Legislative Council

LC Paper No. CB(1)1207/98-99
(These minutes have been
seen by the Administration)

Ref: CB1/PL/EA/1

LegCo Panels on Environmental Affairs and
Planning, Lands & Works

Minutes of joint meeting held on
Friday, 5 February 1999, at 10:45 am
in Conference Room A of the Legislative Council Building

Members of the LegCo Panel on Environmental Affairs

Members present :

Hon Christine LOH (Chairman)
* Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai, JP
Prof Hon NG Ching-fai
Hon Bernard CHAN
Hon CHAN Wing-chan
Dr Hon LEONG Che-hung, JP
Hon Mrs Sophie LEUNG LAU Yau-fun, JP
* Hon WONG Yung-kan
* Hon LAU Kong-wah
Hon Mrs Miriam LAU Kin-yee, JP
Hon LAW Chi-kwong, JP

Members absent :

Hon HUI Cheung-ching (Deputy Chairman)
Hon YEUNG Yiu-chung
Hon CHOY So-yuk

Members of the LegCo Panel on Planning, Lands & Works

Members present :

Hon Edward HO Sing-tin, JP (Chairman)
Dr Hon TANG Siu-tong, JP (Deputy Chairman)
Hon HO Sai-chu, JP
Hon James TO Kun-sun

Members absent :

Hon LEE Wing-tat
Hon Ronald ARCULLI, JP
Hon LAU Wong-fat, GBS, JP
Hon Andrew CHENG Kar-foo
Hon TAM Yiu-chung, JP

* also a member of the LegCo Panel on Planning, Lands and Works

Public officers attending :

For agenda item II

Mr CHAN Wing-sang, JP
Deputy Secretary for Works (Works Policy)

Mr HU Man-shiu, JP
Director of Water Supplies

Mr CHEUNG Tze-leung
Chief Chemist (Water Science Division)
Water Supplies Department

Mr KWONG Hing-ip
Chief Assistant Secretary for Works
(Technical Services)

For agenda item III

Mr Gordon SIU
Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands

Deputy Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands (Environment)

Mr CHAN Wing-sang, JP
Deputy Secretary for Works (Works Policy)

Mr J Collier, JP
Director of Drainage Services

Mr Benny Y K WONG
Assistant Director (Waste & Water)
Environmental Protection Department

Dr Malcolm BROOM
Principal Environmental Protection Officer
(Water Policy)
Environmental Protection Department

Mr Danny TSUI
Principal Assistant Secretary for
Planning, Environment and Lands (Environment)

Mr HON Chi-keung
Chief Engineer
(Strategic Disposal Scheme Division)
Drainage Services Department

Mr KWONG Hing-ip
Chief Assistant Secretary for Works
(Technical Services)

Clerk in attendance :

Miss Odelia LEUNG,
Chief Assistant Secretary (1)1

Staff in attendance :

Ms Pauline NG,
Assistant Secretary General 1

Mrs Mary TANG,
Senior Assistant Secretary (1)2

I Election of Chairman

Hon Christine LOH was elected Chairman for the joint meeting.

II Quality of Dongjiang water
(LC Paper No. CB(1)837/98-99(01))

2. Mr LAU Kong-wah said that he understood that the quality of Dongjiang water had been discussed by the Hong Kong - Guangdong Environmental Protection Liaison Group but the paper provided by the Administration did not contain information on the discussion. He queried whether it was worthwhile to construct a closed aqueduct if contamination of the source water from nearby factories remained unresolved. He enquired if the Administration had discussed the matter with the Guangdong authorities and had any long term plan to improve the quality of Dongjiang water.

3. The Deputy Secretary for Works (Works Policy) (DS/W) affirmed that the Hong Kong - Guangdong Environmental Protection Liaison Group had looked into the problem of quality of Dongjiang water. The Guangdong authorities had stepped up enforcement actions against pollution along Dongjiang. Over a hundred factories along the upstream of Dongjiang had since been closed down. A number of applications for setting up developments with potential polluting activities had been turned down. DS/W stressed that the current quality of raw water from the main stream of Dongjiang at the intake point was graded as meeting the national standard Class II, which was considered acceptable. It was not appropriate to compare untreated Dongjiang water with fully treated water, the quality of which was governed by World Health Organization drinking water quality guideline values.

