你們沒有百分百測試過該系統。

**李永達議員：**

為甚麼你們事前沒有了解到在加入“registration”資料的“component”後會造成影響呢？你們事前完全不知會有這後果嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們當時不知道。因為，首先這是“IT”，即“technical system”內的一個運作問題，我們作為“end user”、“operator”，對此不是十分了解。

**主席：**

“Flight swapping”的功能不是那時才有的，而是一直都有應用的，是嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

啟德機場的系統亦有提供“flight swapping”的功能。但啟德的系統在輸入“registration”資料後，是沒有問題的。

**主席：**

為甚麼“flight swapping”在赤鱸角機場沒有經過測試？既然這項功能亦與“registration number”有關，為甚麼沒有進行測試？這是“oversight”，即疏忽，還是可以理解的遺漏呢？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

有關“registration”資料的問題，其實“TMS”內的資料分為兩個“components”。“TMS”系統在進行測試時，是以系統本身的“database”資料來進行測試的；但“registration”資料則由“FIDS”的另一個承辦商“EDS”負責。而“TMS”本身是由“EDS”另一個“sub-contractor —— TPG develop”的，當我們測試“TPG”為我們提供的系統，進行“swap”時，輸入“registration”資料這一“part”尚未有功能。

**主席：**

我們想知道誰人應對這件事負責？

**李永達議員：**

主席，可否讓我插言發問，林先生說他是“end user”，他有否堅持進行測試？

**主席：**

不，林先生先回答這件事應由誰來負責？這項功能沒有經過測試，應由誰來負責？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們是根據程序進行，程序中並沒有包括“registration”、“swap”的。

**主席：**

是否在策劃的過程中有遺漏？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

這不是遺漏，我們完全不知道會發生這種情況。因為啟德機場的系統同樣有“registration”，可以輸入資料，但不影響“swap”的功能。

**李永達議員：**

主席。

**主席：**

李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

主席，林先生自稱為用家，從你們的利益出發，測試愈逼真，“stress”

愈大，便對你愈有利，因為你能測試出最多問題。有甚麼因素阻礙你堅持進行“registration swap test”呢？譬如“IT”說不需要進行這項測試，你也可要求他們照樣進行。

**主席：**

剛才林先生已答覆說他根本沒有想過有需要這樣做。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我沒有想過這方面會出現問題，若預先知道，我們當然會堅持進行測試。當然，在事後檢討，我們知道當時應該要進行這項測試，但事前我們完全沒有察覺到這個問題。事實上，在系統內可能有很多資料互有“inter-relationship”，所以我們不會特別刻意研究某項資料會否影響另一項運作，或會產生其他問題。

**主席：**

單就這問題進行討論。何鍾泰議員。

**何鍾泰議員：**

多謝主席。林先生在新機場調查委員會作供時說過，這是一個“poor decision”，即是不佳的決定，應該在啟用前一晚便輸入資料，那麼即晚便會知道有沒有問題。你是不是這個意思？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

你可否重覆問題？

**何鍾泰議員：**

在10月26日，向新機場調查委員會作供時表示，你“did not expect any problem with the routine overnight flight changes into either the SAS or TMS, and agreed that it was a poor decision not to attempt to input the routine flight swap before the night of AOD”，這裏所指的“flight swap”是否同一件事？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對不起，因為剛才……



**主席：**

林先生，你向新機場調查委員會作供時曾被問及，如果你在啟用前一晚把這些資料輸入系統，你便可預早發現這問題，並將問題解決；但你只是臨時把資料輸入，所以這是一個不佳的決定。輸入資料的工作應該在機場啟用前一晚進行，你所說的是不是這個意思？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信如果我們在之前有.....你是說如果在7月5日晚上測試過這項功能，便可發現這個問題？

**主席：**

是的。

**何鍾泰議員：**

請問你當時回答問題時所說的是不是這個意思？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是的。

**何鍾泰議員：**

因為啟德和赤鱘角機場兩個系統並不相同，所以你在事前沒有預計會發生這樣問題。其實這些工作可以在啟用前進行，但你沒有這樣做，那麼，你認為在程序或籌劃上是否有疏忽？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們在6月中旬利用啟德機場的航班資料做了一項測試。“registration”的資料“build-up”方面亦有出現問題。關於航班和飛機的資料，“registration”有另一種方式將這些資料輸入系統內，而輸入這些資料的過程是延誤了很久的。

**主席：**

你在6月時已知道有延誤？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們已經知道輸入資料有延誤。

**何鍾泰議員：**

為甚麼你不提出這事，再進行測試，直至滿意為止？你有沒有向你的上層主管提出這問題？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

沒有。當時“IT”承諾協助我們盡快將資料輸入“database”。

**何鍾泰議員：**

有沒有輸入資料？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

他們後來確有進行輸入，但很遲才辦妥。

**何鍾泰議員：**

所謂遲了，是指甚麼時候？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

在6月底、7月初的數天。

**何鍾泰議員：**

他們當時告訴你，輸入資料後沒有出現問題？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

輸入資料後，“database”內存有這些資料，雖然有了這些資料，但我們仍然不知道這些資料會令“flight swap command”產生這樣的問題。

**主席：**

是。

**吳靄儀議員：**

之後未有機會試驗操作，是嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是的。

**主席：**

何承天議員。

**何承天議員：**

主席，請問林先生，你代表機場方面控制這種運作，你本人在測試方面的角色是甚麼？是否由“IT”進行測試，然後將結果告訴你？抑或是你或你的職員亦有一起監察著測試的過程？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我有派職員監察測試的過程，但主要的安排仍是由“IT”來進行。當然，這是指在“development phase”期間，因為所有與承辦商的聯絡工作和有關任何更改的事宜，全由“IT”負責，我們的角色只是一個“operator”、一個用家。

**主席：**

登記的問題已討論太久，我不想在這問題上花太多時間。

**劉慧卿議員：**

我想跟進剛才副主席的問題，即你在之前一晚沒有把資料輸入系統，這是不是導致機場在啟用當日情況愈來愈壞的原因之一？在事後檢討時，你亦承認這是一項錯誤的決定。在這方面是否有失職呢？如果你有輸入資料，可能都會慢一點，但你卻是沒有輸入。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不，我想可能是有一些誤會。我剛才的意思不是指之前一晚沒有輸入資料，我所指的是在7月4日或7月3日晚有沒有嘗試這樣做，但在7月5日晚上，所有資料均已輸入。

**劉慧卿議員：**

不是的，主席，林先生在10月26日向新機場調查委員會作供時說沒有輸入資料。

**主席：**

“Flight changes”，只是“flight changes”沒有輸入。

**劉慧卿議員：**

“Overnight flight changes”。

**主席：**

即你有輸入資料。但現在說的是“flight swapping”，當晚出現問題的是“flight swapping”。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

請容許我再解釋一次。我們已把有關“flight swapping”的資料輸入“TMS”和“SAS”系統內。但是，當晚我們收到航空公司——國泰和港龍所提供的更改航機資料，正正就是在處理更改航機的資料時出了問題。

**吳靄儀議員：**

何時收到這些資料？

**主席：**

何時收到更改航機的資料？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是在7月6日凌晨1時至1時半左右收到這些資料。

**主席：**

在1時收到更改航班的資料後，你大約在2時便發覺有問題？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們將所收到的資料輸入系統，由那時開始便發現出了問題。

**劉慧卿議員：**

主席，他在那時所說的並不是這樣。讓我簡單地讀一遍，當時，大律師問你：“Did you ever try to input the routine overnight flight changes into either the SAS or the TMS system before the night of AOD?”你回答：“No”。他問：“Why not?”你回答：“We did not expect any problems with that input”。大律師再問：“But of course the simple answer is, if you have never tried to do it, then you do not know whether you will have a problem or not. Do you agree with that?”你回答：“Yes”。大律師問：“Again, would you agree that that was a poor decision not to try, not even to attempt to try this routine flight swap before the night of Airport Opening?”你回答：“I think in hindsight, yes”。

**主席：**

林先生。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不錯，我剛才所說的是，我們沒有在之前——不是在7月5日或7月6日的時候——而是指在這之前，譬如說在7月3日或4日之前，我們沒有進行這項試驗。

**劉慧卿議員：**

我想說清楚的一點是，在之前一天是應該輸入一些資料的，但你沒有輸入；而當時你沒有輸入，是你以為到當天才輸入亦是很容易的，但你在當天進行輸入時，卻已經無法輸入了，由此引伸出問題愈來愈……

**主席：**

對不起，我相信林先生剛才不是這樣說。他說他曾把一些資料輸入

系統。

**劉慧卿議員：**

但他現在承認沒有輸入資料。

**主席：**

不是，且慢，先弄清楚罷。林先生說有些資料已輸入系統內，但“flight swapping”的資料沒有在7月6日凌晨之前輸入，因為當時仍未有這些資料。但到了——即剛才吳靄儀議員所問，他們到大約1時才獲得那些資料。但你問究竟他有沒有嘗試……

**劉慧卿議員：**

不，剛才他說沒有輸入。林先生，請你重覆一遍。

**主席：**

他說沒有輸入，因為未有資料。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

請容許我很快地再一次解釋這個程序。我們在7月5日下午已經把資料全部輸入，從啟德機場飛往赤鱘角機場的所有航班資料、抵達的資料和所有飛機“registration”的資料亦有輸入。這是每天的“routine”運作，國泰和港龍航空公司會向我們提供更改航班的資料，這些資料一般都會在當晚或到了深夜——通常在飛機全部抵達、知道航班的時間後，航空公司會再編排第二天的飛機航班——才能提供給我們。

**主席：**

這些是“routine”的程序，但問題是你有沒有在事前測試過這項功能？你確實沒有進行測試？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對。

**主席：**

有關“registration”的問題，我希望不要再討論下去，因為我們已花了很多時間討論此事。李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

我按時間表發問。當發生問題後，你找專家協助，但問題最終仍未得到解決。我不會再問這方面的問題。在證人陳述書第13段，你說有些資料是民航處“CAD”提供給你們的，你發覺這些資料發放給你們時很慢，情況是否這樣？這是你的證人陳述書第13段，你看到沒有？

**主席：**

即“ETA”。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對。

**李永達議員：**

你在陳述書第9段說民航處的“ETA”資料發放得很慢，在9時和10時都是這樣的情況，“We asked CAD if they could provide such information earlier. They responded that they did not have available manpower to do this.”。請問在這段期間——因為你對這個情況的描述很簡單，這是不是說，由9時開始，向你們發放“ETA”資料的速度已經很緩慢，直至10時仍很緩慢，你們開始向民航處尋求加速提供資料的方法，但他們的答覆是沒有足夠人手做這工作，問題之所以延續兩小時而無法解決，原因是否在此？