4. On the measures taken to ensure the quality of water supplied, DS/W said that apart from strengthening control and enforcement against pollution, the Guangdong authorities had implemented a series of improvement measures before the completion of the closed aqueduct. These included constructing sewage treatment plants along the open aqueduct and a nitrification plant at the inlet of Shenzhen Reservoir. The Administration believed that these measures, together with the construction of a closed aqueduct, would solve the water quality problem effectively in the long run. DS/W was confident that the closed aqueduct would be completed on schedule in 2002.

5. Mr LAU Kong-wah queried the need for the closed aqueduct if the quality of existing Dongjiang water was considered acceptable. The Director of Water Supplies (D of WS) explained that with the rapid urban development in Southern Guangdong, pollution would get worse. To avoid contamination from distributory rivers of Dongjiang, it was necessary to protect the water quality through the construction of a closed aqueduct. The Administration trusted the Guangdong authorities to control pollution and enforce legislation to protect the water quality.

6. Mr LAU Kong-wah sought clarification of the basis on which the Administration trusted the Guangdong authorities to prevent deterioration of water quality. He pointed out the ongoing industrialization in areas along Dongjiang, such as Dongguan. He queried how the Administration could monitor the matter given that meetings with the Guangdong authorities were held only once a year.

7. DS/W said in response that the Guangdong authorities considered economic interest only in the past but were now more environmental conscious. The Administration was liaising not only with the Guangdong authorities but also with the Guangdong Environmental Protection Bureau. The Administration was confident that the Guangdong authorities was committed to the task of improving water quality.

8. On the timetable for carrying out the improvement measures listed out in paragraph 12 of the Administration's paper, D of WS said that the strengthening of control on polluting activities and the construction of sewage treatment plants were ongoing tasks which would continue to be undertaken even after completion of the closed aqueduct. The relocation of the intake pumping station upstream and the construction of a nitrification plants had already been completed. In response to members, the Administration confirmed that Hong Kong would not bear any cost for the construction of sewage treatment plants and would provide information on the plan contemplated by the Guangdong authorities for such provision along the open aqueduct.Admin.

9. Professor NG Ching-fai enquired about the availability of test results to prove that the relocation of the intake pumping station to a few hundred metres upstream of Dongjiang had resulted in improvements in water quality. D of WS said that the intake pumping station before relocation was near a polluted distributory river. The relocation had avoided contamination from this river. DS/W said that the Guangdong authorities had assured the compliance of raw water quality at the intake point with the national standard Class II. The Administration had recently requested the Guangdong authorities to provide information on the quality of raw water before and after the relocation of the intake point which would be made available to members. Admin.

10. Mr James TO sought information on the inclusion of any provisions in the Agreement signed with the Guangdong authorities for the required quality of water supplied to Hong Kong and compensation for non-compliance.

11. DS/W said that the Agreement for the provision of Dongjiang water was signed in 1989. Under the Agreement, water supplied to Hong Kong should be of the national standard Class II. There were no provisions for compensation in the event that the water supplied fell short of this standard. The Hong Kong side could however refuse to accept the water if this was found to be poor in quality and ask for compensatory supply after the water quality had improved.

12. Mr James TO pointed out the need for including compensation provisions in the Agreement as this would provide fiscal incentives for the Guangdong authorities to take active measures to improve the quality of water. DS/W said that it would not be possible for the Administration to amend unilaterally the terms of the Agreement which lasted beyond 2010. Any changes in the terms would have to be agreed upon by both sides. He further advised that when the Agreement was signed in 1989, Hong Kong was then in urgent need of water. The SAR Government might be able to negotiate for better terms when the current Agreement expired.

13. The Chairman enquired about the channel for arbitration should any contracting parties fail to fulfil the terms of the Agreement. DS/W said that the Agreement which was signed between the Governments was very special. The Administration had sought legal advice from the Department of Justice and was told that the Agreement was not subject to the jurisdiction of either Hong Kong nor the Mainland. Members requested and the Administration agreed to provide the legal advice and to consult the Guangdong authorities to release the relevant sections of the 1989 Agreement to members. Admin.