**主席：**

林先生，請你解答。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

請容我詳細解釋，“ETA”是有關飛機到港的資料。有其他兩個不同方法可將資料提供給我們：其一是直接由民航處的“AIDB”系統將資料輸送至機管局的“AODB”系統，再轉送到“TMS”的系統，有關資料會自動在系統內顯示出來；若這個系統失靈，還有第二個方法，在民航處有

一個系統，可以把資料直接“send”到我們的“monitor”，“monitor”會直接顯示有關資料。機場啟用當天，由“AIDB send”至“AODB”的“link”在早上出了毛病，故該系統在8時許關閉。另外，大約在7時，“monitor”亦出現資料“freeze”靜止的問題，由於“stand-by”系統失靈，所以我們需要用電話向指揮台詢問“ETA”的資料。在這情況下，如果他們可以在較早時使用“electronic”的方法，我們在飛機抵達前已可收到“ETA”，但因為要用電話查詢，我們要在飛機降落前約10至15分鐘才獲得所需的資料。我所說的緩慢，意思其實是指很遲。在機場啟用當天，整個早上的情形都是這樣。

**主席：**

“AIDB,AODB”和“ACC”，即“monitor display”螢光幕顯示，這兩個系統都同時“down”了，何時才發覺這兩個系統“down”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我知道這系統是在8時30分“down”，因為我們“IT”的同事一直“monitor”着那些資料，知道出現了很多問題，所以他便“isolate”這個系統。

**主席：**

我們看“FIDS log”的“log detail”，這個系統在6時已經“down”了，“AIDB,AODB”在開始時已經“down”了。你可否“confirm”這件事？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我從“IT”同事的資料中知道這個系統是在8時30分“switch off”的。

**主席：**

但根據我們所得有關“log”的資料顯示，這個系統根本是在開始運作時便已經“down”了。

**吳靄儀議員：**

主席，我可否詢問證人，“link down”是否等於他們所說的“switch off”，這可能是指兩個階段。

**主席：**



是這樣嗎，林先生？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

有可能，我不大清楚。因為這方面的運作不屬於我的工作範圍。

**何鍾泰議員：**

我想在此詢問一點，多謝主席。剛才主席已經說過，其實在6時已經無法接收“ETA、ATA、ATD”。當時你有否向你的主管(例如“Mr Chern HEED”)提出任何意見，說應該做些甚麼？你認為當時你可以提出一些甚麼意見？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

當時，如果我們不能使用系統來輸送資料，最快捷的方法便是用電話向指揮台索取資料。

**何鍾泰議員：**

但因為資料不斷積聚，形成“backlog”，始終都是無法趕上，變成積聚的資料愈來愈多。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對。

**何鍾泰議員：**

這個問題其實在開始時已可以察覺得到，是嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不錯，當資料輸送緩慢時。因為當時“IT”正在“check system”，我們當然希望“system”可以“restore”，當時沒有估計到問題會那麼嚴重。

**主席：**

林先生，你向新機場調查委員會作供時說過，其實機場啟用當日有6大問題，例如把資料發放予乘客、航空公司和停機坪的服務，這幾方面都依賴你提供資料，但你根本無法向各方面發放資料。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不錯。

**主席：**

當你發覺到那些系統都已失靈時，你們不是已有一個“contingency plan”——後備應變計劃嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們在“ACC”停機坪控制中心的工作，是要把資料輸入“FIDS”系統，但“FIDS”發放資料是由“IT”及“AOCC”負責。我們的“contingency plan”，是我們一旦無法直接輸入資料時，便需改用電話或“fax”，把資料交予“AOCC”，再由他們發放。

**主席：**

當日出現問題，是否由於你亦不能預先收到那些資料，因為“CAD”的“ETA”的資料來得緩慢？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**主席：**

因為資料供應緩慢，你們亦不能把資料發放予“AOCC”，情況是否這樣？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

有關“ETA”方面的情況，你說得不錯。在12時左右，指揮台已“set up”至可將“ETA”“fax”給我們。指揮台是直接“fax”給我們和“AOCC”的，因為“ETA”的“dissemination”發放是由“AOCC”負責的。我們在“ACC”那裏很需要使用這些資料來安排飛機的停泊。

**主席：**

停機坪的資料全部由你負責，對嗎？為乘客提供資料的便是

“AOCC”……

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是。你說的是停機坪……我說的是向其他地勤公司和航空公司提供資料的工作，這些都不是由我負責的。

**主席：**

這是在調查委員會作供時說的，你說是由你安排所謂“stand allocation”。我們現在不是討論“ETA”，我們是指“stand allocation”，即你所做的工作，你所做的工作的資料，你當時說出現了一個很重要的問題，就是說有關你所做的工作的資料，在發放予乘客、飛機公司和“ramp service operators”(即“ramp handling operators”)方面出了問題。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

這是對的，你說我們所做的工作，我的意思是說，我們在“ACC”需要“input”輸入……

**主席：**

不是，這是說你自己所做的工作，你自己所做的工作，發放出去的那些……

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們所做的工作，其實是……

**主席：**

“Stand allocation”

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

“Stand allocation”，即我們“assign”飛機停泊位置的功能。

**主席：**

那方面的功能緩慢。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

但那項功能都要依靠“FIDS”發放予所有“user”。

**主席：**

李永達議員。

**李永達議員：**

請問林先生，你剛才說指揮台大約在12時才用“fax”將航班資料傳送給你及另一個地方。其實開始出現問題時，我們的“log”顯示“FIDS”大約在6至7時便“down”了……

**主席：**

0600 hours。

**李永達議員：**

你說在8時許關機，為甚麼由8時許關機，至9時你知道資料輸送緩慢，要到12時才用“fax”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是。我所指用“fax”，是當時我們曾多次與指揮台接觸，相信是因為指揮台亦有人手的問題，他們直到那時才可把資料“fax”給我們，而他們“fax”給我們的資料，可早些提供“ETA”的資料給我們。

**李永達議員：**

林先生，我不否定你的意見，用“fax”較以電話或其他形式快，因為電話線路亦可能會“jam”，請問用“fax”是由你建議，還是由“CAD”決定？為甚麼會那麼遲，為甚麼不可以早一些？當然，早一些用這個方式，正如副主席所說，即使未能完全處理積聚的資料，亦可以較快地處理。

**主席：**

林先生。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信這不是用電話抑或“fax”那種方法可以較快的問題。主要是用“fax”可以提供更多資料給我們。

**主席：**

不是，李永達議員是問你為甚麼那樣遲才用“fax”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

這方面我不能解答。

**李永達議員：**

你有沒有要求他們用“fax”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

有。我們當然有要求他們盡快提供資料。

**李永達議員：**

你在何時提出要求？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們約在9時已向他們提出。

**李永達議員：**

9時提出要求，在12時才“fax”資料，究竟中間發生了甚麼問題？為甚麼需要用這麼長時間來“fax”呢？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

讓我稍作補充罷。問題不是他們將15分鐘後需要降落的飛機資料“fax”給我們，我們用電話都可以收到那方面的資料，那不是最大的問題，而他用“fax”可以提供的資料，是飛機抵達前半小時或再早一些便可以提供給我們的。

**主席：**

李永達議員的問題是，既然系統在9時已經不能運作，為甚麼不能立即用“fax”來處理資料輸送的問題。

**李永達議員：**

林先生，我想你亦同意“fax”可以令你們早些取得資料，對你的工作，對整個系統都很方便。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們當然很想可以早些、快些取得資料，但指揮台亦有他們的困難。

**主席：**

你的意思是這問題不是你可以解答的，可能只有“CAD”才能解答。總之他們是在12時才開始將資料“fax”給你。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是的。

**李永達議員：**

你同意用“fax”這種方式對你的工作有幫助。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

無論用“fax”或電話，我們最主要是取得資料，但我們需要盡早取得資料。

**主席：**

吳靄儀議員。

**吳靄儀議員：**

我想先將事實弄清楚一點。當“Monitor”失靈後，你便開始用電話求助，但指揮台很遲才把資料提供給你，即使你很早使用電話聯絡他

們，他們亦是很遲才把資料提供給你，是這樣嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是的。因為……

**吳靄儀議員：**

不用解釋，是這樣嗎？

**主席：**

我們想知道事實。

**吳靄儀議員：**

我只想了解當中的“chronology”，你可以在稍後再作解釋。你用電話聯絡指揮台，但他們很遲才給你回覆，直到航班抵港前15分鐘，他們才能給你提供資料，是嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是的。

**吳靄儀議員：**

這與用電話或傳真是否有關係呢？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信用電話會更快，因為傳真要寫下來，寫了之後才“fax”給我們。

**吳靄儀議員：**

其實指揮台一直以來都可以隨時傳真給你，並非機件有故障，是嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是。

**吳靄儀議員：**

為甚麼到後來用傳真時又會快一些呢？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我想解釋清楚，其實我們並不是快了點，而是早一些取得資料。

**吳靄儀議員：**

為甚麼當時可以早一些？譬如他們一知道後，當你致電給他們時便應該立即將有關資料告訴你，為甚麼他們沒有即時告訴你，而是“hold”着資料，要稍遲才告訴你呢？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信他們不是“hold”着資料，正如剛才主席所說，我不能代指揮台回答這個問題。

**劉慧卿議員：**

關於電話的問題，在證人陳述書第16段，你說電話系統的狀況亦非十分理想，我想這是由於有太多人使用電話。但剛才你又說曾通過電話來索取資料，但指揮台卻不能提供資料給你。請問其實是不是電話線太繁忙？

**主席：**

電話可否駁通？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

在機場啟用的當天早上，電話線相當繁忙，我們的電話除了“PABX”外，還有4個後備電話，所以我們有足夠的電話可以打出。

**主席：**

你說的是“trunk mobile radio”？你是否指“TMR”？



**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是“TMR”，而是另外的由電話公司提供的電話。

**劉慧卿議員：**

為甚麼你在這段中說電話接駁不通，但現在又說有足夠的電話可供使用呢？引述其中一句“However, it was not always possible to do this in a timely fashion due to heavy loading of telephone calls”，這段說話令我以為電話線路太繁忙，以致你在使用時沒有足夠的電話線路。其實情況並非這樣，而是證人陳述書所寫的不正確，是嗎？

**主席：**

讓證人解答。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是。這是說當我們致電其他公司時，很多時候無法與他們接通。例如當我們想通知一間航空公司或地勤公司有關班次應該放在甚麼位置時，電話無法與他們接通。

**主席：**

這是你向別人提供資料，不是我們剛才所說的“ETA”資料，那是由“CAD”提供給他們的。

**劉慧卿議員：**

即是說，你要打電話到外面是可以的，有足夠電話線路供你使用，但你卻無法接通航空公司的電話，因為他們的線路很繁忙。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是的。