14. Mr HO Sai-chu said that the proposal to purchase water from the Mainland was initiated by the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce to meet Hong Kong's pressing need then. The arrangement had served Hong Kong well all these years. Since Hong Kong had to rely on the Guangdong authorities for the supply of water, the two sides should co-operate with a view to improving the water quality. He enquired if the two Governments had explored long-term measures to achieve this goal, such as by relocating the intake pumping station further upstream if the water quality was found to be unsatisfactory, or identifying new alternatives.

15. D of WS advised that the Hong Kong Government had all along been co-operating with the Guangdong authorities in ensuring the supply of quality water. The initial idea was to resolve the contamination problem through the construction of a number of sewage treatment plants along Dongjiang. However, with the rapid pace of industrialization, consideration had been given to identifying a new water source without contamination. In 1997, the Heyuan authority submitted a proposal to the Guangdong Provincial People's Government to supply water to Hong Kong from Heyuan for the purpose of eliminating poverty. Heyuan was much further upstream and the water quality there was better. Before agreeing to the construction of the closed aqueduct, the Hong Kong Government had requested the Guangdong authorities to advise on the viability of the Heyuan option. At a special meeting on 21 February 1998, the Guangdong authorities provided a written note stating that the Heyuan option was not acceptable. D of WS said that relocating the intake pumping station further upstream was not a long term solution to the water quality problem. The further upstream it was relocated, the lesser would be the water. To tackle water pollution at root, the Guangdong authorities considered and the Hong Kong side agreed that the right way was through legislation and enforcement. DS/W added that the quality of water supplied would be constantly monitored by both Governments. With the completion of the closed aqueduct in 2002, there would be a marked improvement in water quality.

16. The Chairman suggested buying the land along Dongjiang to tackle contamination. D of WS replied that it was immaterial whether or not the land along Dongjiang belonged to the Government. What mattered was the taking of enforcement against polluting activities. With the closure of a number of factories along Dongjiang, pollution was expected to mitigate.

17. Mr LAU Kong-wah had doubts about the effectiveness of the different improvement measures implemented or contemplated by the Guangdong authorities. He requested the Administration to provide the undertaking made by the Guangdong authorities to ensure the supply of quality water and the reasons for rejecting the Heyuan option. Admin.

18. Referring to Annex II to the paper on the quality of Dongjiang water at Muk Wu Pumping Station, Mrs Sophie LEUNG said that the Water Supplies Department (WSD) should set its own objectives on the quality of water supplied, expressed in terms of acceptable limits of physical and chemical parameters. WSD should then work with the Guangdong authorities to achieve these water quality objectives which should be enhanced as times went by.

19. D of WS said that the figures listed in Annex II were average values. The quality of raw water fluctuated and it would be difficult to ensure raw water quality meeting a certain standard all the time. Noting the Chairman's concern about high levels of ammonia, the Chief Chemist of Water Supplies Department (the Chief Chemist) supplemented that there was no standard for ammonia under the 1938 edition of the national standard. The Hong Kong Government had discussed with the Guangdong authorities on the trend of increase in ammonia. The construction of a nitrification plant at the inlet of Shenzhen Reservoir would lower the ammonia content and increase the level of dissolved oxygen in raw water. DS/W said that international standards were available on drinking water only but not on raw water. Suitable measures were taken by individual Government to treat water to meet acceptable standards for consumption.

20. In response to Mr LAU Kong-wah, the Chief Chemist advised that the chance of getting cancer by drinking water was only one in a hundred thousand even if a person consumed two litres of water daily in which suspected carcinogen was present at the World Health Organization guideline value level for 70 years. The concentration of chloroform in the water had never exceeded the World Health Organization guideline values. Members requested the Administration to provide the following -

  1. the test results of raw water at Muk Wu pumping station for the past three years, including the concentration of chloroform in the treated water;

  2. an explanatory note on probable carcinogenic substances present in raw water, including the highest levels found and the number of times where the acceptable limits were exceeded; and

  3. a paper to elaborate on value-for-money of the closed aqueduct.

(Post-meeting note: The information on (a) was provided by the Administration and circulated to members under LC Paper No CB(1)918/98-99)

21. Members agreed that the Panel would further discuss the subject upon receipt of the information.

III Stages I and II of Strategic Sewage Disposal Scheme (SSDS)

The progress of tunnelling works under Stage I of SSDS
(LC Paper No. CB(1)837/98-99(02))

22. With the aid of a visualiser, the Director of Drainage Services (DDS) briefed members on the progress of tunnelling works under Stage I of SSDS, highlighting the salient points of the information paper. He invited members of the two Panels to visit the tunnel sites in order to observe the progress of the excavation works. However, owing to the problems of access and superstition amongst miners who believed that allowing females into tunnel sites would bring bad luck, DDS suggested that only a small group of male members should go at any one time.