**劉慧卿議員：**

並非你本身的電話線不敷應用，這方面的準備是充足的？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是電話線不足，我們有足夠電話線路。

**主席：**

你向新機場調查委員會作供時說，到11時30分，情況已經很混亂，很多航班延遲抵達，但你們又沒法安排他們進入“stand”。直至1時，全個停機坪已經滿了。你可否解釋，這是否你不斷向“CAD”要求早些取得資料以分派“allocation”的原因？但指揮台不能提供資料給你，致令飛機滯留在停機坪內，情況是否如此？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信不單是索取“ETA”資料的問題。當天早上11時許，我們雖然不能用系統發放資料，但我們亦有盡量打電話通知航空公司和地勤公司去“接機”和“做機”，但我相信基於有其他問題出現，早上有部分飛機“delay”，不能按原定時間離港。

**主席：**

離港還是到港？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

離港。

**主席：**

這可能是雪球效應。你不能讓飛機離開，造成飛機滯留在停機坪內，是嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對的。這不是我們不讓飛機離開，可能是乘客或行李亦出了問題而需要等候，令航班要延遲離港。因航班需要延遲離港，直到11時，當來港的航班到達時，原本安排到港航班停泊的位置便不能照原定計劃提供給這些航班使用，而需要更改位置。我們在飛機停泊位置的安排上有“criteria”，我們希望盡量安排飛機停泊在接近其所屬航空公司運作的一區。我們發覺在這方面愈來愈難辦到。到1時，我們發覺停機坪的空位

所餘無多，以致飛機到港之後，出現停下來等位的情形。

**主席：**

你在10月26日向新機場調查委員會作供時說，平日一天約有10至20次“flight changes”航機改變，但當天卻有60至70次。這種改變，是因為你剛才所說航班的互相延誤而造成的雪球效應，還是不知道是甚麼原因導致航班比平日多出6至7倍那麼多的改變？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

這是“vicious circle”，即雪球效應，因為原本編排的飛機停泊位置，正如我剛才所解釋，那些飛機不能到達，但當飛機到達之後，我們亦有可能、甚至乎將預定的位置再改，曾經有一些情況，是飛機的位置需要連續更改兩次或以上，因為當停機坪滿了，便惟有視乎有哪一架飛機可以離開機場，然後安排另一架飛機停泊，一如“car park”泊滿的情況。但停機坪的“layout”令致出現更大困難，例如有些飛機在一邊等候時，騰空的停機位卻在另一邊出現，飛機便不能駛進去，因此，當日的確出現了很大的困難。

**主席：**

你向新機場調查委員會作供時說，國泰航空公司在事前沒有表示過會“轉”60至70次，你的意思似乎是說國泰為甚麼“轉”得這麼多，其實情況不是這樣？是抑或不是？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我不明白你的問題。你說“轉機”的“轉”，是指“swap”飛機的“轉”，還是當時飛機抵達後要“轉機”呢？

**主席：**

“Flight changes”。

**何承天議員：**

再看看那一段罷。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

“Flight changes”。

**主席：**

是的。當日在10月26日……

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對不起，因為我手上沒有那份“live note”。

**主席：**

不要緊，我讀出來罷，因為各位委員可能也沒有。“On AOD, or the night before AOD, Cathay Pacific never advised that there were going to be sixty to seventy aircraft changes later that day. All that we are talking about is the daily movement plan that Cathay Pacific routinely files.”你說：“I agree with you.”他說：“There never was a problem of inputting sixty to seventy flight changes. There never was a sudden surge of flight changes being advised by Cathay Pacific in the late hours of the 5th and early morning of AOD. All Cathay Pacific was doing was submitting its daily movement plan in accordance with agreed routines”。到底那60至70次的“swap”，是國泰的問題，抑或不是他們的問題？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

這不是國泰的問題。國泰要調機的數量，我們的“system”應該可以接受，而工作程序亦可以接受。

**主席：**

換言之，不是國泰航空公司出現問題，而是上述的雪球效應和其他的問題引致這60至70次的航班轉變。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對。

**劉慧卿議員：**

林先生，對於當天發生的問題，你是否認為完全無法預計？發生問題的時候你是否同樣感到很愕然？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是的，因為我沒有估計到會有那麼多問題同時出現，而造成那麼大的影響。

**劉慧卿議員：**

但系統本身出現問題，你卻是可以預計到的？到那裏的時候是否已經“心大心細”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們在6月時仍對“TMS”存有懷疑，但到機場啟用前的最後兩星期，這個系統是可以運作的。在機場啟用前一晚，當飛機抵達赤鱸角機場時，輸入資料的工作沒有出現問題。我相信這是因為其他資料的發放，以及剛才所提的6個原因等，各方面同時發生問題，所以造成這樣大的混亂。

**劉慧卿議員：**

故此，你事前並未預計過一旦有甚麼問題發生，你們會如何應付，你在事前完全沒有考慮過應變計劃？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是，我們的每一個系統均有一套應變計劃，但全部系統失靈的整體應變計劃，我們確是沒有。

**主席：**

當時是否全部系統失靈？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是。

**劉慧卿議員：**

但你剛才說有應變計劃。所以李永達議員問你為甚麼要等待至12時才用傳真傳送資料。如果你有應變計劃，當8時至9時出現問題時便可立即應變。我們在這方面不是十分瞭解，請你向我們解釋某個系統有甚

麼應變計劃，可以立即進行補救。要經過數小時才作出的措施，算是甚麼應變計劃？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

例如剛才說的“ETA”，主系統如果壞了，我們應該仍然可以從“monitor”取得資料，當“monitor”的資料也不能取得時，我們便要靠電話傳真。

**劉慧卿議員：**

我們也明白，但為甚麼需要等那麼多小時？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是很久。

**劉慧卿議員：**

你是說這方面你無法回答？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**劉慧卿議員：**

但你是負責應變的。

**主席：**

這是你負責的範疇。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是，不錯。

**劉慧卿議員：**

為甚麼你無法回答？

**主席：**

其實是不是你完全沒有想過有這樣的“scenario”？

**李永達議員：**

不，我覺得劉慧卿議員問得對。我想跟進劉慧卿議員的問題，就是當場有些情況，即使你決定不了，你有沒有找上司幫忙？當然，你不能指揮“CAD”，但當你知道有問題，如果有更好的方法去做，對整個機場會有好處。你決定不了，你不能影響對方，便應找上司解決。你有沒有找上司解決問題？或者找他協助？

**主席：**

你有沒有找“Chern HEED”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

有，“Chern HEED”知道那些問題，因為他也有到“ACC”，看到當時的運作。

**李永達議員：**

他甚麼時間到“ACC”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

他在10時前來過。

**李永達議員：**

他在10時前到達，但要到12時才能解決問題，可算很遲。為甚麼要那麼久？你已經用方法找到你的上司。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。我曾與他聯絡數次。

**主席：**

我在這裏再補問一條問題。你在回答新機場調查委員會的時候，曾經說過，在97年11月，你印象中“TMS”可以用“manual input”，即可以用人手輸入。但後來你又得知系統不可以分拆，即不可以“standalone”。為

甚麼會出現這情況？因為現在全部連接起來了，一個環節有毛病，當然會影響全部。如果可以“standalone”，當日的情況是否不致這麼惡劣？你最初知道可以獨立運作，到何時才知道不能獨立運作？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

首先，我們當時相信系統可以獨立運作，可以將資料輸入系統內。直至後期，在12月後，我們才知道不能這樣做。所以我們才打算...

**主席：**

設立“SAS”。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

設立“SAS”。這是很高層的人士所作的決定。另外.....

**主席：**

如果系統“standalone”.....你的意思是，“SAS”已經做了那件事，這件事根本沒有影響，是不是這意思？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不是。“SAS”當日也有問題，我相信“SAS”有問題的理由，是因為在3月最後兩星期才開始找“contractor”設立整個系統，時間太短。

**主席：**

副主席。

**何鍾泰議員：**

主席，我想跟進這點。既然在12月已經知道不可以“standalone”，即是要開始決定是否設立“SAS”，為何直至3月才找承辦商？期間隔了3個多月，是否沒有決定？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

當時我有向上司反映，因為我很關注這問題，但最後要到2月才獲



得批准。

**何鍾泰議員：**

你等了4個月才獲得上司批准，以致後期也沒有時間真正測試“SAS”的可靠性。是不是這樣？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不單只設立“SAS”，那時還要設立“stand-by FIDS”，即整個系統需要有一個後備支援。

**何鍾泰議員：**

即是說，是否設立“SAS”的決定，和是否同時設立“stand-by FIDS”的決定是相關的，因此等了4個月。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**主席：**

兩個決定是相關的？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信決定是在同一份“Board Paper”內，是同時考慮的。

**何鍾泰議員：**

但主席，容許我問，兩者實際上是否有關連？抑或根本可以單獨決定是否設立“SAS”？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

運作來說是獨立的。

**主席：**

你有否用文件向“Chern HEED”指出，現在“TMS”有問題，不能

“standalone”，需要快些制定應變計劃。你說曾數次向上司提出，是否用文件提出？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我在我們的例會中曾經提出。

**主席：**

有沒有會議紀錄？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

有紀錄。

**主席：**

可不可以給我們？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我回去找找。

**主席：**

好的。吳靄儀議員。

**吳靄儀議員：**

主席。我也是問有關應變的問題。如果系統出了問題，那怎樣辦？“TMS”出了問題時有“SAS”，那麼如果最終這兩個系統也出了問題，即“monitor”直接的連繫出了問題，你事前也知道要用人手，是不是？用人手的意思是否用電話？當時是用電話。你討論應變計劃時，是不是已想到利用電話和傳真？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對。

**吳靄儀議員：**

你們在測試和訓練時，已計劃好如果要用電話，應由誰人負責和怎樣處理，要增加甚麼人手，是否這樣？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們當時在“ACC”增加了人手。我們有些管理階層的人員提供幫助。人手會視乎那裏出現問題便到那裏幫忙。當然我們有幾個工作範圍。

**吳靄儀議員：**

即是說當時已不僅作了心理準備，假設系統壞了便會用人手，而且，要動用多少人手、有甚麼補救的方法等也計劃好，是不是？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們是用人手支援的。

**吳靄儀議員：**

如果有人手，當日實際上是否已有那些人手在幫忙？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**吳靄儀議員：**

我不明白你在第13段所說，其實“ETA, monitor displaying information”在7時已經“freeze”了。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**吳靄儀議員：**

那麼你應立即開始用人手操作。為什麼你要在9時、10時，才要求“CAD”早些提供資料，不要在航機到達前15分鐘給你資料？期間發生了甚麼事？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

當日飛機航班由7時起才開始抵達。

**吳靄儀議員：**

在9時、10時前有多少班機抵達？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我現時手頭上沒有那些資料。