23. Responding to Mr HO Sai-chu's enquiry about the progress of litigation against the original tunnel contractor, DDS said the Government called for the forfeiture of the two contracts in 1996 when the original contractor unilaterally suspended works in all the tunnels. This had resulted in major arbitration which had taken some time to proceed. The second preliminary hearing would be held in London in January 1999. The main hearing was scheduled to start in February 2000. A lot of preparatory work was needed on both sides. Hopefully, a decision could be reached by mid-2000. The question of compensation would then follow based on the findings of arbitration.

24. Noting from the information paper that there was "some delay" in the tunnelling works, Mr HO Sai-chu said that it was unclear as to the meaning of "some delay" in respect of each of the tunnels. DDS said that the three completion contractors were working diligently to make up for lost time. The primary cause for the delay was due to the need to replace the vertical mucking systems which were left on site by the previous contractor. Based on the current pace of works, it was estimated that there would be four to eight months' delay in completing all the tunnels. The progress of the remaining works would be determined by actual geological conditions to be encountered. The revised target date for completion of all the tunnels was by the end of 2000. DDS emphasized that whilst time and costs were very important, safety and quality should be the main priority in completing the tunnelling works.

25. Mr CHAN Wing-chan expressed concern about the possibility of further delay in the works and its impact on Stage II of SSDS. He was also concerned about the costs of delay. DDS said that there was no guarantee on the progress of the works as there might be further technical problems. He assured members that there would not be any knock-on effect on Stage II of SSDS. The Administration was confident that Stage I works would be completed well in time before the commencement of construction works for Stage II. As regards the costs of delay, DDS said that the original contractor had filed claims for reimbursement and the present contractors had also lodged claims. If there was further delay which was considered by the contractors to be beyond their control, there would be potential claims. These were normal contractual situations with regard to any major works contracts. The total expenditure for the project would not be known until the works had been completed and the claims settled.

26. Professor NG Ching-fai pointed out that the tunnelling works under Stage I of SSDS should have been completed in mid-1997 under the original schedule. From the start, the project was not considered viable because of the envisaged immense difficulties associated with unforeseen ground conditions. Despite public views against the project, the Administration took on the advice of the consultants and went ahead. The project was now besieged with problems and was branded a "fiasco" by the engineering community. Professor NG said that since the project had been started, the Administration could not turn back but to complete it. But at least, it should make clear to the public the actual difficulties encountered.

27. DDS disputed the statement that the project was a "fiasco". He said that the construction of deep sea sewage tunnels was itself a difficult engineering task. The project was to serve the community for many generations to come. The works involved drilling holes in rocks 130 to 150 metres below the sea. It was unfortunate that the original contractor pulled out the works. The project was now proceeding in full swing by three contractors who were working diligently and making reasonable progress. DDS said that he would be pleased to take members to the tunnelling sites to demonstrate that the engineering works were technically feasible.

28. Given the circulation of rumours in the community about the technical problems associated with the tunnelling works for a while, the Chairman queried why the Administration had not been able to allay these concerns. DDS said that tunnelling works were difficult engineering works particularly when they were performed under great depths. There were residual problems involving replacement of equipment in some tunnels. Technical problems were encountered with the tunnel from Tsing Yi to Stonecutters Island whilst boring through a fault known as the "Lead Mine Pass" fault. The fractured rock in the fault was proving difficult to drill through. Nevertheless, excavating works had been performed safely and professionally. The Administration was looking at ways to make up for lost time. A long core of a thousand metres was being drilled horizontally from Stonecutters Island in an attempt to reveal more about the geological conditions. The current contractors had demonstrated that they could deal with difficult ground conditions. The engineers working for the project were experienced in tunnelling works. They realized the problems and were proud of their works. In fact, one of the tunnels had already been completed two weeks ago. The tunnel in Tseung Kwan O and To Kwa Wan was making reasonable progress. Unfortunately, media reports had only given one side of the story.