**吳靄儀議員：**

是否有很多航班，還是“CAD”很遲才有資料給你？還是越來越遲才給你資料？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

在新機場開始運作的一兩小時後，航班開始增加、問題更加嚴重時開始給我資料。

**吳靄儀議員：**

好的。

**劉慧卿議員：**

有關人手和訓練方面。因為你在10月27日在調查委員會中承認，人員訓練不足。當時大律師問你，你回答說：“Yes, they did not know how to, in other words, they did not have sufficient training in using workarounds”，說的是那系統。我想你解釋，甚麼是“workarounds”，是不是打電話？怎樣才算是訓練不足？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

“Workarounds”純粹是指“TMS”的運作。因為我們所接受的訓練是根據“TMS”早期給我們的“operation manual”進行，但之後他們認為有些運作可以用“workarounds”，“兜圈”用另一方法可以做到。

**劉慧卿議員：**

即怎樣？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

以“flights log”為例，在7月6日那天，“EDS”後來派了一位工程師到來，他找到其他方法，可以……

**主席：**

7月6日之後？我們現在說的是……

**劉慧卿議員：**

他說當日“EDS”的工程師……我是說你們的工作人員學到些甚麼？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

他們學的是根據“operation manual”所載的運作模式。

**劉慧卿議員：**

怎樣做？他們教你們的同事當日如何做？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

很“straightforward”，就是用“command”去做每一個程序。

**劉慧卿議員：**

你在這裏對調查委員會說，他們其實沒有受到足夠的訓練。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

他們在使用“command”方面有足夠訓練，但如果出現問題，不能用“command”去做，要改用另一個方法去做，他們並沒有受過這方面的訓練。

**劉慧卿議員：**

但當日需要那些知識。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

當日因為做不到，要用“兜圈”的方法去做。

**劉慧卿議員：**

他們沒有受過那種訓練。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對。

**劉慧卿議員：**

這方面是否有問題？

**主席：**

等一等。“兜圈”來做的安排在出事當日是否已存在、抑或是當日出了問題，才去找方法“workarounds”？你是否明白我的意思？是哪一種情況？抑或一早已有了“workarounds”，但又不訓練你的同事去做？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我不清楚有沒有，因為這是“EDS”的……

**主席：**

總之你們沒有收到……

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們不知道可以這樣做，如果知道，我們當日當然會做，不需要……

**劉慧卿議員：**

但當日他們的人來到，他們便這樣做。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**劉慧卿議員：**

之前沒有教你們，他們自己來做，所以當日你們做不到。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**劉慧卿議員：**

那你是否覺得有點失望？因為他們訓練你們處理這些情況。當然你會要求我問他們……

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

當然是……

**劉慧卿議員：**

因為你當時說，你自己也覺得你的同事沒有接受足夠的訓練，以應付當時的情況。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

如果需要那“workarounds”的話，他們應該訓練我們，讓我們知道如果出現這類問題時，有另外一個方法可以解決。

**劉慧卿議員：**

你們現在懂得了，對嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

當然，因為我們現在有些程序是用“workarounds”做的。

**主席：**

林先生，我想在完結之前問你兩條一般性的問題。第一，你這裏說

有兩個“SI trial”，即是在5個“trial”中，你們到第4、第5個才參與，第1、2、3個測試你們都沒有參與。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

1,2,3純粹是在……

**主席：**

“PTB”。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

“PTB”方面。

**主席：**

即不是和你的同事一起做。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我的同事也有參與，但沒有飛機到來。第4、5兩次測試是有飛機的。

**主席：**

我想問你，兩個“SI trial”只有很少飛機參與，是否足以訓練你的同事，使他們習慣實況？因為無論如何，這和啟德不同。訓練是否不足夠？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們不將它視作訓練，只不過是確定程序和確保運作良好。其實我們除了那兩次“SI trial”……因為第一次“SI trial”是在5月2日進行，第2次是在6月14日進行，但之後我們還有一次“police exercise”，那次我相信是6月22日。之後國泰安排一架747去測試飛機庫。我們也安排該架飛機到停機坪停泊。在那兩個月內，總共有10次“landing”，亦在停機坪做了14次停泊。還有在7月，國家主席的專機及克林頓有兩班飛機抵達。所以總共有10次飛機“landing”，14次飛機“parking”，我相信所有員工有頗多機會熟習或確定程序。



**主席：**

當日出現問題，你認為是否有部分是人為錯誤？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信這是無人可以……我們也預測不到會出現這麼大的問題。所以……

**主席：**

當日你在場看到情況非常混亂，大家也很關心和擔心。你在觀察時，是否覺得由於工作人員未能熟習工作，引致很多問題，即所謂雪球效應。有沒有一部分是人為錯誤？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信一定有不熟習工作的情況，因為無可否認，在新機場運作的第一天，沒有人會有經驗，所以需要適應當時的情況。但這可能不是一種過失，而是要適應和盡快協調。

**主席：**

這是否導致問題繼續發生的重要原因？因為你所說的6大理由中，沒有提及工作人員不熟習工作。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是，因為工作人員不熟習工作不是一個理由。我相信早已預計工作人員在第一天不會很熟習工作。無論在任何新地方第一天開始運作，總會有些“teething problems”。

**主席：**

還有一條問題。你說操作“airbridges”的工作人員要考牌，但為何會那麼失敗？你又說“auto-leveller”不能運作等等，這些不是全部經過測試嗎？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

那“auto-leveller”確實出了問題，但很不幸，“auto-leveller”的問題在機

場開幕前察覺不到。

**主席：**

是否又是測試不足的問題？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

“Auto-leveller”的問題是，在剛才我提及的14班航班中，有8架飛機在機場開幕前已經試用橋，包括使用“auto-leveller”。但可惜那8班航班並沒有載客和載貨，不需要入油，因此飛機無需進行大幅度的升降，令“auto-leveller”產生功能。但在測試時，我們的工程維修部人員在接收橋的時候，曾檢查過每條橋的“auto-leveller”系統。我自己的同事亦曾再檢查每條橋，包括“auto-leveller”的運作。在7月6日，有幾班機出現這方面的問題，但問題是個別及“random”的“ocurrence”，而不是每一條橋的“auto-leveller”也不能運作。當日也有很多飛機要停泊，但只出現幾個問題。

**吳靄儀議員：**

請問“auto-leveller”是失靈，還是根本是壞了？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們知道了這個問題後，便立即安排承建商進行檢查。他們檢查後，發覺有一個軟件內的時間要再調較，才可以配合飛機的時間。因為如果飛機的高度有改變，例如入油或乘客登機時，那“auto-leveller”是一個滑輪，能感應到飛機的移動，令那條橋同步升降，時間方面需要調較。

**主席：**

完全和操作人員無關？完全是承建商……

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

這是一個自動運作的系統。

**劉慧卿議員：**

我最後想問林先生，在機場開幕前一星期或幾天，你是完全有信

心，覺得沒有問題，即是你沒有在任何情況下向你的主管指出有些事不妥當，感到擔心。你是否完全沒有這樣做？你是否沒有對任何人說過可能會出事？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

沒有。

**劉慧卿議員：**

雖然未經充分試驗，但你有信心不會出現大問題。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

對。

**李永達議員：**

剛才林先生說有十多架次的測試，但林先生你也同意，如果測試整個機場的泊位，用一架飛機測試是不夠的。即使我不懂駕車，但我也可以在闊大的停車場泊車。其實測試的意思，是要有一個比較接近現實的情況，飛機越多越好。其實你在最後兩次“SI trial”用的飛機也很少，最多的一次有多少架？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

最多的一次有3架飛機，因為我們沒辦法做到像平日……

**李永達議員：**

我不是要你做到像平日有幾百架飛機那麼多。我想問你的意見，用3架飛機可否視作測試？等於找3個人駕駛汽車進入有200個車位的停車場泊車，要怎樣泊也可以。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是，所以那“SI trial”的目的，並不是做一個“load test”或者“stress test”，主要是測試個別公司……

**李永達議員：**

那些程序。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

.....他們的程序，例如入油、落貨.....

**李永達議員：**

好了，我知道。所以作為用家的角度，你覺得你是否應爭取一個較佳的測試形式？你剛才說那3架飛機的上落，或者“landing”，其實不是測試系統，亦不是測試“stress”的程度。你作為一個用家，你是否認為不需要？你有沒有爭取過？有甚麼困難，令你做不到？

**主席：**

林先生。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信這會有很大困難。首先你要找很多航空公司，提供很多飛機給你，而這些飛機的運作.....我們基本上能找到的是國泰、港龍，他們是香港的航空公司.....

**李永達議員：**

我想問你是否曾爭取過？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

有的。但.....

**李永達議員：**

每間公司同時派兩架飛機，而不是單在同1天內，而是使10多20架飛機一起飛來。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我們與“Chern HEED”……是曾經爭取過多一些飛機飛來。

**李永達議員：**

但不成功。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

是。

**主席：**

我想補充一個問題。關於“stress test”，“load test”，當然如果有“live load”是最好不過，但即使沒有“life load”、“stress and load test”也會有“simulated load”，或者有其他的“test”可以做。有沒有做那些“test”？“stress and load test”，不是“actual load”的，不是“real load”，有沒有做？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

如果是測試停機坪的運作，我們沒有做。

**主席：**

是否應該做？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信那不是十分重要，因為每一班航機來到，有一組人去做。我相信當時的問題不是因為沒有進行“load test”而發生，主要是因為不能發放航班資料……

**主席：**

但你剛才對我們說，“airbridges”測試時的情況和實際情況有分別，因為多了人和行李等等。

**吳靄儀議員：**

不是的，主席。不是因為有多少架飛機的問題，而是……

**主席：**

我現在已經不是說有多少架飛機，我現在是說每一個“airbridge”……

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

每一個“airbridge”，不錯。

**主席：**

當你測試的時候，有沒有這些“test”，例如“stress and load test, reliability”。即一定有一個“list of tests”的。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

不錯。

**主席：**

是不是已經全部測試過？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

這些已經全部測過。

**主席：**

全部已經測試過？

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

我相信已經全部測試過。好像剛才所說的問題，不是因為“load test”的問題，換言之不是要放很大的“load”……而是“software”有一個“bug”，而這個“bug”很“random”，不是每一次也能夠找到。

**主席：**

好了。今天的研訊到此為止。林先生請你注意，如果委員會認為有需要命令你進一步作證，你要再次出席。現在你可以退席。

**機管局機場管理科飛行區運作總經理：**

多謝。

立法會調查赤鱘角新香港國際機場自1998年7月6日  
開始運作時所出現的問題的原委及有關事宜  
專責委員會  
Legislative Council Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances  
leading to the problems surrounding the commencement of the operation of  
the new Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok  
since 6 July 1998 and related issues

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**主席：**

謝謝。我們到會議室C。

**[研訊於下午1時12分結束]**

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