29. Professor NG did not accept the Administration's explanations. He pointed out that construction of deep sea tunnels was not the only option available for sewage disposal. It had been indicated clearly to the Administration from the outset that the project would be thronged with problems. He considered that the Administration had obviously made an unwise decision to proceed with the project and was now finding ways to rectify the problems.

30. DDS disputed the view that deep tunnels were not the best solution for sewage disposal. He said that the alternative of transporting a large amount of sewage around the Hong Kong harbour was inconceivable. The other option of higher grade treatment within the harbour had been debated many times. The conclusion of many experts was that it was the way right to go for a centralized sewage treatment system. There were many proven examples overseas which showed that deep tunnels were the right solution for sewage transfer and disposal. He was aware that the Panel had an earlier meeting on the subject with experts from the Hong Kong University who had supported the construction of deep tunnels.

31. The Chairman said that it would not be useful to go back to a decision which had been made years ago. To be forward looking and to allay members' concern about further delay, DDS said in response to the Chairman that the Administration would update members on the progress of the works as frequently as members wished. The Deputy Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands (DS/PEL) added that the quarterly reports on SSDS which were provided to the Advisory Council on the Environment (ACE) could be made available to members for reference.

32. Dr Raymond HO noted with concern the geological problems of the western tunnels and that grouting had to be applied to prevent excessive ground water inflow. He said that the western tunnels would be expected to meet more fault lines when the tunnelling works progressed along North East and South West New Territories. He enquired how the Administration would tackle these geological problems and prevent recurrence of similar problems in future works.

33. DDS said that the Administration would carefully review the methodology for tunnelling through fault lines and the degree of site investigation before embarking on future stages of SSDS. There was not much experience in the world in implementing the technology of boring tunnels at depths of 130 to 150 metres below the sea and under water pressure of 14 bars. The project team was breaking new grounds in grouting against such water pressure in these conditions. It was learning all the time and having success. With the knowledge gained over the past, the Administration would be in a better position to tackle deep tunnelling through rock faults in future.

34. Dr Raymond HO emphasized that more efforts were needed to identify the fault lines. He further pointed out that more specifications about ground conditions and mucking systems should be provided in future tenders as these would have serious implications on costs. DDS said that he shared Dr HO's concern about cost estimates.

SSDS Stage II Environment Impact Assessment
(LC Paper No. CB(1)837/98-99(03))

35. DS/PEL said that the information paper was a follow-up to the Legislative Council Brief (Re: PELB(CR)35/01/05) issued to members following the meeting of the Executive Council (ExCo) on 5 January 1999 in which the first phase of the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) for Stage II of SSDS options was considered. The second phase of the EIA which was looking at site specific impacts of construction would be conducted on the assumption of chemical treatment of sewage enhanced by disinfection with an outfall at east of Lamma Island. It was expected to be completed in mid-1999. The results of the EIA would be reported to LegCo and ACE. The Administration would be working closely with its counterparts in the Mainland, looking ahead at the economic and social development expectations for the Region and considering whether upgrading of treatment levels or constructing a longer outfall would be necessary in the longer term. In order to retain the flexibility to upgrade the system should this be considered necessary, land had been reserved at Lamma Island Quarry site.

36. Referring to paragraph 7 of the paper regarding the preference of the Mainland side for the discharge to be within Hong Kong waters, Mr LAU Kong-wah queried why this not been made known at the earlier Panel meetings when the Stage II options were discussed. From the information provided by the Administration, members were all along under the impression that all the four options were equally acceptable to the Mainland.

37. In response, representatives of the Administration made the following points -

  1. The paper provided to members for the Panel meeting on 26 October 1998 had summarized the discussion with the Mainland experts (LC Paper No. CB(1)354/98-99(01)(a)). It was stated in paragraph 10 of the paper that the Mainland side preferred the option with chemically enhanced primary treatment plus disinfection and an outfall at East or West Lamma;

  2. The decision on the option chosen was made by the Hong Kong side after taking into account the views made by members of the public, ACE and LegCo members; and

  3. After the last meeting with the Expert Group on Sewage Disposal on 30 November 1998, a press release was issued regarding the outcome of the discussion. A number of local newspapers reported the outcome, setting out the stance of the Mainland experts that they would not prefer the discharge location to be within the Mainland waters. The Administration would provide members with a copy of the press release.

[Post-meeting note : a copy of the press release was provided by the Administration and circulated to members vide LC Paper No. CB(1)879/98-99.]

38. Professor NG Ching-fai was of the view that the Administration owed the public an explanation as to why it had not accepted ACE's choice for option 2 for SSDS Stage II, i.e. chemical treatment with disinfection with an outfall in the Lema Channel. DS/PEL said that at the ACE meeting when the choice of options for SSDS Stage II was discussed, considerable differences of views were expressed. The advice of ACE was taken seriously by the Administration. Most of the views were accepted, except their preference for a longer outfall under option 2. ACE had agreed that if option 2 could not be adopted for any reason, a shorter outfall east or west of Lamma (i.e. option 1) could be adopted. The crux of ExCo's decision had been made clear in the information paper provided. The decision took account not only of the Mainland's interests but also the concern about tunnelling issues, since a shorter tunnel minimized risks and provided more certainty of completion within schedule. Given the need for flexibility in future, it made sense to adopt an option which provided a fully functioning treatment system but would not involve any abortive expenditure. The costs for constructing a longer outfall under option 2 might be abortive if it was decided later to introduce a higher level of treatment.

39. Mr CHAN Wing-chan said that he had raised concern at earlier Panel meetings about the Mainland's attitude to those options with outfalls extended into Mainland waters. He had been advised that all the options were acceptable. He considered that members had been misled by the Administration. The Chairman concurred that option 2 should not have been included as an available option in the first place if the Mainland had objected to the discharge location.

40. On Mr LAU Kong-wah's concern about the impact of the selection of option on sewage charges, DS/PEL said that at the Panel meeting on 26 October 1998, the Administration had provided members with an estimate on the expected recurrent costs of the different options and the different approaches in meeting costs. Before consideration be given to financing further stages of SSDS, the Administration would need to look at the whole package of capital and recurrent expenditure for all the sewage works throughout the territory. The community had to be prepared to accept the long term recurrent expenditure needed to support the programme as well as the capital expenditure. While the Administration did not have a firm time-table yet, it was expected that an overall package could be submitted to LegCo within this year so that members would have time to discuss the proposal before considering the major capital financing items.

41. Referring to paras 3(b) and 7 of the paper, Mr LAW Chi-kwong noted with concern that further studies might have to be undertaken to establish the need to upgrade the level of treatment or to construct additional or longer outfalls. He said that the marginal costs would be comparatively less if all the upgrading works could be done at one go. He was also concerned about the flexibility for upgrading the system given that the land required for different options varied greatly.

42. DS/PEL said in response that the real issue with upgrading was that the environmentally acceptable options would not be able to meet requirements on total inorganic nitrogen. Denitrification would be required in order to meet this requirement. The Administration was aware of the issue of costs. In considering the option for Stage II, it was noted that the option selected would not involve any abortive expenditure if further upgrading to the system was needed subsequently. The works to be undertaken now were to meet the present requirements. Further studies would focus on long-term strategies, taking account of population growth, economic development pattern, and regional development. It was necessary to develop regional cooperation with the Mainland to address the problem of water quality. DS/PEL assured members that the whole Lamma Quarry site had been earmarked for potential use by SSDS and there should not be any problem about the availability of land for upgrading the system should this be considered necessary.

43. Professor NG sought clarification on whether the Administration had decided to proceed with option 1 or to carry out a detailed EIA on option 1 only. He was concerned about the steps to be taken by the Administration should the EIA studies reveal that option 1 would result in unacceptable environmental impacts. DS/PEL said in response that it was necessary to make a choice out of an initial range of options for detailed examination. It would not be cost effective to conduct detailed EIA studies on all the four options. EIA was a statutory process. The outcome of the EIA studies would be subject to the scrutiny by ACE. If the results indicated that environmental requirements could not be met, the Administration would definitely give regard to such findings. Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands affirmed that the Administration had only decided to conduct detailed EIA studies on option 1. The outcome of the EIA studies would be reported to the Panel. He assured members that if the EIA studies revealed that the option was environmentally unacceptable, the Administration would reconsider the matter.

IV Any other business

44. There being no other business, the meeting ended at 12:45 pm.

Legislative Council Secretariat
26 April 1999